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Abstract:  
Towards a Global Ethics:   The Debate on Nanotechnology in 
the European Union and China 
 
The primary aim of the thesis is to assess whether ethical governance of Science 
and Technology is feasible as a global approach, using the example of 
nanotechnology.  
The thesis firstly compares ethical issues identified by stakeholders in China 
and the EU relating to the rapid introduction of a potentially transformative 
technology, namely nanotechnology.  Part One of this thesis explores how the 
‘narratives’ of nanotechnology differ in each region, particularly given their different 
bioethics contexts, and examines how specific concerns translate into policymaking.  
In questioning whether Eastern and Western approaches to nanotechnology 
governance can be aligned, one can observe that Europe is increasingly co-
operating and competing with China.  Such new interdependences between global 
actors require new global approaches to S&T policy, including ethical governance. 
 Part Two of this thesis explores the concept of ‘global ethics’ and discusses 
the feasibility of a global approach.  Given criticism of both universalism and 
relativism, it is often argued that a universal approach that takes sufficient account of 
local context cannot be developed.  
On the assumption that global ethics are achieved by global actors, this 
thesis looks at global agency.  
The thesis connects discourse ethics and participatory Technology 
Assessment (pTA), arguing that a version of Habermasian discourse ethics can 
provide a theoretical framework for dialogue between West and East. Discourse 
ethics has developed around Habermas’s argument that social order depends on our 
capacity to recognize, through rational discourse, the intersubjective validity of 
different views.  Habermas asks the basic question of global ethics, of how different 
views (particularly of social order) can be universally recognized and agreed, 
perhaps within an 'ideal community' of communication, one that may be global. 
 The thesis adds to Habermas’s discourse model, utilising virtue ethics as well 
as the work of, for example, Taylor, Beck, Korsgaard and others on identity 
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formation.  It is argued that the significant factor in global ethics is the formation of 
the agent’s moral identity, the formation of which requires one to go beyond one’s 
context, to achieve an intercultural personhood.  Habermas (as do Taylor, Beck and 
others) suggests identity as a dual concept, reflecting an interdependence of society 
and one’s inner self.  This would mean that one can understand the cultural biases 
inherent in any act of communication, while acting autonomously of such bias.  
If such a model of dual identity/agency can be applied to the intercultural 
dialogue on the governance of nanotechnology between East and West, it could 
potentially provide a new tool or model within pTA.   
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Introduction: Towards a Global Ethics?  Science & 
Technology Policy for Nanotechnology 
 
 
Now nanotechnology had made nearly anything possible, and so the cultural role in 
deciding what should be done with it had become far more important than imagining 
what could be done with it.1 
 
Our stubborn egocentricities lead us to believe that the world must be run according 
to our own templates; that all would be well with the world if only it were populated 
with people like us.  But our dehumanised apprehension of the familiar points directly 
to the resolution.  Only when we come to understand, or even just acknowledge, 
each other’s complexities can comprehension begin.  Only when we apprehend each 
other as human...will the world begin to make sense.2 
 
 
Nanotechnology has been described as equivalent to the development that kick-started 
the industrial revolution;3 as a potential road to salvation for developing counties dealing 
with issues of energy production, agricultural productivity enhancement, and water 
treatment;4 but also as a Faustian bargain that may yet lead to global destruction.5  
Although at present nanotechnology is used in a variety of products, ranging from skin 
creams and food packaging to longer-lasting tennis balls and warmer socks, its potential is 
as yet undefined (solar power for all!  A cure for cancer! Nanobots!), leading to both 
utopian hype and dystopian dread.  Is it a form of miraculous engineering, a universal 
nostrum, or a terrifyingly vague science that may ultimately reduce the universe to ‘grey 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Neal Stephenson, The Diamond Age (London: Viking, 1995) p. 31. 
2 Waleed Aly, People Like Us. How arrogance is dividing Islam and the West (Sydney: Picador, 
2007), xviii. 
3 Alexander Arnall, Future Technologies, Today’s Choices (London: Greenpeace Environmental 
Trust, 2003), at <http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/MultimediaFiles/Live/FullReport/5886.pdf.>.  
4 Joachim Schummer, ‘The Impact of Nanotechnologies on Developing Countries, in Fritz Allhoff, 
Patrick Lin, James Moor, John Weckert (eds.), Nanoethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of 
Nanotechnology (Hoboken: Wiley, 2007),  291-307; also Andrew Jamison, ‘Can Nanotechnology Be 
Just? On Nanotechnology and the Emerging Movement for Global Justice’, NanoEthics 3 (2009), 
129-136.  
5 Bill Joy, ‘Why the future doesn’t need us’, Wired, April 2000, 238-62, at 
<www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html>. 
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goo’?6  Or is it simply a new line of research that has already proved disappointingly 
unable to live up to its potential?7 
The facts are that nanotechnology will affect our lives (as indeed it already does 
through products available on the market), and that surveys show it to be poorly 
understood by the public in terms of its risks and benefits.8  
An emerging science, nanotechnology provides an opportunity for the public to 
work alongside researchers, corporations, and governments to attempt ethical 
implementation.  It provides a test case for how the world might act given a technology that 
could conceivably transform the global economy and provide solutions to major global 
issues such as pollution, while potentially creating new environmental and health risks. 
Nanotechnology, in particular, has been presented as a key site for experimenting with 
novel forms of so-called upstream engagement, or efforts to engage members of the 
public in dialogue about emerging technologies.9  It provides a context for the emergence 
of a new risk governance paradigm, in terms of which local societies' political cultures and 
risk perceptions become significant factors in risk assessment and governance, with  
conventional top-down/authoritative decision-making models now taking more notice of 
public risk discourse.10 
 
How might the world act together to inculcate ethical concerns into nanopolicy as it is 
formulated across the globe?  This broad question may seem both idealistic and futile, yet 
it is only a restatement of a much older question about how to ensure that new 
technologies affect us only with our consent. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology (London: Fourth Estate, 
1996), p. 172. 
7  For example, a 2010 Friends of the Earth report argues that, given the energy costs of producing 
nano-enabled products for environmental benefit, the potential in the area of energy storage and 
conversion has been overstated. See ‘Nanotechnology, climate, and energy: Over-heated promises 
and hot air’, November, 2010, at    
<http://nano.foe.org.au/sites/default/files/Nanotechnology,%20climate%20and%20energy%20-
%20Australia%20web.pdf>. 
8 A 2010 report for example noted that ‘only 45% of Europeans say they have heard of 
nanotechnology’, in George Gaskell, et al, Europeans and Biotechnology in 2010. Winds of 
change?  A Report to the European Commission’s’ Directorate-General for Research (European 
Union, 2010), p. 8, at <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_341_winds_en.pdf>. 
9  ‘Nanotechnology and Society: Moving upstream’, ENSAA 5 May, 2011, at  
<http://www.ensaa.eu/index.php/innovation/106-nanotechnology-moving-upstream.html>. 
10 Kuei-Tien Chou, ‘Biomedtech Island Project and Risk Governance. Paradigm conflicts with a 
hidden and delayed high-tech society’, Soziale Welt 58 (2007), 123-143 (p. 126). 
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This question raises several others: 
(1) What are the particular and/or new ethical concerns that might be raised by a 
new technology such as nano?  
(2) How do we work together globally to agree on such concerns?  
(3) And who is ‘we’? What skills and processes are required for such global 
participation? 
 
Given these 3 questions, encompassing a discussion of nanoethical issues, another of 
global cooperation, and also of ‘skills and processes’, it is useful to be clearer regarding 
the intent of this thesis. The study contributes, firstly, to a comparative understanding of 
the environments within which nanotechnology is ‘regulated’ and discussed within China 
and the EU.  Part I of this thesis (Chapter 1-3) thus offers a case study of (dis)similarity. 
Part II of the thesis (Chapters 4-6) looks at how global ethics (given these differences) 
might work, offering a proceduralist model, one of pTA (participatory Technology 
Assessment). 
The primary aim of this thesis is to provide an expanded pTA model, given my 
premise that global ethics is best done through global agents in pTA. Habermasian 
thought allows the expansion of current pTA models to predicate how agents might 
achieve consensus – perhaps even global consensus (as Habermas’s ‘universalisation 
principle’ suggests). 
          Nanotechnology as a globally significant new technology provides a useful case 
study against which to examine how pTA (nanofora, for example) might work within and 
across differing cultures such as those of the EU and China. Given nanotechnology's 
significance in both regions as central to economic growth, agreement on the ethical 
impact on society of such a potentially radical new technology would seem to be of 
considerable importance.  
 
 
1. New concerns? 
The first question is a very broad one, encompassing issues of military usage, distributive 
justice (given that nanotechnology could have vast application in developing countries), 
and risk management of toxicity, as well as more futuristic scenarios to do with human 
enhancement.  No wonder that the range of potential nanotechnology applications has led 
to debates about public involvement in decision-making.  
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 Science journalist Philip Ball succinctly stated the problem in his article on why 2003 
was ‘the year that society (in the UK that is) woke up to nanotechnology and got very 
alarmed’.  Following the publication of Michael Crichton’s Prey in late 2002, and the start 
of public debates in the UK media on the dangers of nanotechnology, Ball suggested the 
following ethical questions should be asked: 
Is nanotechnology primarily about wealth creation, or improving our quality of life, or 
something else? Who is developing it, and why? With what responsibility, justification 
and accountability? Who deals with potential problems, and how? Is there, and 
should there be, a public mandate for it? The scientific community has no excuse for 
ignoring such questions.11 
 
 
Ethics and socio-ethical analysis have increasingly become an integral part of the 
assessment of any new technology and its applications.12  Some countries, for example 
the Netherlands, have instigated national programs dedicated to ethics in Science and 
Technology (S&T) or have established academic institutes to conduct research into the  
 
ethical implications of new technologies.  In China, ethical, legal and social implications 
(ELSI) analysis is becoming a standard for evaluating new S&T developments.  
 
Global variation in ELSI approaches to S&T development is however rather too large a 
topic to be useful; this thesis attempts to narrow down the notion of ‘global’, by ‘West’ 
referring chiefly to the EU, and by ‘East’, principally to China.  
Whereas the EU has a history of attempting communal social policy across its 
member states (currently 27, with another 7 in candidature), the East has tended to form 
economic policy clusters, although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN 
(currently 10 members), which also looks at social policy, can be noted.  There is no 
common approach towards an Asian policy on nanotechnology, as there is in the EU, and 
China has thus been selected for two reasons.  China is one of the two largest Eastern 
‘players’ in nanotechnology S&T (the other being Japan).  China offers an interesting 
example of a country that fully perceives the benefits of a new technology, including its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Philip Ball, ‘2003: Nanotechnology in the firing line’, 23 December, 2003, at 
<http://nanotechweb.org/cws/article/indepth/18804>. 
12 R.W. Berne, ‘Towards the Conscientious Development of Ethical Nanotechnology’, Science and 
Engineering Ethics 10 (2004), 627–638.  
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potential in the field of convergence technology (bio/cogno-nano), while arguably having a 
less regulatory approach to such economically promising science than the EU:  
Like no other country China understood that to win the race depends on finished 
products through Nano-Bio-Cogno-Info convergence.... Second, but maybe even 
more important, there are no ethical restrictions or social controversy on developing 
and using nanotechnologies for new products and systems.13 
 
China’s massive investment in nanotechnology research indicates the attempt to become 
a leading producer of nanomaterials, and a nanoscience knowledge hub.  But whether 
China is able to leverage off its increasing wealth and funnel this into global leadership in 
science and technology, in large measure depends on still nascent regulatory systems.14  
  
In terms of regional ethics concerns, the EU debate is clearly broader than the one taking 
place in China.  While toxicity risk is paramount in both, the EU, having already been 
‘burned’ on the issue of genetically modified (GM) food, has an approach that is more 
oriented towards public concern.  For the EU, ‘risk’ means not only the possibility of 
‘catastrophic scenarios of new and unpredictable technologies gone awry’, but also of 
public perceptions of such potential catastrophes or of possible social problems.15   
 EU and Chinese approaches to bioethics and S&T ethics differ in terms of the 
application of the precautionary principle, and the extent of public debate.  
  
Part One of the thesis (Chapters 1-3) thus offers some comparative analysis of the 
differing contexts to nanoethics and nanoregulation in China and the EU.  Chapter One 
examines the EU and China to see if similar ethical issues relating to nanotechnology 
development can be distinguished, or whether the ‘narratives’ of nanotechnology differ 
markedly in each region, particularly given their bioethics contexts, which will be discussed 
in Chapter Two.  Regional policies and regulations are then compared in Chapter Three.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ‘Nanotechnology In China Is Focusing On Innovations And New Products. Strong Growth’,  
Nanotechnology Now, 14 May 2007, at <http://www.nanotech-now.com/news.cgi?story_id=22584>. 
14 Darryl Jarvis, Noah Richmond,’  Regulation and Governance of Nanotechnology in China: 
Regulatory Challenges and Effectiveness’,  European Journal of Law and  Technology 2.3 (2011), 
at <http://ejlt.org//article/view/94>. 
15 A.C. Lin,  ‘Size matters: regulating nanotechnology’, US Davis Legal Studies Research Paper 
635. (2006), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=934635>. See also Mette Ebbesen, ‘Nanoethics – Not from 
Scratch’, conference paper given at  the Nano Ethics Workshop, 22-23 September 2007 at the 
University of Aarhus,   p. 13. See also J. Moor, J. Weckert, ‘Nanoethics’, in Davis Baird, Alfred 
Nordmann, & Joachim Schummer (eds.) Discovering the Nanoscale (IOS Press, 2004), p. 305.  
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In looking at a ‘global’ approach, the aim has been to select two regions that espouse 
apparently diametric cultural values, such as Western individualism and so-called Eastern 
communitarianism.  China is often regarded as the country that most clearly epitomises 
so-called ‘Asian values’.  By Asian, ‘Confucian’ is usually meant, with a 'Confucian' 
commitment to 'hard work, thrift, filial, piety and national pride' having encouraged rapid 
economic growth in much of Asia.16  Amartya Sen, while suggesting the limitations of such 
a generalisation, i.e. that it would be ‘a mistake both to see Confucianism as the only 
tradition in Asia’ and to see Confucius as simply an authoritarian figure, notes however 
that a Confucian authoritarian image is often taken as synonymous with ‘Asia’.17   
 
Rather than the contentious term ‘Asian values’, however, which would for example not 
have too much applicability to India,  perhaps ‘Orientalism’ is a more useful term, in that it 
implies not so much  specific values, as a structure of antithesis.  Edward Said’s well-
known work on Orientalism suggests a dichotomy between ‘us and them’ exposed by 
Western views of the East as inferior.  The dichotomy is central to both regions, whose 
self-identification rests partly on definition through opposition – the East is ‘what the West 
is not’, and vice versa.18  The social and cultural values underpinning bioethics debates in 
China and the EU might suggest that it is a problem created by different ideas of one’s 
social identity.  In the West, identity is driven by human rights discourses and the priority of 
autonomy, whereas in the East, tao (harmony) and ren (benevolence) appear more highly 
valued. 
 ‘Otherness’ is an integral part of Said’s theories of how the clash of civilizations, of 
East and West, has evolved through negation rather than recognition and acceptance of 
the other’s differences.  
 China, for the purposes of this thesis, is posited as potentially, in its 
communitarianism, antithetical to the EU, a useful ‘other’. 
In the second half of this thesis, ‘otherness’ is explored in terms of collaborative or 
dialogue structures that enable recognition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Alan Dupont, 'Is there an “Asian Way''’, Survival   38.2 (1996), 13-33 (p. 15).  
17 Amartya Sen, ‘Human rights and Asian values; What Kee Kuan Yew and Lee Peng don’t 
understand about Asia’, The New Republic, July 14, 1997, at 
<http://www.hmb.utoronto.ca/HMB303H/weekly_supp/week-02/Sen_Asian_Values.pdf>.  
18 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1977), at 
<http://www.odsg.org/Said_Edward(1977)_Orientalism.pdf>. 
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Part Two looks at the  central question of this thesis; as Hongladarom asks, how can we 
achieve a consensus shorn of the metaphysical basis on what constitutes the good life, the 
‘good citizenship’ or ‘good social identity’ of the respective groups that enter into the 
deliberation?19 
2. Global cooperation? 
Is global consensus really necessary?  New interdependencies in S&T development, along 
with a globalised and increasingly mobile market for S&T products, require some 
agreement on how these technologies should be governed.  
Global bodies have achieved some progress in addressing concerns about 
nanotechnology.  These organisations include the International Council on Risk 
Governance (IRGC), the International Council on Nanotechnology (ICON), the Globally 
Harmonised Scheme for classification and labelling of substances (GHS), the International 
Standards Organization (ISO), the Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and 
Technology (UNESCO/COMEST), the OECD Working Party on Nanotechnology (WPN), 
and the OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials (WPMN).  Chapter Three, 
in addition to looking at regional regulation, also examines such international regulatory 
collaborations.  
Europe is increasingly co-operating and competing with China and India, two major 
emerging economies that are also keen to develop their S&T sectors.  It is arguable that 
new interdependencies between global actors require innovative global approaches to 
S&T policy, or at least, a recognition of different local approaches to a global science.  
Of course, this begs the wider question: Can there ever be such a thing as a ‘global 
approach’?  
Chapter Six examines issues arising from the universalist approach, such as so-
called universal values being labelled paternalistic,20 or else described as a new form of 
neo-colonialism21 thought to undermine human dignity as well as cultural pluralism.22 
Conversely, universalism’s ‘foe’, particularism or relativism (which argue that values are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Soraj Hongladarom, ‘Asian Bioethics Revisited: What is it?, and is there such a thing? Eubios 
Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 14.6 (2004), 194-7 (pp. 195-6). 
20 Kaja Finkler, ‘Can Bioethics be Global and Local, or Must It Be Both?’, Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography 37 (2008), 155-179. 
21 Heather Widdows, ‘Is Global Ethics Moral Neo-Colonialism? An investigation of the issue in the 
context of bioethics’, Bioethics 6.21 (2007), 305-15. 
22 Roberto Andorno, ‘Human Dignity and Global Rights as a Common Ground for a Global 
Bioethics’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 34 (2009), 223-240. 
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culturally and specifically bound), may be criticised for creating a moral relativism that 
leads to justification for doing whatever one wishes.  
While universalism has become a much less hegemonic, more pluralistic concept 
in the last twenty years, relativism has also become less ‘irresponsible’.23  However, this 
battle between the universal and the local still presents a challenge for policymakers 
developing an inclusive global and ethical approach to nanotechnology.  One solution to 
the problem is to increase the means of public participation.  
 
 
3. Increased public participation?  
This thesis looks at the use of participatory Technology Assessment (pTA) in S&T 
evaluation, a trend that has grown since the 1980s in the EU.  pTA can be defined as a 
drive towards incorporating social concerns into technology assessment through public 
dialogue incorporating a greater use of laypersons.  This trend has been driven by 
increased public scepticism of scientific research and development.24  Reports of public 
dissatisfaction in China following various food safety scandals over milk and gutter oil 
confirm that scepticism about (a lack of) regulation is not confined to the EU.  
The outcome has been a demand for more informed public debate, in addition to 
greater public involvement in how new technologies should be regulated and funded), as 
well as how they should be applied to everyday life.25  Policymakers in the EU anxious not 
to repeat the mistakes associated with the introduction of biotechnology initiatives like 
genetically modified (GM) foods – namely, that legislation came too late and with too little 
public engagement and ethical reflection – began to call for the inclusion of ethical and 
societal impact assessments of potentially transformative new technologies at an earlier 
stage in policymaking.  With public participation, societal expectations can be unmasked or 
exposed, and the risk/benefit debate adjusted accordingly.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Marie-Eve Morin, ‘Cohabiting in the globalised world: Peter Sloterdijk’s global foams and Bruno 
Latour’s cosmopolitics’, Society and Space 27 (2009), 58-72. 
24 G. Gaskell, P. Thompson, N. Allum, ‘Worlds apart? Public opinion in Europe and the USA’, in 
M.W. Bauer, G. Gaskell (eds.) Biotechnology – the Making of a Global Controversy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 386. 
25 R. Doubleday, ‘Risk, public engagement and reflexivity: Alternative framings of the public 
dimensions of nanotechnology’, Health, Risk & Society 9.2 (2007), 211-227 (p. 211). 
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However, global ethics requires global agents and so the second half of this thesis 
(Chapters Three-Six) focuses on agency and the actions of the layperson.  ‘Actors and 
agendas’ is a concern within current nanoethics commentary.26 
 
 
Chapter  Four looks at the pTA ‘nanofora’ that have been attempted thus far in the EU 
and China (the latter being somewhat less concerned with  this approach  as yet), and  
links pTA  to the field of discourse ethics.  Following the view by Ladikas and Schroeder 
that global ethics is reliant on such practical fora as platforms for intercultural dialogue and 
trust-building,27  pTA can usefully be informed by the dialogue- and process-oriented 
theories of a discourse ethicist such as Jürgen Habermas.  
Discourse ethics has developed around Habermas’s argument that social order 
depends on our capacity to recognize, through rational discourse, the intersubjective 
validity of different views.  It aims to be a consensual ethics, in which only those norms 
and actions can claim legitimacy that have been subjected to discourse, and when a non-
coercive consensus by all affected has been achieved.  Thus Habermas claims that 
something can be valid when the foreseeable ‘consequences and side-effects of its 
general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be 
jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion’.28  Communicative or discourse action 
attempts to coordinate purposive action rationally, so that all might come to a reasoned 
agreement about the truth of a statement or of the rightness of a norm.29   
The principles Habermas sees as requisite for dialogue are very similar to those of 
pTA, particularly those of inclusivity and range of representation.  Commenting on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See NanoEthics 7 ( 2013),which contains several articles on societal challenges of 
nanotechnology, in particular, Lotte Krabbenborg, ‘DuPont and Environmental Defense Fund Co-
Constructing a Risk Framework for Nanoscale Materials: an Occasion to Reflect on Interaction 
Processes in a Joint Inquiry’, 45-54.  
27 Doris Schroeder and Miltos Ladikas have looked at the issue of globalization from the rather 
more practical issue of global basic income, utilising the ideas of Pogge on resource dividends. See 
M. Ladikas, D. Schroeder, ‘Too early for global ethics?’, Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics,  
14.4 (2005), 404-10 (p. 413).	  
28  Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass.:  
M.I.T. Press, 1998), p. 42. 
29  Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1:  Reason and the Rationalization 
of Society (trans. Thomas McCarthy) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004),  pp.  285-7. 
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Habermas, for example, Benhabib advocates ‘practical discourses’ in which all who are 
affected can be ‘participants in the discourse through which the norms are adopted’.30   
Nanotechnology’s issues have already been debated through such an approach, 
as we can see from nanodialogues conducted in Europe over the last 5-7 years, while the 
2006 nanodialogues for example held in Zimbabwe sought to inspire bottom-up 
approaches to nanoinnovation by engaging local community groups to assess the 
appropriateness of nanotechnologies for community needs.31   
pTA and discourse ethics are mutually beneficial for the purpose of this thesis in terms of  
Habermas’s notion of ‘universalisation’.  The focus of discourse ethics is what is 'equally 
good for all’, of selecting ‘from the mass of evaluative questions those action-related 
conflicts that can be resolved with reference to a generalizable interest.32  Habermas asks 
the basic question of global ethics, of how different views (particularly of social order) can 
be universally understood and reconciled, perhaps within an 'ideal community' of 
communication, one that may be global.  His ‘universalisation principle’ offers a useful 
methodology for examining how a pTA model might work globally.  
  A model of global engagement is one of global pTA, oriented towards 
universalisability. It is a model that requires three components: 
• An understanding of the issues that transcends cultural differences 
• A pTA structure with clear procedural guidelines, and that can affect/effect policy 
• And ‘virtuous’ citizens able and willing to participate in such a process and achieve 
consensus. 
 
 
The third point takes this thesis into the realm of virtue ethics, and Chapter Five examines 
the idea of ‘global virtues’, looking at Aristotelian, or western-centric virtues, Habermasian 
‘virtues’ or skills’, and Chinese jen or ren-ethics, encapsulating such ideas as non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 11. 
31  David J. Grimshaw, Jack Stilgoe,  Lawrence D. Gudza, ‘Can Nanotechnologies help achieve the 
millennium development target of halving the number of people without access to clean water by 
2015?’,  at <http://practicalaction.org/docs/ia4/nano-dialogues-2006-report.pdf>. 
32 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Discourse Ethics, Law and Sittlichkeit,’ in Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews 
with Jürgen Habermas, ed. P. Dews (London: Verso, 1992), 245-271 (p. 248). 
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maleficence, respect for others, ‘human heartedness’, benevolence, love, compassion, 
kindness and  humanity.33  
This forms the basis for the concluding section of this thesis (Chapter Six), on 
whether participants in such a Habermasian-inspired  discourse/pTA process might be 
able to achieve a ‘dialogic form’  or ‘dialogic self’, a concept informed to a degree by  
Korsgaard in her work on agency and  self-constitution, Appiah on the dialogically 
constituted self, Gutmann and Thompson on first and second-order values, and  Charles 
Taylor  on  recognition and difference:   
 
 
 
We give due acknowledgment only to what is universally present – everybody has an 
identity – through recognising what is peculiar to each. The universal demands an 
acknowledgement of specificity...in the case of the politics of difference, we might 
say that a universal potential is at its basis, namely, the potential for forming and 
defining one’s own identity.34  
 
 
As Taylor puts it, identity is created dialogically through our interactions with others. 
Through such intersubjectivity, we develop new vocabularies of comparison, discover 
shared aspects of identity, and achieve, hopefully, an ‘intercultural personhood’ that 
‘includes a vital component of an outlook on humanity that is not locked in a provincial 
interest of one’s ascribed group membership’, as Beck has stated,35 and that may lead to a 
‘fusion of horizons’.36  And, so, perhaps, to a global ethics.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 W.T. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 
p. 105.  
34 Charles Taylor,  Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), p.35; p.42. 
35 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’, Theory, Culture and Society 19.1-2 
(2002), 12-44 (p 25). 
36 Taylor borrows this phrase from Gadamer; ibid, p. 62.  
 
 
12 
Chapter One:  What is nanotechnology, and what should 
we be worried about? 
 
Nanotechnology quests, like all newly developing technological ambitions, are also 
quests for personal fulfilment.1 
2  
How can such a brave new science, one that is so full of potential that it has been 
called the ‘Next Industrial Revolution’ by governments and scientists, not also impact 
our relationships, society, environment, economy or even global politics in profound 
ways.3 
 
 
For members of the public, nanotechnology (or, as it is also labelled, nanoscience, nano-
scale research, or nanotechnoscience), is a term only vaguely understood, and is often 
confused with the popular and inaccurate trend of labelling anything in technology with very 
small features as 'nano'.  Defined properly, nanotechnology is the ‘engineering of functional 
systems at the molecular level’, with one nanometer (nm) being one billionth of a  
metre.4  The European Commission suggests ‘nanosciences and nanotechnologies’ to  
 
 
                                                
1 Berne, ‘Towards the Conscientious Development of Ethical Nanotechnology’, ibid, p. 630. 
2 ‘The wacky world of nanotechnology consumer products’, Nanowerk 31 March, 2007, at 
<http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=1711.php>. 
3 Patrick Lin, Fritz Allhoff, ‘Nanoscience and nanoethics: Defining the disciplines’, in Nanoethics: The 
Ethical and Social Implications of Nanotechnology, ibid, pp. 3-4. 
4 To put this in context, a human hair is 80 000nm wide. Definition taken from the Centre for 
Responsible Nanotechnology website: see <http://www.crnano.org/whatis.htm>. Although there has 
been some debate about the precise size range within which a structure may be called nano, this is 
not of particular relevance to this thesis.  The relevant range is usually 1-100 nm, but can extend to 
below 0.1 nm and above 100 nm; the upper limit of 100nm for nanotechnology has however been 
called arbitrary, and, Allhoff argues, such a limit ignores the dimensionality that nanowires and 
nanofilms demonstrate - see Fritz Allhoff, ‘On the Autonomy and Justification of Nanoethics’, 
NanoEthics 1 (2007), 185-210 (p. 187). 
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distinguish between the science and its technological application; the label 
‘nanotechnology’ seems the most relevant (as well as the most broadly used) term for 
discussing nano-manufactured technologies that affect our lives.5  From artificial coatings 
made by nanothin layers that, when used on steel, could have delayed the 9/11 collapse by 
over 20 minutes, to rust nanoparticles to which arsenic oxide would bond, thus purifying 
water, to nanoparticles used in household refrigerators, it is evidently a technology with the 
potential to affect most major industries.  
 In a 2003 Greenpeace report, Arnall, noting the breadth of the field, suggests that 
nanotechnology is a catalyst for general scientific advancement. For example, if large-scale 
carbon nanotube production does become a reality, it will be equivalent ‘to the 
development that kick-started the industrial revolution’, for nanotube-based material can 
offer a substance 50-1200 times the strength of steel at one-sixth of the weight.6 Thus 
…complex nanotech products will change five very different parts of the economy: 
the chemical industry, textiles, the construction industry, the food/agriculture industry, 
and robotics. The chemical industry may be transformed into a nanomaterials 
industry. Nanotech may change the competitive factors in the textile industry, create 
new products for the building industry along with making the food and agriculture 
industry more efficient.7 
 
 
Thus possible applications of nanotechnology range across: 
• Better construction & manufacturing methods  
• Improved water filtration products 
• Better energy storage and conversion 
• Improved IT memory and storage  
• Better paint and textiles that are resistant to stains, UV, and bacteria 
• Improved military/security technology (battlesuits,  surveillance devices) 
• Improved food packaging for storage 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Towards a European strategy for nanotechnology, communication from the commission (European 
Commission, 2004), at: 
<ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/nano_com_en_new.pdf>. 
6 Alexander Arnall, Future Technologies, Today’s Choices, ibid, p. 18. 
7 Lawrence Gasman, Nanotechnology applications and markets (Norwood, MA: Artech House 
2006), p. 42. 
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• More effective cancer treatments, and 
• Improved pesticides and fertilizers. 
 
 
Nanotechnology is often examined not only in terms of its potential and practical 
applications, but also for its transformative potential.  Under the heading of nanotechnology 
we tend to think of engineering at the scale of the very small; however, we may also 
remember utopian (or dystopian) visions, such as that in Eric Drexler’s 1986 Engines of 
Creation, of tiny assemblers capable of creating any desired macroscopic object.  With 
such technology we could, theoretically, create anything, a concept explored by Neal 
Stephenson in his novel The Diamond Age (1995), which depicted a world of ubiquitous 
nanotech where molecular assemblers can create basic goods, free to anyone who 
requests them, thus eradicating starvation and homelessness.8   
It is a vision of ‘nanotech synthesizers in factories, then restaurants, and finally in 
homes,’ of foods that ‘could simply be synthesized cooked, with no need for a stove’, while 
the dishes are also ‘synthesized along with the food, and then simply dropped dirty into the 
recycler.’9  This kind of future could enable consumers to enjoy not only plentiful, but 
‘interactive’ food that would allow for modification based on their own nutritional needs or 
tastes: ‘thousands of nanocapsules containing flavour or colour enhancers, or added 
nutritional elements (such as vitamins), would remain dormant in the food and only be 
released when triggered by the consumer.’10   
Even more radically, the UK science fiction series Red Dwarf episode ‘Nanarchy’ (7 
March, 1997) shows nanobots recreating body parts, in this case rebuilding a character's 
missing arm.  Such visions stimulate much ‘nano hyperbole’,11 claims that nanotechnology 
‘contains the answers, to the extent that there are answers, to most of our pressing  
material needs’.12  One response to this might be to distinguish between futuristic and near  
 
 
                                                
8 See Greta Aiyu Niu, ‘Techno-Orientalism, Nanotechnology, Posthumans, and Post-Posthumans in 
Neal Stephenson's and Linda Nagata’s Science Fiction’, MELUS, 33. 4 (Winter, 2008), 73-96. 
9 J. Storrs Hall, Nanofuture (New York: Prometheus, 2005), pp.  132-3. 
10 John Dunn, ‘A Mini Revolution,” Food Manufacture, September 1, 2004, at  
<http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/news/fullstory.php/aid/472/A_mini_revolution.html>. 
11 M. Ellen Mitchell, ‘Scientific Promise: Reflections on Nano-Hype’, in Nanoscale, ed. Nigel M. de S. 
Cameron and M. Ellen Mitchell (New Jersey: Wiley, 2007), 43-60 (p. 58).  
12 R. Smalley, ‘Presentation to the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology’ 
(March 3, 2003) at <http://www.ostp.gov/PCAST/march3meetingagenda.html>. 
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term visions of nanotechnology.  Certainly, nanobots and cell reprogramming are not as  
yet anywhere near realisation, and molecular assembly is not expected for decades (if at  
all).13  Thus we might distinguish between evolutionary or ‘incremental’ technology, and 
disruptive or radically transformative technology.  (Wilsdon distinguishes between ‘shallow’ 
and ‘deep’ technologies).14 
The radical novelty of nanotechnology becomes apparent when we see the 
emergence of ‘unusual physical, chemical and biological properties’, and of new materials, 
such as the ‘buckyball’, discovered in 1985.15  This new material has many potential 
applications in medicine, photo-optics and energy; for example, buckyballs can be used to 
store hydrogen at high densities, allowing hydrogen to become economically competitive 
with gasoline as car fuel, thus solving one of the challenges faced by the alternative energy 
industry.16 
The discovery of buckyballs was followed by that of carbon nanotubes in 1991.  The 
latter, as they generate no heat during conduction, have the potential to transform  
thermal management products (i.e. more efficient cooling), while their considerable tensile 
strength has already allowed them to be used as strengthening agents in polymers and 
concrete – they might eventually provide lightweight material to build spacecraft, or even 
allow the building of a ‘space elevator’ to move people and materials out of earth's orbit.  In 
medicine, nanotubes could increase the rate of healing by creating a ‘scaffold’ to assist  
bone growth, act as cellular ‘needles’ to assist targeted drug delivery, or be placed in 
sensors to detect pollutants. 
 
                                                
13 José López, ‘Bridging the Gaps: Science Fiction in Nanotechnology’, Hyle, 10.2 (2004), 129-152;  
also,  S.R. Davies, P.  Macnaghten, ‘Narratives of mastery and resistance: Lay ethics of 
nanotechnology’, NanoEthics 4 (2010), 141–151; J.-P. Dupuy, ‘The narratology of lay ethics’,  
NanoEthics 4 (2010), 153–170. 
14 J.-P. Dupuy, A. Grinbaum, ‘Living with uncertainty: towards the ongoing normative assessment of 
nanotechnology’, in J. Schummer, D. Baird (eds.) Nanotechnology challenges – implications for 
philosophy, ethics and society (Singapore:  World Scientific Publishing, 2006), 287–314. Also D. 
Munshi, P. Kurian, R.V. Bartlett, A. Lakhtakia, ‘A map of the nanoworld: Sizing up the science, 
politics, and business of the infinitesimal’, Futures 39 (2007), 432–452; and J.  Wilsdon, ‘The Politics 
of Small Things: Nanotechnology, Risk, and Uncertainty’, IEEE Technology and Society  Magazine  
23 (2004), 16–21. 
15 Zhong L. Wang, ‘What is Nanotechnology?’, at 
<http://www.nanoscience.gatech.edu/zlwang/research/nano.html>. 
16 Jason Mick, ‘Great Buckyballs! Storing Hydrogen with Carbon Nanostructures’, Daily Tech, March 
33, 2008, at 
<http://www.dailytech.com/Great+Buckyballs++Storing+Hydrogen+with+Carbon+Nanostructures/arti
cle11196.htm>. 
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In the energy field, Australia’s national science agency, the CSIRO (Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation), in conjunction with two Australian 
universities, is developing nanochemical sensors to enhance discovery rates of untapped 
oil or gas deposits beneath the seabed, in a bid to prepare for predicted oil and gas 
shortages in the future. Petrochemical companies suggest that nanotechnology will enable 
far greater rates of extraction from existing reserves (through creating lighter yet stronger 
‘proppants’ that are forced into drilling fractures).17   
The potential applications seem endless. 
Yet much of what is sold as nanotechnology is just a redefinition of existing science. 
Consider sunscreens, which use miniature colloids, an application of general chemistry.18  
Or computer chips assembled in familiar ways, though now merely on a microscale – is this 
really a new technology?19  
 The argument as to whether nanoscience is in fact a new science can be extended 
into a discussion of nanomedicine, arguably a ‘continuation of the understanding  
of physiological, biochemical, cellular, genetic, and disease processes’.20 The term ‘nano- 
enabled’ might in fact be more accurate than ‘nanotechnology’ in some cases.21 
Nanoscience can also be defined as a convergence technology, an interdisciplinary 
science, or amalgamation of established disciplines.22  Biomolecular nanotechnology has 
research potential from molecular biology and biophysics to applications in biosensing,  
biocontrol, bioinformatics, genomics, medicine, computing, and information storage and 
energy conversion.   
A 2006 study of nanotechnology patents suggests the US leads in four out of the top 
five top fields: nanotubes, plasmonics (optical data transmission), self-assembly and  
                                                
17 ‘Leap From Science Fiction Into Real-World Engineering’, The American Oil & Gas Reporter, (July 
2010), at <http://www.beg.utexas.edu/aec/pdf/0710_AEC_Eprint.pdf>. 
18 J. Moor, J. Weckert, ‘Nanoethics: Assessing the Nanoscale from an Ethical Point of View’, in D. 
Baird, A. Nordmann, J. Schummer (eds.) Discovering the Nanoscale (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2004), 
p. 302. 
19 Christopher J. Preston, Maxim Y. Sheinin, Denyse J. Sproat, Vinal P. Swarup, ‘The Novelty of 
Nano and the Regulatory Challenge of Newness’, NanoEthics 4 (2010), 13-26 (p. 13). 
19 Peter Rodgers, ‘Nanoelectronics: Single file’, Nature Nanotechnology 29 June, 2006, at 
<http://www.nature.com/nnano/reshigh/2006/0606/full/nnano.2006.5.html>. 
20 C. Christopher Hook, ‘Nanotechnology and the Future of Medicine’, in Discovering the Nanoscale, 
ibid, 337-360. 
21 A point that may be of interest is that nanoscale materials occur naturally; the nanoscale foot hair 
of a gecko for example allows for greater adhesion when climbing, and there are  magnetotactic 
bacteria that contain magnetic (navigational) nanoparticles. Fritz Allhoff, Patrick Lin, Daniel Moore, 
What is Nanotechnology and Why Does it Matter (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 17-18. 
22 Preston, Sheinin, Sporat, Swarup, ibid, p. 15. 
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(anti)reflection.  Europe was also shown to be catching up in plasmonics.  Nanotech 
scanning probes enabling the production of better microchips and other microelectronics 
are likely to remain the largest focus for patents.23 
One of the biggest areas of research is nanomedicine. Although the ultimate goal, 
Red Dwarf style, of monitoring, repairing, and improving all human biological systems, is far 
off, nanomedicine is predicted to lead to both major health improvements and very good 
economic returns in the near to medium future.  Wade and Williams note that the US 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Roadmap’s Nanomedicine Initiative lists its major goals 
as: 
…finding ways to 1) search out and destroy early cancer cells, 2) remove and replace 
broken cell parts with nanoscale devices, and 3) develop and implant molecular 
pumps to deliver medicines.24 
 
 
Nanoscale science is potentially useful for diagnostics, tailor-made drug design, and cell 
targeting.  A possible application is that of gold nanoshells being targeted onto a tumour.  
When a laser is directed onto the tumour, it will heat and destroy the gold, while leaving the 
healthy tissues (with no gold nanoparticles attached) cool and unaffected – a huge benefit 
compared to chemotherapy.  
 A further application will be the development of ‘lab-on-a-chip technology’ which, at 
the nanoscale, allows for biological samples to be tested for hundreds of known conditions.  
Such field labs can allow for far greater access to medical help, and to swifter diagnosis 
and better disease treatment, particularly in developing countries.  
 Another example is that of pharmaceutical companies using cost-saving 
nanotechnology to reduce the size of drugs due to increased surface-to-volume ratios and  
reactivity.  The benefits have been summarized as follows: 
Nanotechnology can enhance the drug discovery process …  It will also result in 
reducing the cost of drug delivery, design and development and will result in the 
faster introduction of new cost-effective products to the market.25 
 
 
                                                
23 G. Schmid, H. Brune, H. Ernst, W. Grünwald, A. Grunwald, H. Hofmann, H.  Krug, P.  Janich, M. 
Mayor, W. Rathgeber, U. Simon, V.  Vogel, D. Wyrwa, Nanotechnology.  Assessment and 
Perspectives (Berlin: Springer, 2006), p. 302, p.  319.  
24 Wade Adams, Linda Williams, Nanotechnology Demystified (Blacklick, OH, USA: McGraw-Hill 
Professional Publishing, 2006), p 112. 
25 R. Bawa, S. Johnson, ‘Emerging Issues in Nanomedicine and Ethics’ in Fritz Allhoff, Patrick Lin 
(eds.) Nanotechnology and Society: Current and Emerging Social and Ethical Issues (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2008), 207-223 (p. 212). 
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Nanodrugs may be more efficiently administered transdermally rather than orally.  Better 
time-release drug products can be manufactured for more calculated long-term dosages.26   
 
More than 30 countries had national nanotechnology activities in 2001, while others had 
some evidence of individual or group research, as shown in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Global distribution of nanotechnology activity by country and 
classification.27 
 
 
 
                                                
26 Allhoff, Lin, Moore, What is nanotechnology, ibid,  pp. 226-7. 
27 Table adapted from, Donald C. Maclurcan, ‘Nanotechnology and Developing Countries’, AZjono 
Journal of Nanotechnology Online, October 19, 2005, at 
<http://www.azonano.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=142>. Also see Mihail Roco, ‘International Strategy 
for Nanotechnology Research and Development’, Journal of Nanoparticle Research 3.5-6 (2002), 1-
10 (p.10), at <http://www.nano.gov/html/res/IntStratDevRoco.html>. 
National Activity/Funding 
Developing: Argentina; Armenia; Brazil; Chile; China; Cost Rica; Egypt; Georgia; India; 
Iran; Mexico; Malaysia; Philippines; Serbia & Montenegro; South Africa, Thailand, Turkey; 
Uruguay; Vietnam 
Transitional: Belarus; Bulgaria; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Estonia; Hong Kong; Hungary; 
Israel; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland, Romania; Russian Federation; Singapore; Slovak 
Republic; Slovenia; South Korea; Ukraine 
Developed: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; 
Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; 
Portugal; Puerto Rico; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; UK; USA 
Individual or Group Research 
Developing: Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ecuador; Ghana; Kenya; Lebanon; 
Macedonia; Sri Lanka; Swaziland; Zimbabwe;   
Transitional/Developed:  Macau, Malta, UAE; Liechtenstein 
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The ETC Group (Action Group on Erosion, Technology, and Concentration) has estimated 
that 60 countries have ‘state nanotech initiatives, including newcomers Nepal, Sri Lanka 
and Pakistan’ – a doubling of activity in ten years.28 
Table 2 shows a more recent comparison of countries according to whether their 
research activity is globally dominant in commercial terms.  Japan, Germany, South Korea 
and Taiwan are leading the way, with China and the UK also in the top six of those 
dominating the market with nanoproducts.29 
 
Table 2:  Countries dominating in nanotechnology 
 
 
                                                
28 The Big Downturn? Nanogeopolitics (ETC group, 2010), at  
<http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/nano_big4web.pdf>. 
29 David Hwang, ‘Ranking the nations on nanotech’, Solid State Technology, August 27 (2010), at 
<http://www.electroiq.com/articles/stm/2010/08/ranking-the-nations.html>. 
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Products for the public 
Research activities indicate that nanotechnology may eventually realise many of science 
fiction’s predictions.  Yet as far as the public is concerned, the current or imminent results  
of the above research, namely, the products, are what count.  The Project on Emerging 
Nanotechnologies estimated in a 2008 report that over 800 manufacturer-identified 
nanotech products were available, with new ones coming onto the market at a rate of three 
to four per week.30  According to a 2009 report, there were 600 products in the market that 
producers claim are based on nanotechnology.31  It was estimated that US$32 billion worth 
of products incorporating nanotech were sold globally in 2006, and by 2014, 2.6 trillion US 
dollars in manufactured products will be ‘nanoproducts’, making up 15% of total global 
manufacturing.32  This figure is, however, debatable - a 2007 analysis described these 
large figures as a purely sensationalist attempt to hype an artificially constructed market.33 
 The list of current products contains a considerable range of items, from cosmetics 
and sunscreens to clothing with dirt-repellent nanofinishes, to solar technology, to scratch-
proof paint.  In Israel, sol-gel nanotechnology is being used to make a more efficient acne 
cream.  Nanocosmetics is already a large market, with L’Oreal owning more than 200 
patents allegedly utilising the ability of nanoparticles to penetrate deeply into the skin.  Sol-
gel technology is also used in the production of perfume, and of more efficient surface 
coatings with improved corrosion and abrasion protection.34 
Nanopaints with improved insulating properties can reduce a household’s energy 
bill, while the heat conductivity of solar panels may be improved with nano-enhanced  
materials.35  Titanium dioxide, a brilliant white pigment used in paints, is transparent at the  
nanoscale, and has a photocatalytic effect that helps sunlight break down dirt. When 
applied to glass, the result is ‘self-cleaning’ windows.36  Then there is kitchenware, stain-
                                                
30 The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies has an online inventory of products at: 
<http://www.nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/>. 
31 M. Decker, Z. Li, ‘Dealing with nanoparticles: a comparison between Chinese and European 
approaches to nanotechnology’, in M. Ladikas, (ed.) Embedding society in science & technology 
policy. European and Chinese perspectives (Brussels: European Commission, 2009), 91-123 (p. 
92).  
32 George A. Kimbrell, ‘The Potential Environmental Hazards of Nanotechnology and the applicability 
of Existing Law’, in Nigel M. de S. Cameron, M. Ellen Mitchell Nanoscale (eds.) (New Jersey: Wiley, 
2007), 211-238  (pp. 213-4). 
33 Michael Berger, ‘Debunking the trillion dollar nanotechnology market size hype’,Nanowerk April 
18, 2007, at<http://www.nanowerk.com/spotlight/spotid=1792.php>. 
34 M. P.  Pagliaro, Nano-Age. How Nanotechnology Changes Our Future (Weinheim: WILEY-VCH, 
2010), p. 127. 
35 Yimin Li, Gabor  Somorjai, ‘Nanoscale Advances in Catalysis and Energy Applications’, 
NanoLetters 10. 7 (2010), 2289-2295. 
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resistant clothing, insulated footwear,37 bone tissue implants (to supersede traditional 
orthopaedics), and one of the earliest products, Wilson Double Core tennis balls, that keep 
their bounce longer (being coated internally with a nanocomposite that reduces air 
leakage). 
Take Thailand as one example of a varied nanomarket: the products of focus for 
manufacturers are waterproof and more durable silks, ‘smart packaging’ to monitor and 
maintain the state of food, more productive wine fermentation, ‘self-sterilising’ rubber 
gloves, and new car body materials.38   
On the topic of smart packaging for food, nanotechnology has the potential both to 
cut waste due to improved packaging,39 and to reduce bacteria that cause food poisoning.40  
Food packaging is of importance for countries that may not have efficient supply chain 
structures, in terms of reducing food wastage during transportation. In the food industry 
alone, experts estimate that nanotechnology will be incorporated into $20 billion worth of 
consumer products by 2010.41  Companies such as H.J. Heinz, Nestlé,  
Hershey, Unilever, and Kraft are investing heavily in nanotechnology applications.42  
Nanotechnology could have a huge impact on developing countries, having the 
potential to advance agricultural productivity through the genetic improvement of plants and 
animals, delivery of genes and drug molecules to specific sites at cellular levels in plants 
                                                                                                                                                
36  Jo Twist, ‘Eco glass cleans itself with sun’, BBC News Online 8 June 2004, at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3770353.stm>. 
37 Josh Wolfe, ‘Top Ten Nanotech Products ‘, Forbes Nanotech Report, 1 December, 2005, at 
<http://www.forbes.com/2006/01/10/apple-nano-
n_jw_0109soapbox.inl.html?boxes=popstories&boxes=custom>. 
38 P. Changsorn, ‘Firms see lower costs, more profit in nanotech’, The Nation, November 22,  2004, 
p.10.  
39 Bayer Polymers has developed a packaging film enriched with silicate nanoparticles, that 
‘massively reduce the entrance of oxygen and other gases, and the exit of moisture, thus preventing 
food from spoiling.’ Tiju Joseph, Mark Morrison, Nanotechnology in Agriculture and Food. A 
Nanoforum Report (2006), at 
<http://www.nanoforum.org/nf06~modul~showmore~folder~99999~scid~377~.html?action=longview
_publication>. 
40 ‘Nanotechnology May Be Used For Food Safety’, Science Daily (Dec. 28, 2008),  
at<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/12/081228194854.htm>for a deception of a 
microscopic biological sensor that detects food borne 
pathogens.<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/12/081228194854.htm>.   
41 ‘Nanotechnology in Food and Food Processing Worldwide, 2003-2006-2010-2015’ 
(Helmut Kaiser Consultancy, 2006), at  <http://www.hkc22.com/nanofood.html?>. 
42 Josh Wolfe, ‘Safer and Guilt-Free Nano Foods’, Forbes.com, August 10, 2005, at 
<http://www.forbes.com/investmentnewsletters/2005/08/09/nanotechnology-kraft-hershey-
cz_jw_0810soapbox_inl.html?partner=rss>.   See also Nanotechnology in Agriculture and Food 
Production: Anticipated applications (PEN report 2006), at 
<http://www.nanotechproject.org/file_download/files/PEN4_AgFood.pdf>.  
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and animals, and gene-technologies for plants and animals under stress conditions.43  Iron 
nanoparticles that apparently break down harmful substances in soil could prove 
environmentally valuable.44  So would water filtration devices (extremely fine nanofilters) 
allowing rural populations in Africa to access clean water at minimal cost.  
The 1.6 billion dollars of public money pledged for research in the US in 2010 
indicates the central role the US government thinks nanotechnology will play across 
several areas of technology.  Yet there is also the rather cynical view that comes after 
spending any time online looking for nanoproducts.  'Nano-tea’, allegedly made by extra-
efficient pulverising of the tealeaf to so-called ‘nanograde’ fineness, is just one of these 
specious products.  Some products are also misleadingly labelled, such as the first so-
called nanoproduct to be recalled from the market, the bathroom cleaner ‘Magic Nano’, 
later found in fact to contain no nanoparticles.45  More seriously, it has been suggested that 
nanotechnology ‘is going underground’ as a result of the controversy surrounding 
nanotechnology, leading manufacturers to remove any mention of nanomaterials from their 
products, while continuing to use nanotechnology processes.46 
 
With this broad range of applications, it is clear that the public will inevitably have to 
engage (indeed, already is engaging) with nanotechnology. Let us now look at some of the 
ethical issues stimulated by the emergence of such a potentially transformative technology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
43 J. Kuzma, Peter VerHage, ’Nanotechnology in Agriculture and Food Production: Anticipated 
Applications. Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies and The Consortium on Law, Values and 
Health and Life Sciences’ (Centre for Science, Technology and Public Policy, September 2006, at 
<http://www.nanotechproject.org/50>. Also, see H.C. Ward, J.Dutta, ‘Nanotechnology for agriculture 
and food systems - A view’, Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Innovations in Food 
Processing Technology and Engineering, 11-13 January 2005, at 
<http://www.nano.ait.ac.th/Download/AIT%20Papers/2005/Nanotechnology%20For%20Agriculture%
20And%20Food%20Systems%20_%20A%20View.pdf>. 
44 Astrid E. Schwarz, ‘Green Dreams of Reason. Green Nanotechnology Between Visions of Excess 
and Control’, NanoEthics 3 (2009), 109–118. Green nanotechnology: It’s easier than you think 
(Woodrow Wilson Center, April 2007). 
45 M. Pagliaro, Nano-Age. How Nanotechnology Changes Our Future, ibid, p.133. 
46 ‘Consumer products drop nanotechnology claims for fear of consumer recoil’,  Nanowerk June  
15, 2009, at  <http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=11181.php>.   
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Approaching nanoethics  
The role of nanoethics is ‘to engage in conversation with others about what kind of 
world should be constituted’.47 
 
 
When approaching the issue of the effects of a new technology, one standard approach is 
that of ‘ELSI’, which examines the ‘ethical, legal and societal implications’ of new 
technology.  This acronym appeared in 1989 in the West as part of the Human Genome 
Project, the basic goal of such an approach being to forestall adverse effects associated 
with biotechnology, to sponsor research and conferences, and also to make policy 
recommendations.  The temptation for commentators on nanotechnology’s implications for 
society has been to add an ‘N’ at the start – hence a ‘NELSI’ approach.48  
This makes it sound a little easier than it is, as one issue with nanotechnology is not 
merely its extensive reach of applications, or the idea of ‘adverse effects’, but its 
‘unknowable’ quality – something that commentators have even labelled ‘noumenal’ (more 
intellectually than empirically understood).  Nanotechnology may also require a paradigm 
shift in the way we think about it; such a new science may require a radically new 
approach, for ‘noumenal technology recedes into the uncanny otherness of nature and 
resists our attempts to make it an object of experience and knowledge.’49  Thus Dupuy and 
Grinbaum argue for insufficiency in all of the three main, traditional theoretical approaches 
(of consequentialism, virtue ethics, and deontology): 
Virtue ethics is manifestly insufficient since the problems ahead have very little to do 
with the fact that scientists or engineers are beyond moral reproach or not. 
Deontological doctrines do not fare much better since they evaluate the rightness of 
an action in terms of its conformity to a norm or a rule... As for consequentialism –  
i.e. the set of doctrines that evaluate an action based on its consequences for all 
agents concerned - it treats uncertainty as does the theory of expected utility, namely 
by ascribing probabilities to uncertain outcomes.50 
 
 
                                                
47 Deborah G. Johnson, ‘Ethics and Technology “in the Making”: An Essay on the Challenge of 
Nanoethics’, NanoEthics 1 (2007), 21-30 (p. 26). 
48 Eric Fisher, ‘Lessons learned from the Ethical, Legal & Social Implications Program (ELSI): 
Planning a Societal Implications Research Program for the National Nanotechnology Program’, 
Technology in Society 27 (2005), 321-328. 
49 A. Nordmannn, ‘Noumenal Technology: Reflections on the Incredible Tininess of Nano’, Techné 
8:3 (Spring 2005), at 
<http://www.akademik.unsri.ac.id/download/journal/files/scholar/nordmann.pdf>. 
62  Dupuy, Grinbaum, ‘Living with Uncertainty’, ibid, pp.293-4. 
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However, this statement seems a little naïve, in that ethical theories are rarely used 
uncritically.   
Can one have an ethical debate about technologies that do not yet fully exist?51 Does 
such a new science require a new approach and a new set of ethical questions?52  
Nordmann argues we cannot predict the future of nanotechnology – all we can say is that it 
is a ‘horizon of expectation in which something unheard-of or unspeakable will appear’.53  
Yet Weckert states sensibly that worrying about predictive assessment is unhelpful, that  
there must be ethical discussion before, during, and after development of the 
technology. Ethics must be proactive, reactive, and it must occur pari passu with the 
development.54 
 
 
Bostrom suggests a need to ‘develop better high order epistemic principles for the conduct 
of scientific research’, concluding that ‘until we achieve a dramatic enlightenment in our 
capacity for pragmatic synthesis…we will continue to stake out our ethics and policy paths 
in the dark’.55 
 Allhoff has argued that nanotechnology issues are similar to those raised by other 
technologies, but that should not detract from the need to apply specific ethical attention to 
nanotechnology – an approach that seems sensible.56 
Some commentators suggest a compromise – not an entirely new paradigm, but less 
structured, more laterally innovative and interdisciplinary approaches to the challenge.  
Berne, for example, advocates the use of ‘creative moral imagination’.57 Cameron sees  
                                                
51 M.E. Gorman, J.F. Groves, J. Shrager, D. Baird, J. Schummer, ‘Societal dimensions of  
nanotechnology as training zone: Results from a pilot project’, in Discovering the nanoscale, ibid, 
63–73. 
52 Arianna Ferrari, ‘Developments in the Debate on Nanoethics: Traditional Approaches and the 
Need for New Kinds of Analysis’, NanoEthics 4 (2010), 27-52. 
53 Alfred Nordmann, ‘No Future for Nanotechnology? Historical Development vs Global Expansion’, 
in William Sims  Bainbridge, Mihail C. Roco)  (eds.) Progress in Convergence. Technologies for 
Human Wellbeing   (Boston:  Blackwell, 2006), 43-66 (p. 52). 
54 John Weckert, ‘An approach to nanoethics’, in G. Hodge, D. Bowman, K. Ludlow (eds), New 
Global Frontiers in Regulation. The Age of Nanotechnology (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar: 2007), 49-
66 (p. 54). 
55 Nick Bostrom, ‘Technological Revolutions: Ethics and policy in the dark’, in Discovering the 
Nanoscale, ibid, 129-149 (p. 147, p.150). 
56 F. Allhoff, ‘On the authority and justification of nanoethics’, NanoEthics 1 (2007), 185-210 (p. 208). 
57 R. Berne, ’Science Fiction, Nano-Ethics and the Moral Imagination’,  in The Yearbook of 
Nanotechnology in Society, Volume I: Presenting Futures  in Erik Fisher,  Cynthia Selin, Jameson  
Wetmore (eds.) (New York: Springer,  2008); she discusses moral imagination also in her  Nanotalk: 
Conversations with Scientists and Engineers About Ethics, Meaning, and Belief in the Development 
of Nanotechnology (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2006). 
 
 
25 
virtue in nanoethics detaching itself from bioethics to adopt a deliberately broader 
approach.58  Gordijn argues that nanotechnology’s breadth may require some ‘new 
questions’,59 while Swiestra and Rip suggest that new technology may lead to the ‘co-
evolution’ of ethics and new technologies.60 
 Whereas many commentators take a consequentialist approach, Lewenstein for 
example argues that instead of looking at areas of nanotechnological impact, one should 
look at the four broad questions of fairness, equity, justice and power across 
nanotechnology areas.61  His argument is developed by Bennett-Woods, who also looks at 
issues of competing loyalties, such as security versus privacy or profit versus equity.62 
 
In practical terms, the nanoethics debate could be reduced to the following set of 
challenges: 
• There may be a need for anticipatory governance 
• Informing the public of nanoissues becomes a particularly complex task. Doubleday, 
reviewing six public engagement projects on nanotechnology in the UK and USA in 
2005-6, argues that the nanotechnology ‘framing of public engagement is both too 
broad and too narrow to allow for a fully articulated public discussion’.63 The 
questions of nanotechnology may not as yet have been fully articulated 
• And for ‘nanoethicists’, the challenge is to identify and debate complex nanoissues 
– possibly by developing more ‘creative’ methodologies than those already being 
utilised. 
 
In response to the last point, we might begin by looking to science fiction as a means of 
isolating nanoethical issues. 
 
 
 
                                                
58 N.M. Cameron, ‘Towards Nanoethics?’ in Nanoscale: Issues and perspectives for the Nano 
Century, ibid, 281-294. Nanoscale, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron and M. Ellen Mitchell (New Jersey: 
Wiley, 2007) 
59 Gordijn, ‘Nanoethics: From Utopian Dreams and Apocalyptic Nightmares’, ibid,  p. 528. 
60 Tsjalling Swierstra, Arie Rip, ‘NEST-ethics: Patterns of Moral Argumentation About New and 
Emerging Science and Technology’,  in D.M. Kaplan (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Technology 
(Lanham:  Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 208-227. 
61 Bruce Lewenstein, ‘What Counts as a “Social and Ethical Issue” in Nanotechnology?’, Hyle 11.1 
(2005), 5-18 (p. 15). 
62 D. Bennett-Woods, Nanotechnology: Ethics and Society (New York: CRC Press, 2008), p. 5. 
63 Richard Doubleday, ‘Risk, public engagement and reflexivity: Alternative framings of the public 
dimensions of nanotechnology’, Health, Risk and Society 9.2 (2007), 211-227 (p. 220). 
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1.1. Hypothetical nanoethics?   Science fiction and nanotechnology 
 
Mind uploading would be a fine thing, but I’m not convinced what you’d get at the end 
of it would be even remotely human.64 
 
 
We begin our discussion of nanoethics, and our eventual discussion of how Eastern and  
Western approaches to the issue reflect differing ethics with a quick trip through nano-
themes as handled by science fiction writers in the West.  It should be noted that (as 
discussed in the Introduction) for the purposes of this thesis, by ‘West’ I refer chiefly to the 
EU but also at times briefly to the US, and by ‘East’ principally to China. 
Richard Feynman has suggested that the scientific and visionary aspects of 
nanotechnology have been interconnected from the beginning.65  Science fiction can in 
some of its incarnations, such as satiric texts, for example, be an effective forum for ethical 
debate.  Science fiction texts offer the reader contemporary issues in new contexts, thus 
casting them in fresh light.66   
Milburn suggests in fact that nanotechnology has depended throughout its history 
on a symbiotic relationship with science fiction.67  Dupuy argues that ‘dreams of reason’, 
which ‘can take the form of science fiction’, ‘have a causal effect on the world and 
transform the human condition.’68  This is rephrased by Grunwald as ‘explorative 
nanophilosophy’ that has ‘something valuable to contribute to future nano-debates, and 
future applied ethics.’69  Engineering students have even been set science fiction texts in 
class to ensure that they understand the ‘ideological landscape’ of nanotechnology.70 
                                                
64 Author Charles Stross, quoted in an interview with R. Sirius, ‘When I called Charlie Stross a Dirty 
name....Transhumanist’, Acceler8tor (sic) (May 31, 2012), at 
<http://www.acceler8or.com/2012/05/when-i-called-charlie-stross-a-dirty-name-transhumanist/>. 
65 Richard Feynman, ‘There’s plenty of room at the bottom’, Engineering and Science 23.5 (1960), 
22-36. He was referring principally to the utopian visions of science fiction writer Frank Heinlein. 
66 Andrew Milner, ‘Framing Catastrophe. The Problem of Ending in Dystopian Fiction’,  in   A. Milner, 
M. Ryan, R. Savage (eds.)  Imagining the Future. Utopia and Dystopia (North Carlton: Arena 
Publications, 2006), 333-56. 
67 Colin Milburn, Nanovision: Engineering the Future (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
68 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, ‘Some Pitfalls in the Philosophical Foundations of Nanoethics’, Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 32 (2007), 237-261 (p. 242). 
69 Armin Grunwald, ’From Speculative Nanoethics to Explorative Philosophy of Nanotechnology’, 
NanoEthics 4 (2010), 91–101. 
70 Chris Toumey, ‘The Literature of Promises’, Nature Nanotechnology 3.4 (2008), 180-181, at 
<http://www.nature.com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/nnano/journal/v3/n4/full/nnano.2008.74.html>. 
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Of course, the opposite view can be argued.  Detractors suggest that this 
speculative focus can distract from current realities,71  that ‘most nanoethics is too 
futuristic…at the expense of ongoing incremental developments that are more ethically 
significant’.72  Gordijn argues that utopian or apocalyptic visions impede nanoethics in their 
encouragement of far-fetched scenarios,73 and Keiper even suggests that what happens in 
such speculative debates is a short-circuiting of logic, whereby the unlikely becomes 
inevitable.74 
Despite this criticism, science fiction's exploration of more speculative aspects of 
nanotechnology might at the very least afford a useful insight into the public's perception of 
this complex technology.  In an analysis of UK media coverage of nanotechnology over a 
15-month period (2003-4), the most prevalent reference was to Michael Crichton’s novel 
Prey, which features deadly nanoswarms.75  Although Crichton’s critical gaze appears 
chiefly aimed at profiteering corporations, the image of a woman controlled by a devouring 
technology that exhibits predatory swarm behaviour is a sobering image of the destructive 
consequences of rushing headlong into a new technology.   
 
 
Nanofiction can usefully depict those pressing ethical issues that require consideration, 
delineating areas of concern and offering hypothetical scenarios that highlight 
contemporary problems.  This can help in encouraging or directing public debate. Such 
issues become quickly apparent from any brief analysis of the last two decades of science 
fiction, nanotechnology having become a theme in the 1990s in Western literature after its 
early minimal appearance in such texts as Arthur C.Clarke’s1956 story ‘The Next Tenants’, 
describing tiny machines that operate on a microscale, or Robert Silverberg’s 1969 short 
story ‘How It Was when the Past Went Away’, which shows a form of nanotechnology 
being used in the construction of loudspeakers. 
                                                
71 Alfred Nordmann, ‘If and Then: A Critique of Speculative Nanoethics’, NanoEthics1 (2007), 31–46 
(p. 27).  See also Rebecca Roache, ‘Ethics, speculation, and values’, NanoEthics 2 (2008), 317-27;  
Roache states that  ethicists should ‘focus on maximising what is most valuable’, regardless of 
whether it is a current concern or a ‘desirable vision of the future’ (p. 326).  
72 Alfred Nordmann, Arie Rip, ‘Mind the gap revisited’, Nature Nanotechnology 4 (2009), 273–274 (p. 
273). 
73 Bert Gordijn, ‘Nanoethics: From Utopian Dreams and Apocalyptic Nightmares Towards a More 
Balanced View’, Science and Engineering Ethics 11 (2005), 521-533. 
74 A. Keiper, ‘Nanoethics as a Discipline?’, New Atlantis (Spring, 2007), 55-67. 
75 Alison Anderson, Alan Petersen, Clare Wilkinson, Stuart Allan, Nanotechnology, Risk and 
Communication (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 9, p. 51, p. 69. 
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 One should first note however that such an analysis is of limited use for the 
purposes of this thesis and its comparison of Chinese/EU attitudes to nanotechnology.  
This is due to the fact that Eastern science fiction is a rather different genre.  If one 
compares Western science fiction novels from the US and the UK with those published in 
China, it immediately becomes apparent that the latter are not necessarily a useful 
speculative forum.  As in Russia, China has struggled with a genre that simultaneously 
promotes technological superiority and innovation, while also showing a deep level of 
satire.  There is a certain nervousness in China even when it comes to time travel TV 
shows, criticised for promoting ‘feudalism, superstition, fatalism and reincarnation’.76  Two 
recent science fiction novels from China, Han Song’s 2066: Red Star over America (2000), 
and Chan Koonchung’s The Fat Years (2009), thus only cautiously examine China’s 
superpower status.  Liu Cixin perhaps conceals his message within a depiction of aliens’ 
attempts to control the minds of the Chinese populace in his trilogy Three Bodies (2007-
2011).  
The East does have a tradition of translating classic science fiction novels from 
English – Jules Verne being one popular choice.  Yet Verne’s popularity in the East is 
probably due to the way his novelistic style adapts well to the ‘industrial’ focus of Chinese 
science fiction, i.e. that celebrates technology rather than tackling ethical problems.77  
 
 
The nanoissues raised by Western science fiction writers can be listed as follows: 
a) Nano-based consumerism in not necessarily socially beneficial – the ‘lotus-eater’ 
scenario. 
b) Technology might outstrip our ability to control it - the doomsday/dystopia scenario. 
Examples include Crichton, Stel Pavlou, and Robert Ludlum, who have used 
nanotechnology (Prey, Decipher, The Lazarus Vendetta) as a useful part of the 
thriller’s nemesis theme, in terms of which ‘the enemy’ always has dark forces, 
whether merely violent, or scientifically terrifying, at his command. 
                                                
76 Clarissa Sebag-Montefiore, ‘Cultural Exchange: Chinese science fiction's subversive politics’, Los 
Angeles Times, 25 March, 2012 (Entertainment Section), at 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/25/entertainment/la-ca-china-culture-20120325>. 
77 Steven Chen, ‘Back to the Future’, China Daily 30 August 2007, p. 18, at 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-08/30/content_6066566.htm>. 
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c) Nanoenhancement might lead to new types of ‘super’ human beings, creating 
increased social elitism, or nanosoldiers.  It might even destroy our humanity as 
illustrated by the ‘superhuman’, ‘cyborg’, and ‘Frankenstein’ scenarios. 
 
 
(a)   Lotus-eating in the nanofuture 
It is conceivable that the best-known novel on nanotechnology, apart from Crichton’s Prey, 
is Neil Stephenson’s The Diamond Age (1995), already mentioned as depicting a world of 
ubiquitous nanotech where molecular assemblers can create basic goods that are freely 
distributed to anyone that requests them.  Yet Stephenson’s world of abundant nanotech is 
socially stratified and stagnant.  In such a world of plenty, there is little to strive for – apart 
from the freedom denied to the poor, kept docile through nanomanufactured goods and 
denied any say in their lives.  Similar to Stephenson’s vision of autocratic Victorians, 
Charles Stross’ Singularity Sky (2003) depicts the ‘New Republic's iron grip on its populace 
as enabled through having control of so-called 'cornucopia machines’, which are a type of 
nanotech assembler factory.  For both of these novels, nanotechnology in the form of 
molecular assembly seems to be the modern equivalent of the Roman Empire’s bread and 
circuses, intended to keep a population well-fed and docile. 
 Interestingly for the purposes of this thesis (although digressive in this current 
discussion), Stephenson introduces occasional references to the clash of Western and 
Eastern cultures.  A character remarks at one point how ‘poisonous’ Western technology 
has been to China:  
Just as our ancestors could not open our ports to the West without accepting the 
poison of opium, we could not open our lives to Western technology without taking in 
Western ideas, which have been as a plague (sic) on our society. The result has 
been centuries of chaos.78 
 
 
Nancy Kress’ 2008 story ‘Nano comes to Clifford Falls’ develops the idea of 
nanotechnology having reduced the human drive to achieve.  Her utopia of abundance at 
first looks rather appealing, however, this quickly changes into a dystopia.  The molecular 
assemblers given to the town of Clifford Falls can make the protagonist’s neighbour a  
 
                                                
78 Neal Stephenson (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 417. 
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Porsche, foodnano makes everyone’s meals, until someone hacks into the nanomachine 
and all it will make is garbage cans, the mayor has to outlaw the making of nanoliquor, and 
eventually all the teachers quit and home schooling has to be reintroduced.  Crime 
increases due to the lack of police officers and eventually some towns fall into anarchy.79  
Thus nanodestruction is brought about by what at first seems like a good idea, namely the 
reduction of poverty through nanomanufacturing.  
 
 
(b)  Unleashing nanoterror and/or creating the ‘nano-panopticon’? 
The nano-doomsday scenario will be familiar to readers of pulp fiction, or watchers of B-
movies in which cackling scientists maniacally work on destructive devices.  Although there 
are some positive texts, such as Damien Darby’s Nano Saviour (2012), in which 
nanomachines create an artificial intelligence that restores ecological stability, science 
fiction writers opt for more destructive and dystopian nanofutures – probably because 
impending disaster makes for a more thrilling plot.  Drexler’s famous end-of-the-world 
scenario is fairly popular; arguing that molecular assembly should be treated with caution, 
as assembler-based life forms, being more efficient than natural organisms, could destroy 
the biosphere.  He even suggests that runaway nanotechnology could turn the universe 
into ‘grey goo’ (although in fact he uses the image of dust to signify the state of matter once 
the biosphere has been consumed, a state that is indeed probably grey, but not particularly 
gooey).  Other writers have replicated this scenario in various doom-laden ways. Kurt 
Vonnegut’s 1962 Cat’s Cradle hypothesises a form of nano-permutation of water called 
'ice-nine', that is solid at room temperature, and which inevitably gets released into the 
environment, bringing about the end of the world.80  And in Walter Jon Williams’ Aristoi 
(1992), nano-apocalypse has already occurred – the universe is on its ‘backup version’, 
post the incident of ‘Mataglap Nano’,  a gray goo-style disaster which originated in 
Indonesia. 
Vonnegut’s apocalypse is created unintentionally, but what of more intentionally 
destructive uses of nanotechnology?  The US air force noted the following important areas  
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of nanoresearch in 2003: ‘increased information capabilities; miniaturization of systems; 
new materials resulting from new science at these scales, and increased functionality and 
autonomy.’  Taken together, this suggests the creation of autonomous war machines.81  
The latter sounds potentially rather doom-laden, reminiscent (at a stretch) of Kevin J. 
Anderson’s 1993 novel Assemblers of Infinity that shows Earth ironically making plans for 
war against ‘voracious’ nanos  (the familiar runaway technology scenario). 
In David Nelson’s 2011 thriller Nano War the protagonist works with Al-Qaeda on 
nanotechnology-based weapons of mass destruction that could soon be unleashed against 
America.  The 2007 test of a Russian thermobaric bomb allegedly revealed the 
development of a more efficient explosive manufactured through nanotechnology and 
might raise the dark image of suicide bombers with even more destructive power strapped 
to their bodies.82  However, Russia’s growing nanotech focus appears to be far broader 
than just military use, with eight priority directions of nanotechnology development defined 
as necessary for the Russian economy.83  There might be benefits as well, such as in more 
efficient battlefield wound treatments made available through nanoparticles. 
 Many science fiction texts use nanotechnology as a plot device, while offering 
cautionary tales of scientific hubris.  Others are more insightful in terms of their vision of the 
societal consequences of a new technology.  Chris Howard’s Nanowhere (2010) depicts a 
utopian world of ‘socialised medicine based on the coming miracle of molecular 
engineering.’84  Yet ultimately this leads to dictatorship, political prisoners and sterilized 
women. 
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One less frequent aspect of the nanofuture in science fiction is that of 'nano-
panopticism'.85  This occurs as a result of nanotechnology being used to create ultra-small 
surveillance devices.  In fact, a nanodevice capable of powering itself by harvesting energy 
from vibrations while at the same time wirelessly transmitting data over long distances was 
announced in 2011.  The team behind it suggested its positive outcomes for medical 
technology and the environment: 
The idea that something so small might be able to transmit data across distances 
could lead to new generations of medical sensors powered by a person’s own blood 
flow, environmental sensors powered by the ebb and flow of atmospheric air, and 
wearable sensors that run and transmit on the power leftover by the wearer’s own 
footsteps.86 
 
 
Less optimistically, devices of this type might have additional implications for privacy and 
civil liberties, for ‘nanotechnologies will enable more sophisticated monitoring and 
surveillance technology’.87  Yet science fiction writers, possibly because the ‘Big Brother’ 
idea of increased monitoring is such a staple of the genre, do not seem to have engaged 
with the question of whether the advent of nanotechnology has made this situation 
markedly more challenging in ethical terms.88  This is odd when we look at a 2004 survey in 
the US that reported how ‘losing personal privacy’ was the most salient concern about 
nanotechnology.  A survey taken a year later detected a confirmed a similar public 
opinion.89  But one can say that the privacy debate has been ongoing for some time, in 
various forms.  For example, in Japan there has been consistent interest shown in the 
issue of medical records confidentiality, whereas in the US, privacy debates have become  
subsumed under the problem of terrorism and security.90  Consequentially, nanoethicists  
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such as Bennett-Woods have asked whether personal privacy constitutes a basic human 
right, or if it should be subject to the ‘greater good’ of national safety and security.  If this is 
the case, then ‘what constitutes a morally unacceptable threshold of threat or risk to justify 
loss of privacy?’91 
In cyberpunk novels – a branch of science fiction depicting societies dominated by 
technology – surveillance is taken for granted within the fictional setting.  These worlds 
contain a ubiquitous level of nanotechnology, accelerating the datastream in which the 
characters now live.  They are worlds of fast information manipulation.  
The ramifications of nanosurveillance are broad, and there are various ethical 
dangers that might be created.  It would be possible to increase economic targeting of 
consumers due to monitoring devices.  Toumey predicts improved fingerprint recognition 
that could allow one to derive ‘lifestyle intelligence’ based on a person's fingerprints, such 
as whether s/he is a smoker.92  Perhaps more worrying might be so-called genetic 
discrimination based on increased nanodiagnostic information being available to, say, 
insurance companies.  Implanted biochips, although intended to monitor tumours or 
activate targeted therapy, may reveal further information that is detrimental to the patient’s 
insurance status.  Nanotechnology may offer the potential for faster and thus more cost-
effective genome mapping, thus population screening of neonates might become freely 
available.  This raises ethical issues already identified and relating to civil liberties including 
possible restrictions on insurance, employment, even reproduction. The 1997 film Gattaca, 
which featured fast DNA sequencing based on a nanotechnology device, and which 
allowed for both mentoring of and discrimination against so-called ‘imperfect’ humans, 
provides one extreme vision of a society based on nano-enabled elitism.  And in his 
Wondergenes, Mehlman suggests another elitism, offering the scenario of a Harvard  
Business School Class made up of applicants selected according to their genetic profiles, 
suggesting the creation of a new ‘genobility’.93 
This leads us into the topic of one particular form of potentially runway or 
destructive nanotechnology – human enhancement. 
 
                                                
91 Bennett-Woods, ibid, p. 147.  
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 c) Nanosoldiers, nanoelites, cyborgs, Frankensteins 
Doomsday scenarios aside, the major area of interest to science fiction writers appears to 
be that of human enhancement – perhaps obviously, given that writers of science futures  
are often interested in the next evolutionary step for humankind.  What kind of 
enhancement, however? Moral? Physical? Cognitive?  Savulescu suggests in writing on 
genetic enhancement that we might even improve our moral behaviour through 
enhancement.94  Nanomedicine is presented as the ‘key that will unlock the indefinite 
extension of human health and the expansion of human capabilities’.95  Does one not have 
a moral imperative to become the ‘best one can’?  Surely society as a whole benefits, the 
more its citizens improve?  Or is this ‘playing God’, with potentially disastrous socio-
economic consequences?96  The vision of molecular assembly, that of life ‘visualized as a 
do-it-yourself kit’, that ‘implies that we can also take the world apart and rebuild it to our 
own taste’ suggests obvious dangers.97  Jeff Carlson’s 2007 novel Plague Year shows 
nanomachines created to fight cancer inevitably malfunctioning.  This leads to the 
destruction of most planetary life forms.  The concern is that: 
Just as genetic science appeared to open “the book of life,” nanotechnology appears 
to give us an instruction manual for basic substances. Perhaps what makes 
nanotechnology seem to need nanoethics, then, is that it prompts questions about 
our control over nature - analogous to the ethical questions about changing human 
nature.98 
 
 
One novel that neatly encapsulates the issue of runaway technology and human 
enhancement is John Robert Marlow’s 2004 novel Nano, which offers the suggestion that 
enhancement must parallel nanotechnology – in short, we need to be smarter if we are to 
control such dangerous technology.  Nanotechnology is released upon the world as a  
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weapon that disassembles all in its path, a clear nod to Drexler’s ‘grey goo’ scenario.99  
Marlow makes the point that humankind is not evolutionarily advanced enough to deal with 
this new technology capable of being used for good and evil; and thus we will usually end 
up with evil.  Molecular assemblers can create mature trees in seconds and free a dying 
bird from an oil spill through hydrocarbon disassembly, but nanotechnology is equally, in 
Marlow's protagonist's words, power: ‘Invincibility. Immortality. Wealth from nothing’.100   
 Marlow offers the familiar ‘technology as too much power’ scenario, and the reader 
awaits the inevitable demonstration of hubristic destruction for ‘complex technologies 
create totalitarian technocracies’.101  The only way to avert doomsday is for the protagonist 
and his partner to inject nanites into their brain in hope of hyper-evolution.  This would give 
them the ability to come up with an answer to the question of how to stop the nanoswarm.  
The answer to militaristic totalitarianism is to allow the world to be run by two new 
nanoenhanced superintelligences - nanoelitism replacing nanodestruction.  Or, a more 
positive message might be that enhancement relating to the evolution of one’s moral 
capacity is required in using any other nanotech. 
   As Marlow’s novel suggests, the idea of nanotechnology being used as an 
enhancement weapon is a popular one in science fiction, though we might remain sceptical 
of it being developed in the real world. 
One specific area of concern is that of militarily-directed nanoenhancement.  The 
2009 report on the ethics of human enhancement prepared for the US National Science 
Foundation identified several potential issues for ethical debate, including that of an 
enhanced elite being unfairly advantaged, particularly in military contexts.102  Joy’s 
‘Faustian bargain’, the trading of security for destructive technology, is difficult to pin down 
in factual terms due to a lack of public information about defence projects, particularly in  
China.103  We know that in the US, MIT’s Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (ISN) was 
established in 2002 with $50 million of funding from the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA).  It aims to create a 21st century battle suit that ‘combines high-
tech capabilities with light weight and comfort…that monitors health, eases injuries, 
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communicates automatically, and maybe even lends superhuman abilities.’104  Whether this 
is merely a better piece of battle gear, rather than enhancement in the strict sense of 
changing human physiology, is a question made more complicated by simultaneous work 
being carried out on internal enhancement.  This means the use of smart drugs to improve 
combat readiness as well as to create a defence against biological, bacteriological or 
chemical combat agents.  The drug Modafinil is a prominent example, allegedly providing 
combatants with 40 hours of alertness.  
Science fiction can conceive of even more insidious weapons, as in Linda Nagata’s 
Deception Well (1997), one of the four novels in her ‘Nanotech Succession’ series.  The 
protagonist is infected by a ‘cult’ nanovirus that exudes nano-created psychoactive 
enzymes that transform anyone into adoring followers.  He attempts to lead his followers to 
salvation; however, the reader is left to ask whether this is truly for some ‘greater good’, or 
if it is another exercise of power.  Nagata’s Tech-Heaven (1995) looks at the idea of power 
in a different but similarly disturbingly religious context.  Here, nanobiotechnology is used to 
‘resurrect’ the dead and so the protagonist has her husband’s body frozen in the hope that 
nanomachines might 'raise the dead' and ‘make the universe her playground’.105    
 
 
The idea that enhancement is dangerous because it might create human beings with 
‘superpowers’ has been developed by some writers into depictions of societal dangers, 
such as elitism.  The ongoing debate about the demographic shift to a large elderly 
population, a problem exacerbated by some countries’ falling birth rates, as well as the 
rising costs of care, is dealt with by science fiction writers in more extreme terms.  
‘Immortality’ treatments in dystopian texts, be they nano-manufactured or else 
biotechnological, are usually reserved for an elite class of society.  James Gunn’s The 
Immortals (1958) and Elizabeth Moon’s The Serrano Legacy series (1993-2000)  
demonstrate this problem well; immortality markedly increases the gap between those who 
have access to treatment and those denied the privilege.  Although we might consider 
current research into a nanoparticle anti-cancer drug as a wonderful, ethical way of 
improving the quality and duration of life,106 will be shared with all, given the cost of 
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developing such treatments and the result of prior debates on the cost of retroviral 
medication?107  Or are we back to the idea of nanoelitism? 
 
The idea of a race of ‘superhumans’ with a godlike ability to manipulate matter may seem 
rather far-fetched. Nevertheless, it is an idea that adds to the ongoing debates in bioethics 
on the nature of being human.  Elaine Graham, looking at digital, cybernetic, and 
biomedical advances in terms of their impact on our understanding of human beings, 
argues that technology is seen as a kind of liberation.  Humans are released from 
‘vulnerability, contingency and specificity' revealing 'a doctrine of humanity informed 
fundamentally by a distrust of the body, death and finitude’.108  Graham contends that 
liberation results from the removal of any reminders of our limitations.  This might include 
human flesh, which can reveal our weakness, frailty and finitude.  Yet for many science 
fiction writers, any superpowers inevitably lead to hubris, and consequent disaster.  In their 
view, humans should not ‘play God’. 
Perhaps an ethical distinction should be drawn between overcoming and 
enhancing.109  Any medical procedure could conceivably change one’s view of self, if only 
from sick or incapable to that of well and filled with potential.  But a distinction between 
therapy and enablement, (i.e. between Foucault's subject 'constructed within a benevolent  
narrative of amelioration and healing'110 and that of the subject pursuing perfectionism),111  
frequently informs the debate.  Critics of enhancement tend to stress the ‘special’ gift or 
uniqueness of human nature, asserting that any tampering with it would blur the definition  
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and in some way detracts from our humanness.112 
The most prevalent form of human enhancement in Western science fiction relates 
to what is called ‘NBIC’ convergence. NBIC, as the acronym has it, refers to the 
convergence of the disciplines of nanotechnology, biology, IT and cognitive science.  
 At one end of the spectrum, it involves uploading consciousness into a computer, 
while at the other it leads to nanotechnological engineering at neural levels, enhancing 
cognition or consciousness through neural implants or some kind of brain computer. 
Swiestra et al have utilised the convergence issue to interrogate whether existing 
interpretative or cognitive frameworks would become deficient compared with enhanced 
nano-consciousness.113  Dupuy goes further to say that as cognitive science takes the 
leading role in NBIC, it effectively becomes a research program examining new methods of 
perceiving reality.114 
Yet what might be lost if humanity were to evolve into cyborgism, becoming heavily 
reliant on technology?  One answer comes from Kathleen Goonan’s Queen City Jazz 
(1994), the first nanotech novel.  Noonan’s ‘nanotech cycle’ of Queen City Jazz, Mississippi 
Blues (1997), the prequel Crescent City Rhapsody (2000), and Light Music (2002), 
examines the issue of threats to identity from nanotechnology.  In Queen City Jazz, 
Goonan’s futuristic Cincinnati is a place where huge bio-engineered bees carry information 
through the streets, and enormous nanotech energy-producing flowers burst from the tops 
of strange buildings. It also depicts an ‘NBIC’ future, in which uploaded consciousnesses 
form part of a hive or group mind.  The  ‘information nanos’ designed to educate, and 
described as ‘cheap and easy brain growth for the masses’, lead to a future lacking in 
humanity, freedom, and individuality.115  The problem is not entirely technological in 
Goonan’s novel; instead it is the result of a hubristic scientist's reach exceeding his grasp.  
The nanoarchitect’s desire to keep his mother alive leads him to upload her into the city 
mind, creating a tyrannical queen bee who rules the city.  The moral of the story is of 
course that humanity is probably not to be trusted with the tool of nanotech.  Our emotions, 
which arguably make us human, may lead us into error.  Thus Goonan suggests that  
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nanotechnology is merely a part of the journey of self-discovery; and that with our 
greater knowledge both of self and of matter, the tools of nanotechnology might be 
entrusted to us.  For Goonan, nanotech acts as a ‘metaphor for the power of thought, and 
for the power of language.  This may sound odd, but it seems that the more we understand 
matter the better we understand ourselves’.116 
 Nanotechnological enhancement may lead us to a new transhuman or posthuman 
state.  The terms ‘transhuman’, ‘posthuman’ and ‘extropian’ are often used without 
particular distinction, but the latter tends to be a more political expression (the five 
principles of extropianism published by Max More, co-founder of the Extropy Institute in 
1992 include a focus on anti-government interference).  Transhumanists see the 
enhancement movement as a unified effort between science and technology toward human 
progress, enhancement resulting in greater good.117  Transhumanism and posthumanism 
can be distinguished as stages on the enhancement path, as suggested by Nick Bostrom, 
founder of the World Transhumanist Association.  He defines ‘posthuman’ as a term for the 
more advanced beings that humans may one day design themselves into ‘if we manage to 
upgrade our current human nature and radically extend our capacities’.118 
Some science fiction writers consider the idea of physical enhancement as a 
positive one, as Charles Sheffield does in The Cyborg from Earth (1998).  In this tale, the 
protagonist is saved from death by nanomeds that remake his body.  These are benign 
tools that, despite remodelling the protagonist’s plump self, do not change his basic design.  
This is rather different to the posthumanist vision often explored by science fiction writers in 
terms of the ‘postnatural’ state of NBIC convergence, or uploaded consciousness.119  In this 
context, the human being might be discussed in terms more familiar to software engineers, 
as data, or as a composition of manipulated computer codes expressive of the equivalence 
between materiality and informatics.  Human ontology might thus become digitized with the 
unification of flesh and data, bodies and information.120  Venkatesan argues that NBIC 
convergence may imply the reductionist creation of a nanoself losing the ‘considerations of 
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spirituality, sociality, psychological and mental well-being, and the human needs for 
nurturing and sustenance' in 'the grandeur of the technological visions of convergence’.121 
Charles Stross’ Glasshouse (2006) depicts a universe in which nanotechnology 
allows minds to be fully digitized, backed up and restored; thus people are able to swap 
physical bodies and edit or manufacture memories at any time.  His novel outlines the 
freedom that can come to a society with unlimited plasticity of identity, though his 
protagonists become paradoxically trapped in a terrifying social experiment, or panoptical 
‘glasshouse.’122  In his collection Accelerando (2005) he repeats this negative stance on 
nano-induced freedom, arguing that enhancement may lead to slavery, not superhuman 
abilities.  Stross offers a (deliberately sentimental) example of enhancement resulting in 
‘slavery’ – kittens’ neural networks enhanced and enslaved to missile guidance systems.123 
The theme of man's enslavement to his own technology returns us to the ‘runaway 
doom’ scenario, as in Linda Nagata’s The Bohr Maker (1995). Nagata looks at nano as a 
potentially liberating technology; the heroine Phousita’s horror at being internally colonised 
by nanotech is balanced by the power that it gives her to flee her poverty-stricken existence 
and browbeating husband.  However, such a vision is contradicted by an alternative use of 
nanotech, one requiring a trade-off in terms of individual freedom, as characters become 
absorbed into a form of group mind.  Bohr’s maker is the catalyst for revolution, for political 
liberty, yet not liberty as we might relish it. This ambiguous novel shows that the 
consequences of nanotechnology's transformation of humanity are as yet not fully 
understood. 
Stross’ Accelerando collection introduces a debate on a new legal concept of ‘what 
it is to be a person’, namely, one ‘that can cope with sentient corporations, artificial 
stupidities, secessionists from group minds, and reincarnated uploads’.124  Questioning 
what enhancement is for, Stross describes a group of ‘uplifted’ virtual lobsters who desire 
freedom from the world which has given them sentience without purpose or clarity.125  
Stross discusses the ‘not human’ economic system that a digital new world might construct, 
as well as the issue of dealing with a distributed ‘superego’ that occurs when one’s self is 
uploaded to several technological devices, a nanobiology-enabled dissolution of the human 
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into a posthuman distributed network, potentially resulting in a new form of group 
consciousness, or otherwise leading to utter fragmentation and loss.126  Enhancement may 
create wonderful new forms of identity, or it could result in the complete destruction of our 
humanity.  If being human is what gives us purpose, then another negative consequence of 
immortality is the pointlessness of eternal life.  In texts that depict a NBIC future, when 
‘computer-based life will supplant biological life’, as in Robert J. Sawyer’s Flashforward 
(1999),127 or Greg Egan’s Permutation City (1994), machine-human consciousnesses 
struggles to find a purpose.  This is the major theme of Kage Baker’s Company series 
(1997-2007), in which nano-repaired immortals (cyborgs) are sent back in time as historical 
scavengers, but are unable to find meaning in their lengthened existence. 
 
 
In conclusion, Western science fiction writers have identified many of the topics that appear 
in journal articles on the social and ethical implications of nanotechnology, such as: 
• Whether nanomedicine is beneficial, or leads to enhancement with potentially 
negative effects in terms of creating new elite and ‘inhuman’ identities 
• Whether nanotechnology can be uncontrollably destructive 
• Whether it will measurably increase our loss of privacy. 
 
What other nanoissues can be identified, outside of the pages of science fiction novels? 
And to return to our earlier question, do the East and West have varying perceptions of 
nanoissues?  If so, how have nanoethics debates developed in the EU and in China? 
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the noosphere, or next evolutionary, collective level of consciousness; is term used by Stross in the 
Accelerando collection (p. 99).  
127 Robert J. Sawyer, Flashforward (New York: Tor,1999), p.166. 
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1.2 Nanoethics debates in the EU and in China 
Either the ethics of NT (nanotechnology) will catch up or the science will slow 
down.128 
 
Bioethics does not serve society well simply by promoting a respect for other 
cultures. That’s nice, but not enough. It better promotes society by helping to develop 
the criteria and standards for knowing which practices and values should be 
accepted and affirmed, which simply tolerated, and which rejected.129 
 
 
The mainstreaming of debates about nanotechnology in the West is due in part to the 
publication of reports by Greenpeace, the Royal Society and Royal Academy (RS/RAE), 
and insurance company Swiss Re in 2003-4.  The first of these called for greater public 
debate so as to ensure the environmental benefits and risks of nanotechnology were 
understood, the second looked at chemical regulation and general socio-ethical issues, and 
the third looked at nanoparticle risks. 
One platform for nanoethics debates in the West is the journal NanoEthics: Ethics for 
Technologies that Converge at the Nanoscale (Springer), begun in 2007.  Of course, 
literature on nanoethics appeared well before that date, and Kjolberg and Wickson have 
written a useful account of pre-2007 literature on the nanoethics field (1994-2006), 
demonstrating a peak in publications during 2003.  Their database reveals four key areas 
of interest in the EU and US. First, governance, the ‘processes and institutions for decision 
making, regulation, legislation and public engagement.’130  Early discussion of the ethics of 
nanotechnology in the EU and US has understandably tended to focus on risks to human 
health and to the environment, a context that places an emphasis on determining whether 
precautionary and regulatory measures are appropriate and efficient.  The other three 
areas of particular interest defined by Kjølberg and Wickson were: 
Perception: examining how nano is understood, presented, talked about and imaged. 
Science: exploring the practice of nano S&T [Science & Technology] development 
and instrumentation. Philosophy: engaging questions of metaphysics, the 
natural/artificial and ethical norms.131 
 
 
                                                
128 A. Mnyusiwalla, A.S.  Daar, P.  Singer, ‘Mind the gap. Science and ethics in nanotechnology’, 
Nanotechnology 14 (2003), R9–R13, p. R12. 
 129 Daniel Callahan, ‘Universalism and Particularism. Fighting to a Draw’, Hastings Centre Report 
30.1 (2000), 37-44 (p. 44). 
130 Kamilla Kjølberg,  Fern Wickson, ‘Social and Ethical Interactions with Nano: Mapping the Early 
Literature’, NanoEthics 1 (2007), 89–104 (p. 92).   
131 Kjolberg, Wickson, ibid, p. 93. 
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The issue of risk governance due to fears of toxicity will be dealt with later in this thesis, as 
the differing approaches of the EU and China to nanopolicy may indicate some basis for 
further comparison. Before looking at those areas of risk policy and public perception, 
however, we need to first establish the other concerns that exist. If there is broad 
agreement on these issues, then we should look at whether the difference then consists in 
how these issues are prioritised and handled for it is important to determine which socio-
ethical framework forms the context for discussion.  Once we have identified the core 
values that appear to underpin each region’s general approach to ethics, we may be able  
 
to suggest a way of reaching global consensus.  To this end, we are interested in looking at 
any differences between the 'narratives' of each region and the way that these 
contextualise nanotechnology.  This might mean understanding nanotechnology as 
economic and scientific progress, or as part of a debate over precaution and responsibility.  
To identify these contexts, this thesis will focus on: 
• Critical literature on nanoethics published in each region, and  
• The regional bioethics background already in existence. 
 
 
Debates on nanoethics - EU 
The 2008 report from the Rathenau Institute in (the Netherlands (which promotes the 
formation of public and political opinion on S&T) examined a list of societal questions about 
nanotechnology compiled chiefly by the EU, to ‘determine whether this list is complete, and 
to establish the degree of urgency which the NGOs attach to various issues’.132  The 
conclusion was that debates on nanotechnology, given the breadth of the area, need to be 
targeted, clearly defined, and considered separately from other debates on health and 
S&T. The report also notes current public awareness of nanotechnology as ‘extremely 
low’.133 
Western commentators on nanotechnology issues usually come up with a list that, 
apart from toxicity related primarily to health and environmental risks, tends to incorporate 
the following: 
 
                                                
132  Lucien Hanssen, Bart Walhout, Rinie van Est, Ten lessons for a nanodialogue. The Dutch 
debate about nanotechnology thus far (The Hague: Rathenau Institute, 2008), p. 55. 
133 Ibid, p. 60. 
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• Privacy 
• Enhancement 
• Military usage 
• Equity, including the equity issue in developing countries, and  
• Public involvement.134 
 
 
Other issues are more specific, such as Spagnolo and Daloiso’s suggestion that one area 
of ethical concern is the shift from patient-doctor interaction to home-care technology used 
by the patient (portable medical nanotechnology).135  Schummer has also raised the issue 
of intellectual property rights.136  Another concern, less widely discussed, has been that of 
technological determinism.  The vision of ‘autonomous’ technology, with the human being 
reduced to a spectator of progress, assumes a pessimistic resignation to deterministic 
forces, allowing technology to act as a force unto itself, with neither the public nor scientists 
claiming agency over it.  Jamison has taken a view that the strong economic drive may 
cause a S&T ‘hegemonic’ narrative to appear, in terms of which there is little concern for 
societal values.  He argues that nanotechnology is developing according to a commercial 
model; this does not mean that its applications cannot have social value, but this value 
would inevitably be only a secondary concern.137 
  
 
How best to categorise all these issues? At this point it is useful to introduce Barakat and 
Jaio’s three categories of nanoethical issues:  
1. Life-basics ethics (Risk and ‘first do no harm’ ethics). This includes concepts like 
autonomy, military applications, fear of uncontrolled actions (e.g. run-away 
reactions and uncontrolled self replications), and health hazards.  
2. Life-quality ethics (justice and equality ethics): This includes ideas like the nano-
divide where the gap between rich and poor nations will increase.  
                                                
134 Stephen Wood, Alison Geldart, Richard Jones, ‘Crystallizing the nanotechnology debate’, 
Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 20.1 (2008), 13-27, p. 17.  
135 Antonio G. Spagnolo, Viviana Daloiso, ‘Outlining Ethical Issues in Nanotechnologies’, Bioethics 
23.7 (2009), 394-402 (p. 396). 
136 Joachim Schummer, ‘Identifying ethical issues of nanotechnologies’, in  Nanotechnologies, Ethics 
and Politics (Paris: UNESCO, 2007), 79-99. 
137 A. Jamison, ‘Can Nanotechnology be Just?’, ibid, p.129.  
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3. Life and human definition ethics: This includes the concept of integrity and issues 
related to human change.138 
 
 
The journal NanoEthics  announced its mission as that of focusing on issues that ‘include 
individual health, wellbeing and human enhancement, human integrity and autonomy, 
distribution of the costs and benefits, threats to culture and tradition and to political and 
economic stability.’139  The years 2007 to 2010 covered general areas of ongoing concern,  
with articles on risk and regulation, enhancement, nanomedicine, NBIC, and public 
perceptions – in addition to other topics including justice, teaching nanoethics, green 
nanotechnology, intellectual property rights, ambivalence towards technology, Australian 
and Thai nanoresearch, and nanoethics.   
What of more recent topics?  The journal has addressed the controversial issue of 
animal disenhancement – an interesting branch of the nanoenhancement debate (volume 
6, April 2012).140  A series on ‘imaging’ the nanoscale raised the question of the 
relationship between science and art (volume 5, August 2011).  Ruivenkamp and Rip’s 
article on the speculative nature of nanoethics demonstrates how this problem is 
exacerbated by the essentially ‘unseen’ nature of the nanoscale.141  The same issue, via 
Grinbaum’s article on the iconography of nanotechnology, picked up this issue of ‘the 
unseen’, describing the knowledge gap between scientist and layperson as a ‘two-class 
system’.142 
This brings us to a nexus of issues centred on the role of the public. This topic, of 
public involvement in the nanodebate and in nanopolicy, will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four, but the main aspects of the debate can be briefly noted here.  The first is 
that of public education, more specifically noted by Grinbaum as the problem of  
 
                                                
138  Nael Barakat,  Heidi Jiao, ‘Proposed Strategies for Teaching Ethics of Nanotechnology’,  
NanoEthics 4 (2010),  221-8. 
139  The focus of the journal is described at:  
<http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/applied+ethics/journal/11569>.  The statement includes: 
‘additionally there are meta-issues including the neutrality or otherwise of technology, designing 
technology in a value-sensitive way, and the control of scientific research.’ 
140 For example, chickens might be bred blind (purposely disenhanced) to improve their welfare in 
animal commodity contexts such as dark breeding pens. 
141 Martin Ruivenkamp,  Arie Rip, ‘Entanglement of Imaging and Imagining of Nanotechnology’, 
NanoEthics 5.2 (2011), 185-193. 
142 Alexei Grinbaum, ‘Nanotechnological Icons’, NanoEthics 5.2 (2011), 195-202 (p. 201). 
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communicating a complex, microscopic science that cannot be demonstrated easily. 
Science can be lexically challenging for a wider audience liable to lose patience with the 
debate if the issues are not particularly clear-cut, an educational difficulty confirmed by the 
ongoing debates on global warming which reveal how ‘disinformation’ through lobbying 
may frustrate public discussion.143  In addition, risk-reporting tends to take place in the 
general media at the expense of articles on the benefits of nanotechnology, which are 
confined to business or science sections with much smaller audiences.144 Moreover, 
nanotechnology risk has a clear sensationalist appeal, which if amplified by the media, can 
lead to stigmatization of a technology to the point that it becomes ‘blemished’ or ‘tainted’ by 
discourses of risk’.145 
The next issue is that articles on the undefined risks of a product backed by strong 
economic imperatives, with ‘low gates’ to the market in regulatory terms, are symptomatic 
of a continued interest in ‘anticipatory assessment’ as well as perceived tensions between 
public trust and corporate responsibility.146  Some of the more interesting debates in 
NanoEthics have been on the ‘de-centralisation’ of nanoresearch and policy, for instance 
by shifting the emphasis onto the person rather than the institution or policy-making 
body.147  On this topic, Am, Nielsen and Nydal claim that the nanotechnology field ‘went  
global before it had reached a mature state' and that there 'has not been, as it were, a 
centre delivering core knowledge to be consumed, imitated, opposed or modulated in the 
periphery.’148  Is it therefore up to the scientist and the public to take responsibility? 
Perhaps philosopher Han Jonas's familiar notion – that we need an ethics of responsibility 
now that power has outstripped knowledge in terms of technology – has resurfaced.   
 
 
                                                
143 Jerry C. Collins, ‘Nanotechnology and Society: A Call for Rational Dialogue’, in Nanoscale, ibid, 
115-128. 
144  See L.F. Stephens, ‘News Narratives about Nano S&T in Major U.S. and Non-U.S. Newspapers’, 
Science Communication 27.2 (2005), 175-99.  
145  Alan Petersen, Alison Anderson, ‘A Question of Balance or Blind Faith? Scientists’ and Science 
Policymakers’ Representations of the Benefits and Risks of Nanotechnologies’, NanoEthics (2007), 
243–256. Nicholas Russell, Communicating Science (Cambridge, CUP 2010), p. 108, p. 112.  See 
also A. Irwin, ‘Constructing the scientific citizen: Science and democracy in the biosciences’, Public 
Understanding of Science 10 (2001), 1-18, and Alison Anderson et al, Nanotechnology, Risk and 
Communication, ibid, p. 60. 
146 Wade L. Robison,  ‘Nano-Technology, Ethics, and Risks’, NanoEthics  5.1 (2011),  1-13 (p. 11). 
147 See for example Myska on the Norwegian NANOTRUST initiative, focusing on the 
trustworthiness of researchers:Bjørn K. Myskja ‘Trustworthy Nanotechnology: Risk, Engagement 
and Responsibility, NanoEthics 5.1 (2011), 49-56. 
148 Kåre Nolde Nielsen, Trond Grønli Åm, Rune Nydal, ‘Centre and Periphery of Nano -  A  
Norwegian Context’, NanoEthics  5.1 (2011),  87-98 (pp. 90-1). 
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Debates on nanoethics - China 
While China has given the risk issue priority in cases such as the credible effects of 
nanoparticles on humans and the environment, there has also been acknowledgement of  
other societal concerns.  This is mentioned in The Director’s Note in the 2007-8 Annual 
Report of the China Nanosafety Lab, in which it is stated that the lab ‘must take an 
extensive and deep research of nanotechnological influence on human health, 
environment, and social problems’.149  The problem is that despite mentioning these social 
problems, the report does not provide any further detail on what they might be. This is 
explained by the fact that concerns about nanoethics started later in China than in the EU.  
China’s belief in social progress through scientific development means that economic 
impetus, rather than societal concern, is often the major driver and overriding impetus 
behind new technologies.  Thus, compared to the reasonably extensive debate in the EU, 
the Chinese nanoethics debate is fairly low-key.  
Ying likens nanotechnology concerns to genetically enhanced (GM) foods issues, 
implying a public acceptance issue, albeit without much exploration of the problem, a topic 
that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.150  Li discusses environmental 
problems by giving the example of a Korean company that halted production of a particular 
model of washing machine following pressure from Friends of the Earth, as well as noting 
wider issues such as increased lifespan due to nanomedical development  
and the societal impact that this might incur.151  Wang notes potential problems related to 
consumer rights (in the context of food and cosmetics products), in addition to privacy and 
intellectual property rights issues.152  Fan, perhaps the most ‘Western’ in his strong societal 
emphasis on nanoethics, notes that ‘compared with safety issues, research on ethical, 
legal and social issues should be strengthened’, as should dialogue between the scientific 
community and the public.153 
But as Cao and Li note, the shift from an approach to nanotechnology policy and 
regulation based predominantly in the scientific community, to one founded on regulations 
                                                
149 Director’s Note, Forefront, (2007-9) (Annual Report). 
150 H.J. Ying, ’Managing the Risks of Nanotechnology Development’,  Chinese Science Forum 5 
(September 2006), 110-113. My thanks go to Professor Ma Ying of CASTED for supplying me with 
this article, and those mentioned in footnotes 131, 132 and 134, and to my students Xi Wang and 
Yvonne Yu for their translations.  
151 S.H. Li, ‘Small World, Big Results’, Chinese Social Science News 11 (8 April), 1-2. 
152 G.Y. Wang, ‘Nanotechnology Safety and Regulation’, Daily News,  11 November 2010, 1- 2. 
153 C. Fan, ‘The Ethical Environment of Nano-Science’, Presentation Transcript, 3rd International 
Workshop on Innovation and Performance Management, 1-4 July, 2010, University of Kent. 
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developed in collaboration with social scientists is an ongoing process.154  Choi's 2003 
study listed the following issues which need to be addressed by Asian nanoethicists: 
• Equity between those with access to technology and those without, both in terms 
of developed versus underdeveloped countries, as well as internally within rural 
and urban populations 
• Privacy issues in Confucian systems (there has long been debate over the 
individual’s right to privacy of medical information, for example, particularly in 
Japan) 
• Gender issues (as the majority of nanoscientists are male) 
• Brain implants and other issues relating to human enhancement 
• Undue inducement, for human subjects in nanomedical clinical trials for example  
• Military uses of new technologies 
• Environmental toxicity, including how effectively nanowaste can be managed in 
space-limited countries with large populations. 
 
 
This list is not markedly different to Western concerns, however we can more fully 
appreciate the differences by comparing China's approach with that of Taiwan.  Taiwan's 
National Strategic Plan for Responsible Nanotechnology reflects the government’s ambition 
to realize the full potential of nanotechnologies while acknowledging that there  
may be a harmful societal impact.  This outlook on technology policy can be summed up in 
the following section from the most recent Taiwanese Science and Technology 
Development Plan (2009-2012): 
Appropriate ethical and legal responses may be needed to deal with the risks posed 
by new technologies to life and the environment, and the ethical conflicts they 
cause…Unlike such areas as medical biotechnology, where ethics committees have 
been established, little has been done thus far to address research ethics in many 
new technological fields in Taiwan (such as genetic technology and 
nanotechnology).155  
 
                                                
154 N. Cao, S. Li, ‘The Development of China’s Nanotechnology Needs Allies in Humanities and 
Social Sciences’, Chinese Social Sciences Today, 25th September, 2010, at 
<http://sspress.cass.cn/newspaper/paper.aspx?Id=1000129>.  
155 National Science and Technology Development Plan 2009-2012 (National Science Council, 
Taiwan, 2012),  at <http://web1.nsc.gov.tw/public/Attachment/91214167571.PDF>,  p. 60; See also 
Mika Purra,  Noah Richmond, 'Mapping Emerging Nanotechnology Policies and Regulation: The 
Case of Taiwan' (2010), at 
<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/regulatingnanotechnologiesnanopdfs/
Taiwan2010.pdf>. 
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The Thai government is currently reviewing the country’s first strategy plan on 
nanotechnology safety and ethics, drafted in 2011. This sounds more proactive in terms of 
nanoethics than China, although Harmon et al note that very little ethical debate has really 
taken place in Taiwan.  Despite the formation of Taiwan’s National Science and 
Technology Programme for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology, an organisation that 
coordinates various regulatory bodies, there are no nanoscience ethics committees and it 
is arguable that civil society groups have been marginalised.  Given the so-called Asian 
drive towards technology as economically advantageous, the Taiwanese nanonarrative, 
like that of China, tends to be positive, and ‘serves in some respects as a cultural counter-
point’ to the more cautionary approach more often found in Europe.156 
 
 
In conclusion, the above discussion indicates that there are several familiar topics in 
nanoethics debates that resurface frequently. In both China and the EU, the issue of risk to 
human health and environment are clearly a priority; the enhancement, military and privacy 
debates less so, while the equity issue tends to be even further down the scale.   The table 
below summarizes the general approach to such issues in both the EU and China.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
156 Shawn H. E. Harmon, Shang-Yung Yen and Shu-Mei Tang, ‘Invigorating ‘Nanoethics’: 
Recommendations for Improving Deliberations in Taiwan and Beyond’, NanoEthics  5.3(2011),  309-
318  (p. 312). 
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Table 3: Main nanoethics issues in China and in the EU 
 
 Pro (West) Contra (West) Pro (East) Contra (East) 
Enhance
-ment  
A new and improved 
‘better human’ with 
increased longevity, 
fewer health issues, 
possibly even 
enhanced 
intelligence through 
IT/cognitive/biologic
al convergence 
(NBIC) 
Creation of new 
elites (enhancement 
only for the rich); 
loss of ‘humanness’ 
(‘nanoself’); 
increased longevity 
means more 
pressure on 
resources 
Not seen as an 
issue in 
public/scientific 
debate 
IT/neurobio-
engineered 
implants;  
equity of 
access 
Nano’s 
impact 
on 
health 
Health amelioration, 
better drugs; 
portability  – better 
health care for 
remote and rural 
communities; 
economic benefit of 
reduced health care 
spending and 
innovation 
Threats to human 
health through 
dermal exposure or 
inhalation or 
ingestion of 
nanoparticles 
Health care 
improvements, 
commercial  
advantages 
Threats to 
human health 
through dermal 
exposure or 
inhalation or 
ingestion of 
nanoparticles 
On the 
environ
ment 
Amelioration of 
environmental 
issues such as non-
potable 
groundwater; 
increased 
agricultural yields 
Threat to 
environmental health  
Improved 
fertilizers, thus 
increased 
agricultural 
yields 
Threat to 
environmental 
health; 
nanowaste and 
space 
limitations 
Military 
Applic-
ations of 
Better wound care; 
more precise 
targeting (less 
Leading to  ‘unequal 
wars’; creation of 
‘supersoldiers’  
Better weaponry Military uses of 
nanotechnolog
y, i.e. weapons 
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nano  collateral damage) 
How 
nano 
might 
affect 
access 
& equity 
 
General economic 
benefit globally in 
terms of new 
products that will 
affect the 
construction, energy, 
medtech and IT 
industries 
Increased 
(nano)divide 
between developed 
and developing 
countries  - issues of 
distributive justice, 
global benefit  
Economic 
stimulus for all  
Nanodivides 
within Asian 
countries with 
large rural 
and/or poor 
populations; 
undue 
inducement 
Relating 
to 
privacy 
Smaller and less 
obtrusive 
surveillance devices; 
greater security 
Increasingly 
miniaturised 
surveillance devices 
lead to potential loss 
of civil liberties, 
increased 
surveillance of 
average citizens;  
privacy of medical 
information becomes 
an issue 
Greater security Access to 
medical 
records, e.g. 
may harm civil 
liberties 
Relating 
to public 
percep-
tions 
Pro-‘advancement’ Public acceptance 
post GM-food issue 
is vital for economic 
success of new 
products 
Stimulus to 
purchasing 
power; ‘nano’ is 
an advertising 
plus 
Public fears 
might impede 
economic 
progress 
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Chapter Two: Bioethics as an approach to nanoethics in 
China and the EU 
 
‘I’ve learnt from the GM debate’, says Welland.  ‘It’s easy to condemn a technology, 
but hard to fight back.’1 
 
 
The brief discussion of literature on nanotechnology issues in Chapter One offers some 
idea of what occupies the minds of nanoethicists. How else might we approach 
nanoethics?  One argument is that nanoethics is an extension of bioethics debates. As 
Grunwald argues, ‘many of the ethical questions raised by nanotechnology are already 
known […]  The ethics of technology, bioethics, the ethics of medicine, [and] the 
theoretical philosophy of technology’ already consider questions relevant to nanoethics.2  
Nanoethics, given that nanomedicine and issues of risk to human health (toxicity) are the 
immediate issues with nanotechnology, is inevitably ‘in some respects modelled on the 
development of bioethics’.3  While critics value the starting point offered by an already-
documented field, they also appear to wish for something broader, though which remains 
difficult to define.  Since a new and broader framework has yet to appear, one can argue 
that existing bioethics frameworks and narratives provide the most likely basis for 
nanopolicy and nanoethics development.4 
 
 
The GM controversy  
Before looking at bioethics, however, one might note that references to food ethics were 
constantly made in early discussions of nanotechnology issues (and indeed continue to be 
made), parallels being drawn with the introduction of GM food and the subsequent public  
 
                                                
1 Professor Mark Wellland (Head of the Cambridge Neuroscience Centre), quoted in   J. Giles, 
’Nanotechnology: What is there to fear from something so small?’, Nature  1 (2004), p. 750. 
2 A. Grunwald, ‘Nanotechnology – a new field of ethical enquiry’, Science  
Engineering Ethics 11 (2005), 187-201 (p. 198). 
3 Adam Keiper, ‘Nanoethics as a Discipline?’, The New Atlantis (2007), 55-67 (p. 55). 
4 Maura A. Ryan, ‘Beyond a Western Bioethics?’, Theological Studies 65 92004), 158-177. 
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outcry in some EU countries.5  It is therefore worth spending a little time on the 
controversy, and on the way it may show differing – or not – public attitudes in China and 
the EU, as well as public involvement in debates on the introduction of new technologies 
that might be potentially harmful while promising huge benefits.  
Public response to GM food in the EU grew negatively with the publication of 
reports alleging that GM food was ’unsafe’, that  several GM crops had affected wildlife by 
reducing amounts of weed seed, and that GM crops offered little or no economic benefit.6  
Despite the fact that there is no evidence of toxicity relating to GM crops, as noted in a 
2008 review published by the Royal Society of Medicine,7 the belief in the EU that this was 
a ‘Frankenfood’ was widely held in the 1990s.  Following this public outcry over 'unsafe’ 
food, the EU Council of Ministers placed a moratorium on GM food in 1998.  This ban on 
genetically modified food imports is estimated to have cost the US over 6 billion dollars in 
corn exports.  
Studies in developing countries indicate that nanotechnology has the potential to 
advance agricultural productivity, particularly through more efficient fertilizers.8  But in 
March 2008 Friends of the Earth called for ‘a moratorium on the further commercial 
release of food products, food packaging, food contact materials and agrochemicals that 
contain manufactured nanomaterials until nanotechnology-specific regulation is introduced 
to protect the public, workers and the environment from their risks, and until the public is 
involved in decision making.’9  A report from the Institute of Food Science and Technology 
in the UK argued that more safety data is required before nanoparticles can be included in  
                                                
5 The 2001 survey across the EU on GM food (averaged at 56% against) indicated both an 
interesting variety of responses, from strong negative reaction in Britain and Belgium to lesser 
opposition in Spain and little in the Netherlands. Later surveys have shown a ‘downward trend in 
support for GM food.’ See ’Eurobarometer – More Europeans opposed to GM food’, 12 November, 
2010, at <http://www.gmwatch.org/latest-listing/1-news-items/12660-eurobarometer-more-
europeans-opposed-to-gm-food>. 
6 P. Mitchell,  ‘UK government caught in GM dilemma’, Nature Biotechnology 9. 21 (2003), p. 957. 
See also Steve Hughes, John Bryant, ‘GM Crops and Food: A Scientific Perspective’, in J. Bryant, 
L.B. La Velle, J. Searle (eds.)  Bioethics for Scientists  (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 115-
140 (p. 132). 
7 S. Keys, J.K. Ma, P.M. Drake, ‘Genetically modified plants and human health’,  Journal of the 
Royal Society of Medicine 101.6 (2008), 290–8, at 
<http://jrsm.rsmjournals.com/cgi/content/full/101/6/290>. 
8 Tiju Joseph, Mark Morrison, Nanotechnology in Agriculture and Food, Nanoforum Report, April 
2006, at <ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/nanotechnology_in_agriculture_ 
and_food.pdf>. 
9 ‘Nanomaterials, Sunscreens and Cosmetics: Small Ingredients, Big risks’ (Friends of the 
Earth Australia and USA Report, May 2006), at <http://www.foe.org/camps/comm/nanotech/>, p. 
46. 
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food.  The report pointed out that current legislation did not force companies to 
label food items containing nanoparticles.10  In May 2011, the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) published a guidance document for the risk assessment of nanomaterials 
in food and feed applications including food additives, enzymes, flavourings, food contact 
materials, novel foods, feed additives and pesticides.11   
 
In China, while there has also been no definitive evidence showing GM food to be harmful 
to humans, the topic has been controversial for some time, escalating after the Ministry of 
Agriculture granted bio-safety certificates to two pest-resistant GM rice varieties and a corn 
variety in November 2009 – a major step in promoting the research and planting of GM 
crops.  The approval made China the first country in the world to give the nod to field trials 
of GM staple foods, but 
Officials, researchers and scientists are divided on whether and when GM food 
should be commercialized... Supporters and opponents have also been facing off 
over environmental safety and economic security issues. The Chinese government 
has put food security high on the agenda in its national development plans.12 
 
 
After granting these biosafety licenses, 120 Chinese academics signed a public petition in 
March 2010 asking the Ministry of Agriculture to withdraw the certificates.13  
 A general Food Safety Law was only introduced in China in 2009, whereas one has 
been in place in the EU since 2002. The Chinese Law was ‘pushed’ by a food crisis 
relating to contaminated milk in 2008 and is regarded as ‘still an ongoing process’ 
complicated by ‘considerable fragmentation of regulatory authorities’, meaning that there 
‘is a considerable difference between theory and practice in the Chinese food safety 
system’.14  There is also a lack of food safety watchdogs or other NGO bodies that could 
facilitate participation from the public, although it should be added that the Food Safety  
                                                
10 Tiju Joseph, Mark Morrison, ibid, p. 12.  
11 ‘European Food Safety Authority publishes nanotechnology guidance for food and feed 
assessment’, Nanowerk 11 May, 2011, at <http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=21308.php>.  
12 ‘GM food: Hope or fear for the Chinese?’, 16 October, 2012, at 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/16/c_13559695.htm>. 
13 L. Jia, Y. Zhao, X-J. Liang, ‘Fast evolving nanotechnology and relevant programs and entities in 
China’, nano today 6.1 (2011), 6-11.  
14 Margherita Polo, ‘Food and nano-food within the Chinese regulatory system: no need to have 
overregulation’, European Journal of Law and Technology 2.3 (2011), 1-16 (p. 2).  Thanks to 
Camilo Fautz (ITAS/GEST) for supplying this article.  
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Law approval process was open to public scrutiny, and ‘more than 11 000 comments were 
made to the law-making body’.15  A China Daily 2010 survey concluded that more than 
85% of respondents were worried about the potential health hazards of GM food.16  Hu 
and Chen’s earlier survey of Beijing consumers found that consumer purchase intentions 
of GM vegetable oil were low, indicating a ‘considerable scepticism toward GM products’.17  
 Is public trust such a huge issue in China?  Yes, and no.  A country with strong 
economic imperatives and an eye to global markets is always conscious that ‘new’ can be 
a selling point, but that ‘untested and potentially unsafe’ is unacceptable to risk-averse 
customers.  However, there is less of a tradition of public participation in policymaking. 
Thus it is difficult to see what impact the public protests may have had.  The Chinese 
government is still investigating whether the town of Jiangkou, located in Central China's 
Hunan province, was allegedly used as an experimental site in 2008, with ‘dozens of 
children believed to have been fed GM modified rice as part of a nutrition research 
program led by a professor from Tufts University in the US’.18  There have been small-
scale protests, as when around 40 people, demonstrating outside the Ministry of 
Agriculture in September 2011, presented a letter asking the ministry to stop advocating 
staples such as GM grain in China.  About 80 people had signed the letter, including 
experts and some former government officials.19 
 
 
The two main lessons of the GM debate appear to be that there are issues about public 
involvement in the process – more participation might have encouraged less public 
paranoia – and that new technologies can become ‘plausibly linked to catastrophic  
scenarios of new and unpredictable technologies gone awry’.20  The GM debate created a  
                                                
15 Polo, ibid, p. 12.  
16 See China Daily, 3 April, 2010, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
03/04/content_9534076.htm>. 
17 W. Hu & K. Chen, ‘Chinese consumers be persuaded? The case of genetically modified 
vegetable oil’, AgBioForum 7.3 (2004), 124-132, at <http://www.agbioforum.org>. 
18 ‘GM food testing worries parents’, China Daily 12 September, 2012,  at 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012/09/12/content_15753932.htm>. 
19 Yan Shuang, ‘Anti-GM food protestors claim crops are unsafe’, Global Times  13 September 
2011, at <http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/675011/Anti-GM-food-protesters-claim-
crops-are-unsafe.aspx>. 
20 A.C. Lin, ‘Size matters:  Regulating nanotechnology’, (Davis Legal Studies Research Paper 635, 
2006), at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=934635>. See also Mette Ebbesen, ‘Nanoethics – Not from 
Scratch’, conference paper given at  the Nano Ethics Workshop, 22-23 September 2007 at the 
University of Aarhus,   p. 13. See also J. Moor, J. Weckert, ‘Nanoethics’, in Davis Baird, Alfred 
Nordmann,  Joachim Schummer (eds.) Discovering the Nanoscale (IOS Press, 2004), p. 305.  
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considerable trust deficit amongst the global public, one that may paralyse  
nanodevelopment again.21 
 
 
Back to the bioethics debate… 
The most common approach to nanoethics thus far in the West has been that of bioethics, 
which can be defined as ‘the systemic study of human conduct in the area of life science 
and health care, insofar as this conduct is examined in the light of moral values and 
principles.’22   
 Bioethics has consistently posed some of those speculative ‘big questions’ about 
how an ethical relationship between technological advances and human beings might be 
defined.  When bioethics emerged in the US as a reaction to the biotechnological and 
biomedical advances of the 1960s, its questions were very similar to those currently 
identified in the context of nanotechnology, namely:  
How were human beings wisely to confront the moral puzzles, perplexities, and 
challenges posed by the confluence of the great scientific and cultural 
changes?...Who should have control over the newly emergent technologies?… How 
could individuals be assisted in taking advantage of the new medical possibilities or, 
if need be, protected from being harmed by them? How could the fruits of the 
medical advances be most fairly distributed? What kind of character or human virtues 
would be most conducive to a wise use of the new technologies?  
What kind of institutions, or laws, or regulations would be needed to manage the 
coming changes in a moral fashion?23 
 
 
André Hellegers and Van Rensselaer Potter were the first to use the term 'bioethics' in the 
1970s to designate a focused academic area of inquiry, noting that the overriding question  
was that of medical technology's effects on society.24  The Kennedy Institute established 
by Hellegers (and its counterpart, the Hastings Institute) appear to approach bioethics as 
more than a study of ethical issues in medicine.  They also include issues about public  
 
                                                
21 Geert van Calster, ‘Risk Regulation, EU Law and Emerging Technologies: Smother or Smooth?’, 
NanoEthics 2 (2008), 61–71 (p. 71). 
22 Encyclopaedia of Bioethics, Warren T. Reich (ed.)   (New York: Macmillan, 1995), p. 136. 
23 D. Callahan, ‘Bioethics’, in Ruth Chadwick, Doris Schroeder (eds.) Applied Ethics. Critical 
Concepts in Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2002), vol.  II, 3-19, p. 6. 
24 Warren Thomas Reich, ‘The word ‘bioethics’: Its Birth and the Legacies of those who Shaped it’, 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 4.4 (December, 1994), 319-335. 
 
 
57 
health, population concerns, genetics, environmental health, reproductive practices and 
technologies, animal health, animal welfare to name just a few.25  In this sense, bioethics 
offers a good starting point for a discussion of how different cultures may approach the 
broad issues offered by a potentially far-reaching new technology such as 
nanotechnology. 
We shall therefore use bioethics as a starting point to see what values inform the 
bioethics debate, looking for any similarities that might exist in China and the EU. 
The following discussion will cover four topics in both regions: (1) Social values, (2) 
Bioethics guidelines, (3) Guiding principles, and (4) Public attitudes to science and 
technology.  
Given that the point of this thesis is to argue that cultural differences can be to a 
degree overcome in a public decision-making process, the following discussion sets the 
parameters of difference and similarity.  It may seem, given the accepted (if clichéd) 
understanding of  the differences between East and West, an impossible task – how can 
one see any real convergence between a highly individualistic Western culture based on a 
strong human rights discourse, and a Chinese culture in which social harmony is key, and 
with greatly differing political structures from those in Western democracies? Nevertheless, 
this thesis will attempt to draw out the shades of grey between the black-and-white 
differences usually accepted in discussions about East and West.  
 
 
 
 
2.1 Social values and bioethics - informing the nanodebate in the EU 
 
Do we today have an available bioethics? Yes, we do, a bad one: what the Germans 
call Bindestrich-Ethik, or 'hyphen-ethics', where what gets lost in the hyphenation is 
ethics as such. The problem is not that a universal ethics is being dissolved into a 
multitude of specialised ones (bioethics, business ethics, medical ethics and so on) 
but that particular scientific breakthroughs are immediately set against humanist 
'values', leading to complaints that biogenetics, for example, threatens our sense of 
dignity and autonomy.26 
  
 
                                                
25 The Hastings Centre, established in 1969 (Hellegers established the Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
in 1971), saw its mission as ‘to address fundamental ethical issues in the areas of health, medicine, 
and the environment as they affect individuals, communities, and societies.’ See 
<http://www.thehastingscenter.org/About/Default.aspx>. 
26 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Bring me my Philips Mental Jacket’, London Review of Books, 22 May 2003, at  
<http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/VLE/DATA/CSEARCH/MODULES/CS/2006/03/0163/_.htm>. 
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We begin with an obvious rider – to refer to the EU as having ‘one approach’ to bioethics is  
of course far too general. The EU, created as a political and economic union of now 28   
member states, is usually seen as an economic entity, rather than a cultural one.  That 
said, given the current issues in the Eurozone, and the threat of withdrawal, those 
economic ties might be looser than was first thought.  In a more general sense, it is 
fallacious to assume that cultures themselves do not contain wide heterogeneity, and so it 
may be no more difficult for a ‘US bioethicist to discuss ethics with an Asian colleague than 
for a US Mormon to discuss them with a Jewish neighbour.’27  And it is equally fallacious to 
state that cultures are static, for they contain ‘a diversity of specific life-forms, each with its 
own peculiar laws of evolution’, or ‘ongoing conversations’.28  Discussing the values of EU 
culture and society is therefore an inevitably partial endeavour; yet at the same time there 
are agreements commonly seen as ‘Western’ or ‘European’ that provide a basis for 
comparison with other global regions.  
 
2.1.1   EU social values 
What agreement might there be on European values? President Barroso (2004-) 
summarised them at the 10th South East Europe Cooperation Process Meeting in Zagreb 
in 2007: 
This year we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the European Union. We are proud of 
this achievement, which has brought peace, prosperity and solidarity to a continent 
wracked by war [...] we reaffirmed our shared values, like freedom, democracy, the 
rule of law, tolerance and mutual respect. …. Those values formed the very 
foundations of the European Union. They remain at the core of our activities today.29 
 
 
Barroso’s list of values suggest the oft-declared basic principle of European and Western 
legislation, that of individual rights.  Dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity citizens’ rights and 
                                                
27 David Solomon, ‘Domestic Disarray and Imperial Ambition: Contemporary Applied Ethics and the 
Prospects for Global Bioethics’, in H. Tristram Engelhardt (ed.) Global Bioethics: The Collapse of 
Consensus (Sudbury: M&M Scrivener, 2006),  335-361. Solomon sees three aspects to this 
problem: the temporal export problem; the problem of exporting ethical insights among persons in 
the same culture, i.e., the local export problem; and the problem of translating ethical insights within 
the ethical viewpoint of a single person, i.e., the personal export problem. 
28  Seegun Gbadegesin, ‘The Moral Weight of Culture in Ethics’, in Edmund D. Pellegrino, 
Lawrence J. Prograis (eds.), African American Bioethics: Culture, Race, and Identity (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2007), p 28;  Frances V. Harbour, Thinking About International Ethics 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), p. 169. 
29 José Manuel Barroso, Opening speech at 10th meeting of SEECP South East Europe 
Cooperation Process Meeting, Zagreb, 11th May 2007, at 
<http://www.europaworld.org/week306/barrosospeech18507.htm>. 
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justice are the 6 main ideas of the 2000 European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights are the 
core values that the EU set out at the beginning of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), which 
strengthened the role of the European parliament and increased European co-decision-
making on policy.  Given these statements, it is unsurprising that approaches to bioethics 
in the EU tend to ’emphasise individualistic ways of thinking’.30 
 
2.1.2  EU Bioethics guidelines 
These values are replicated in four international (thus not specifically European) biolaw 
Conventions and Declarations, adopted by nearly all member states of the EU: 
1. The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, or ‘Oviedo Convention’ (1997) 
2. The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) 
3. The International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003)  
4. and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005).31  
 
 
The Oviedo convention, as its full title (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine) suggests, stresses human rights and 
dignity as overarching principles of EU bioethics.32  
 The classic Western liberal notion of human rights emphasises absolute individual 
political and civil rights, while most non-Western traditions place greater emphasis on the 
community basis of rights and duties, and on economic and social rights.  This may be the 
key difference between the EU and China in approach to lawmaking, including biolaw. 
Yet one should beware the cliché of an apparent antagonism between Western 
human rights/individualism and a more communal, socially determined form of existence in  
the East, i.e. so-called Eastern communitarianism.  As Bielefeldt argues, ‘what is at stake  
                                                
30 Nial Scott, ’Research ethics: European and Asian perspectives, global challenges’, in Ladikas 
(ed.), Embedding society in science and technology policy, ibid, p.32. 
31 Roberto Andorno, ‘First Steps in the development of an International Biolaw’, in Kris Dierickx, 
Herman Nys, Paul Schotmans (eds.), New Pathways in European Bioethics) (Antwerpen: 
Intersentia, 2007), 121-138 (p.122). 
32 N. Lenoir, B. Mathieu, Les norms interrnationales de la bioethique (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1998), p.102. 
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in human rights is not an abstract individualism, but rather the principle of equal freedom, 
which, as a critical demand, always affects individuals and communities simultaneously. 
Thus he argues that: 
...although human rights clearly enlarge the scope of individual freedom, they are by 
no means merely individualistic.  They are not meant to lead to an ‘atomistic society’ 
devoid of communitarian solidarity.  Against the widespread confusion of human 
rights and Western individualism, human rights always imply a social dimension 
because human freedom can unfold only in relation to fellow persons.33 
 
 
We can interpret the notion of ‘human rights’ rather more broadly than as ‘democratic 
freedom’ or ‘democratic protection for the vulnerable’.  Traer argues that one might ‘look 
beyond the institutions Westerners equate with human rights’ to those ‘cultural forms’ that 
set forth ‘those political, social, and economic rights that contribute to the dignity of the 
individual person.  Bielefeldt similarly argues for ‘pluralism and difference’ as applicable to 
the concept of human rights (while acknowledging that some cultural practices are 
precluded under any form of human rights – an example being that of slavery).34 
 Perhaps instead of institutions, we should follow the example of the bioethics 
Declarations, in which the application of principles is given precedence over concrete 
rules.  
Of the guiding principles of autonomy and dignity, we shall, perhaps controversially, 
given that autonomy is often claimed as the chief principle in bioethics, examine the 
second. 
 
 2.1.3  Guiding principles: Dignity and other principles 
Before looking primarily at dignity, we should consider some of the other principles that 
have been noted.  ‘Principlism’ was first formalized as a moral decision-making approach 
in the US, by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research in the Belmont Report on April 18, 1979.  The report resulted in  
a statement of four basic ethical principles. Beauchamp and Childress have promoted 
these four guiding ideas, which are: not inflicting harm intentionally (nonmalificence);  
                                                
33  Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate,’ Human Rights Quarterly, 17.4 
November (1995), 587-617 (p. 592). 
34  Robert Traer, Faith in Human Rights: Support in Religious Traditions for a Global Struggle 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1991), p. 158;    Bielefeldt, ibid, p. 594, p.601. 
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assisting the individual to make meaningful choices (autonomy); acting so as to contribute 
to the welfare of others (beneficence); and offering fair, equitable and appropriate 
treatment (justice).35   
There have been similar ‘restatements’ of these principles such as the BIOMED II 
project, Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw (1995-1998), a 
cooperation across most EU countries that identified the principles of respect for 
autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability as four important ideas or values for 
European bioethics and biolaw.  They thus serve as reflective guidelines and important 
values in European culture.36  
Although Gert, Culver and Clouser argue that the principles are often mere 
'checklists', certainly not all clear action guides,37 they do provide a practical approach for 
many of the health ethics issues faced by practitioners (‘checklists’ are not at all a bad 
thing).  
Why dignity then as the centre of our discussion, rather than autonomy?38 
Instead of arguing for the priority of autonomy over dignity, this section will look at 
dignity as a major principle of bioethics, and one that might allow a point of similarity with  
China. Whereas China does not value autonomy as highly, nor does it follow the human 
rights discourse enshrined in EU regulation, dignity is a term relevant to Chinese culture, 
as it is in the West.  This might offer some way forward in terms of global ethics, moving us 
beyond the individual rights/autonomy versus state power over the individual dichotomy 
only too apparent from any political analysis of the two regions. 
Andorno notes that the principle of recognising human dignity is supported in the 
above-mentioned Declarations by a stress on the primacy of the human being over the 
sole interest of science or society.39  In addition, the European Convention on Human  
Rights and Biomedicine (1997) states that parties to the Convention shall ‘protect the 
dignity and identity of all human beings’ and shall guarantee everyone, without  
                                                
35 T.L. Beauchamp, J.F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001).  
36 J. Rendtorff, ‘Basic ethical principles in European bioethics and biolaw: autonomy, dignity, 
integrity and vulnerability--towards a foundation of bioethics and biolaw’, Medicine, Health Care, 
And Philosophy, 5.3  (2003), 235-244. 
37 Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, K.  Danner Clouser, Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals 
(Cary, NC:  Oxford University Press, 1997), 71-92.  
38 Macklin however sees dignity as nothing other than autonomy. Ruth Macklin, ‘Dignity is a 
Useless Concept’ British Medical Journal 327 (2003), 1419-1420. 
39 Andorno, ‘First Steps in the Development of an International Biolaw’, ibid, 127-134. 
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discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with 
regard to the application of biology and medicine.40  Human dignity, as a central ‘value’ or 
principle might seem to give EU bioethics a distinctive individualistic flavour, one that can 
be contrasted to the so-called Eastern approach in which societal good is prioritised over 
that of the individual.   
 Yet is dignity solely individualistic?  Kantians would argue that the term relates to 
the group dignity of 'rational beings’.  Dignity is a confused term in contemporary bioethics. 
It has been used by American bioethicists to refer to autonomy, and by Catholic 
bioethicists to refer to the sanctity of life, to name just two contradictory meanings. 
Macklin’s 2003 ‘Dignity is a Useless Concept’ suggests a practical approach would be 
preferable, arguing that instead of a nebulous concept, (or what she terms a ‘slogan’ or  
‘restatement of other vague concepts’), the recognition that no one has the right to impinge 
on the life, body or freedom of the other, works better for practitioners.41  In this context, 
dignity becomes synonymous with autonomy.42   
Dignity can refer to ‘both the intrinsic value of the individual and the inter-subjective 
value of every human being in its encounter with the other’.43  The second phrase  
suggests the social nature of dignity alongside its more individualistic meaning.   
I follow Schroeder’s approach, which separates dignity and human rights.44  
Schroeder’s work on dignity suggests that two categories can be distinguished – inviolable 
and aspirational dignity.  Her analysis of Kantian dignity, which states that it is the 
inviolable property of all rational beings to be treated as an end, not merely as a means, 
differentiates it from aspirational dignity, in terms of which there are certain expectations of  
an individual determined by society and culture.45  For example, in the euthanasia debate, 
one view is that everyone has the right to aspirational dignity and thus to die if that  
 
                                                
40 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997), 
Article1, at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm>. 
41 Macklin, ibid, p. 1419. 
42 Steven Pinker’s development of Macklin’s idea argues that it has been hijacked by conservatives. 
Steven Pinker, ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’, New Republic,  238.9 (2008), 28-31. 
43 P. Kemp, J.D.  Rendtorff (eds.) Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw. Vol. I. 
Autonomy, Dignity, Integrity and Vulnerability (Copenhagen-Barcelona: Centre for Ethics and Law 
and Institut Borja de Bioètica; 2000), p.  11. 
44 For Schroeder’s compelling arguments for such separation, see her ‘Human Rights and Human 
Dignity. An Appeal to Separate the Conjoined twins’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2012), 
323–335.  
45 Doris Schroeder, ‘Dignity: One, Two, Three, Four, five, Still Counting’, Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 19.1 (2010), 118-125.  My thanks to Professor Schroder for this table. 
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dignity is traduced.  The opposing view is that the individual must continue to live due to  
his/her inviolable dignity.  Such views are not only contradictory; they show one of the 
many possible disagreements about the meaning of dignity.  The following table 
summarizes the different meanings as identified by Schroeder.  
 
Table 4: Distinct meanings of dignity46 
 
In
vi
ol
ab
le
 D
ig
ni
ty
 
Traditional 
Catholic dignity 
Dignity is an inviolable property invested by God in 
all human beings, which makes each life sacred. 
Kantian dignity Dignity is an inviolable property invested in all 
rational beings due to their capacity for moral self-
legislation.  As dignity holders, rational beings have 
the right to exact always respect for their sense of 
purpose and self-worth.  
 A
sp
ira
tio
na
l D
ig
ni
ty
 
Aristocratic 
dignity 
Dignity is the quality of a human being who has 
been invested with superior rank and position and 
acts accordingly.  
Comportment 
dignity 
Dignity is the outwardly displayed quality of a human 
being who acts in accordance with society’s 
expectations of well-mannered demeanour and 
bearing. 
Meritorious 
dignity 
Dignity is a virtue, which subsumes the four cardinal 
virtues47 and one’s sense of self-worth. 
 
 
Looking at the above distinctions, one could understand aspirational dignity as 
individualistic.  For instance, individuals strive to attain the four cardinal virtues and a 
sense of self-worth.  However, inviolable dignity works more at the group level or even 
species level, as shown in Kant's definition of all rational beings having dignity, or the 
Catholic Church’s belief that all human beings have dignity.  
                                                
46 Schroeder, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity’, ibid, p. 122.  
47 The four cardinal virtues are: prudence, or appropriate action; justice; restraint (self-control, 
moderation); and courage (or fortitude).  
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In a similar vein, Feldman argues that dignity has three spheres of operation, 
consisting of the dignity of the species, of a group, and of the individual.48  Human dignity 
can be universal, or subjective, or socially relative.  
 
In conclusion: 
1. Dignity is a term that can refer both to the individual’s rights, and to his/her social 
interactions. 
2. Whereas one might argue for the dignity of the individual as more important in a 
Western values system, and the dignity of the individual in social terms as more 
important in the East, a definition of human dignity can include both. 
3. Dignity is a concept that can be discussed in terms of methodology and virtuous 
agency, rather than as simply value-based.  In other words, dignity can be 
expressed not as autonomy, but as agency, as the second half of this thesis will 
discuss. 
 
 
2.1.4 EU public attitudes to S&T, and the precautionary principle 
Given that social values can be significant drivers for a citizen’s attitudes toward science, 
the 2001, 2005, 2008, and 2010 EU (Eurobarometer) surveys of S&T attitudes might be 
expected to emphasise these core values.  How interested are citizens in S&T, though? A 
Eurobarometer survey in 2002 on European public attitudes to biotech concluded that on 
the whole, the European population is largely inattentive to biotech advances but is 
globally positive about biotech.49  Other surveys, however have suggested ambivalence.50  
  
A 2001 survey noted that Europeans ‘express interest in new scientific discoveries and 
technological developments where 30 percent are very interested and 49 percent are 
                                                
48 David Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value’– Part 1’, Public Law (Winter, 1999), 682-702 
(p. 689). 
49 Eurobarometer 52.1 The Europeans and Biotechnology (2002), at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/research/quality-of-life/eurobarometer.html>. The survey added that ‘the 
European public employs a sort of “risk rhetoric” that stays largely on the declarative or ritual plane 
and exerts little real influence on the perceived “usefulness” of applications’. 
<http:///europa.eu.int/comm/research/pdf/aurobarometer-en.pdf>. 
50 ‘Report on the European Commission's Public Online Consultation. Towards a Strategic 
Nanotechnology Action Plan (SNAP) 2010-2015’, p. 72, at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/research/consultations/snap/consultation_en.htm>. 
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moderately interested’.51  The key findings of the 2010 survey confirmed that Europeans 
appeared moderately interested and moderately well informed on new technologies, 
although the latter tends to vary according to which technology – the 2002 Eurobarometer 
report noted a ‘surprisingly low’ level of understanding of some basic biotechnology issues, 
and nanotechnology continues to be less well understood than many other relatively new 
sciences.52  There is also, of course, regional variation; in the 2010 survey, 6 countries in 
the EU showed quite low levels of interest in technology – Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Lithuania, Turkey and Bulgaria.  There was some correlation here with countries that 
regard themselves as poorly informed on science and technology, such as Bulgaria, 
Romania, Portugal and Turkey, (others being France, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovakia and 
Spain).53 
 The more pertinent, though very broad question is perhaps whether the public 
believe that science is valuable and ethical.  Some states have a cultural distrust of 
scientists ‘playing God’ which might influence that view, and in this context, one might note 
that 2 out of 5 European respondents admitted to being superstitious (with the highest 
rates being recorded in Italy, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia).54  
In the 2010 survey, general negativity about the effects of science manifested in 
scepticism towards scientists who ‘cannot be trusted to tell the truth about controversial 
scientific and technological issues because they depend more and more on money from 
industry’, while certain countries appeared to have become more cynical – Germany being 
30% less positive on S&T than in previous surveys for example.  Six out of 10 Europeans 
felt that S&T can sometimes damage people’s moral sense, and 1 in 2 thought that some 
applications of S&T can threaten human rights.  Europeans also felt that S&T could be 
used by terrorists in the future.  When asked which area of research should be prioritised 
by researchers in the European Union, 40 percent of respondents mentioned health 
issues, with energy issues at 21 percent and environmental issues at 18 percent. 
 
                                                
51 Eurobarometer 55.2  Europeans, Science and Technology (2001), p.7, at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_340_en.pdf>.  
52 Eurobarometer 52.1, ibid,  also  Report on the European Commission's Public Online 
Consultation. Towards a Strategic Nanotechnology Action Plan (SNAP) 2010-2015  (European 
Commission, 2009-10),  p. 72 at <http://ec.europa.eu/research/consultations/snap/report_en.pdf>. 
53 Eurobarometer Report 73.1  Science and Technology (2010), at <at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_340_en.pdf>. 
54 Joachim Schummer, ‘Cultural diversity in nanotechnology ethics’, Interdisciplinary Science 
Reviews 31.3 (2006), 217-230 (p. 221). 
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And perhaps most interestingly, only slightly more than half of Europeans surveyed 
agreed that new inventions would always be found to counteract any harmful use of 
science.  Half felt that if a new technology poses a risk that is not yet fully understood, then 
the development of this technology should be stopped even if benefits are expected.55 
Given this background, European technology policy has therefore focused on the principle 
of protecting individual human rights, chiefly through ‘precaution’: 
Following an assessment of available scientific information, where there is 
reasonable concern for the possibility of adverse effects but scientific uncertainty 
persists, measures based on the precautionary principle may be adopted, pending 
further scientific information, for a more comprehensive risk assessment, without 
having to wait until the further reality and seriousness of those adverse effects 
become fully apparent.56 
 
 
The precautionary principle suggests some counterbalance to economic imperatives, as 
shown when looking at environmental threats:  
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach should be widely 
applied by states according to their capabilities where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.57  
 
 
The precautionary principle underscores the EU's focus on individual rights, as does the 
general European concern for increasing the level of public involvement in S&T decision-
making, with leaders in this field being Holland, the UK, France and Germany.  However, 
the 2010 Eurobarometer survey noted that 91 percent of respondents either never or 
hardly ever attended public meetings or debates, yet felt that governments should do more 
to encourage young people and women to be involved with science.  It seems that the 
level of public disinclination to be actively involved in S&T debates (instead of being 
‘passively’ surveyed) is still high. 
 
                                                
55 And finally, a majority of Europeans believed that collaboration between the EU and other 
countries is important to make the EU a global player, 7 out of 10 believing that joint research 
collaboration with the USA is important, 64% thinking that links with poorer countries should be 
strengthened, and 61% of respondents advocating links in particular with China and India. 
56 Encyclopaedia of Nanoscience and Society (ed. D. Guston), vol. II (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 
2010), p. 625. 
57 See Angelo Maria Petroni, ‘Perspectives for Freedom of Choice in Bioethics and Health Care in 
Europe’, in Global Bioethics: The Collapse of Consensus, ibid, 238-270. 
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In conclusion, although discussing a homogenous EU approach to bioethics can only lead 
to partial statements, one might predicate a strong narrative based on protecting the 
individual’s rights and dignity.  This is perhaps reflected in the degree of public scepticism 
towards S&T and the prevalence of the precautionary principle, which allegedly places risk 
to individual human health and the environment higher than economic imperatives.58 
 
  
2.2  Social values and bioethics  – informing the nanodebate in China 
 
Ought bioethics in East Asia to use the same approaches (assumptions, principles, 
theories, styles, methods, concepts) as bioethics developed in the West, or ought it 
to reflect a specifically East Asian approach to the subject’?59   
 
The question given in this quotation suggest that we must again begin with a rider:  Asia is 
composed of 3.4 billion people of diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious composition 
(Confucian, Buddhist, Islamic, Hindu) and thus it is unlikely that Asia subscribes to a single 
set of beliefs, completely different from those held by a billion people in Europe and 
America.  Thailand, for example, has a controversial history in biotechnology, ranging from 
issues of morality and environmental concerns, through to issues of intellectual property 
such as ‘biopiracy’ and compulsory licensing.60  Other factors are those of urbanism and 
education with Pollard raising the issue of country attitudes given that ‘science and 
technology are formally accepted ideas among only sophisticated Thais in metropolitan 
areas.’61   
                                                
58  John Weckert, James Moor, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Nanotechnology, International 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 20.2 (2006), 191-204 offer a useful article defending the 
precautionary principle’s use as a coherent tool in nanotechnology assessment.  
59 Ruiping Fan, ‘Self-Determination vs. Family Determination: Two Incommensurable Principles of 
Autonomy’, Bioethics 11-9 (1997), 309-22 (p. 310). 
60 T. Changthavorn, ‘Bioethics of IPRs: What does a Thai Buddhist think? Paper presented at 
Roundtable  discussion on Bioethical Issues of IPRs’,  Selwyn College, University of Cambridge, 
2003.  See also C. Kachonpadungkitti, D. Macer, ‘Attitudes to bioethics and biotechnology in 
Thailand (1993–2000), and impacts on employment’, Eubios Journal of Asian and International 
Bioethics 14 (2004), 118–134; and R. Meléndez-Ortiz, V. Sánchez (eds.),Trading in Genes: 
Development Perspectives on Biotechnology, Trade, and Sustainability (London: Earthscan, 2005). 
 61  Irina Pollard, ‘High Tech Neuroscience, Neuroethics, and the Precautionary Principle’,  in Asia-
Pacific Perspectives on the Ethics of Science and Technology (Bangkok: UNESCO Bangkok, 
2007), p. 45. 
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It should be noted that Asian values are often ‘unified’ by being conflated with 
Confucianism; Bell insists that even differences across Asian cultures are rooted in 
Chinese political 'traditions' such as Confucianism.62  
2.2.1. Asian social values 
Leaving this aside, one can still offer some general comments on Asian social values. 
According to various surveys, in which Asian respondents defined the top six societal 
values, in their view, two, unsurprisingly, were collective values such as an orderly society 
and societal harmony (the others were:  accountability of public officials, openness to new 
ideas, freedom of expression, and respect for authority).63  The Asian values movement 
(as promoted by Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, and Dr Mahathir bin 
Mohamad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia), argues strongly for communitarian values. 
Lee has attributed Singapore's speedy economic achievements to such Asian values as 
‘strong family ties and responsibility for the extended family', hard work, thriftiness, and 
individual discipline for family benefit.  Mahathir has denounced Western individualism for 
having led to ‘the breakdown of established institutions and diminished respect for 
marriage, family values, elders, and important customs, conventions, and traditions.’64 
 Critics of the concept of Asian values  (some  ‘would claim that the notion... has 
served as a pretext for soft authoritarianism’),65  in fact repeat some of these values, such 
as the importance of family, communitarianism, work ethic, and so forth. 66  Bell’s claim 
that there 'are no distinctly Asian values' 67 does not seem commonly supported. 
Thus the general assumption about ‘Asian values’ is that collective harmony is the 
core, as opposed to the Western emphasis on the individual and his/her rights, autonomy, 
and dignity.  Wang notes a Confucian emphasis on ‘care for others’, in terms of Confucian 
                                                
62 Daniel A. Bell, Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006),  p. 239. 
63 Kam-por Yu, ‘The Alleged Asian Values and Their Implications for Bioethics  (Eubios, 2003)    at 
<http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4232.htm>. 
64 Yew and Mahathir both cited in M.D. Barr, Cultural Politics and Asian Values: The Tepid War, 
London: Routledge, 2002), p. 3.  See Heather Widdows, ‘Western and Eastern Principles and 
Globalised Bioethics’, Asian Bioethics Review 3.1 (2011), 14-22. 
65 So Young Kim, ‘Do Asian Values Exist? Empirical Tests of the Four Dimensions of Asian Values’, 
Journal of East Asian Studies 10 (20120), 315-344 (p. 316). 
66 Kim, ibid. See also Mark R. Thompson, ‘Whatever Happened to Asian Values?’,  Journal of 
Democracy 12 (2001), 154-65; and Donald K. Emerson, ‘Singapore and the “Asian Values’ debate’, 
Journal of Democracy 6.4 (1995), 95-105. 
67 Bell, ibid, p. 52 
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ren or jen ethics, meaning less focus is placed on the independent person.68  Certainly 
family is important in many Asian nations, and this may lead to various inequities from a 
Western perspective; for example, the Singapore government advocates unequal 
distribution of medical benefits to male and female employees.  Such a policy is unjustified 
from the perspective of gender rights, but it can be justified if the father is regarded as 
having special status, to which the makers of social policy owe a special responsibility.  
The Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tongh, has argued that the government would 
like ‘to channel rights, benefits, and privileges through the (male) head of the family, so 
that he can enforce the obligations and responsibilities of family members’.69   
Perhaps proponents of Asian values simply wish to ensure a placid, cooperative and 
hardworking population, however, the movement does offer a means for deflecting 
accusations of human rights abuse.  Democracy may always be interpreted rather 
differently in the East compared with the West; a paper analysing the East Asia Barometer 
(EAB) survey conducted in South Korea in February 2003, looking at whether Western-
style liberal democracy is compatible with Confucianism, concluded that: 
.... contemporary Korean political culture still manifests the Confucian legacy of 
hierarchical collectivism and benevolent paternalism, the Confucian ideal of family 
still remains a model of governance in the eyes of many ordinary Koreans. Yet those 
attached to Asian values still desire democracy…however, their view of democracy 
might be one of good communitarian governance.70 
 
 
No wonder that the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights affirms the universality of 
human rights, but pleads for greater context-sensitivity in their promotion.71 
The AsiaBarometer 2003, 2004 and 2005 surveys, (each of which was carried out 
across 6-12 countries ranging from Japan to Laos to Mongolia to Uzbekistan), covered a  
variety of topics.72  One commentary on the survey data, the collection How East Asians  
                                                
68 Y. Wang, ‘AIDS, policy and bioethics: ethical challenges facing China in HIV prevention’,  
Bioethics, 11-3/4 (1997), 323-326. 
69 Henry Steiner, Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 544-545.  Such a policy is regarded as having the effect of strengthening the family. 
70 Chong-Min Park, Doh Chull Shin, ‘Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy? The 
Case of South Korea’, Asian Barometer Working Paper Series: No. 26 (Taipei,2004), at 
<http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/workingpapers/no.26.pdf>. 
71 William M. Sullivan, ‘Ethical Universalism and Particularism: A Comparison of Outlooks’, In 
William M. Sullivan (ed.) The Globalization of Ethics. Religious and Secular Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 191-212.  
72 Such as: Infrastructure development, economic conditions, life values, customs, rules, identity, 
political consciousness, health (the 2005 survey did not include health conditions); The 2006, 2007 
and 2008  surveys added the following topics: quality of life, governance, democratic 
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View Democracy, argues that democracy is in fact seen as an important value in Asian 
societies – but when placed against economic development, it becomes rather less so.73  
The need to provide for one's family is the chief motivation for individuals.  The same 
commentary also notes that the doctrine of personal interests coming in second to those of 
the community is becoming less popular; responses to the statement,  ‘Even if parents' 
demands are unreasonable, children should still do what they ask,’ which used to be an 
Asian value, indicated that such family obedience was  less popular today.74  A 2005 study 
that asked respondents to state what was the ‘most important thing’ in their lives found that 
the most frequent answer was ‘family and children’ in Japan and South Korea, but in 
Taiwan, Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong it was ‘life, health, myself’.75 
China's Maoist communitarianism is still the dominant paradigm since the formation 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, though there has since evolved a form of hybrid 
socio-political philosophy…based on two thousand years of power-centralized, 
autocratic monarchy – one that has lacked any rights-oriented, individualistic, liberal 
democratic tradition…The historicism and social holism of this system, interwoven 
with traditional ideas, puts the greatest emphasis on nation, society and country 
rather than on individuals.76 
 
 
The notion of community is actually broader than that of family, and means ‘harmony’. In 
traditional Chinese society: 
…there is less emphasis on individual rights, self-expression, and self-
determination.  In the community, qualities such as harmony, function, and 
responsibility are stressed more than individual rights, and familial relationships 
assume primary importance.77 
 
                                                                                                                                               
consolidation/regression, social virtues, happiness, international alignments, new middle class, 
religiosity, mass media, globalization.  
73 How East Asians View Democracy (eds. Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan,  Doh 
Chull Shin (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
74 Andrew J. Nathan, Yun-han Chu, Joanne J. Myers,  How East Asians View Democracy,  
Carnegie Council podcast, November 2008, at 
<http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/0085.html>. 
75 Cross-national Social Survey in East Asia: World Values Survey (2007), at 
<http://jgss.daishodai.ac.jp/research/monographs/jgssm7/jgssm7_14.pdf>. 
76 R. Qiu, ‘Medial ethics and Chinese culture, in E. Pellegrino, P. Mazzarella, P Corsi (eds.) 
Transcultural Dimensions in Medical Ethics (Frederick, MD.: University Publishing Group, 1992), 
159-180  (pp. 170-2). 
77 M. Ip, T. Gilligan, T. Koenig, J. Raffin, ‘Ethical decision-making in critical care in Hong Kong’,  
Critical Care Medicine, 26.3 (1998),  477-451. 
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2.2.2.  Chinese bioethics guidelines 
Bioethics became a discipline in China following the first Chinese euthanasia trial in 1986, 
the subsequent debate about a person's right to life, and the publication of Qiu’s Bioethics 
in 198778.  However the label of ‘Chinese bioethics’ must be used with caution, as 
bioethics itself, as one critic has claimed, is a Western idea not simply because it 
originated in the United States or has its roots in the West, but because of the way it is 
theorized, structured, formulated, and practiced, as a ‘normativity of whiteness’.79  
 
In China, bioethics was not initially regarded as a priority: 
The fact that Chinese scientists don’t share the ethical concerns of their Western 
counterparts is confirmed by a 1993 survey of 255 Chinese geneticists: An 
overwhelming majority said that public health and the “quality” of the population 
should be improved through practices that would be rejected in the West as 
eugenics…. ‘Chinese culture is quite different’,” said the Chinese scientist who 
performed the survey.  ‘Things are focused on the good of society, not the good of 
the individual.  It would shock people in the West, but my survey reflects cultural 
common sense’.80 
 
 
However, bioethics has recently become more ’respectable’ in China, as Guo states: 
The importance of international collaboration in science has led policymakers to 
recognize the value of ‘ethics’ for purposes of global recognition. The government’s 
awareness of subject (sic) has improved the respectability of bioethics as an 
academic discipline.81 
 
 
In 1998, the Chinese Ministry of Health (MOH) issued its Interim Regulations or Ethical 
Review of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, defining protocols for an 
ethical review of human biomedical research in China.  Research institutions would 
establish ethics committees to safeguard procedures in human subject research, while all 
large certified hospitals would establish medical ethics committees.  In addition, the MOH 
established a national ethics committee and provincial ethics committees.  China has 
                                                
78 A general introduction to ethics in relation to genetics, euthanasia, organ transplantation etc. 
79  C. Myser, ‘Differences from somewhere: The normativity of whiteness in bioethics in the United 
States’, American Journal of Bioethics (2003), 1-11. See also S. Arekapudi, M.  Wynia,  ‘The 
unbearable whiteness of the mainstream: should we eliminate, or celebrate, bias in bioethics?’ 
American Journal of Bioethics 3 (2003), 18-29. 
80 ‘Chinese Bioethics? “Voluntary” Eugenics and the Prospects for Reform’, The New Atlantis 1 
(2003), 138-140. 
81 Congcong Guo, ‘Conceiving Conception: The Bioethics of Assisted Reproductive Policy in China  
(Harvard College, March  2011), p.45f, at <http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/6535>. 
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regulations in place on organ transplantation, scientific misconduct, and on AIDS 
treatment.82  Ethics committees are established in most large Chinese hospitals and thus it 
has been argued that ‘medical professionals and the highly educated populations in the 
PRC are mostly influenced by, and accept, Western bioethics.’83  Although China now has 
regulatory structures similar to those of the West, Hennig claims that they differ in that they 
‘are not enforceable by law.’84  However, Qiu suggests that ‘after years of debate, China 
has reached a consensus that it is indeed necessary and desirable to regulate biomedical 
research and biotechnology for the purpose of protecting human subjects’.85  Thus the 
2007 Regulation for Ethical Review of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects 
requires that each institution conducting biomedical research must establish an 
Institutional Research Ethics Committee (IREC), providing a framework that will protect 
human subjects.  Yet Qiu also notes that ‘a number of challenges have arisen during the 
course of implementing the Regulation’ due to resistance to ethics and malfunctioning 
ethics committees.  He also notes the issue of informed consent (given the Confucian 
tradition that individuals are more tied to their communities, who may consent for them).86  
There are other instances in which the Chinese approach to bioethics differs from 
that of the West. In terms of protecting the human subject, China has guidelines on Human 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (MOH, July 2003) that prohibit human reproductive 
cloning.  By contrast, the country does allow the creation of human embryos for research 
and therapeutic purposes like embryonic stem cell research, leading to the argument that 
the Chinese cultural environment has far fewer moral obstacles to the use of human 
embryos in research than many other nations have.87  Klein sums it up as follows: 
                                                
82 Listed on the Bioethics Network in China website, a 
<thttp://www.chinaphs.org/bioethics/regulations_&_laws.htm. 
83 Yue Wang, Group protection in human population genetic research in developing countries: the 
People’s Republic of China as an example (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 2011) at 
<http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3005/>, p. 185; also E. Li, ‘Bioethics in China’, Bioethics 22.8 (2008), 448-
454 (p.450).  
84 Wolfgang Hennig, ‘Bioethics in China: Although national guidelines are in place, their 
implementation remains difficult’, EMBO Reports 7.9 (2006), 850–854. 
85 Renzong Qiu, ‘Reflections on Bioethics in China: The Interactions Between Bioethics and 
Society’, in C. Myer (ed.) Bioethics Around the Globe (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2011), 164-
190  (p. 171). 
86 Renzong Qiu, ‘Bioethics in China (1990-2008), Asian Bioethics Review 1 (December 2008),44-57  
(p.52). 
87 Renzong Qiu, ‘Bioethics and Asian Culture’, in Qui, R. (ed.) Bioethics: Asian Perspectives – A 
Quest for Moral Diversity (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004); also X. Yang, 
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Embryo Stem Cell Research. Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century’, Eubios Ethics Institute 39.2  
(2003), 18-31, at <eubios.info/ABC4/abc4049.htm>. 
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In China’s race to the top, the... central government therefore targets specific 
selected areas with the potential to compete successfully internationally. Human 
embryonic stem cell research (HESCR) is one such area, because cautious stem 
cell policies and the ongoing controversy in large parts of the developed world offer 
unprecedented research and commercialization opportunities for China.... due to  
 
Confucian moral philosophy Chinese have no moral qualms in China about using 
human embryos in stem cell research. As personhood can only be acquired through 
social practice, according to Confucian teachings, human value evolves out from an 
individual’s social relations with society, the family or other groups, but it cannot be 
acquired before birth. 88 
 
 
Hence the view that the EU, given its increasing trade and co-operation with China, needs 
to ’persuade China to adopt the precautionary principle as part of its environmental and 
trade policy’,  in order to facilitate the ‘harmonization and implementation of EU and 
Chinese regulations and standards’.89  
 
 
2.2.3  Communitarianism and other principles 
Chinese culture is seen as one of obligation, not one based on individual rights. This 
notion has become so widespread that it is rarely challenged.  Yet the difference may be 
one in degree rather than substance – the so-called Asian shift away from individual rights 
does not necessarily negate individual rights, but rather recognises the limits of the 
individual rights-based approach for people who have a relational theory of personhood.  
As Wertz et al argue: 
Although Western Ethics is based on rights and principles and Asian ethics is based 
on caring and relationships, often the practical outcomes of the two approaches are 
similar…. Western principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice are 
implicit in the Confucian ideal of humanness. The difference between Asian and 
Western ethics lies principally in the amount of credence given to the autonomy, 
privacy, and rights of atomized individuals.90 
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89 EU Regulation, Standardization, and the Precautionary Principle (National Trade Foreign Council, 
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90  DC Wertz, JC Fletcher, K. Berg, Review of Ethical Issues in Medical Genetics (WHO, 2003), p. 
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Lee argues that Chinese society needs Western individualism to counter ‘excessive 
emphasis on the collectivist conception of the common good’ in terms of which ‘people’s 
assertions of basic rights and freedom have been neglected’.91  Thus although the notion 
of community is not quite as inflexible as may be thought, it is still prioritised over 
European individual rights. Chattopadhyay argues that there are two particular 
divergences of approach: 
Consider autonomy, the dominant principle of bioethics in the United States…. It is 
difficult for some Western bioethicists to realize that the principle of individual 
autonomy – even when tweaked to fit in non-United States settings by relocating 
autonomy in the family, or the clan, or an elder – is an assault on the tradition and 
values of non-Western societies who believe in the matrix of relationships in dynamic 
equilibrium of the cosmos. Or, consider the language commonly used in bioethics 
such as ‘end-of-life’. This term, so widely accepted in the West is heard and 
apprehended much differently by a traditional Hindu who believes in ‘life after 
death’.92 
 
 
Fan draws a distinction between Western and Eastern concepts of autonomy, in that he 
first requires that the patient, as long as being competent, has the final authority to make 
clinical decisions for himself, whereas in Asia 
the family’s decision should be made for the best interests of the patient in 
accordance with the objective conception of the good life adopted by the local 
cultural group. And it is the value of harmonious dependence between family 
members, rather than individual differentiation and independence, that this principle 
upholds.93  
 
 
Thus Kaelin contrasts the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights, with its commitment towards universally shared ethical values, with the reality of 
the Filipino notion of autonomy, which does not focus on ‘individual consent to health care, 
individual confidentiality, or individually articulated concerns with beneficence, caring or  
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diversity and the East Asian perspective’, in N. Fujiki, D. Macer ( eds.),  Bioethics in Asia (Tsukuba: 
Eubios Ethics Institute, 1998),  107-109. 
 
 
75 
truth-telling.’94  In terms of medical ethics, ‘the family, more than the individual, is often 
considered as one basic unit in the two aspects of doctor-patient relationships’.95  As Fan 
states: ‘the family, having a responsibility, must shoulder the fiduciary obligation of care for 
the patient, including taking care of the burdens of communicating with the physician and 
making medical decisions and signing a consent form for the patient.’96 
 
The Asian view of autonomy is much more relational than in the West.  It is unsurprising 
therefore that Asian bioethics is informed by recognition of the interdependence of all 
forms of life on earth, a ‘holistic harmony’ – ‘community’ in a very broad sense.97  In China, 
for example, tao, or harmony with the universe, is seen as the context for social harmony: 
Confucius recognized that not everyone was willing to cultivate a high degree of 
moral virtue, and that not everyone who tried would succeed. In practice, Confucius 
seemed to believe that only a minority would succeed in attaining moral superiority, 
and that he should concentrate his effort on enabling such a moral elite to become 
good leaders of the rest... (yet)  in Confucian thinking, the dignity of the individual 
comes not from the capacity to act independently of other members of society but 
from the capacity to be a part of an interdependent whole.98 
 
 
The reference to dignity is important here, given the previous contention that the EU 
bioethics declarations emphasise dignity.   De Bary suggests that when discussing the 
Chinese individual and his/her dignity we use the term personalism rather than that of 
individualism, as it suggests less of the Western context of liberal values and more of the 
worth and dignity of the person as ‘self shaped and formed in the context of a given 
cultural tradition, its own social community, and its natural environment to reach full 
                                                
94 Lukas Kaelin, Contextualizing Bioethics: The UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
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Kymlicka (eds.) The Globalization of Ethics. Religious and Secular Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, New York , 2007): 117-133 (p. 123,  p.127). 
 
 
76 
personhood’.99  Rather than placing collective over individual, the Confucian way is to seek 
a balanced relation between self and society.100 
Dignity in the Chinese context means various things.  Rather than autonomy and 
individual rights, it means agency, self-cultivation and compassion.  In fact, this description 
aligns well with what Schroeder describes as meritorious dignity, which requires individual 
agents to strive for the cultivation of virtues, as well as more universal ‘humanness’, for 
‘the belief in human dignity presupposes an irreducible worth attached to every person 
insofar as s/he is a human being.’101 
 It has been argued that dignity has always been, and is becoming more important 
(at least ‘officially’): 
The Chinese government places great importance on respecting human dignity. In 
April 2006, President Hu Jintao said…that ‘Chinese civilization has always given 
prominence to the people and respect for people's dignity and value’…Premier Wen 
Jiabao pointed out that ‘everything we do, we do to ensure that the people live a 
happier life with more dignity and to make our society fairer and more 
harmonious’.102  
 
 
In her analysis of Chinese historical texts, Fox Brindley sees agency as individual potential 
balanced by external checking agencies, holistically combined. Although we cannot 
necessarily prove such a view to be reflected in contemporary forms, it suggests a 
perspective of agency and individuality that is more complex than merely ‘bowing to 
authority’.  While the Chinese view does differ from the Western-centric one of the 
individual as possessing sovereign rights and full autonomy, the Chinese holistic individual 
can ‘achieve salvation for himself or herself from within a much larger web of social and 
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cosmic interconnectedness and agency’; rather than ‘rights-bearing’ individuals they are 
‘agency-fulfilling’ individuals.103   
‘Self-inspired’ agency is linked to self-cultivation, or to what Angel calls ‘self-
mastery’.104  As Ivanhoe argues, the Chinese ‘enduring concern with the issue of moral 
self-cultivation’ can mean either the Confucian model of acquired virtue, or that of the 
Mengzian developmental model.105  Ivanhoe’s work is interesting in that it underlines the 
notion that although virtue is to be cultivated for the greater good of the community, it is 
first and foremost a focus on the self.  In his view, Confucian virtue-acquisition rests on the 
creation of a separate or individual identity.  Thus ‘the conventional wisdom that the 
Chinese are group-oriented is, paradoxically, matched by the equally conventional view 
that the Chinese are individualists’, the latter deriving from the neo-Confucian doctrine of   
individual perfectibility. 106  Opposing this view, Schwartz notes that although Confucianism 
argues for self-realisation, it does not stress liberty or individual rights.107 However this 
perpetuates a very Western way of thinking about Chinese individualism, trying to 
shoehorn it into Western concepts. 
Ivanhoe suggests that the focus on self-cultivation is both an individual and a 
universal process. Discussing the philosopher Dai Zhen’s version of Confucianism, he 
notes Dai’s argument that ‘one needs to pass one’s spontaneous reactions to things and 
events through the sieve of universalisability in order to filter out “mere opinions” and arrive 
at the “unchanging standard” of moral truth.’108  The Confucian idea of acquiring a social, 
humble form through the rules of relationships (or social etiquette) sounds old-fashioned, 
yet contains a modern idea, that one has a ‘social’ self that directs individual virtues 
towards consensus.  I will come back to this idea when I deal with the issue of the type(s)  
 
                                                
103 Erica Fox Brindley, Individualism in Early China, Human Agency and the Self in Thought and 
Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press,  2010), p.130. p.145. Edwin Hui, ’Personhood and 
Bioethics: Chinese perspective’, in Bioethics: Asian Perspectives: A Quest for Moral Diversity, ibid, 
29-44, suggests the concept of Asian personhood differs from the Western person as ‘thing in 
itself’, the Asian version of a person being ‘thing in relation to others’.  
104 Stephen Angel, Human Rights in Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 132-3. 
105  Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), p. ix. 
106 Lucian W. Pye, ‘The State and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation’, in B. Hook (ed.)  The 
Individual and the State in China (Oxford:Clarendon,1996), 16-42 (p.  35, p. 19). 
107 Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), p. 27. 
108 Ivanhoe, ibid, p. 103. 
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of agency required by the Habermasian agent.  Part of the drive towards consensus 
comes from the notion of compassion, prominent in Asian professional ethics,109 but more 
broadly, from the Chinese notion of ren or jen, a compound term meaning ‘humanness’, 
and encompassing benevolence and compassion.  Recognizing the worth of others means 
recognising the worth of self in mutual recognition of one’s humanity.  
 Fox Brindley and Ivanhoe offer a tempting vision of autonomy replaced by a dignity 
of agency and by the cultivation of a dual self, one social, one individual, which exist in 
balance.  I will return to these ideas and discuss them further in later chapters.  
 
2.2.4  Attitudes to S&T in China 
Miller argues that science in China has a subversive quality, but in fact the narrative is a 
conventional one of technological impetus and of China’s global competitiveness.110  How 
strongly does the Chinese public adhere to this view that S&T are ‘always good’?  The first 
survey of Chinese attitudes to S&T was undertaken in Beijing in 1989, and showed that 
the majority surveyed respected S&T as major contributors to economic success and the 
solving of China’s issues, be they health, pollution and so on.111  This is similar to a survey 
of attitudes towards nanotechnology conducted in Japan in 2004, where 85.6 percent of 
respondents hoped that nanotechnology would benefit healthcare, and over 80 percent 
said that it would solve environmental problems.  Additionally, 98 percent believed it would 
be of positive benefit, compared to 70 percent in the UK and 68 percent in the US.112   
 
A survey of Chinese public scientific literacy, conducted in September 1990,  
demonstrated a need for greater public communication by scientists, a call supported by 
then president Hu Jintao in 2008.113  It is therefore unsurprising that a survey on GM food 
                                                
109 Hans-Martin Sass, Zhai Xiaomei, ‘Global Bioethics: Eastern or Western Principles? 
Asian Bioethics Review 3.1 (2011), 1-2, at 
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asian_bioethics_review/toc/asb.3.1.html>. 
110 H. Lyman Miller, Science and Dissent in Post-Mao China. The Politics of Knowledge (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press,1996). Lyman argues for a 1980s liberalization of science  although 
notes that it is difficult to tell how wide-ranging or indeed coherent this was; his own bias being for 
science as having an anti-authoritarian ethic  is clear (p.11).   He notes interestingly however the 
views of liberal scientists such as Fang Lizi and Xu Liangying in their ‘open letters’ of 1989.  
111 Zhongliang Zhang,  ‘People and science: public attitudes in China toward science and 
technology’, Science and Public Policy 18.5 (1991), 311-317. 
112 Yasumoto Fujita, ‘Perception of Nanotechnology Among General Public in Japan’, Asia Pacific 
Nanotechnology Weekly 4.6 (2006), at <http://www.nanoworld.jp/apnw/articles/library4/pdf/4-6.pdf>. 
113 Zhongliang Zhang, ‘A survey of public scientific literacy in China’, Public Understanding of 
Science  2.1 (January 1993), 21-38. Also Yun Liu,  Yibin Duan, Guangling Xiao,  Li Tang, ‘S&T 
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concluded that public non-awareness of the subject was widespread.114  Public 
perceptions on nanotechnology are low; according to Ma and Liao, a recent survey 
showed that when asked about nanotechnology, ‘60.7% responded “‘don’t know’”, or have 
a wrong understanding’.  Ma and Liao note that the discussion of nanotechnology in China 
was somewhat propaganda-driven until 2003, after which ‘the discussion became more 
objective and rational’.115  As Ma also notes, 
there are also some similarities between the Chinese and European publics: science 
has a very important place in the Chinese people’s heart, and the way Chinese 
people access information is also becoming increasingly similar to that of the 
Europeans. In terms of perceptions of science and technology, the Chinese public 
holds a more optimistic view about science than the Europeans.  Although the 
Chinese public is becoming more cautious and objective about science in recent 
years, such an attitude has not yet translated into the kind of worries and fears for 
science as seen in Europe. Science is still largely viewed as an important tool for 
transforming the world in the eyes of the Chinese public, and little attention is given 
to the possible challenges science may bring to our beliefs and values.116 
 
 
The following table sums up this differing approach in terms of a broader EU interest in the 
social impact of new technologies, versus the more Chinese belief in innovation’s 
economic power as primary. 
 
Table 5: Differing bioethics, differing social contexts (China and EU) 
 
 EU China  
Social 
values  
Dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human 
rights  
Family, harmony, community; ren 
or jen ethics – i.e. care for others, 
benevolence, humanness 
Major 
cultural 
value 
Individual human rights/autonomy a 
priority  
Community prioritised over 
individual autonomy 
                                                                                                                                               
policy evolution: A comparison between the United States and China (1950-present)’, 2011 Atlanta 
Conference on Science and Innovation Policy.  
114 Ma Ying, Zhao Yandong, ‘Analysis of Beijing Resident’s Satisfaction to Food Safety’, Social 
Science of Beijing 3 (2009) (GEST project copy). 
115 Ma Ying, Maio Liao, ‘Nano-technology Development in China and Three Related Ethic 
Discussions’, PowerPoint presentation,  GEST roundtable, September 5, 2012, Beijing. Supplied by 
Dr Miltos Ladikas.  
116 Ma Ying,  ‘Public Perceptions of Science and Technology in China’’, in  Ethics State of the Art: 
State of Debate in the Three Regions, GEST Report,  May 2012 (supplied by Dr Miltos Ladikas).  
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difference 
Similarity?  Dignity, defined as both a general or 
social value, and also as agency? 
 
Dignity of self-realisation? 
 
Attitude 
towards 
S&T and 
scientists: 
1. Public differentiation between 
technologies i.e. differing risks for 
nuclear, nano, GM 
1. Risk v benefit  
2. Post-Fukushima emphasis on 
confidence/or lack thereof in 
government,  according to how it 
handles S&T crises 
3. Survey in 2010: 6 out of 10 
Europeans felt that S&T can 
sometimes damage people’s moral 
sense; 1 in 2 that applications of 
science and technology can threaten 
human rights 
4. Innovation is always good  
5. Tao governs technology  
6. Harmony between tian (nature) 
7. and ren (human) 
8. Trust in government  (although this 
 may be starting to decrease due 
9.  to food scandals) 
10. Concern with social responsibility  
11. of scientists 
 
 
2.3 Global bioethics/global nanoethics? 
 
The importance of cultural diversity and pluralism should be given due regard. 
However, such considerations are not to be invoked to infringe upon human 
dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms, nor upon the principles set out in 
this Declaration, nor to limit their scope.117 
 
 
Seven broad areas of global bioethics debate can be identified: 
1. Normative bases appropriate for the emerging field of global bioethics  
2. Global research ethics, and what is owed to research subjects  
3. Collaborations  
 
 
                                                
117 UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, Article 12: June 24, 2005, at 
<www.undp.org/hdr2001>. 
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4. Practices in education 
5. Euthanasia 
6. Global bioethics and religion, and  
7. Processes being developed amongst international organizations for identifying 
universal norms and values.118 
 
The above suggests common practices, rather than a set of common values.  Dwyer for 
example perpetuates that view when he argues not for a new set of concepts to address 
issues in global health, but for detailed case studies instead.119   
Transformative steps for achieving global bioethics have been suggested based on 
processes of international knowledge sharing.120  The International Science and Bioethics 
Collaborations (ISBC) project is an example that brings together social anthropologists 
from Cambridge, Durham and Sussex Universities as well as research partners from nine 
Asian countries.  The project aims to address current social, economic and cultural issues 
in international collaboration and knowledge exchange around bioscientific research, 
biomedicine and bioethics.121  As Schummer notes, avoiding any cultural imperialism in 
bioethics is usefully achieved through international discussions:  
International discussion of ethical issues of nanotechnology is an excellent and 
important exercise, not only because views on nanotechnology are so diverse, but 
also because nanotechnology is frequently attached to a particularly strong and 
naïve attitude of ‘improving the world’. International discussions can help us  
 
                                                
118 On research subjects, see Ruth Macklin, ‘Global Justice, Human Rights, and Health’ in Ronald 
M. Green, Aine Donovan, Steven A. Jauss (eds.) Global Bioethics. Issues of Conscience for the 
Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Clarendon, 2008),  141-160; on collaborations, see Eric M. Meslin, 
‘Achieving Global Justice in Health through Global Research Ethics: Supplementing Macklin’s “Top-
Down” Approach with one from the “Ground Up”’’, also in Global Bioethics,  163-178; and on 
processes, see  John Harris, ‘Global Norms, Informed Consensus, and Hypocrisy in Bioethics’,   
Global Bioethics, ibid,  297-323. 
119 James Dwyer, ‘Teaching global bioethics’, Bioethics 17.5/6 (2003), 17432–446. Dwyer notes the 
difference between Singer and Rawls in that the latter looks at laws and institutions, and Singer at 
fundamental human interests - Rawls distinguishes the duty to assist citizens of other countries 
from the principle of distributive justice that applies to the society of which one is a citizen (p. 14 of 
15). 
120 Peter A. Singer, Archana Bhatt, Sarah E. Frew, Heather Greenwood, Jocelyn Mackie, Dilnoor 
Panjwani, Deepa L. Persad, Fabio Salamanca-Buentello, Béatrice Séguin, Andrew D. Taylor, Halla 
Thorsteinsdóttir, and Abdallah S. Daar, ‘Harnessing Genomics and Biotechnology to Improve 
Global Health Equity’, Global Bioethics, ibid,  pp. 179-204. 
121 University of Cambridge International Science and Bioethics Collaborations, at 
<http://www.placebo.socanth.cam.ac.uk/isbcsubproj2b.php>. 
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understand that our notions of both ‘improvement’ and ‘the world’ are very complex, 
culturally diverse and under continuous revisions.122 
 
 
And not merely international, but international and local, as per Maclurcan’s caution 
against any nanotechnology approach that ignores the ‘potential for local, village 
development of “appropriate' nanotechnologies”, and that may even ‘perpetuate’ deficit 
thinking within international health, technology and development policy.’ 123  
There is no doubt that practical collaborations in bioethics distribute knowledge, 
arguably increase standardization, and may offer more unified approaches to ethical 
issues, not merely in terms of global inclusion but also of multidisciplinarity – which may 
aid in those ‘creative searches’ for new methodologies that nanotechnology might require.  
However, these collaborations do not address the fundamental issues. Would work on 
global values underpin a global bioethics?  How could we reconcile the dignity/human 
rights discourse in the West with the principle of ‘harmony’ espoused in the East? Are we 
arguing for a rather ‘weak’ philosophy that might combine Confucian ethics with Western 
rationalism and individualism?124  
 
 
 
Which values for a global bioethics? Or should we consider processes?  
A 1993 International Bioethics Survey across ten countries suggested both a positive 
attitude to S&T and that the respondents are bioethically mature.125  Is this sufficient as a 
basis for global cooperation on a new technology such as nano? 
An article in The Economist on October 2,  2010, suggested that the ‘philosophical 
question of whether universal values exist has turned into a political fight, dividing 
                                                
122 Joachim Schummer, ‘Cultural diversity in nanotechnology ethics’, Interdisciplinary Science 
Reviews 31.3 (2006), 217-230, p. 223. 
123 Donald C. Maclurcan, ‘Southern Roles in Global Nanotechnology Innovation: 
Perspectives from Thailand and Australia’, NanoEthics 3  (2009), 137–156.  
124 Ren-Zong Qui, ‘The Tension between Biomedical Technology and Confucian Values’, in  Cross-
Cultural Perspectives, ibid,  71-88. 
125 Darryl  Macer, ‘International Bioethics Survey – World View’, in Bioethics for the People by the 
People (ed. D. Macer) (Christchurch: Eubios Ethics Institute, 1994), 125-138 (p. 128). This survey 
however noted ‘significant differences in public opinion concerning biotechnology in India, Thailand 
(and China) which poses a dilemma for policy makers.’ Macer identifies greater enthusiasm for 
‘enhancement’ therapies in these 3 countries than in the others surveyed. See also Debasmita 
Patra, E. Haribabu and Katherine A. McComas, ‘Perceptions of Nano Ethics among Practitioners in 
a Developing Country: A Case of India’, NanoEthics, 4.1 (2010), 67-75. 
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scholars, the media, and even, some analysts believe, China’s leaders’.126  In China, the 
debate on universal values (pushi jiazhhi) allegedly began in 2008 after the Sichuan 
earthquake; in December of that year ‘Charter 08’ was signed in support of universal 
values by several dissidents.  However no clear outcome has emerged from that 
discussion. 
 One widely adopted approach in bioethics has been that of principlism, i.e. of 
Beauchamp’s and Childress’s argument in favour of the four principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice.  Tangwa argues that these four principles are 
cross-culturally valid (using the particular example of Africa), in that ‘although the 
emphasis given to each and the way they are applied or operationalized may differ... they 
form the basis of the similarities underlying the remarkable diversity of the sub-cultures’.127 
Tai has commented that the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence have been a 
part of Eastern values since the time of Confucius.128   
 Given differing Eastern and Western approaches to the idea of precaution, 
however, these principles may not be quite as unifying as we might like.  Let us see if 
there might not be a more creative approach.  One recent suggestion has been that of the 
idea of ‘global solidarity’ itself – the approach becomes the principle, as it were.  Global 
solidarity promotes global equity as well as the five values of ‘respect for human life; the 
intertwined relationship between human rights, responsibilities and needs; ensuring 
freedoms; democratic principles of accountability, representation, cooperation, and good 
governance; and environmental sustainability’.129  This seems to be a tall order. 
 
Sakamoto gets to the heart of the issue when he discusses the idea of harmony, not 
solidarity. What he argues is that we need a Western agreement that is communitarian, or 
holistic – however one wishes to label it, a communal approach is required. This implies a 
Western recognition of agreement as more important than individualism per se: 
This work is the most crucial part of Global Bioethics, which is expected to 
harmonize and to bridge over all kinds of global ethoses, East and West, North 
and South. In this sense the new Global Bioethics should be ‘holistic’ in contrast 
to the ‘individualistic’ European model. Even today, Taoism, Confucianism, and 
                                                
126 ‘The debate over universal values’, The Economist, October, 2, 2010, 65-6 (p. 65). 
127 Godfrey B. Tangwa, ‘Ethical principles in health research and review process’, Acta Tropica 
112S (2009) S2–S7, S4. 
128 M.C.T. Tai & S.L. Chung, ‘Developing a culturally relevant bioethics for Asian people’, Journal of 
Medical Ethics 27 (20001), 51-54.   
129 Françoise Baylis, ‘Global Norms in Bioethics: Problems and Prospects’, in Global Bioethics, ibid, 
324-41   (p. 331). 
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Buddhism have a dominant influence on the ethos of the Asian world at its 
foundations….. new bioethical issues…necessarily require some sort of 
communitarian way of thinking from the global point of view.130 
 
 
In other words, rather than arguing about values that we might agree on, we really need to 
be arguing about how we agree, or disagree.  Sakamoto does not simply offer this idea of 
harmony as the guiding principle of global bioethics, but rather suggests the means for 
achieving it. 
Sakamoto argues for four key aspects in any possible global bioethics: (1) a new 
humanism, the (2) minimization of human rights, (3) a holistic harmony, and 4) the policy 
of global bioethics as a ‘social tuning’ technology.  The second and third points obviously 
suggest some compromise between Western and Eastern narratives.  The first proposes, 
albeit vaguely, ‘a new philosophy concerning the relation between nature and the human 
being’, but the fourth is arguably the most interesting of these ideas.131  Sakamoto 
introduces the idea of policy to harmonize differing aspects of global bioethics based on 
'bargain consensus', or 'dialogue bargain policy': 
I suggest that the global bioethics of the new century should not refer to any kind of 
‘universal principle’, ‘justice’, ‘categorical imperative’, or the like for its policy. The 
only policy possible here will be continuing dialogue without any reference to any 
rigid principle, or, on the contrary, with reference to all antagonistic principles as 
impartial bargain alternatives, ultimately soothing the opposition and antagonism 
among the principles to reach a ‘consensus of any kind’… We can imagine here that, 
through the process of reaching a bargain consensus, some sort of common feeling 
or compassion between both parties would be effectively born. I tentatively assume 
the existence of such a common feeling in all people as the ‘Feeling of Ache and 
Pity’… I assume that we could best reconstruct a new, post-modern humanism 
based on this feeling of ‘ache and pity’; for the third millennium.132 
 
 
Sakamoto’s dialogue draws on compassion and feelings of humanity, which may be 
similar to Tao’s ‘ethics of just caring’, that allows for context, relationship and particularity 
to counteract the impartiality of the reductionist approach to bioethics that she sees as 
                                                
130 H. Sakamoto, ‘Towards a new “global bioethics”’, ibid, p. 196.  
131 H. Sakamoto, ‘A New Possibility for Global Bioethics as an Intercultural Social Turning 
Technology’, in Julia Tao Lai Po-Wah  (ed.) Cross-Cultural perspectives: On the (Im)Possibility of 
Global Bioethics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 359-68 (p. 364). 
132 Sakamoto, ‘A New Possibility’, ibid, p. 366-7; also, H. Sakamoto, 'Globalisation of Bioethics – 
from the Asian perspective’, in Challenges for Bioethics in Asia. The Proceedings of the Fifth Asian 
Bioethics Conference (ABC5), 3-16 February, 2004 in Tsukuba Science City, Japan), (ed.  Darryl 
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currently prevalent.133  Sakamoto’s idea, in short is that the practice of global dialogue will 
lead to the principle, or ‘common feeling’, that might advance a global bioethics.  
 Similarly, Hongladarom argues that ‘decisions as how people from different 
backgrounds are to co-exist with one another peacefully ‘should be made on an 
'overlapping consensus' which is ‘shorn of the metaphysical basis on what constitutes the 
good life of the respective groups that enter into the deliberation.’134  In line with this 
argument, this thesis will look at the practices of global ethics – particularly 
dialogue/participatory Technology Assessment – rather than venturing into the realm of 
universal values.  We will thus begin with practice on a global policy level.  
 
 
In conclusion:  the bioethics context is different in East and West. As personhood can 
only be acquired through social practice, according to Confucian teachings, human value 
evolves from an individual’s social relations.  Confucianism describes each human being 
as a bearer of specific social roles: as father, as son, as wife, as ruler, as subject, as 
friend.  Each role is assigned a different status and a different pattern of behaviour, or 
duties.  This is not a system of individual rights, but of roles.135   
Western individualism takes a different approach, one more based on the right to 
an individual's autonomy.  This outlines the basic conflict that is often perceived in broad 
terms between West and East.  However, this chapter makes the following two claims: first 
that ‘dignity’, seen as a primary value in Western discourse on the individual and his or her 
rights, is a more universal quality than is usually thought.  Second, (and as a related point), 
that agency is a preferred term to autonomy or dignity.  Dignity should not even be seen as 
a form of autonomy, as that too has connotations of human rights, but of virtuous agency. 
This suggests that it might more effectively be seen as a process, rather than a values-
based system. 
 
                                                
133 However she also suggests that a ‘just caring’ ethics might require some form of moral 
framework, would need to be grounded in some conception of a good life.  
Julia Lai Po-Wah Tao,  ‘Is Just Caring Possible? Challenge to Bioethics in the New century’, Cross-
Cultural Perspectives on the (im)Possibility of Global Ethics, ibid, 41-58 (p.50). 
134 Soraj Hongladarom, ‘Asian Bioethics Revisited: What is it?, and is there such a thing? Eubios 
Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 14.6 (2004), 194-7 (pp. 195-6). 
135 Harro von Senger, ‘Chinese Culture and Human Rights’, in Wolfgang Schmale  (ed.) Human 
Rights and Cultural Diversity - Europe, Arabic-Islamic World, Africa and China (London:  Keip 
Publishing, 1993), p. 295, p. 305, p. 309. 
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Chapter Three:  Nanoregulation 
 
The European Commission is losing the leadership on nano. We cannot support 
innovation whilst disregarding the protection of human health and environments. 
Without the citizens’ support, the nano future is condemned.1 
 
 
...it is still necessary to set up a viable system based on the precautionary 
principle.....since research in the field of social and ethical evaluation of 
nanotechnology developments in China is not as advanced as in the USA and 
Europe, cooperation is important to avoid making similar mistakes and to promote 
the smooth development of nanotechnology.2  
 
 
In 2007, Kjolberg and Wickson offered the view in the journal NanoEthics that current 
nanoregulation is insufficient, and that more research on toxicology was needed.  They 
identified regulation as the first of the four major concerns raised by commentators up to 
that date. This raises three questions, which this Chapter will address:  
 
1. What are the risks of nanotechnology in terms of the impact on human health and 
the environment, as seen by commentators in China and in the EU? 
2. What regulation is currently in place in these two regions for nanotechnology? (Is it 
new regulation, or adapted?) 
3. What global regulation is currently in place for nanotechnology? 
 
 
3.1 What are the risks, and what regulatory approaches might we take? 
Given, as discussed in Chapter One, the view of nanotechnology as a potentially runaway 
technology that can be used by ‘dark forces’, what exactly are the risks (as perceived by 
researchers)? 
 The effect of nanotoxins has yet to be fully determined, and lab studies have 
shown that there might be some respiratory system damage through the inhalation of 
                                                
1 ‘NGOs respond to European Commission's second regulatory review of nanomaterials’, Nanowerk 
25 October, 2012, at <http://www.nanowerk.com/news2/newsid=27087.php>. 
2 Michael Decker, Zhenxing Li, ‘Dealing with nanoparticles’, ibid, p.106.  
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nanoparticles, leading to the fear that nanotech might potentially be ‘the next asbestos’.3 
Andrew Maynard, chief scientist for the Project for Emerging Nanotechnologies, suggested 
in 2006 a need to ‘energize’ the global research community to tackle potential 
nanotechnology dangers.  In his testimony before a US Federal government committee, he 
asked the following questions:  
What effect do airborne nanoparticles have on the lungs?  Do nanoparticles 
penetrate the skin? What happens to nanoparticles in water? How do they behave in 
the gastrointestinal tract?  What happens to nanoparticles when they are poured 
down a drain and enter the waste stream? 4 
 
 
Risks  
Nanomedicine, due to the action of particles about which not enough is yet known, may 
cause cardiovascular disease, increasing the risk of heart attacks and strokes,5 with some 
critics also arguing that ‘there is no question that the invasion of cells by nanoparticles 
could be carcinogenic’,6 and that some nanoparticles already in commercial use are toxic 
to cells.  These can allegedly damage DNA, negatively affect proteins, and cause cell 
death.7  A study at the University of Rochester found that when rats breathed in 
nanoparticles, the particles settled in the brain and lungs, which led to significant increases 
in biomarkers for inflammation and stress response.8  Mice studies have also found that 
nanoscale titanium dioxide can cause genetic instability and can pass from pregnant mice  
                                                
3 Alison Anderson et al Nanotechnology, Risk and Communication ibid,  p.  5. 
4 Andrew D. Maynard, ‘Nanotechnologies: Overview and issues’, in P.P. Simeonova, N. Opopol, 
M.I. Luster (eds.), Nanotechnology - Toxicological Issues and Environmental Safety (Springer, 
2007),  1-14. 
5 Where Gold Glints Blue. Scientists on the Nanorevolution (Swedish Research Council, 2008), p. 
95. Adam Satariano, ‘Pollution Particles Lead to Higher Heart Attack Risk’ (2010), at 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=washingtonstory&sid=aBt.yLf>. Donald Evans, ‘Ethics, 
Nanotechnology and Health’, in Nanotechnologies, Ethics, and Politics, ibid,  pp. 125-154. 
6 Jim Motavalli, ‘Wanted: Nano-cops’, New Haven Independent, 1 June 2010, at 
<http://newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/ wanted_nano-cops/id_26623>.   
7 Kirsten Gerloff, Catrin Albrecht, Agnes W. Boots, Imgard Forster, P.F. Roel, ’Cytotoxicity and 
oxidative DNA damage by nanoparticles in human intestinal Caco-2 cells’,  Nanotoxicology 3.4 
(2009), 355-364;   Salik Hussain, Leen C.J. Thomassen, Ioana Ferecatu, Marie-Caroline Borot, 
Karine Andreau, Johan A. Martens, Jocelyne Fleury, Armelle Baeza-Squiban, Francelyne Marano,  
Sonja Boland, ‘Carbon black and titanium dioxide nanoparticles elicit distinct apoptotic pathways in 
bronchial epithelial cells’,  Particle and Fibre Toxicology 7.10 (2010), at 
<http://www.particleandfibretoxicology.com/content/7/1/10/>. 
8 Cristina Buzea, Ivan Pacheco, & Kevin Robbie, ‘Nanomaterials and nanoparticles: Sources and 
toxicity’, Biointerphases  2. 4 (December, 2007), MR17-71. 
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to their offspring, damaging their genital and cranial nerve systems.9  (Titanium dioxide is 
used in allegedly close to 400 sunscreen products, according to an Australian study.10)  A 
study in China indicated that nanoparticles induce skin aging in hairless mice, while a two-
year study at UCLA's School of Public Health found laboratory mice that had consumed 
nanoscale titanium dioxide showed DNA and chromosome damage.11  Several types of 
engineered nanomaterials including titanium dioxide and carbon nanotubes are believed to 
produce pulmonary inflammation and fibrosis in animals,12 even brain damage.13  
Andre Nel (Chief Scientist, Nanomedicine, Los Angeles' NanoSystems Institute at 
the University of California), has discussed the need to assess whether the 'nanocarriers' 
that transport drugs have  
hazardous effects that are different and independent from the drugs being 
delivered… so far the only studies on the effects of nanotechnology in animals have 
focused on industrial nanomaterials rather than those used in nanomedicine (and) 
the same screening methods will be used to look at the safety of nanodrugs.14  
 
 
Som et al. also warn that health risks associated with indirect exposure of humans to 
nanoparticles in the environment cannot be ignored.  They give the cautionary example of 
                                                
9 Toshie Tsuchiya, Ikuko Oguri, Yoko Nakajima Yamakoshi, Naoki Miyata, ‘Novel harmful effects of 
[C60] fullerene on mouse embryos in vitro and in vivo’,  FEBS Letters 393 (1996), 139-145.  
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<http://www.tga.gov.au/npmeds/sunscreen-zotd.htm>. 
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‘Mechanisms of pulmonary toxicity and medical applications of carbon nanotubes: two faces of  
Janus?’, Pharmacology and Therapeutics. 121 (2) (2009), 192–204. See also K.S. Avolainen, L. 
Pylkkänen, H. Norppa, G. Falck, H. Lindberg, T. Tuomi, M. Vippola, H. Alenius, K. Hämeri, J. 
Koivisto, D. Brouwer, D. Mark, D. Bard, M. Berges, E. Jankowska, M. Posniak, P. Farmer, R. Singh, 
F. Krombach, P. Bihari, G. Kasper and M. Seipenbusch,  ‘Nanotechnologies, engineered 
nanomaterials and occupational health and safety – A review’, Safety Science 48.8  (2010), 957-
963. 
13 Eva Oberdorster, ‘Manufactured Nanomaterials (Fullerenes, C60) Induce Oxidative Stress in the 
Brain of Juvenile Largemouth Bass’, Environmental Health Perspectives 112.10 (2004), 1058-62. 
See also B. Holmes, ‘Carbon ”footfalls” harm fish’, New Scientist 182 (2004), p. 11. 
14 Munyaradzi Makoni, ‘Case study: South Africa uses nanotech against TB’, 24 November 2010,  
at <http://www.scidev.net/en/health/nanotechnology-for-health/features/case-study-south-africa-
uses-nanotech-against-tb-1.html>. 
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children facing harmful lead exposure through the intake of soil and dust contaminated by 
lead-based paints falling off walls and facades.15  
There is no clear resolution to the issue of nanotechnology’s environmental effects.  
One problem is that of the length of time that nanoengineered materials may last in landfill 
sites.  Thus a 2003 Greenpeace survey suggested that the environmental impact of a new 
class of non-biodegradable pollutants needed consideration.16   
A 2010 Friends of the Earth report suggested that many promised benefits from 
nanotechnology in terms of improving energy capture, manufacture and storage, are 
counteracted by the high-energy demands and environmental impacts of manufacturing 
nanomaterials.  Nano-enhanced solar panels are not only energy-inefficient to 
manufacture, they appear to have a considerably reduced lifespan in comparison with 
conventional panels.  Therefore, even if the manufactured products may be more energy 
efficient, the production cost and the lack of durability will diminish that saving.  And 
besides, as the report gloomily states, environmental products are a tiny section of a 
market that focuses more on commercial applications: 
Most nanoproducts are not designed for the energy sector and will come at a net 
energy cost. Super strong nano golf clubs, wrinkle disguising nanocosmetics, and 
colour-enhanced television screens take a large quantity of energy to produce, while 
offering no environmental savings. Such nanoproducts greatly outnumber 
applications in which nano could deliver net energy savings.17 
 
 
A UNESCO 2006 report referred to the risk of scientists being ‘no longer capable of 
autonomously directing scientific research due to the growth of external pressures.’  One 
assumes that these pressures include the hunger for biotech advances and the 
tremendous commercial potential they allegedly represent, as the report goes on to 
discuss the allegedly over-zealous granting of patents.18  
 
 
                                                
15 Claudia Som, Markus Berges, Markus, Quasim Chaudhry, Maria Dusinska, Teresa Fernandes, 
Stig I. Olsen, Bernd Nowack,  ‘The importance of life cycle concepts for the development of safe 
nanoproducts’, Toxicology 269.2/3 (2010), 160-169.  
16  Arnall, Future Technologies, Today’s Choices,  ibid, 2.5.2. 
17 Nanotechnology, climate and energy, ibid, pp. 5-6.  See Michael Berger, ‘Blowing hot air – how 
not to criticize nanotechnology’, Nanowerk, November 18 2012, at 
<http://www.nanowerk.com/spotlight/spotid=19060.php> for a critique of this report’s 
‘misconceptions’. 
18 The Ethics and Politics of Nanotechnology (UNESCO report, 2006). 
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Yet corporate interest in nanotechnology is not the issue; corporate corner-cutting in 
the rush to market, and of global access to products, are.  Industry agents may, in such a 
rush to market,  ‘realise that it is in their interest to present nanotechnology as “business 
as usual” or “evolutionary” in order to render nanotechnology familiar and therefore 
harmless’.19  The opposing view can, of course, be put that without corporate funding for 
the major potential applications of nanotechnology, many beneficial products would not be 
manufactured.20  
McCray, looking at the seminal work of Roco in promoting nanoresearch as a US 
national priority, notes a particular ethical concern about how the defence industry has 
played a significant part in funding these advances.21   
Nanotechnology has been condemned for its potential to advance Western 
consumerism, and little yet has been aimed at products that might benefit the poor. 22 
Whereas nanotechnology is an important driver for economic success, the West has some 
concerns that nano-products may lead to a displacement of jobs and major changes in 
trade balances between countries; manufacturing in countries with weaker controls (who 
subsequently export worldwide) may increase risk, and benefits may be unevenly 
distributed (leading to a so-called global ‘nanodivide’ between North and South).  An 
example is that of nanotechnology in Africa, which is discussed briefly in Appendix B. 
 In conclusion, the risk of toxicity to human health and the environment remains 
uncertain in the long term, while economic so-called risk can often be seen as a positive.  
It can encourage market responsibility on the part of corporations sensitive to the threat of 
consumer activism.  In the EU health and environment are the two (interrelated) major 
areas of risk, with many countries, particularly in Europe, remembering the introduction of 
drugs such as thalidomide in the 1960s, as well as the GM food debate.  The tendency 
towards adopting the precautionary principle means that the EU is reasonably risk-averse.  
  
                                                
19 Clare Shelley-Egan, ‘The Ambivalence of Promising Technology’, NanoEthics 4  (2010), 183–189 
(p. 187). 
20 Emmanuel Hassan, Jerry Sheehan, ‘Scaling-up nanotechnology’,  OECD Observer No. 237, May 
2003, at <http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1005/Scaling-
up_nanotechnology.html>. 
21 W. Patrick McCray, ‘Will Small be Beautiful: Making Policies for our Nanotech Future’, in   Wiebe 
E. Bijker, W. Bernard Carlson, Trevor Pinch (eds.)  Technology and Society. Building Our 
Sociotechnical Future (Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT Press, 2009), 323-368. 
22 B. McKibben, Enough: Staying human in an engineered age (New York: Henry Holt, 2003). A. 
Mnyusiwalla, et al,  ‘Mind the Gap’, ibid, 9-13. 
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The situation is different in China, where the precautionary principle is not pervasive, yet 
China is catching up in terms of nanosafety concerns.  The issue for China has intensified 
after a nanoparticle exposure accident in a poorly ventilated Chinese paint factory in 
August 2007.  Seven workers contracted lung disease, and 2 of these died.23 After this 
incident, ‘Chinese policymakers shifted focus to the risk management aspects of 
nanotechnology’, an example of which is the large-scale program begun in 2011 on 
monitoring factory worker exposure.24  The 2007 incident raised several questions about 
whether the link between exposure and pulmonary illness can be proven.  There are now 
more than 30 research organizations in China that have initiated research activities 
studying the toxicological and environmental effects of nanomaterials and nanoparticles, 
as well as a further 120 research organisations that are undertaking general research into 
nanoscience and nanotechnology.25  
 
 
Four types of regulatory approaches 
Before looking at the differing regulatory approaches in each region, we might first briefly 
note that the word ‘regulation’ can mean different things.  This is significant in terms of 
whether regulation is ‘open’, (i.e. involving a mixture of governmental, NGO and civil 
engagement), or closed, meaning purely top-down in its approach.  There are four types of 
regulatory initiatives, ranging from: 
1. Registers such as the UK Voluntary Reporting Scheme and the Swiss Nano-
inventory;  
2. Risk management systems, ranging from governmental such as the 
NanoKommission, for example, or business-generated, such as the Cenarios 
(Certifiable, Nanospecific Risk Management and Monitoring System) system 
introduced in Germany in 2008;  
                                                
23  Y. Song, X. Li, X. Du, ‘Exposure to nanoparticles is related to pleural effusion, pulmonary fibrosis 
and granuloma’,  European Respiratory Society’(2009),  at 
<http://www.ersj.org.uk/content/34/3/559.full>.  
24 Tang, ibid, p. 14. 
25 Feng Zhao, Yuliang Zhao and Chen Wang, ‘Activities related to health, environmental and 
societal aspects of nanotechnology in China’, Journal of Cleaner Production 16 (2008), 1000-1002.  
J. Cheng, H. Xu Xin, X.  Cao, S. Cheng, ‘Risk Management of Nanotechnology’, Journal of Safety 
and Management 9.3 (2009), 148-154101. 
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3. Codes of Conduct generated by governmental agencies, NGOs or business 
initiatives (business/NGO partnerships), such as the IG-DHS Code of Conduct for 
Nanotechnology or the BASF Code of Conduct Nanotechnology; to  
4. Actual regulatory policy, which is legally enforceable. Currently no specific 
nanoregulation exists – nanorisk is covered by existing legislation. However, the 
first international law designed specifically for nanotechnology is coming into effect 
as this study is being completed (July 2013).  This is regulation (EC) no 1223/2009 
of the European Parliament and of the council of 30 November 2009 on cosmetic 
products, and which will require label notification of ‘the presence of substances in 
the form of nanomaterials’, according to Article 13.26 
  
The use of the word ‘voluntary’ gives the reader an idea of why the first type of 
nanoregulation is considered ineffective.  A 2004 study of public perceptions of 
nanotechnology in the US showed that 60 percent of respondents did not trust business 
leaders to minimize nanotechnology risks.27  Yet there is the increased power of the 
consumer.  The GM food scandal, and the economic results of the GM boycott (discussed 
in Chapter Two) indicate that corporations need to be careful in how their markets perceive 
risk. This is an issue for both China and the EU.28  
The 2006 ‘Voluntary Reporting Scheme’ introduced in the UK in terms of which 
companies would report to the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
has been negatively assessed for a lack of compliance incentives.  In 2008 the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implemented a program for the nanotech industry 
to report their use of nanomaterials voluntarily – a program that also appears to have 
failed.29  However, Allhof, Lin and Moore, in their consideration of what effective regulation 
might look like, suggest that a compromise solution involving nanoindustry self-regulation 
plus legislation may be the best solution.30  The evolving context surrounding regulation 
                                                
26 ‘Nanotechnology policy making - mandatory tools’, Nanowerk, April 30, 2013, at 
<http://www.nanowerk.com/spotlight/spotid=29822.php>.  For the actual regulation, see: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009R1223:EN:NOT>. 
27 M.D. Cobb, J. Macoubrie, ‘Public perceptions’, ibid, p. 400. 
28 R.P. Appelbaum, R.A. Parker, ‘Innovation or imitation? China's bid to become a global leader in 
nanotechnology’, March, 2007, p. 21, at 
<http://www.cns.ucsb.edu/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=100&func=select&id=3P>.  
29 Allhof, Lin, Moore, Why Does it Matter?, ibid, p. 99; Rebecca Trager, ‘EPA Nanosafety Scheme 
Fails to draw Industry’, Chemistry World , 5 August, 2008, at 
<www.rsc.orgg/chemistryworld/News/2008/August/0508081.asp>. 
30 Allhof, Lin, Moore, Why does it matter, ibid, p. 125. 
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can include hybridity of civil and governmental regulation, with national or state codes plus 
non-conventional, voluntary, private-sector-initiated regulatory arrangements.31 
 Risk management systems have also been criticised for their voluntary nature.  
Cenarios, however, described by the company as the ‘first and only nano safety standard 
with certificate worldwide’, has an external body that certifies nanosafety.   
Any moves towards transparency of this kind create a new global culture of 
awareness, as well as pressuring governments towards greater action on nanorisk.  
One might mention in this context the role of environmental NGOs.  The response 
to the European Commission’s second regulatory review of nanomaterials by a group of 
NGOs, the European Environmental Bureau and various consumer organisations and 
trade unions on October 23, 2012, has been strongly critical of the lack of governmental 
action on nano-specific regulation, stating that 
The European Commission is losing the leadership on nano. We cannot support 
innovation whilst disregarding the protection of human health and environments. 
Without the citizens’ support, the nano future is condemned.32 
 
 
The BASF Code of Conduct (deriving from the German chemical corporation BASF) is 
tied to the company's image and marketing the company as responsible.33  However, the 
IG-DHS (an acronym referring to a group of Switzerland’s biggest retailers) Code, 
introduced in 2008, is described as a ‘strong measure’, in that it demands precise 
information from suppliers as to nanomaterials in their products.34 The IG-DHS suggests, 
as mentioned under point 2 above, that due to a lack of appropriate regulation at a 
governmental level, private companies’ codes of conduct have become more important. 
Thus the UK has a NanoCode, the Nanocare Initiative, and the Nano Risk Framework.35    
 In terms of both regulation and policy, the issue is whether existing policies cover 
nanorisks sufficiently, or whether, as in the US, where some nanomaterials can be 
regulated within the existing Toxic Substances Control Act, this may be neither ideal nor 
                                                
31 Diana M. Bowman, Graeme A. Hodge, ‘”Governing” nanotechnology without government?’, 
Science and Public Policy (August 2008), 475-87. 
32 ‘NGOs respond to European Commission's second regulatory review of nanomaterials’, ibid. 
33 The BASF Final Report appeared in May 2013. It can be accessed at: 
http://www.dialogbasis.de/fileadmin/content_images/Home/Dialogforum_Nano_of_BASF_2011-
2012_web_engl.pdf>. 
34  Ulrich Fiedeler, Michael Nentwich, Sabine Gressler, Andre Gazslo, Myrtill Simko, ‘Voluntary 
approaches  by industry in the field of nanomaterials’,  Nano-Trust Dossier 016en (December, 
2010), at <http://epub.oeaw.ac.at/ita/nanotrust-dossiers/dossier016en.pdf>. 
35  Ferrari, ‘Developments’, ibid, p. 35. 
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sufficiently far-reaching.36  The seminal 2003 Royal Society Report in the UK accepted 
current regulatory frameworks in that country as sufficient but recommended a review, and 
caution given the lack of evidence as yet on the effect of, for example, inhaled 
nanoparticles, as well as the ‘avoidance as far as possible’ of emitting nanoparticles.37 A 
2004 EU legislative review  - launched for assessment of nanorisk and need for regulatory 
intervention - offered 12 recommendations, such as a new nomenclature for 
nanochemicals to highlight that these are in fact new (thus their effects cannot necessarily 
be considered similar to their non-nano versions), better risk assessment mechanisms, 
greater data, and so forth.  The three major conclusions, across a range of papers on risk 
in this review, were: 
• That there is as yet not enough data on the risks of nanoproducts, 
• Given the above, there is a need to improve risk assessment mechanisms and 
criteria, to be cautious about nanoparticle elimination into the environment, and  
• There is a need for dialogue (the EU report lists this as the 8th of its 12 
recommendations).38 
 
Does nanotechnology require new, specific regulatory approaches? There is no particular 
agreement on what a new system of regulation should look like, or how it might be 
achieved, with new risk assessment tools,39 greater public participation, and new global 
codes of conduct being just some of the pathways suggested.40  As Guerra states, the task 
is not easy: 
Major issues arise when one tries to answer the following two questions: (1) which 
specific model of regulation could be appropriate to discipline peculiarities derived 
from the new kind of research on technoscientific subjects, and (2) which principles 
can model specific regulations.41 
 
 
                                                
36  Preston, Sheinin, Sporat, Swaruip, ‘The Novelty’, ibid, p. 39. 
37 Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties (Royal Society Report, 
2004), section 10, at  <http://www.nanotec.org.uk/report/chapter10.pdf. 
38  ‘Nanotechnologies: a Preliminary Risk Analysis on the Basis of a Workshop Organized in 
Brussels on 1–2 March 2004 by the Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General of the 
European Commission’, at <http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/documents/ev_20040301_en.pdf>. 
39 O. Renn, M.C. Roco, White paper on nanotechnology risk governance. International Risk 
Governance Council (IRGC), 17 Apr 2007 (Geneva), at 
<www.nsf.gov/crssprgm/nano/reports/irgc06_wp.pdf>.   
40 G. Hunt, ‘Nanotechnologies and Society in Europe’ in Nanotechnology. Risk, Ethics and Law, 
eds. G. Hunt & M. Mehta (London: Earthscan, 2008), 92–104. 
41 Giorgia Guerra, ‘European Regulatory Issues in Nanomedicine’, NanoEthics 2 (2008), 87–97 (p. 
95). 
 
 
95 
All this is made somewhat complicated by the fact that with nanotechnology, the issue is 
one of ‘futuristic’ risk assessment issues (‘anticipatory regulation’, i.e. of legislating for an 
emerging and as yet poorly understood technology).  This requires one ‘to select or 
construct a particular future from innumerable alternatives, a process which will hopefully 
provide enough information to base a decision on’.42  Thus the seminal 2004 Royal Society 
Report segments the field into specific futures for which ethics can prepare – ‘specified 
uncertainties’ – and then matches such futures with existing institutions that presumably 
can ’cope with them’.43  Nanorisk decision makers will be in the situation of ‘decision 
making with incomplete knowledge of outcomes (as well as their associative 
probabilities).44   
Although this is surely the problem with any new technology, Dupuy and Grinbaum 
argue that nanotechnology is more problematic than most:  ‘one serious deficiency, which 
hamstrings the notion of precaution, is that it does not properly gauge the type of 
uncertainty with which we are confronted at present’, and so they argue for a more 
extreme approach, that of ‘ethics beyond prudence’.45  By this they appear to mean that 
we need new ideas of what prudence might mean, as the precautionary principle is 
insufficient. As Ferarri notes, we have an ‘epistemically new situation characterised by 
uncertainty, ignorance, and ambiguity’.46   
This could imply new and much stricter regulation.  Or it might perhaps lead to 
more ‘open’ regulation, involving a greater spread of opinion and consultation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
42 Mario Kaiser, Monika Kurath, Sabine Maasen, Christoph Rehmann-Sutter (eds.), Governing 
Future Technologies: Nanotechnology and the Rise of an Assessment  Regime (Springer, 2009),  
p. 181.  
43 Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: Opportunities and uncertainties (The Royal Society, 2004), 
at <http://www.nanotec.org.uk/report/Nano%20report%202004%20fin.pdf>, p. 187. 
44 Fritz Allhoff, Patrick Lin and Daniel Moore, What is Nanotechnology, ibid, pp. 75-77. 
45 J-P. Dupuy, A. Grinbaum, ‘Living with Uncertainty’, ibid, p. 290.  
46 Ferrari, ‘Developments’, ibid, p. 33. 
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3.2  Nanoregulation in the EU 
 
We are still in the initial phases of (policy) development. There are not, so far, any 
internationally agreed definitions relating to the technology.... Recent proposals for 
renewing regulation on food additives have made this the first piece of regulation to 
include explicit reference to nanotechnology.47 
 
 
Given the novelty of nanotechnology, is there an opportunity, as Faunce suggests, to 
shape policy in Europe to reflect a ‘greater balance between private and public goods in 
two areas of primary concern to human well-being:  medicine and biosecurity’?48 
 
With the 2004 Lisbon Strategy, Europe stated its aim of being ‘the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010’.49  A focus on nanotechnologies 
was seen as a key part of this strategy. During the formation of the 2004 European Nano-
Electronics Initiative Advisory, European technology companies such as Philips, Nokia, 
Ericsson, and AMD decided that if Europe wanted to lead the world, it would need to invest 
at least 6 billion euros per year to switch from micro to nanoscale electronics.  A public-
private partnership charged to come up with and implement a European nano-electronics 
research agenda first met in 2004.  Its goals included: supporting research and investment 
in nano, speeding up innovation and productivity, the facilitation and acceleration of market 
penetration of new technologies, aligning research/technology with European policies and 
regulatory frameworks, and increasing public awareness, understanding, and acceptance 
of nanotechnologies.50  A later group, The European Network of Excellence program 
(Nano2Life) evolved from 2004-2008, and representing 200 scientists, 23 research 
organizations, and 12 countries, joined with industrial partners to identify regional centres, 
disciplines, and expertise available for collaboration.  Goals have included developing joint 
research projects on four major technical platforms: functionalization, handling, detection, 
and integration of nanodevices.  
                                                
47 René von Schomberg, ‘Introduction’, in René von Schomberg, Sarah Davies (eds.), 
Understanding Public Debate on Nanotechnologies. Options for Framing Public Policy A Report 
from the European Commission Services (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 
2010), p. 9, at  <http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-
society/document_library/pdf_06/understanding-public-debate-on-nanotechnologies_en.pdf>. 
48 Thomas A. Faunce, ‘Nanotechnology in Global Medicine and Human Biosecurity: Private 
Interests, Policy Dilemmas, and the Calibration of Public Health Law’, Global health Law, Ethics and 
Policy (Winter, 2007), 629-42 (p. 629). 
49 ‘Lisbon Agenda’, at <http://www.euractiv.com/en/agenda2004/lisbon-agenda/article-117510>. 
50 Wade Adams, Linda Williams, Nanotechnology Demystified, ibid, pp. 238-9. 
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Given such economic impetus (even, arguably, economic determinism), what governance 
exists, and what ethical advisory bodies function in the EU? 
 
EU nanotechnology advisory groups – EGE, HLEG, ETAG, EGAIS 
The history of EU nanoregulation should be placed in the context of biotechnology 
regulation, which dates back to the 1990s, with the establishment in 2001 of a European 
Commission Group on Ethics in Science and Technology (EGE).  The Group was created 
to advise the Commission on how to exercise its powers as regards the ethical aspects of 
biotechnology. It noted in its general report for the 2005-2010 period examples of 
embedded ethics in policy such as the Science and Society Action Plan (2001), the Action 
Plan for Life Sciences and Technology (2007), as well as legislative activities including 
directives governing clinical trials, patents, data protection, the use of animals in 
experimentation, and the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Action 
Plan.  
 Unsurprisingly, the advisory groups have advocated the precautionary principle. 
The EGE’s 2006 Opinion 21 paper underlined ‘the vital importance of addressing concern 
for safety with respect to … nanotechnology in general’. I t advocated, in regards to 
nanomedicine, the need to establish measures to verify the safety of nanomedical 
products, and issues of military usage of nanotechnology, enhancement, economic equity 
and animal testing (familiar issues, as identified in Chapter One).51  The EGE group has 
been referred to as ‘largely unknown’, however, according to a public (admittedly global 
rather than EU) survey.52   
The High Level Expert Group (HLEG) on Key Enabling Technologies was 
convened by the EC in 2010 to develop possible policy measures to promote the industrial 
take-up of key technologies such as nano by EU industries.  The HLEG’s SIG subgroup 
(special interest group, nanotechnology) offered a 2004 report, advocating both moral  
 
                                                
51 Paula Martinho da Silva, Nanotechnologies for Sustainable Development (European 
Commission, 12 November 2009), at <http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/pdf/swedish-presidency-
event/martinho_de_silva.pdf> 
52 Report on the European Commission's Public Online Consultation (SNAP) 2010-2015, ibid,  p. 4. 
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pluralism, and the need for ethics to be an intrinsic part for technological advances.53 
Another EU advisory group is ETAG, The European Technology Assessment Group, 
which runs projects on the potential environmental, health and safety risks of engineered 
nanomaterials  (such as their project on chemical risk in 2006, and on human 
enhancement in 2008-9).  The EGAIS (Ethical Governance of Emerging Technologies) 
project, funded by the 7th Framework Programme (Science in Society) has as its mission 
‘to overcome the existent limitations of the current approaches to ethical governance in 
projects with technical development’.54  The European Commission's Directorate-General 
and Services involved in nanotechnology number over a dozen, including 7 agencies for 
risk evaluation.55  
 
 
EU priorities in nanogovernance  
The above outlines how the EU is aware of the need for nanoethics to be part of 
technology development. Are there any particular directions for EU concerns within that 
broad area?  EU awareness of nanotechnology issues began in earnest in 2002-3, after 
discussion of the potential risks by the European Parliament’s Green Party,56 and the 
publication of the 2001 National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in the USA.  In terms of 
the EU’s ‘framework’ structures for funding research and technological development, 
Framework Programme 6 (FP6) (2002-6) indicated that nanotechnology had become a 
research priority, possibly stimulated by a need to compete.  FP6 was introduced with 
policy objectives to enhance innovation, and to ‘change the European research landscape 
through the introduction of the integrated European Research Area (ERA), and create 
sustainable growth, increased employment and greater social cohesion’.57  
                                                
53 See Foresighting the New Technology Wave Expert Group SIG 2 Final Report (2004), at  
<http://ex.europa.eu./research/conefrences/2004/ntw/pdf/sig2_en,pdf>, p. 2. For analysis of the SIG 
group, see Nigel M. de S. Cameron, ‘Ethics, Policy, and the Nanotechnology Initiative: the 
Transatlantic debate on “Converging Technologies”’, in Nanoscale, ibid, 27-42 (p. 29). 
54 EU ethics advising has seen (according to Cordis, the EU’s information repository) an increased 
level of funding allocated in terms of the EU’s 7th Framework Programmes (2007-2011), see 
<http://www.egais-project.eu/>.   
55 The full list can be seen a: <http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/links_en.html>. 
56 Mireille Oud, ‘A European Perspective’, ibid,  p. 273. 
57 Krsto Pandza, Terry A. Wilkins, Eva A. Alfoldi,   ‘Collaborative diversity in a nanotechnology 
innovation system: Evidence from the EU Framework Programme’, Technovation, 31.9 (September 
2011), 476-489. The article has a useful table outlining the framework programs and the focus on 
nanotechnology in each. 
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The first expert recommendations for the EC suggested a special emphasis on 
developing a nomenclature for nanoparticles, on assigning a new Chemical Abstract 
Service (CAS) registry number to engineered nanoparticles, and on grouping and 
classifying nanomaterials with respect to categories of risk, toxicity and proliferation.58 
 The three EC Scientific Committees set up in 2004 for nanogovernance were: 
SCCS (the Scientific Committee on Consumer Safety), that looks at nanomaterials in 
consumer products; SCER (the Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental Risks), 
that looks at nanotechnology in food, as well as medical and environmental issues; and 
SCENHIR (the European Commission’s Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly 
Identified Health Risks), that looks at methodologies for risk issues of new technology such 
as nanotechnology.59 
 The EC’s Action Plan on Nanotechnology (2005), as well as considering possible 
adverse effects on health and the environment, also highlighted the ethical issues 
concerning nanotechnology’s potential to contribute towards Millennium Development 
Goals such as the eradication of poverty and disease. As well as discussing public 
participation and education, the Plan encouraged internationally cooperative work on 
nanoregulation. In 2007, the European Commission accepted the first implementation 
report (2005-2007) of the Action Plan. The second implementation report was adopted in 
2009, with the statement that ‘efforts to address societal and safety concerns must be 
continued to ensure the safe and sustainable development of nanotechnology.’60   
In 2006 NGOs entered the social debate on nanotechnology (in Europe). Most 
NGOs focus on threats to health and the environment, issues of controllability and power, 
as well as questions of access and equity. Many of these organisations support a strong 
precautionary principle and conclude with proposals for a moratorium on the use of 
nanomaterials in products, particularly in food and cosmetics 
 
 
 
                                                
58 Armin Grunwald, Responsible nanobiotechnology: Philosophy and Ethics (CRC Press, 2012), 
p.110. 
59  Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks, SCENHIR. Risk 
Assessment of Products of Nanotechnologies  (EC Directorate-General for Health and Consumers, 
2009), at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_023.pdf>. 
60 Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies: An action plan for Europe 2005-2009. Second 
Implementation Report 2007-2009 (EC Commission, Brussels, 2009), at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0607:FIN:EN:PDF>. 
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EU achievements in nanoregulation? EU-CoC, REACH 
The brief discussion above shows how although there are many forums for discussing 
nanotechnology issues, little is happening in terms of concrete policy.  What has the EU 
actually achieved?  Two significant regulatory attempts have been the EU Code (EU-CoC), 
and REACH. 
 
In 2008-9, the European Commission created ‘EU-CoC’, a Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research, intended to ‘ensure, safe, 
ethical and sustainable nanosciences and nanotechnologies research in the European 
Union’.61  The Code guidelines were intended for use in national strategic nanotechnology 
planning, funding distribution, and to create greater public accountability. 
 The Code’s seven principles – ‘meaning, sustainability, precaution, inclusiveness, 
excellence, innovation, and accountability’ – were generally accepted, although 
‘accountability’ was felt to be too strong and should be replaced with ‘responsibility’. 62 
There has been some praise of the Code:   
The recently released Code…developed by the European Commission is one code 
that is voluntary, but which has originated in a political sphere and which demands a 
higher level of accountability.… the code seeks to intervene at an earlier stage in the 
development cycle of nanotechnologies, embedding principles of responsibility at the 
research stage.63 
 
 
However, it has also been criticised. The European Project NanoCode, a 2-year multi-
stakeholder dialogue providing input to EU-CoC for Responsible Nanosciences & 
Nanotechnologies Research, commenced in January 2010, with the aims of monitoring 
stakeholder input and suggesting revision to this Code of Conduct.  The issue of the ‘lack 
of teeth’ in voluntary codes such as this one is demonstrated by the fact that only 21% of 
respondents’ organisations had actually adopted the Code.  Suggested improvements 
have ranged from the development of tailor-made codes of conduct for specific nano-
                                                
61 See <http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/nanocode-
recommendation-pe0894c08424_en.pdf>. 
62 Commission Recommendation of 07/02/2008 on a code of conduct for responsible nanosciences 
and nanotechnologies research, at <http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/pdf/nanocode-
rec_pe0894c_en.pdf>. 
63 Sarah Davies, Phil Macnaghten, Matthew Kearnes (eds.) Reconfiguring Responsibility. 
Deepening Debate on Nanotechnology (Durham: DEEPEN Report, Durham University, 2009), p.25, 
at 
<http://www.geography.dur.ac.uk/Projects/Portals/88/Publications/Reconfiguring%20Responsibility
%20September%202009.pdf>. 
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companies, ‘naming and blaming’ in the case of non-compliance, linking compliance to 
public funding, and the incorporation of the Code into the EC Research Framework as a 
guideline.  There was a further issue of whether the Code should be promoted as the ‘one 
and only’, or allowed to coexist with the institutional guidelines of each respondent’s 
organisation.  NanoCode’s report on stakeholder attitudes towards the Code concluded 
that ‘awareness of the code was limited to a community of selected key experts’ and was 
not embedded in the everyday life of the large majority of researchers in Europe.64  The 
report also concluded that few governments seemed able to communicate their principles 
to stakeholders effectively.   
  
The second achievement of EU policy has been the 2006 EC establishment of REACH – 
the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical Substances), a 
regulatory framework addressing the following aspects of nanotechnologies: classification, 
terminology and nomenclature; metrology and instrumentation, including specifications for 
reference materials; test methodologies; modelling and simulation; science-based health, 
safety and environmental practices; and nanotechnology products and processes.65 
 
The aim of REACH is  
to improve the protection of human health and the environment through the better 
and earlier identification of the intrinsic properties of chemical substances...The 
REACH Regulation places greater responsibility on industry to manage the risks 
from chemicals and to provide safety information on the substances. Manufacturers 
and importers are required to gather information on the properties of their chemical 
substances, which will allow their safe handling, and to register the information in a 
central database ….One of the main reasons for developing and adopting the 
REACH Regulation was that a large number of substances have been manufactured 
and placed on the market in Europe for many years, sometimes in very high 
amounts, and yet there is insufficient information on the hazards that they pose to 
human health and the environment. There is a need to fill these information gaps to 
ensure that industry is able to assess hazards and risks of the substances, and to 
identify and implement the risk management measures to protect humans and the 
environment.  
 
                                                
64 ‘NanoCode publishes synthesis report of stakeholder survey on EU Code of Conduct’, at  
<http://www.nanocode.eu/files/reports/nanocode/nanocode-consultation-synthesis-report.pdf>,  p. 
6.  
65 See <http://www.cen.eu/cen/Sectors/Sectors/Nanotechnologies/Pages/default.aspx>, and 
<http://www.ecostandard.org/downloads_a/cen-overview-std-nanotech-sept07.pdf> (point 2.1.1).  
The latte website has an analysis of national standards bodies in the EU, UK, North America, 
Japan, China, and Korea. 
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In 2008, the EC Commission (Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials) concluded that 
existing EU regulatory frameworks covered in principle the potential health, safety and 
environmental risks related to nanomaterials, and  stressed that the protection of these 
areas would be enhanced by improving the implementation of current legislation instead. 
In answer to this communication the European Parliament declared the EC’s statement to 
be misleading and ‘one-dimensional’.66  In 2010-11, the European Parliament, concerned 
with the regulation of nanomaterials under REACH, again requested further study and 
responses to nanorisk.67  The concern was that it did not go far enough to deal with the 
dangers of nanochemicals, given that they operate at such a small scale.   
This was the impetus behind the September 2011 German Advisory Council on the 
Environment’s report Precautionary Strategies for Managing Nanomaterials. The report 
offers a number of suggestions and recommendations, including ‘extensive changes in 
chemicals legislation (REACH)’, arguing that ‘nanomaterials should be consistently treated 
as if they were substances in their own right and registered with dossiers of their own, as 
well as that  ‘authorisation should be based more closely on the precautionary principle.’68  
In early February, 2012, the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) 
released an assessment of the status of regulating nanomaterials under REACH.  The 
Just out of REACH CIEL report recognizes four areas where REACH is ‘not living up to 
expectations for nanomaterials’ and offers options for modifying REACH ‘to fill the 
problematic knowledge gap on nanomaterials’. The report proposes developing a stand-
alone regulation, ‘carefully aligned with the chemical rules, but specifically tailored to 
nanomaterials, a nano “patch” that closes these inherent loopholes.’69  Such a regulation 
would establish clear, legally binding provisions for nanomaterials and create a transparent  
 
                                                
66 Markus Widmer, Stephan Knebel, ‘Fishing for nano risks with the wrong type of fishing net: 
European Parliament calls for sweeping review of current regulations concerning nanomaterials’ 
(St. Gallen: Innovation Society Newsletter, June 2009), at 
<http://www.innovationsgesellschaft.ch/en/index.php?section=media1&path=%2Fmedia%2Farchive
1%2F2009%2F>.  
67 This process was noted by Camilo Fautz (ITAS), ‘Case Study Nanotechnology’, GEST 
presentation, Beijing, September, 2012.   Supplied by Dr Miltos Ladikas. 
68 Precautionary Strategies for Managing Nanomaterials (German Advisory Council on the 
Environment, 2011), at  
<http://www.umweltrat.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/02_Special_Reports/2011_09_Precautionary
_Strategies_for_managing_Nanomaterials_KFE.pdf?__blob=publicationFile>. 
69 Nanomaterials ‘Just Out of REACH’ of European Regulations,  CIEL (February, 2012), at 
<http://www.ciel.org/Chem/JustOutofREACH_Feb2012.html>. 
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and predictable legal environment for the safe production and use of nanomaterials in the 
EU. 
The 2012 Communication on the Second Regulatory Review on Nanomaterials 
describes the Commission’s plans to improve EU law and its application to ensure their 
safe use, concluding that  
nanomaterials are similar to normal chemicals/substances in that some may be toxic 
and some may not. Possible risks are related to specific nanomaterials and specific 
uses. Therefore, nanomaterials require a risk assessment, which should be 
performed on a case-by-case basis…Current risk assessment methods are 
applicable, even if work on particular aspects of risk assessment is still required.70 
 
These conclusions have been criticised for failing to implement the precautionary principle 
sufficiently. This is becoming a global problem: 
Analysts and regulatory reviews have called for increased international cooperation, 
standard-setting, and capacity-building. Some point to the growing 
internationalization of nanotechnology, and the burgeoning international trade in 
nanomaterials and products made with nanotechnology which are likely to create a 
greater need for international harmonization of regulations.71 
 
 
Given EU-CoC and REACH, does more need to be done in terms of regulation and policy 
development? With a lack of definitive knowledge about the effects of nanotoxicity, the 
issue of how far the precautionary principle must be applied is still being debated.  There 
are still issues about whether a ‘truly’ precautionary approach is in fact being followed in 
the EU at the moment.72 
However it should also be noted that the one EU (2010-) ongoing public 
consultation project, ‘SNAP’, has thus far concluded that there was a general perception of 
nanotechnology benefits, particularly in communications/computing, energy, aerospace, 
construction, sustainable chemistry, security and the environment.  Applications for  
 
 
                                                
70 The 2012 Communication on the Second Regulatory Review on Nanomaterials (European 
Commission, 2012), at  
http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/pdf/second_regulatory_review_on_nanomaterials_-
_com(2012)_572.pdf>. 
71 Robert Falkner, ‘Regulating Nanotechnologies: Risk, Uncertainty and the Global Governance 
Gap’, Global Environmental Politics 12.1 (2012), 30-55 (p. 29 of online version) at 
<http://personal.lse.ac.uk/falkner/_private/2012_Falkner_Jaspers_RegulatingNanotechnologies.
pdf>. 
72 Roger Strand, Kamilla Kjølberg, 'Regulating Nanoparticles: The Problem of Uncertainty', See 
European Journal of  Law and Technology 2.1 (2011), at <http://ejlt.org//article/view/88/157>. 
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medicine, agriculture, food and household items were regarded with more scepticism; yet  
there was a ’good or very good perception of EU governance related to nanotechnologies 
in terms of stakeholder consultation and setting research priorities’, while respondents did 
‘not expect more actions in the fields of ethical, legal and social aspects of 
nanotechnology, or in terms of ensuring ethical reviews of EU nano R&D projects’.73 
 
3.3  Nanoregulation in China 
China is arguably further behind on the nanotechnology governance challenges – such as 
addressing low public awareness, developing a robust risk research strategy, and 
implementing an effective oversight system – compared with that encountered in the West. 
According to Tang, Carley and Porter, the initial focus for China was on creating regulatory 
support for significant research in technology commercialization and economic growth.74  
However, a 2004 conference on biological as well as environmental nanoeffects, and the 
launch of a program on the toxicological effects of nanotechnology, suggested that a 
nanosafety debate has begun in China, so that, as Qi has argued, nanosafety research 
has become ‘an integral part of nanotechnology research’.75   
Now that markets are global, how will the public outside of China trust Chinese-made 
(nano)products in the wake of scandals involving tainted pet food, toothpaste, children's 
toys, and drugs? Michelson asks: 
 …can China find an effective way to move up the value chain and transition from 
manufacturing cheaper, low-end products to more expensive, high-end, nano-
engineered goods? …. In the wake of more immediate environmental and public 
health concerns currently affecting China—from managing pollution, to depleted 
fisheries, to lack of access to healthcare—how will disruptive challenges posed by 
nanotechnology exacerbate or enhance these existing problems? Will China have 
the resources and the luxury of proactively addressing environmental and health 
risks posed by nanotechnology in addition to these ongoing challenges?’ 76 
 
                                                
73 Report on the European Commission's Public Online Consultation. Towards a Strategic 
Nanotechnology Action Plan (SNAP) 2010-2015, ibid, p. 18. 
74 L. Tang, S. Carley, A. L. Porter, ‘Charting Nano Environmental, Health, & Safety Research 
Trajectories: Is China Convergent with the United States?’, Journal of Science Policy & Governance 
1.1 (2011), 1-16,  at <http://works.bepress.com/li_tang/9>. 
75 L. Qi, ‘Nanotechnology and Nano-Safety Research Must be Synchronized’,  Science Times, 29th 
Jan 9 (2008),  Section A04. 
76 Evan S. Michelson, ‘Globalization at the nano frontier: The future of nanotechnology policy in the 
United States, China, and India’, Technology in Society 30.3-4  (2008), 405-10 (p. 406). Also see    
E.S. Michelson, ‘Nanotechnology policy: An analysis of transnational governance issues facing the 
United States and China’, in W.A. Blanpied, Z. Gang (eds.) Proceedings of the US–China Forum on 
Science and Technology Policy (Arlington, VA: George Mason University, 2007), 345–358. 
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The Chinese national program of nanotechnology development and regulation dates from 
1987, to the National High Technology Plan (the 863 Plan, as it is called), which supported 
ultrafine particles research. In 1990, the State Science and Technology Commission [the 
predecessor of the current Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)] approved the 
‘Climbing Up’ project, in which nanomaterials research was emphasized. In the early 
1990s, several Chinese academic research organizations joined together to accelerate 
research efforts in China in nanomaterials science, while MOST’s 973 Program (1999) 
was aimed at supporting basic research on nanomaterials and nanostructures (e.g. 
nanotubes).  
The 973 Program’s significance lies in its emphasis on the standardization of 
procedures along with assessment and test protocols, which form the basic framework for 
regulatory considerations of nanomaterials.77  It comes under the review of the National 
Steering Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (NSCNN), established in 2000 
to coordinate nationwide efforts on nanotechnology R&D. The committee is composed of 
21 scientists from universities, institutes and industry as well as 7 administrators from 
government agencies.  
In 2002, the 863 Plan established a series of projects that support nanomaterials 
and nanodevice applications. Since then, nanotechnology has been further recognized as 
a high-priority area by the Chinese government.78  In China’s National Medium- and Long-
term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-2020), nanotechnology is 
identified as one of four priority mission areas/key frontier technologies over the next 15 
years.79  Appelbaum and Parker conclude that China is closing the nanogap that once 
existed between itself and the United States, Europe, and Japan.80  
 
 
                                                
77 The LSE/NUS (Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore and 
the London School of Economics and Political Science) joint project, ‘Nanotechnology Oversight in 
Asia and Europe (2009-10) examines emerging nanotechnology policies in China, India, Taiwan 
and the European Union. Within this project, Jarvis and Richmond argue for the significance to 
China’s nanodevelopment of the 973 Program. Darryl Jarvis, Noah Richmond,  'Mapping Emerging 
Nanotechnology Policies and Regulations: The People's Republic of China', working paper (April 
2010), at <http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/docs/wp/2010/wp1005.pdf>.  
78 Lee Jia, Yuliang Zhao, Xing-Jie Liang, ‘Fast evolving nanotechnology and relevant programs and 
entities in China’, nanotoday 6.1 (2011) 6-11.  
79 R.P. Suttmeier, C. Cao, D.F. Simon, ‘”Knowledge innovation’ and the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences”’, Science 312  (2006), 58–59.  
80 Appelbaum, Parker, ‘Innovation or imitation?’,  ibid, p.21.   
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Presently, there are more than 30 research organizations in China that have 
initiated research activities studying the toxicological and environmental effects of 
nanomaterials and nanoparticles,81 while 120 organisations are conducting general 
research into nanoscience and nanotechnology.82  China has published 15 
nanotechnology standards since the establishment of its Committee of National 
Nanotechnology Standards (2005), dealing mainly with the risk assessment of 
nanoparticles. 
China’s regulatory regime for the management of nanotechnology chemicals will 
likely manage risks comparable to those identified under the EU’s REACH regulatory 
framework, and in 2009 the Chinese government revised the chemical substance rules in 
order to incorporate risk assessment, risk management and data submission requirements 
similar to REACH (this regulation being colloquially known as ‘China REACH’).83 
Of the published Chinese nanotechnology standards, 17 are voluntary, but as 
Jarvis and Richmond note, the regulatory environment is complex and the terms voluntary’ 
and ‘mandatory’ tend to be interpreted in terms of market access (as greater adherence to 
standardisation opens markets). This commercial agenda seems positive, but as China’s 
S&T discourse is tied to the national political agenda, the emphasis on progress rather 
than caution suggests a differing emphasis to that in the EU (to a degree - economic 
drivers, however much countries euphemise them, remain compelling). Thus 
The emergence of an effective regulatory regime able to manage nanoscience-
based-risks in China (is) problematic. The relatively closed nature of the 
nanoscience community and an absence of outreach or public engagement creates 
regulatory modalities that might better be characterised as...closed governance 
regimes.84 
 
 
China has run two major five-year projects: ‘The Toxicological Effects of Carbon  
 
 
 
                                                
81 Feng Zhao, Yuliang Zhao, Chen Wang, ‘Activities related to health, environmental and societal 
aspects of nanotechnology in China’,  Journal of Cleaner Production 16 (2008), 1000-1002. 
82 M. Decker, Z. Li, ibid, p. 101. 
83 ‘New Chemical Substance Notation in China’, at <http://www.cirs-
reach.com/China_Chemical_Regulation/IECSC_China_REACH_China_New_Chemical_Registratio
n.html>. 
84 S.L. Jarvis, N. Richmond, ‘Regulation and Governance of Nanotechnology in China: Regulatory 
Challenges and Effectiveness’, European Journal of Law and Technology 2.3 (2011),  at 
<http://ejlt.org//article/view/88/157>. 
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Nanomaterials’ (2004-2008), and ‘The Environmental Activity and Health Impact of  
Ambient Superfine Particles” (2006-2010). The China Nanosafety Lab, which examines 
environmental health and toxicology matters, is linked into a larger network of research 
centres for nanosafety.  From its inception in 2008 with the establishment of the 
Laboratory for Biomedical Effects of Nanomaterials and Nanosafety, it has worked with the 
Research Centre for Cancer Nanotechnology (at the Tianjin Cancer Hospital), the Lab for 
the Bio-environmental Effects of Nanomaterials and Nanosafety (established by the 
Institute of High-Energy Physics, or IHEP), and the NCNST or National Centre for 
Nanoscience and Technology), and the nano-biological research group at IHEP.   
 The Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is generally responsible 
for the planning and execution of national S&T programs.  It is also responsible for drafting 
rules, regulations and laws, as well as having responsibility for policy implementation. 
MOST is supported by the Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development 
(CASTED), an institution that undertakes strategic research to provide macro-level advice 
and assistance for designing S&T plans. Initially, emphasis was placed solely on scientific 
research in the nanotechnology field, however, new research teams such as the Institute 
of Policy and Management (IPM), part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, have now 
been formed.85   
CASTED contains ISTS, the Institute of Science, Technology and Society, which 
conducts several large-scale surveys on matters such as food safety risks and the public 
image of scientists. One of its three main areas of interest is the social environment of 
innovation.86  CASTED has called for S&T ethics courses in universities on the basis that 
education is the main channel for building a culture of S&T values.  Tsinghua University for 
example has an engineering ethics course.  Several Chinese universities including Dalian 
Technology University, Beijing University, Renmin University, Hunan, and South-East, 
have research centres based around S&T ethics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
85  Professor Zhenzhen Li, Bilat-Silk (Bilateral Support for the International Linkage with China, FP7, 
222800) roundtable on 9 November, 2011 at CASTED, Beijing, China (own notes of discussion). 
86  See their website at  <http://www.casted.org.cn/en/web.php?ChannelID=67>. 
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In conclusion, China, whilst having always had robust structures for risk governance, 
appears to be moving from a narrative of economic benefit towards an awareness of 
potential issues, both those relating to risk and to the more general ’NELSI’ debate. 
China’s similar-to-REACH regulation suggests it is in much the same position in policy 
terms as the EU; the difference however is marked in that there is no structure of NGO 
bodies to comment on deficiencies in REACH, as in the EU, or to survey the 
implementation of REACH in China.  Nor is there the level of civil society involvement, as 
in the EU.  In terms of a Code analogous to that of EU-CoC, Chinese S&T general 
guidelines (set out by MOST) have applied to nanoresearch for decades; a committee on 
science ethics examined scientific misconduct in 2010-11 and has the ethics of emerging 
technologies (GM and nanotechnology) as its next focus, with a Code predicted in 2013. 
 
 
3.4   Global nanopolicy 
 
International ethical guidelines need to be formulated, not only in general as 
opposed to particularistic terms but in such general terms as would make sense and 
meaning to variously and differently situated and circumstanced human 
communities, groups, and assemblages….What a good international ethical 
guideline requires in its formulation and expression is a balancing of different but not 
necessarily conflicting points of view and perspectives – the underlying ethical 
imperative alone remaining constant.87 
 
 
A Chatham House briefing paper in 2009 identified several nanotechnology challenges 
including the pace of change, the uncertainty of commercialization paths, the suitability of 
regulatory frameworks, and of resourcing. The recommendations included: 
• Closing the ‘knowledge gap’ through greater funding for research into nanorisk, 
including greater research funding coordination and better data sharing (a problem 
given corporate confidentiality issues)  
• Improving market registers with a view to global coordination and to ‘gaining a 
comprehensive overview of the commercial use of nanomaterials 
                                                
87 Godfrey Tangwa, ‘Between Universalism and Relativism: A conceptual exploration of problems in 
formulating and applying international biomedical ethical Guidelines’, Journal of Medical Ethics  
30.1 (2004), 65-8 (p. 68). 
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• Increasing work on establishing a firm scientific base for risk assessment, through 
greater resourcing of the OECD global nanotechnology working parties; 
• Giving greater consideration to global governance challenges, with greater 
representation of developing countries in global regulatory cooperation.88 
 
The above emphasis on ’sharing’, global risk assessment and global governance 
challenges indicates an awareness of the need for global risk regulation. 
 
Several of UNESCO's member states have mandated that the organization will set 
universal ethical benchmarks covering issues raised by the rapid development of S&T.  
Will there be a similar declaration to the universal one on bioethics and human rights for 
nanotechnology, or even a ‘Nanotechnology Protocol’ similar to the (binding) Cartagena 
Protocol on Biological Diversity? 89  The latter aims to ensure the safe handling, transport 
and use of living modified organisms.  It is the result of concerns about how modern 
biotechnology may have adverse effects on biological diversity, also taking into account 
potential risks to human health.  Is a global framework convention advisable for 
nanotechnology?90  The ETC group (a technology-tracking civic action group) have argued 
that an ‘International Convention for the Evaluation of New Technologies’ at the United 
Nations is needed, namely ‘an intergovernmental framework that would allow for the 
monitoring and evaluation of new technologies as they evolve from initial scientific 
discovery to possible commercialization’.91 
Any formal international regulatory agreement for nanotechnology will face many 
obstacles and challenges, so ‘if it is likely that any formal international regulatory 
agreement is many years in the future…it may be worthwhile to consider other, less formal  
alternatives to binding treaties at the international level.’92  Some options along this line 
include the Code of Conduct already developed in the EU. A UNESCO paper on ethics 
                                                
88 ‘Regulating Nanomaterials: A Transatlantic Agenda’, EERG BP 2 (2009), 1-8 (p. 9), at 
<www.chathamhouse.org.uk>. 
89 See this protocol at <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/>. 
90 Kenneth W. Abbott, Gary E. Marchant, Douglas J. Sylvester, ‘A framework Convention for 
Nanotechnology?’, Environmental Law Reporter 38 (2008), 10507-10514 (p.  10507). 
91 ‘What is the International Convention for the Evaluation of New Technologies?’ (ETC, 2006) at  
<http://waccglobal.org/en/20062-communicating-with-angels-being-digital-being-human/578-What-
is-the-International-Convention-for-the-Evaluation-of-New-Technologies.html>. 
92 Gary E. Marchant, Douglas J. Sylvester,  ‘Transnational models for regulation of 
nanotechnology’, The Journal of law, Medicine and Ethics 34.4 (Winter 2006), 714-25. See also G. 
H. Reynolds, ‘Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures’, Harvard Journal of Law & 
Technology 17 (2003), 179-209. 
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and scientific development in Malaysia, noting the question of whether a Universal Oath 
for Scientists was necessary, suggested that differences between, say, the Hippocratic 
Oath, or the Seventeen Rules of the Enjuin (an alternative Japanese code of medical 
ethics, or the Islamic Oath for the Physician, are not as marked as are often thought.93 
 
The 1996 EU Oviedo Charter (the ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’) was drawn up in response to the 
argument that advances in biomedicine were moving at such a pace that the laws in the 
various EU member states were not able to keep pace with the developments.  The 
concern was that the rapid pace of developments, and the fragmentation of approaches 
among member states allowed for the possibility of ‘havens’ to emerge for research, in 
which scientists could exploit a lack of regulation so as to evade legal restrictions in their 
own countries.94  
The proper implementation of regulation requires fora for transnational dialogue 
and information sharing, like The International Dialogue on Responsible Research and 
Development of Nanotechnology (which included representatives of 49 counties),95 as well 
as international standards and export controls.  Examples include the awareness-raising 
workshops on nanotechnology that were held in Beijing, Abidjan, Lodz, Kingston, and 
Alexandria.  There have also been International dialogues such as that on the Responsible 
Research and Development of Nanotechnology (established by The European 
Commission in 2004), and the Meridian Institute’s Global Dialogue on Nanotechnology and 
the poor, which has resulted in a paper, a news service, and two workshops (India and 
Brazil, 2006 and 2007).96  
 A November 2011 project on research methods for managing the risk of 
engineered nanoparticles and engineered nanomaterials, the MARINA project, funded 
                                                
93 Siti Nurani Mohd Nor, ‘Philosophical and Practical Reflections of Malaysian Science’, in Asia-
Pacific Perspectives on the Ethics of Science and Technology (Bangkok: UNESCO Bangkok, 
2007), p. 31. The Islamic Code of Medical Professional Ethics,  based on Qur'anic ethics, although 
giving clear advice about respecting patients, fails to mention autonomy as a special premise.  
94 Angelo Maria Petroni, ‘Perspectives for Freedom of Choice’, ibid,  p. 254. Not all EU countries 
have signed the Oviedo charter. 
95 Report on the Third International Dialogue on Responsible Research and Development of 
Nanotechnology  (Brussells,2008), at 
<http://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/report_3006.pdf>. 
96 See their website at 
<http://www.merid.org/en/Content/Projects/Global_Dialogue_on_Nanotechnology_and_the_Poor.as
px?view=cal>. 
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under FP 7 of the EC, will run for four years and involve the collaboration of 47 different 
scientific and industrial partners, including China. There are also individual joint country 
agreements, such as the 2002 EU/China co-operation agreement in the field of material 
sciences.  This agreement facilitates the participation of Chinese research organisations, 
including companies, in European research projects with Chinese funding and vice versa.  
In addition, the EU and China have a joint agreement to exchange data relating to safety 
testing in order to boost research into the effect of nanotechnology products on consumer 
safety.  
 
The European Standards Committee (CEN/TC352) Nanotechnologies was set up with the 
aim of providing an international standard.  To date, the following international bodies have 
attempted some form of global supervision, or regulation of nanotechnology:  
 
1. The International Council on Risk Governance (IRGC) 
2. The International Council on Nanotechnology (ICON)97  
3. The Globally Harmonised Scheme for classification and labelling of substances 
(GHS)  
4. The International Standards Organization (ISO) 
5. The Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology 
(UNESCO/COMEST) 
6. The OECD Working Party on Nanotechnology (WPN), with a focus on 
governance, and  
7. The OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials (WPMN), an 
international forum for the further development of test guidelines and strategies. 
 
It has also been argued that the WTO (World Trade Organisation) has a role to play in the 
global regulation of nanotechnology (in that the WTO has a mandate to review any 
regulations with an impact on trade); yet it does not have the mandate or manpower to 
carry out any harmonization of differing agendas.98  
                                                
97 See Kristen M. Kulinowski, ‘The International Council on Nanotechnology: A New Model of 
Engagement’, in Nansocale, 393-412. 
98 Geert van Caster, ‘The role of the World Trade Organization in nanotechnology regulation’, in   
Graeme A. Hodge, Diana M. Bowman, Karinne Ludlow (eds), New Global Frontiers in Regulation. 
The Age of Nanotechnology (Monash Studies in Global Movements: Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 2007), 287-319 (pp. 295-6, p. 293).  
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There are other bodies that could be listed, however these are organizations such 
as Committee E56 on Nanotechnology, which rather vaguely lists one of its activities as 
‘appropriate global liaison relationships with activities related to nanotechnology’.  Set up 
in 2005 under the auspices of the American Society for Testing and Materials, it may have 
global reach, but it is debatable whether it is a global society in the sense of having 
international partners in research.99  Another that fails to make the list above is the 
International Nanotechnology and Society Network, that consists of researchers exploring 
the connections between society and the possible upcoming changes provided by 
nanotechnology research.  The members represent 37 institutions from 11 countries – but 
the last meeting referred to on the website is one from 2006.100  
 
What do these seven bodies contribute to the global regulation of nanotechnology, or to 
global collaboration on the regulatory consequences of this new technology? 
                                                                                                               
Global or not-so global?  The IRG,  established in 2003 on the initiative of the Swiss 
government, has members from 13 different countries, one of which is China.  Its main 
backers are apparently the Swiss, the US and Chinese Governments, Swiss Re, Allianz, 
EON Energie, ATEL and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (not a particularly 
globally inclusive body, but arguably one with global reach). 101  The IRG’s 
recommendations include an improved knowledge base, the need to take societal 
concerns into consideration in risk evaluation, strengthened risk management procedures 
and processes, and stakeholder participation.102   
Similarly, ICON has the mission ‘To develop and communicate information 
regarding potential environmental and health risks of nanotechnology, thereby fostering 
risk reduction while maximizing societal benefit’, however, it is local rather than global.  
Created between 2004-7 by the National Science Foundation Center for Biological and 
Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN) at Rice University in Houston, Texas, ICON/CBEN 
lists as current projects in 2011 the ‘GoodNanoGuide’, a collaborative platform for 
                                                
99 See the ASTM Committee website at <http://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/E56.htm>. 
100 See the International Nanotechnology and Society Network website, under ‘Meetings’, at 
<www.nanoandsociety.com>. 
101 See the IRC website at <http://www.irgc.org/irgc/about_irgc>. The Chinese member is Professor 
Hou Yunde, Director, State Centre for Viro-Biotech Engineering and State Key Laboratory for 
Molecular Virology and Engineering, Beijing, People’s Republic of China. 
102 Ortwin Renn, Mike Roco, Nanotechnology risk governance, White Paper 2 (Geneva: IRGC, 
2006), at <http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_white_paper_2_PDF_final_version-2.pdf>.  
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researchers to pool knowledge on how best to handle nanomaterials; workshops on 
classifying nanomaterials and developing predictive models for their interaction with living 
systems, and a survey-based best practice project. ICON held an international workshop 
in March 2011 on policy, business and legal nanoissues, however the majority of panellists 
listed were American, and no representatives from Asia were included.103  It is therefore 
difficult to assess the extent to which it might be called ‘international’. 
 
Global standardization: The GHS and the ISO. These rules for the classification, 
labeling and safety data sheets of chemicals at national, regional and worldwide level have 
been promoted by the UN – but the GHS is non-legally binding in the member countries of 
United Nations.  Thus many countries and regions have published their own regulations or 
standards to implement the GHS.104  
The EU adopted the GHS in 2008; it has been applied since January 20, 2009. 
China implemented it in 2010. Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand and Korea have implemented 
GHS in the last 3 years, while South Africa’s 2007 National Standard essentially followed 
the GHS template, but needs expansion for full GHS regulation.105   
The various ISO standards largely provide methodological tools for industry to 
evaluate risk. However, it should be noted that the ISO has a member list of 162 countries, 
including China, which has been involved in 707 standards - more than any other country 
listed.106  China hosted ISO/TCC 229 in 2008 in Shanghai. 
 
 
 
Genuinely global?   Issues of nanotechnology and ethics were first explored during the 
Third Session of COMEST (The Commission on the Ethics of Scientific knowledge and 
Technology UNESCO/COMEST) in Rio de Janeiro in December 2003, which was set up 
under the auspices of UNESCO.  UNESCO will likely play a leading role in the area of 
nanotechnology, ensuring that the perceptions and interests of developing countries are 
                                                
103 ‘Nanotech conference tackles big policy questions for the “small” science’, ASU news February 
16 2011, at <http://asunews.asu.edu/20110216_nanotechlawconference>. 
104 ‘GHS in China, South Korea and Japan’, at  <http://www.cirs-
reach.com/GHS_in_China_Korea_and_Japan.html>. 
105 Details of the Globally Harmonized System can be found at their website, 
<http://www.sigmaaldrich.com/safety-center/globally-harmonized.html>. 
106  A members’ list can be found at http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members.htm. 
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duly considered, while insisting on the importance of tackling this subject creatively from a 
global perspective.107 
In 2005 a group of experts was established in order to assist COMEST in drafting a 
potential policy document for ethics and nanotechnology. The group included 
representatives from South Korea, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, the Netherlands, China, 
Germany, and Brazil.  This group reported results from two meetings in 2005 and provided 
input into COMEST's draft, providing the basis for a consultation process which allowed 
the development of a set of recommendations for the 34th UNESCO General Conference.  
 At the COMEST Extraordinary Session held in Paris in November 2008, COMEST 
members expressed their concern about the lack of visibility of this policy document and 
the failure to take steps towards its implementation, given the serious ethical issues 
emphasized by past work.  COMEST members emphasised the potential toxicity of nano-
engineered particles, and the development of military applications, as well as the need for 
informed public debate on the ethical issues raised by nanotechnologies.  The COMEST 
Working Group on the Ethics of Nanotechnology meets regularly to update this policy 
document and its implementation strategies as well as to make the policies adopted by 
various countries more visible. The 2011 meeting noted the following: 
• That nanotechnology is developing at such a rate that its short and long term 
impact is sometimes difficult to identify 
• That science and technology are being driven by the wrong kind of interests, in 
particular military interests 
• That in third world countries progress (according to some) is unacceptably slow, 
and that 
• Risk management of nanomaterials and their use in consumer products continues 
to give cause for concern.108 
  
The OECD (WPM, WPMN) 
The OECD, through its Chemicals Committee and the mutual recognition arrangement, 
(the  Cooperative Chemical Assessment Program’, that allows for international  
                                                
107 COMEST Extraordinary Session 27-28 June, 2006: Proceedings, at 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001514/151443e.pdf>. 
108 World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST)  Working 
Group on the Ethics of Nanotechnology (Brussels,  27-28 April  2011), at 
<http://www.nanotechia.org/global-news/working-group-on-the-ethics-of-nanotechnology-is-back-at-
work>.  
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harmonization of regulation on new chemicals), has a role to play in the regulation of 
nanotechnology.  The OECD Working Party on Nanotechnology (WPN) has been 
examining how nanotechnology can contribute to the sustainable provision of clean water 
through improved water filtration devices.109 
However, international harmonization can vary across the 30 member states of the 
OECD.110   
As Kurath notes, perhaps none of the governance measures, soft law and self-
regulatory schemes currently operating relative to nanotechnology appears socially robust 
in all aspects.  He does treat the OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials 
(WPMN) positively though, as it has ‘comprehensible standards’, ’is sensitive to risk’, and 
‘has a steering committee that may play a role in the political translation of results and in 
evaluation.’111  
 
The report, Nanosafety at the OECD: The first five years 2006-2010, notes the following 
outcomes, amongst others:112 
• The launch in 2009 of the OECD Database on Manufactured Nanomaterials to 
Inform and Analyse EHS Research Activities, a global resource for research projects 
that address environmental, human health and safety (EHS) issues of manufactured 
nanomaterials113 
• The launch in 2007 of the Sponsorship Programme for the Testing of Manufactured 
Nanomaterials to provide information on the intrinsic properties of nanomaterials 
crucial in choosing or adapting existing risk evaluation and management strategies. 
WPMN has developed an IT collaborative platform called ‘Communities of Practice’ 
(CoP), which refers to groups of experts who convene to discuss technical issues 
related to testing being conducted under the Sponsorship Programme 
• OECD and UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research) jointly held 
Awareness-Raising Workshops on Nanotechnology, and 
                                                
109 See David Rickerby, A.L. Carbone, ‘Nanosystems for Water Quality Monitoring and Purification’ 
(2008), at <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/29/42326650.pdf>.  
110 Rob Visser, ‘A sustainable development for nanotechnologies: an OECD perspective’, in New 
Global Frontiers in Regulation, ibid,  320-332 (p. 326). 
111 M. Kurath, Nanotechnology Governance: Accountability and Democracy in New Modes of 
Regulation and Deliberation’, Science, Technology & Innovation Studies, 5.2 (2009), 87-110. 
112 Nanosafety at the OECD: The first five years 2006-2010 (OECD, 2011), at 
<http://www.oecd.org/science/safetyofmanufacturednanomaterials/47104296.pdf>.  
113 See this database at <www.oecd.org/env/nanosafety/database>. 
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• National surveys to examine various national voluntary reporting schemes and 
regulatory programs to assess the safety of manufactured nanomaterials. Surveys 
are underway amongst national bodies with the aim of updating trends relating to 
commercial activities and their regulatory oversight, and collecting specific 
information on manufactured nanomaterials (such as types and volumes used).  
 
 
Global regulation specifically focused on nanotechnology is, as it is at the local level, non-
existent, while existing global regulations on nanotechnology risk covered by existing 
(mainly chemical) regulations such as REACH are being challenged by NGOs.  Global 
cooperation still appears alive and well, and may lead to more voluntary codes or perhaps 
place more pressure on governments to regulate. It certainly will lead to the dissemination 
of knowledge among international bodies and scientists, and could make a greater amount 
of information available to the public.  More significantly, it will reduce the ‘closed’ nature of 
the Chinese nanoscientific community, possibly creating greater public debate.  
 
 
The discussion thus far: 
In the three chapters thus far, discussion has ranged over the background context to 
global ethics – offering social values and bioethics regulation, and various attempts to 
improve global collaboration on standards The differences noted so far between the EU 
and China  uggest conclusions such as that  
• The difference in the level of public engagement is most salient 
• The discourses of precaution versus economic progress may suggest a major 
difference, yet the precautionary principle in the EU is not 'truly' being followed 
according to certain groups, for economic imperatives are global, and regulatory 
mechanisms not always adequate or mandatory 
• Similar ethical concerns have been expressed, in that toxicity risk is paramount, 
particularly given previous scandals relating to food 
• The bioethics contexts reveal a social distinction between individualism and 
communitarianism, shown for example by bioethics laws in the EU that privilege 
individual human rights 
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• There is a contrast between an ‘open’ system where civil society engagement is 
widespread, and a ‘closed’ one, where decision-making is top-down and 
centralised (and usually less accountable).  
 
 
The following table summarises some of the comparative  discussion across the three 
chapters thus far. 
 
TABLE 6:  A comparison of nanoethics environments in the EU and China114 
 
 Europe Asia (China) 
Social 
values: 
Autonomy, individual human 
rights 
Harmony, community 
Attitude 
towards S&T 
and 
scientists: 
• Public differentiation 
between technologies i.e. 
differing risks for nuclear, 
nano, GM 
• Risk v benefit  
• Post-Fukushima emphasis 
on confidence/or lack 
thereof in government,  
according to how it handles 
S&T crises 
 
• Innovation is always 
good  
• Harmony between tian 
(nature) and ren 
(human) 
• Trust in government  
(although this may be 
starting to decrease 
due to food scandals) 
• Concern with social 
responsibility of 
scientists 
GM food as 
example 
GM ‘backlash’  in many EU 
countries 
GM products sold in China  - 
but must be labelled; some 
public distrust 
Which 
nanoissues 
are seen as 
Toxicity (human and 
environmental), enhancement, 
military use, privacy, 
Safety; science governance; 
global security an emerging 
issue, as is public knowledge 
                                                
114 Much of this information was taken from roundtable discussions in Beijing 9-11 November, 
2011, and published in my article in NanoEthics in 2012- see Appendix A. 
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significant? distributive justice deficit 
Economic 
benefit focus  
Better drugs e.g. for cancer 
treatment 
General economic driver 
Consumer 
confidence in 
new products 
EU 2013 mandatory labelling 
of cosmetics that contain 
nanoparticles 
 
 
New equals good 
‘Nano’ a positive label  
Institutes 
leading 
nanoresearch 
EC Action Plan on 
Nanotechnology 2005-9 
(ongoing implementation 
reports in 2007, 2009) 
2000: National Steering 
Committee for Nanoscience 
and Nanotechnology 
established in China 
Seminal 
reports that 
have 
triggered 
nanoethics 
concerns: 
Greenpeace report, the Royal 
Society and Royal Academy 
(RS/RAE), report and 
insurance company Swiss Re’s 
report (2003-4) 
 
Role of NGOs 
in S&T 
advising: 
Strong in terms of TA and 
policymaker liaison  
NGOs small in size and 
relatively weak in 
organisational capacity, no 
policy-effecting channels 
TA 
infrastructure 
Varied across Europe  Established for  about 10 
years  
Participatory 
Technology 
Assessment 
Many European dialogue 
initiatives, plus individual 
(national) initiatives in 
Germany, the Netherlands, UK 
etc.  
• Vague115  
• Consensus conference 
2008 on GM food – with 
25 participants; from that 
negative experience 
scientific community 
focussed on Code of 
                                                
115 A presentation in Beijing in September 2013 by CASTED scholars noted public participation as  
minimal  - ‘few voices’. Thanks to Dr Miltos Ladikas for providing this presentation. 
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Conduct as way of 
promoting acceptance 
Global view 
and  
cooperation 
On standards On standards  
Increasing awareness of 
Western debates 
International 
bodies - IRG, 
REACH, 
COMEST, 
OECD etc 
EU representatives on all China active on ISO and 
REACH  
Codes? EU Code for responsible 
nanoresearch 
 
MOST S&T general 
guidelines applied to 
nanoresearch from beginning  
 
CAS Special Committee on 
science ethics examined  
scientific misconduct in 2010-
11 and has  ethics of 
emerging technologies as 
next focus (GM and nano) 
 
Code predicted in 2012-13; 
ongoing  
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Chapter Four: pTA (participatory Technology 
Assessment), Habermas’s dialogue/discourse ethics, 
and nanofora 
 
…to yoke the S&T behemoth to ends chosen by the people.1 
 
At what stages in scientific research is it realistic to raise issues of public 
accountability and social concern? How and on whose terms should such issues 
be debated? Are dominant frameworks of risks, ethics and regulation adequate? 
Can citizens exercise any meaningful influence over the pace, direction and 
interactions between technological and social change? How can engagement be 
reconciled with the need to maintain the independence of science, and the 
economic dynamism of its applications?2 
 
 
The first half of this thesis has offered a comparative analysis of the social, bioethical 
as well as policy contexts in which nanoissues are identified and regulated in the EU 
and China. The conclusion to this first section suggested that risk issues are being 
addressed in similar ways by both regions, although in the EU the precautionary 
principle may offer greater stringency, and there is a situation of ‘hybrid’ regulation in 
that region.  This means a mix of voluntary reporting/Codes of Conduct (criticised for 
ineffectiveness), and identification and regulation of nanomaterials under existing 
regulations (criticised for lack of regulatory reach and ‘loopholes’).   
By contrast, China has a top-down or closed regulatory system.  
Global bodies, as shown in the previous chapter, are most effective at clarifying 
standards for nanomaterials through existing chemicals regulations.  None have 
achieved much forward momentum though, either in terms of the broader social or 
ethical issues relating to nanotechnology. 
 In short, the societal ethics of nanotechnology remain unaddressed in policy 
terms. This would seem to be a reason to involve society more closely in policymaking.  
 This brings us to the question, not directly addressed thus far, of who exactly 
should be involved in global regulation and policy.  
 On the assumption that global ethics are enacted by global agents, the 
following three chapters look at how global agents might achieve consensus, i.e.,  
through which virtues or skills, and by means of which procedures. We will look at the  
 
                                                
1 Nick Bostrom, ’Technological Revolutions’, ibid, p. 103. 
2 Kearnes, Macnaghten, Wilsdon, Governing at the Nanoscale, ibid,  p. 28. 
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logic behind this assumption by asking the following questions: 
• Why agency? 
• Why might lay agency, through pTA, be a preferred model for building S&T 
dialogue? 
• What does pTA actually involve? 
• And why do ideas from Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics offer a usefully 
extended model of pTA as a tool for dialogue? 
 
 
4.1 Agency as a global idea? 
Globalization has opened new opportunities for participatory politics.3 
 
Of course, the phrase ‘global idea’ - implying some form of universal consensus on 
values - is immediately contentious.  Is there such a thing as a universal value? 
While we may not agree that ‘consciousness of temporality is the fundamental, defining 
attribute of human beings…respect for the time of the other should be the modality in 
which responsibility for the other can be generalized in the public spheres’,4 we may 
wish to agree that there are indeed values, directives or aims that should be promoted 
and protected on a global basis. But which ones? In his 1990 book Global 
responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic, Küng argues for a globally shared ethics 
based on religious directives such as non-violence, respect for life, solidarity, just 
economic order, tolerance, truthfulness, and equality.5  Tremblay suggests ten 
‘principles for global humanism’ - dignity, respect, tolerance, sharing, no domination, no 
superstition, conservation, no war, democracy and education.6  And Fox argues for a 
foundational ethical principle – that of the ‘responsive cohesion’ of values that through 
                                                
3 Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a global age. Society, culture, politics (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 2000), p. 130 
4 Couze Venn, ‘Altered States: Post-Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism and Transmodern 
Socialities’, Theory, Culture & Society 19.1-2  ( 2002), 65-80 (p. 78). 
5 See <http://www.weltethos.org/dat-english/01-history.htm>. Küng arguably and ironically 
implies one of the particular issues working against a global ethic; local, historical and cultural 
determinants such as religion, allied to an often extremely emotive view of ‘truth’.  However, 
Kimberley Hutchings in her Global Ethics. An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity, 2010), looks at 
Küng’s claim ’that we already have the resources to address the why, what, who and how 
questions of Global Ethics within existing world religions’ (p. 17). 
6 Rodrigue Tremblay, The Code for Global Ethics. Ten Humanist Principles (New York: 
Prometheus, 2010), p. 7. 
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their mutually modifying interactions generate an overall cohesive order,7 while 
Burmeister, Weckert, and Williamson suggest ‘equality, freedom, respect and trust’.8   
It seems that there might be some similarity in these universal aims, yet no 
certainty on any hierarchy of them.  
 To try and find an ideal or value on which there would be agreement is not easy 
- even if we take the very basic right, that of the right to life, as an example. Most would 
surely agree that murder is bad, but do they all feel the same way if they are supporters 
of capital punishment, or anti-abortionists, or those waging jihad?   
The argument between pragmatists and those who, like Amartya Sen, believe 
that systems fail through ignoring ‘non-utility information’ (i.e. religious or other 
ideological matters instead of basic needs such as food and shelter), is not new. 9 
 This discussion could be extended infinitely, but the premise here is that there 
is unlikely to be universal agreement (certainly, there isn’t much currently in evidence in 
the world as we know it). Therefore the first point to be made (unsurprisingly, given the 
emphasis placed later on Habermas’s ideas as centred on procedure) is that any ‘new 
universalism’ is more of a question about agreed method, rather than agreed goals, 
principles or values.    
 Thus Ladikas and Schroeder suggest that global ethics ‘is not a field of 
academic study, it is an activity; the attempt to agree on fundamental conditions for 
human flourishing and to actively secure them for all’, and is reliant on such practical 
activities as platforms for intercultural dialogue and trust-building, as well as 
international ethics committees and ethics reviews for ongoing global negotiations. Any 
solutions to the ‘issue’ of global ethics, surely, should include an implementation 
element. There is a need for a procedural approach.10  Pogge argues that as: 
disagreements about what human flourishing consists in may prove ineradicable, it 
may well be possible to bypass them by agreeing that nutrition, clothing, shelter, and 
certain basic freedoms, as well as social interaction, education, and participation, are 
important means to it - means which just social institutions must secure for all.11 
 
 
                                                
7  Warwick Fox, A Theory of General Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), p. 81. 
8  Oliver K. Burmeister, John Weckert, Kirsty Williamson, ‘Seniors extend understanding of what 
constitutes universal values’, Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, 9.4 
(2011), 238-252. 
9 Amartya Sen, ‘Equality of what?’ in S. McMurrin  (ed.) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 197-220 (p. 212). 
10 Ladikas, Schroeder, ‘Too early for global ethics?’, ibid, p.406. 
11 Thomas W. Pogge, ‘Human Flourishing and Universal Justice’,  in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. 
Miller Jr.,  Jeffrey Paul (eds.) Human Flourishing, vol. 16 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999),  p. 342. 
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Pogge’s view implies basic citizenship rights (survival provisions), a general democratic 
state of choice, (to improve oneself for example, through the freedom to receive 
education), as well as societal interaction. However, these rights are not globally 
accepted, as in the right of women in certain countries to choose education.  Pogge’s 
formulation also turns out to be fairly broad, but in its mixture of practical suggestions 
(shelter) and more idealistic ideas (freedoms including that of participation), he outlines 
one of the main issues with global ethics: that very mixture of the pragmatic ideas with 
‘value-added’ ideas on which there is less agreement. For one might reasonably argue 
that all humans have the right not to live on the street (although strangely, they still 
seem to in most countries), but not necessarily agree that everyone should have equal 
democratic participation.  
This also leads us beyond a strictly procedural emphasis, to one focused on the 
agent; ethics is implemented by institutions, and by agents within certain procedures.   
There is an obvious problem of implementing moral systems – namely, that they need 
to take ‘account of messy realities on the ground in charting a practical course towards 
that objective’.12  Universal values are replaced by agents’ desires to achieve 
compromise. Thus Seyla Benhabib argues that discourse ethics is Kantian ethics 
‘collectivised’. Instead of asking what an individual moral agent could or would will, 
without contradiction, to be a universal maxim for all, one might ask:  
what norms or institutions would the members of an ideal or real communication 
community agree to as representing their common interests after engaging in a 
special kind of argumentation or conversation? The procedural model of an 
argumentative praxis replaces the silent thought-experiment enjoined by Kantian 
universalisability.13 
 
 
Rawls saw advantage as based on means (income, primary goods), and on ‘goods’, 
that included basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement, of choice of occupation, 
income, and the social base of self-respect – a platform of means indispensible for 
realizing certain democratic ideals. Sen gave this argument a different emphasis, 
seeing the significant issue as what ‘goods’ enable people to do. Sen’s capability 
                                                
12 John Arras, ‘Theory and Bioethics’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), at 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/theory-bioethics/>. Even Rawls 
distinguished between ideal and non-ideal situations, although he did not fully address the 
question of by what moral standards a person should govern his conduct given a reasonable 
level of compliance. 
13 Seyla Benhabib, ‘Communicative ethics and current controversies in practical philosophy’, in 
S. Benhabib, F. Dallmayr (eds.) The Communicative Ethics Controversy (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1993), p. 331. 
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approach is defined by its choice to focus upon the moral significance of an individual’s 
capability of achieving the kind of life they have reason to value.14 
Agents are not abstract, as Spence defines them, but are any socially engaged 
actors who ‘value their freedom and wellbeing precisely because they recognize them 
as being the necessary enabling conditions for the fulfilment of their own specific 
individual and communal purposive actions’.15  The above definition is useful for two 
reasons. First, it picks up on the notion of freedom, linked to wellbeing, but also to the 
contentious issue for universalism, that of individual human rights or freedoms. 
Second, it relates to the notion of dual agency – one’s own actions, and ‘communal’ 
actions (i.e. actions undertaken to achieve common rather than individual aims). 
By freedom, one might mean Dissanyake’s ‘I conceive of the human agent as the 
locus form in which reconfirmations or resistances to the ideological are produced or 
played out’, 16 or, more usefully, freedom as the ability to achieve. Sen’s capability 
approach, in which the focus is on the actual freedom a person can exercise to choose 
‘doings and beings’, argues that agency freedom must be present for the agent to 
advance in well-being; thus greater freedom of agency implies a larger capability set.  
What are ‘capabilities’? Martha Nussbaum suggests ten capabilities, arguing that 
justice demands the pursuit, for all citizens, of a minimum threshold of these ten 
capabilities. These are:  
• Lifespan  
• Bodily health (and nourishment) 
• Bodily integrity (including freedom of travel, sexual security, and choice in 
matters of reproduction) 
• Senses, imagination and thought (including the right to education, and freedom 
of expression) 
• Emotions (being able to have attachments to things and persons outside 
ourselves, along with not having one's emotional development blighted by fear 
or anxiety) 
• Practical reason (being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one's own life) 
• Affiliation (social interaction, equality, dignity) 
 
                                                
14 Amarta Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
15 Edward H. Spence, ‘Positive Rights and the Cosmopolitan Community: A Rights-Centred 
Foundation for Global Ethics’, Journal of Global Ethics 3.2 (August, 2007), 181-202 (p. 182).  
16	  Wimal Dissanayake,  ’Introduction’ , in  Wimal Dissanayake (ed.)   Narratives of Agency. Self-
Making in China, India, and Japan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. x. 
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• Other species (being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, 
plants, and the world of nature) 
• Play (being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities) 
• Control over one's environment (both in terms of political choice and material 
goods).17 
 
Thus while Sen, supposedly, ‘filled in the moral space of functioning and capability’, 
Nussbaum ‘fills in the picture by identifying those “central functional capabilities” that 
are (allegedly) necessary and sufficient for the good human life’.18  
 Two interesting aspects of Sen’s theories are that they imply democracy and 
that they allow for cultural relativism. In terms of democracy, Korsgaard’s argument 
suggests displacing the responsibility for agency onto the agent.  
Rather than contentious phrases such as the ‘good life’, given that there are many 
concepts of such a life, we might note Nussbaum’s addition of reason and affiliation in 
her list of capabilities, which allow the capable person entry into a moral life as 
Habermas might define it; it is a life of rational, social reasoning towards consensus.  
 
The phrase ‘good human life’ indicates an issue with the capability approach; agency 
needs to be directed. As Crocker argues, agency requires teleology in that they must 
have a purpose, which Crocker then sees as a concern for others.19 This surely implies 
some ‘universal value’ towards which agents are directed? (This is not always logical, 
given that one’s teleology could simply be a concern for one's self.)  
 The teleology of the agent in terms of capability is his/her ability to develop the 
rational conditions for his/her own flourishing – and for that of other people. Korsgaard 
has a version of this argument:  
Morality is grounded in human nature. Obligations and values are projections of 
our own sentiments and dispositions. To say that these sentiments and 
dispositions are justified is not to say that they track the truth, but rather to say 
they are good. We are better for having them, for they perfect our social nature, 
and so promote our self-interest and flourishing.20 
 
                                                
17 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
18 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Nature, Functioning and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution’,  
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 6 (1988), 145–84 (p.180) 
19 David A. Crocker, Ethics of Global Development. Agency, Capability and Deliberative 
Democracy (Cambridge, CUP, 2008), p. 125. 
20 Christine Korsgaard, with G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, 
The Sources of Normativity (ed. Onora O’Neill) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1996), 
p. 91. 
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Sen suggests a dual teleology. His model allows for a distinction to be made between 
personal and ‘altruistic’ goals, arguing that: 
…when more capability includes more power in ways that can influence other 
people’s lives, a person may have good reason to use the enhanced capability - 
the larger agency freedom - to uplift the lives of others, especially if they are 
relatively worse off, rather than concentrating on their own well-being.21  
 
 
Sen’s view is that one ‘may have good reason’ to act altruistically, if one has the 
capacity to do so. Sen asserts that people can make choices that are not in one’s self-
interest, referring to this as a ‘commitment’, where an individual chooses an action, say 
for reasons of duty, even if it affects personal self-interest.22 (To offer another example 
of this belief, in his environmental ethics Sandler notes  ‘ends independent of our own 
flourishing’ that may also seem ‘good’ and rational, duties that may in fact ‘trump’ self-
interest).23   
 It can be argued that Sen implies selfish altruism – acting out of duty enhances 
one’s self-image and probably one’s standing in the community – but this is of less 
relevance than the notion that one might operate on differing levels of capability, with 
one focussed on self, the other on a more public self.   
 Sen makes another useful point by allowing for adaptation to context and to 
culture in terms of determining the capability set of a person, i.e. that agency allows for 
a recognition of cultural pluralism or relativism. Cultural agency is another capability.  
 Agency freedom is seen both as an individual and a communal value.  This is 
not too far from the ideas of Gewirth, who sees any agent as able to act in a universal 
manner. Gewirth’s ethical rationalism offers a ‘principle of generic consistency’ in which 
every agent must act in accordance with his or her own generic rights to freedom and 
well-being in addition to that of all other agents – the maxim being, ‘act in accord with 
the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself’.24 
 Gewirth’s normative force apparent in any action is procedural, like Habermas’ 
impulse towards consensus, thus escaping the issue of universal values since Gewirth 
grounds ideas of human rights in generic features of action such as voluntariness and 
purposiveness common to all agents. For Gewirth, action or agency supplies the 
                                                
21 Amartya Sen, ‘Capability and well-being’, in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds.) The 
quality of life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30-53. 
22 Amartya Sen, ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’, 
in Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 6.4 (1977), 317-344 (pp. 326-7). 
23  Ronald L.  Sandler, Character and Environment (New York: Columbia University Press,  
2007), p. 18. 
24 Alan Gewirth, ‘The Epistemology of Human Rights’, Social Philosophy & Policy 1.2 (Spring, 
1984), 14-17 (p.17).  
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metaphysical and moral basis of human dignity and personhood, providing human 
rights with a kind of ‘self-grounding’ – ‘the latter might also be termed ‘natural rights’ in 
that they pertain to humans simply in their capacity as actors or agents’.25 (It can also 
be noted that dignity, in Gewirth’s theories, derives from agency, the preferred term for 
discussing individual human rights and individualism in Chapter Two, in that it suggests 
a universal value as well as an individual one.)26 
 Agency is defined in this thesis firstly as procedural, as requiring a structure for 
action, and so we will examine nanofora in this context. Second, it is an aspect of one’s 
public or private identity. This is not too far a stretch from the notion that one may have 
both a private cultural self, and a public, transcendental or universal self, an idea to be 
developed in Chapter Six. 
 
Before looking at nanofora, i.e. the structures that might allow the agent to exercise 
agency, hopefully globally, there is one further aspect of agency to be considered – 
that of lay agency. Why might we focus on lay agents rather than scientists or 
policymakers? In other words, why is the preferred agency model that of pTA?  
 
 
4.2 Technology assessment (TA) and participatory technology assessment (pTA) 
 
Technology assessment…aims at clarifying socioeconomic and environmental 
problems potentially attendant on technological developments and thereby 
providing information to the public and the government . . . that will inform public-
policy decision making as well as guide R&D planning and natural-resource 
allocation.27 
 
 
pTA can be defined as a consultative process through which the public’s opinions are 
solicited. It involves various kinds of social actors such as different kinds of civil society 
organisations, representatives of the state systems, individual stakeholders and 
citizens (laypersons). (The narrower definition of pTA is purely ‘layperson’s opinions’).  
  
 
 
                                                
25 Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 3-7. 
26 Stephen K. White, ‘On the Normative Structure of Action: Gewirth and Habermas’, The 
Review of Politics 34.2 (April,1982), 282-301.  
27 The Politics of Technology Assessment. Institutions, Processes, and Policy Disputes (eds. 
David M. O’Brien, Donald A. Marchand) (D.C. Heath & Co, 1982), p. 7.  
 
 
128 
The increasing interest in pTA reflects a shift from 
a largely closed, intrainstitutional tool of policy analysis and advice to a tool for 
the social assessment of scientific-technological issues at the interface between 
politics and public discourse. Through citizens’ conferences, scenario workshops, 
and consensus conferences, technology assessment has effectively been 
opened up to the public sphere: Citizens and interest group representatives are 
drawn into the process of assessing scientific and technological issues alongside 
experts, the process often takes place in public, and its outcomes are made 
widely available for information and debate.28 
 
 
pTA, which I hypothesize as a version of the Habermasian model of discourse ethics, 
suggests a significant role for the public in global nano(ethics). Is this justified? Who is 
involved in technology assessment and policymaking, and how do these spheres of 
agency overlap?  Governmental regulators, when formulating public policy on S&T, 
draw on a range of expert advisors from the scientific and other communities. The 
following offers a brief overview of how technology assessment has developed since its 
rise in the 1980s. 
 
Where in the cycle of research and product manufacture does TA begin? The ethics of 
researchers, corporations and those bodies funding research requires questions of 
consequence and methodology to be addressed during the developmental stage. For 
example, stakeholder analysis, focusing on the notion of ‘mediation’, or analysis of the 
future role played by technology in human actions and experiences, suggests the 
simple approach of bringing societal concerns to the fore at the earliest possible stage 
in technology development. Thus it requires the effective involvement  of  as broad a 
range of members of society as possible. The ‘value-sensitive design’ approach, first 
proposed in the context of information and communication technology, suggests a dual 
approach by the engineers of products and its external stakeholders or users. ‘Value-
sensitive design’ aims to connect the people who design products and systems to the 
stakeholders affected by these products. 
In the value-sensitive design approach, the core notion is simply put, one of 
dialogue between users and developers leading to a translation of societal concerns 
into products. Yet the situation is arguably more complex, as Jotterand argues when he 
states that: 
 
 
                                                
28 Simon Joss, ‘Toward the Public Sphere - Reflections on the Development of Participatory 
Technology Assessment’, Bulletin of Science Technology Society 22.3 (June 2002), 220-231.	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. . . analysis of the social and ethical implications of nanotechnology must 
confront the pluralism of scientific discourses and the plurality of values and 
norms these discourses entail . . . (post-academic science) . . . is characterized 
by complex relationships between the industry, science, academia, economics, 
and politics that determine what type of research and development ought to be 
pursued on the ground of ethical, economic, political, and social reasons . . . 
(This) requires a dialectic between diverse fields within science and technology 
as well as between the sciences/technologies and the humanities.29 
 
 
In other words, the broader and more pluralistic modes of assessment can be the best 
ones. This means that various types of TA, pTA being merely one of them, should be 
encouraged. ‘Constructive TA’ offers user feedback to researchers, while ‘expert TA’ is 
usually confined to scientists, but can be combined with pTA in mixed expert/layperson 
fora (while Parliamentary TA operates through the medium of parliamentary advisory 
fora). 
 
 
Why pTA?  Before answering this question, it should be noted that there is also a ‘why 
not’, in that pTA is often seen as ineffective. The cynical view is that it is merely a 
cosmetic exercise. pTA offers a way for governments, corporations and research 
institutions to assess community needs and reactions, but that does not necessarily 
translate into substantive changes in policy, but only to a sense of public ‘oversight’  in 
the broadest sense. Thus pTA only has a ‘limited effect on political decision-making.’30  
Joss sees pTA as increasingly recognised by public institutions – though 
recognition is not the same as implementation.31  This statement might be justified by 
examples such as that of the 2009  ‘Nanopodium’ project run in The Netherlands, a 
public dialogue about the threats, opportunities and applications of nanotechnology.  
Although its report was submitted to the Dutch Parliament in 2011, it remains to be 
seen what effect this might have on policy. (In 2009, the Lower House of the Dutch 
parliament introduced three motions concerning nanotechnology; these however were  
limited to risk analysis issues rather than any societal or ethical concerns). One  
 
                                                
29 Fabrice Jotterand, ‘The Politicization of Science and Technology: Its Implications for 
Nanotechnology’, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics  (Winter, 2006), 658-66 (p. 661). 
30 Gabriele Abels, ‘Citizen Involvement in Public Policy-Making: Does it Improve Democratic 
Legitimacy and Accountability? The case of pTA’, Interdisciplinary Information Sciences 13.1 
(2007), 103-116 (p.110).  
31 S. Joss, ‘Public participation in science and technology policy- and decision-making — 
ephemeral phenomenon or lasting change?’, Science and Public Policy 26.5 (1999), 290-293. 
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outcome has been the suggestion to increase NGO involvement in policymaking.32  
In the UK, three nanodialogue projects (NanoJury UK, Small Talk, and Nanodialogues) 
were intended to inform nanotechnology policy, and all reported their findings to 
government and other relevant institutions. Yet, according to Blum, only one institution 
has responded formally to these projects.33 
The question is how to link the public’s voice with the policy-making process. 
Dryzek and Tucker suggest that there is potential for linking pTA to established 
electoral processes.34 Having  
a permanent channel of consultation and communication between 
parliamentarians and the public would significantly improve public trust in the 
governance of science and technology . . . A national institution could, in the right 
circumstances, and with enough political support, guarantee that public dialogue 
has policy impact.35 
 
 
The adoption of the EU ‘Common Position’ on armaments36  was allegedly a 
demonstration of the fact that ‘a well-organized citizen’s lobby can achieve a great 
deal.’37  The European Citizens’ Consultations offer other examples of EU wide 
deliberative democracy. (And 2013 is the ‘European Year of Citizens’, aiming 'to 
mobilise and coordinate wide civil society engagement,' and ‘initiate a European-wide 
debate on issues relating to the exercise of European citizens’ rights and to citizens’ 
‘participation in the democratic life of the EU.’)38 
There is also some concern about how democratic pTA truly is. As Lewidow 
outlines, there is a need to extend the agenda for, and ownership of, such fora, for ‘the 
prospects for democratization depend upon wider, autonomous forms of participation -  
neither sponsored nor welcomed by state bodies.’39 In other words, pTA runs the risk of 
                                                
32 Rinie van Est, Ten Lessons for a Nanodialogue. About Being Serious and having Some 
Serious Fun (Rathenau Institute, 2008), at <http://www.oecd.org/sti/nano/42326543.pdf>. 
33  Anya Blum, Public Engagement and Risk Governance of Nanotechnologies - revolution or 
illusion? (Thesis submitted for Dipl.Ing/MSc, Vienna, 2012), p. 51, at 
<https://zidapps.boku.ac.at/abstracts/download.php?dataset>. 
34 J. Dryzek, A. Tucker,   ‘Deliberative Innovation to Different Effect: Consensus Conferences in 
Denmark, France and the United States’, Public Administration Review 68.5 (2008), 864-876. 
35  International Comparison of Public Dialogue on Science and Technology (Sciencewise 
Report, 2011), p. 60, at <http://www.sciencewise-
erc.org.uk/cms/assets/Uploads/Publications/International-Comparison-of-Public-Dialogue.pdf>. 
36 For a discussion of what this entails, if interested, see 
<http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/eu_common_position>. 
37  Steven P. McGiffen, Biotechnology. Corporate Power versus the Public Interest (London & 
Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 23. 
38 ‘European Year of Citizens 2013 Alliance’, at <http://ey2013-alliance.eu/>. 
39  L. Levidow, ‘Democratizing Agri-Biotechnology? European Public Participation in Agbiotech 
Assessment’, Comparative Sociology 8.4  (January 4, 2009),  541-564. 
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educating the public sufficiently to understand that they might be being cajoled into an 
exercise that offers the comforting illusion of democratic process.  
  
However, the negative view of pTA is a limited one. The ‘effectiveness’ of pTA can be 
measured in terms of more indirect and informal influence.  pTA is useful for global 
ethics and global policymaking in the context of new technologies for the following 
general reasons: 
• It offers new, broader and pluralistic methods of governance for the twenty-first 
century and for a twenty-first century technology like nano, reflecting the 
growing sense that technological innovations are seen as the outcomes of 
social networks that incorporate a range of actors;40 
• it addresses the public trust deficit associated with many new technologies, and 
such a deficit’s attendant economic and political problems;  
• it provides a method of awareness-raising, particularly with complex new 
technologies that may not be communicated effectively by governments or the 
media, thus leading to better informed citizens; and 
• is an effective method of promoting self-reflection and bridge-building amongst 
actors with conflicting views in S&T debates. 
 
 
There are more arguments that support pTA when seen as a development of classical 
expert-focused TA (not least in relation to the lack of understanding of socio-ethical 
issues within the expert community themselves), but as the focus in this thesis is on 
what pTA stands for rather than the specific merits of one methodology over another, 
that issue can be left for future empirical studies. 
 
Given the hypothesis that will be tested over the following chapters, that global ethics 
requires individual agency at both a national and international level or a ‘dual identity’ 
as I shall term it, policymaking needs to be broadened from national committees to 
global citizens. The skill set required of a global citizen will be outlined in the following 
two chapters, but the catalyst for such skill development is public empowerment. In 
other words, a more deliberative, democratic form of engagement with S&T ethics is 
required.  Global ethics necessitates global agency, which requires global  
empowerment. The latter, given differing political structures, is predicated as individual, 
or lay empowerment through pTA.  
                                                
40  Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott, Michael Gibbons, Re-thinking science: Knowledge and the 
public in an age of uncertainty (Cambridge, MA.: Polity, 2001). 
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4.2.1. The public trust issue 
The complexity of public decisions seems to require highly specialized and 
esoteric knowledge, and those who control this knowledge have considerable 
power. Yet democratic ideology suggests that people must be able to influence 
policy decisions that affect their lives.41   
 
 
The power of the consumer is ever increasing. Even in less democratically inclined 
nations governmental policymakers and regulators are increasingly aware that there is 
a strong economic argument for greater public involvement in ‘approving’ new products 
for market; the trust deficit is bad for business, as was brought home with the billion-
dollar losses incurred through the GM boycott. Scandals, particularly those relating to 
food, have left a legacy of suspicion that has fed into the EU nanodebate, giving rise to 
a fear that nanotechnology might be ‘the next GM.’42    
Public dissatisfaction in China after various food safety scandals relating to milk 
and to gutter oil suggests scepticism about regulation is not only an EU issue.  The 
2008 scandal, when milk from the Sanlu Corporation was found to be contaminated by 
melamine, was China’s second major baby-milk scandal. Reports of the death toll from 
the Sanlu contamination vary according to whom one reads, from three to eleven, but 
up to 300,000 children were reported as affected to some degree. The gutter oil 
scandal erupted in September 2011 after reports about companies recycling oil from 
drains behind restaurants first appeared. In China, policymakers are beginning to 
become more concerned, adopting a more inclusive approach, ‘a more reflective 
approach to engaging with the public’, that is ‘real dialogue.’43   
Product boycotts of some products have not only had an economic impact for 
corporations; public attacks on governments undermine governmental authority.44  
There is a growing view that policymaking should not be undertaken purely by 
government regulators, due to growing public scepticism about the lack of neutral 
                                                
41 D. Nelkin, ‘The political impact of technical expertise’, Social Studies of Science 5 (1975), p. 
37. See also A. Fung, E.O. Wright (eds). Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered 
Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003). 
42 B. Walsh, Environmentally Beneficial Nanotechnologies: Barriers & Opportunities (London: 
DEFRA 2007). Renee Kyle, Susan Dodds, ‘Avoiding Empty Rhetoric: Engaging Publics in 
Debates about Nanotechnologies’, Science Engineering Ethics 15 (2009), 81-96 (p. 88). 
43  Richard Jones, ’Public Engagement and Nanotechnology – the UK experience’, Soft 
Machines, January 13, 2009, at <http://www.softmachines.org/wordpress/?p=443>. Jones also 
discusses the  connection of public dialogue to funding priorities. 
44 Kearnes, Machnaghten, Wilsdon,  Governing at the Nanoscale, ibid,  p. 12. 
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experts advising on S&T policy, thus creating a ‘de-legitimisation’ of policy. As Porter et 
al argue,  
 
A technology cannot be described or forecast without reference to society. 
Society contributes significant public resources to technologies seen as leading 
to desirable social goals. It has also demonstrated a willingness to withhold 
support from technologies it deems undesirable.45 
 
 
4.2.2 The ‘legitimisation’ effect of public participation 
Scandals where products have affected human health are now more quickly and widely 
disseminated, due to increased global media, with an accompanying outcry against 
regulators and governments. This has led to a demand, both for more informed public 
debate, and for greater public involvement in how new technologies should be 
regulated and funded, as well as how they should be applied to everyday life.46  (A note 
of caution is sounded by Schummer, who, referring to the USA’s 2003 National 
Nanotechnology Initiative, which prioritises S&T that ‘brings about improvements in 
quality of life for all Americans’,47 argues that societal concerns should balance, not 
impede nanodevelopment.)48  
 The challenge consists in closing the widening democratic gap between 
policymakers and citizens, thereby increasing the citizen’s sense of ownership in 
decisions made about current global issues.  Policymakers now call for the inclusion of 
discussion of the ethical and societal impacts of potentially transformative new 
technologies at an early stage in policymaking – so-called ‘upstream engagement.’49  
The term ‘upstream engagement’, which ‘views the trajectory of new technologies as 
being decided not solely by the scientists and industrialists who seek to develop it, but  
 
                                                
45  Alan L. Porter, Frederick A. Rossini, Stanley R. Carpenter, A Guidebook for Technology 
Assessment and Impact Analysis (New York: Elsevier North Holland, 1980), p.100. 
46 Gaskell, Thompson, Allum, ‘Worlds apart’, ibid,  p.386.  Also, Doubleday, ‘Risk, public 
engagement and reflexivity’, ibid, p.211. 
47 Nigel M. de S. Cameron, ‘Towards Nanoethics’, ibid, 279-294. 
48 J. Schummer, ‘Societal and ethical implications of nanotechnology: Meanings, interest 
groups, and social dynamics’, Techne 8 (2004), 56-87 (p. 66). Also,  Johnson, ‘Ethics and 
Technology ‘, ibid,  p. 27. 
49 H.B. Friedman, Human Values and the Design of Computer Technology (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1997), p.105;  also S. Jasanoff,  States of Knowledge: The Co-
production of Science and Social Order (London:  Routledge, 2004). 
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rather with governments having a responsibility to engage the public in the decision 
and policy-making processes’,50 is another way of defining pTA.51  Thus ‘setting up 
public panels has already become an accepted method within ELSI-research 
programs.’52 As Horst argues,  
Developments for example in biotechnology have sparked off a number of social 
controversies during the past decades and it has been common to understand 
public debate as a necessary prerequisite for the ability to deal with these 
controversies.  (There is) broad discursive consensus in favour of public debate 
and participatory exercises regarding the social responses to biotechnology.53 
 
 
As Kaiser discusses, with public participation, societal expectations can be unmasked 
and exposed through research (interviews); such ‘identified expectations are fed back 
into the public dialogue as contestable values or disputable attitudes that need to 
answer to accountability requirements.’ By subjecting such expectations to scrutiny and 
insisting on accountability, the risk/benefit debate can be continuously adjusted.54  This 
all may mean a re-evaluation of the public’s ability to tolerate risk (and so to accept 
new nanoproducts); the 2006 Swiss canvassing of public opinion on nanotechnology in 
food products and packaging discovered that lay people considered risks to be of more 
importance than scientists did. In addition, upstream engagement presents the: 
. . . potential for engaging with new questions beyond those traditionally 
employed in discussion about risks . . . ideally, this dialogue would explore not 
only visions for society . . . but assumptions about the ways these visions are 
constructed. A key conclusion here is that “upstream” public engagement . . . 
must move beyond conventional “risk communication” based dialogue, to be 
future focused, broadly framed, and to explicitly incorporate questions of both 
public values and technology governance . . . all of this raises significant 
challenges.55 
 
 
                                                
50 Graeme A. Hodge, Diana M. Bowman, ‘Engaging in Small Talk: Nanotechnology Policy and 
Dialogue Processes in the UK and Australia’, The Australian Journal of Public Administration 
2.66 (2007), 223-37, p. 228. 
51 M. Siegrist, C. Keller, H. Kastenholz, S. Frey, A. Wiek,  ‘Laypeople’s and experts’ perceptions 
of nanotechnology hazards’, Risk Analysis 27.1 (2007), 59-69. 
52  Rinie van Est, ‘Keeping the Dream Alive: What ELSI-Research Might Learn from 
parliamentary Technology Assessment’, in Nanotechnology and the Challenges of Equity, 
Equality and Development  (Yearbook of Nanotechnology in Society) (Dordrecht: Springer,  
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53   Maja Horst, ‘Collective Closure? Public Debate as the Solution to Controversies about 
Science and Technology’, Acta Sociologica 53.3 (September 2010), 195-211. 
54 Kaiser, Kurath, Maason, Rehmann-Sutter, ibid, p. 190, p. 194. 
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Risk communication or “upstream engagement”?’, Health, Risk & Society 9.2 (June, 2007), 191-
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This is all particularly significant for nanotechnology. One of the 2006 EU-funded 
DEEPEN (Deepening Ethical Engagement and Participation in Emerging 
Nanotechnologies) project aims was that of ‘developing methodological tools for 
engaging civil society and the nanoscience community in ethical reflection’, hoping to 
‘integrate understanding of the ethical dilemmas posed by emerging nanotechnologies 
into the innovation trajectories of the technology itself.’56  We have a ‘rare opportunity 
to integrate societal studies and dialogues from the very beginning’ in the 
nanodebate.57  Nanotechnology, the ‘natural inheritor of a complex web of 
disenchantment, tension and ill-feeling caused by a series of recent technological 
controversies in Europe’,58 offers ‘an opportunity to road-test new forms of participatory 
and deliberative public engagement with a technology in the early stages of its 
development.'59    
  
Jürgen Habermas, discussing the ‘legitimation crisis’  that governments may suffer 
from when public trust is lost, argues for greater power in the public sphere, something 
he describes as:60 
a warning system with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout 
society. From the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in 
addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only thematize them, furnish 
them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken 
up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes.61 
 
 
In his Between Facts and Norms (1992), Habermas presented a social theory that 
addresses the tension between moral norms and their practical context through legal 
institutionalization based on discursive procedures and the principle of democracy – 
thus ‘only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent 
                                                
56 See <http://www.ist-
world.org/ProjectDetails.aspx?ProjectId=55be342f09d943d392c7ea2b29ace7c0>. 
57  M. Rocco, W.S. Bainbridge (eds.) Societal implications of nanoscience and nanotechnology. 
(Boston: Kluwer, 2001), p. 2.  
58 Kearnes, Macnaghten, Wilsdon,  Governing at the nanoscale, ibid, , p.  14;  also,  M.B. 
Kearnes, R.  Grove-White, P. Macnaghten, J. Wilsdon, B. Wynne, ‘From Bio to Nano: Learning 
the Lessons, interrogating the Comparison’, Science as Culture 15. 4 (2006),  291-307. 
59 P.M. Macnaghten, M.B.  Kearnes, B. Wynne, ’Nanotechnology, governance and public 
deliberation: What role for the social sciences?’, Science Communication 27.2  (2005), 268–
287. 
60 This is a simplified statement of Habermas’ argument in Legitimationsprobleme im 
Spatkapitalismus (1973), which argues that the modern state can be subject to endemic crises, 
which arise from the fact that the state cannot simultaneously meet the demands for rational 
problem solving, democracy, and cultural identity . 
61  Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 359. 
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(Zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been 
legally constituted’.62  
Collins and Evans describe the legitimacy problem succinctly, stating that at the 
start of the twenty-first century ‘it is well established that the public have the political 
right to contribute, and without their contribution technological developments will be 
distrusted and perhaps resisted.’63 
There is arguably a greater sense of ‘de-legitimisation’ that derives not merely 
from governments, but from the condition of modernity itself. Hennen, for example, 
argues that pTA can be analysed in the light of current sociological debate about 
‘uncertainty’, and that pTA, ‘as a response to technological controversy, should be 
understood as a means of dealing, in creative and interactive ways, with the issue of 
(scientific, social, ethical...) uncertainty at the heart of modern society.’64  This indicates 
that ‘knowledge’ in an age of certainty has become less firmly owned by any one body 
or institution, however, the means for achieving an ethical discussion of ‘technological 
controversy’ may require a new and ‘decentralised’ form of approach. 
 The extension of S&T debate into the public sphere, which Habermas describes 
as an autonomous space where citizens engage in reasoned discourse, helps to 
strengthen the foundations of democracy, more specifically, it plays a role in 
strengthening ‘democratic will-formation’.65 Habermas acknowledges that deliberative 
democracy needs to be institutionalised (must become part of policymaking), yet he 
also sees it as a significant part of the ongoing process of decentralisation. It 
encourages citizens to work towards the kind of society they would like to live in. In 
this, it extends the idea of pTA or discourse events as learning processes not only in 
terms of the communication of data and ideas, but also as a means of developing 
democratic skills. 
The issue of decentralization, as I shall argue in Chapter Six, is a crucial 
requirement for global ethics, in that it allows discourse to enter into a new public 
space. 
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63 Harry Collins, Richard Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007), p. 129. 
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4.2.3  New forms of governance? 
Science issues, in their complexity, and in the trust deficit context, have become 
‘a major challenge for governance’.66  
 
As Abels explains, the notion of governance doesn't solely mean institutions anymore,  
rather ‘formal and informal aspects of co-operation and coordination between a 
diversity of social actors… new modes of policy-making by linking the input 
(participation) and output (effectiveness) dimensions of democratic legitimacy.’67 There 
is a growing sense that technological innovations are seen as the outcomes of social 
networks that incorporate a range of actors.68  The social and ethical issues that S&T 
raise are no longer the responsibility of a ‘relatively closed bureaucratic-professional-
legal world of regulation’, but are relocated within the public arena.69   
It is already expected that policymakers and other governmental regulators will 
consult with think tanks, NGOs, researchers and other S&T advisory bodies; the 
layperson’s input has become increasingly important in TA and indeed was part of the 
initial TA landscape in some European countries. pTA was also part of the move 
towards greater democracy and the trialling of consensus conferences for greater 
public discourse, particularly in Europe during the 1980s.70  
The Danish Board of Technology (TeknologirÂdet, or DBT) for example has a 
responsibility to encourage public debate and to serve as an independent source of 
advice and assessment on technology issues for the Danish Parliament. In the DBT’s 
mission statement, special emphasis is placed on clarifying the interaction between 
technology, society and people; the DBT strives ‘to ensure that technology in Denmark 
is in harmony with the desire for a democratic, fair and economically, ecologically and 
socially sustainable society’ that makes use of 'expert knowledge as well as the insight, 
experience and credibility of non-expert citizens.’71  While KIT (the Karlsruher Institut  
für Technologie) in Germany is organizing the Citizen’s Dialogue on S&T, the  
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69  Jotterand, ‘The Politicization of Science and Technology’, ibid, p. 66. 
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Norwegians, Austrians and Swiss have similar projects, and many other TA institutes 
are now focusing on lay participation methodologies. The Rathenau Instituut in the 
Netherlands is known for the methodology of horizon scanning, or foresight, a process 
in which laypersons are often included. In their September 2012 report, the Institute 
argued that nanotechnology and pTA should operate in tandem, for: 
Nanotechnology has provided a new window of opportunity to reframe state-
science-society relationships. In particular the notion of upstream public  
engagement has been put forward…Our study shows that in order to better 
understand the complexities of the governance of science and technology, a new 
research perspective is needed [for] reflecting on the relationship between 
informing and engaging, on the interaction between engagement processes 
within the societal, scientific and political sphere, and on organisational and 
institutional constraints.72 
 
 
The UK’s Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, similarly,  offers as part of its mission, 
the statement that ‘at a time of substantial public service reform, futures thinking has a 
critical role to play in helping to ensure that wider perspectives are identified, traditional 
assumptions challenged and new possibilities explored’.73 
 
 
4.2.4  Educating citizens and policymakers 
The pTA process educates policymakers and the public. Sclove’s 2010 Wilson report 
on the need for a ‘reinvented TA’ in the US argued that ‘informed groups of citizens 
could identify a wide and rich range of issues associated with new technologies, often 
adding nuances to the views of experts and the policymaking community.’74  Clove 
proposed a new national expert-and-participatory TA institutional network – the Expert 
& Citizen Assessment of Science & Technology (ECAST) network. ECAST would be 
independent of the government and comprise a complementary set of non-partisan 
policy research institutions, universities and science museums across the United 
States. 
                                                
72  Rinie van Est, Bart Walhout, Virgil Rerimassie, Dirk Stemerding, Lucien Hansen,  
Governance of nanotechnology in the Netherlands – Informing and engaging in different social 
spheres (Rathenau Instituut working paper, 2012), at <http://www.ce-
as.nl/dynamic/media/4/documents/Governance_of_nanotechnology_in_the_Netherlands_Inform
ing_and_engaging_in_different_social_spheres.pdf>, or at 
<http://www.rathenau.nl/publicaties.html>.  
73  See <http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/horizon-scanning-centre>. 
74  Richard Sclove, ‘Reinventing Technology Assessment: A 21st Century Model’, (Woodrow 
Wilson centre, April 2010),  at 
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ReinventingTechnologyAssessment1>. 
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 Broader procedures incorporating more actors might increase the public 
knowledge base and produce ‘new possibilities of conflict resolution’ and ‘realise 
common interests.’75 Such twenty-first century methodological pluralism solves the 
problems that Ladikas notes in the context of Science in Society (SIS) programs – for 
example, issues of political will, the narrow framing of science issues, methodological 
pluralism, and knowledge integration – all problems that pTA aims to resolve.76   
This pluralism also places pTA at the forefront of global engagement with S&T. 
 
Public awareness of and familiarity with nanotechnology is still low, according to a 
2004-7 study across the US, Switzerland, Japan and Europe.77  One of the ways in 
which the accusations of pTA's inefficacy can be countered is to redefine the notion of 
‘impact’. This can be widened to take into account a TA event’s ’resonance’, by which 
is usually meant awareness raising and action initializing. Thus Guston argues that 
pTA should be assessed qualitatively rather than in terms of effectiveness: 
. . . pTA offers a combination of intensive and extensive qualities that are unique 
among modes of engagement . . . this combination led to significant learning and 
opinion changes, based on what can be characterized as a high-quality 
deliberation. The quality of the anticipatory knowledge required to address 
emerging technologies is always contested, but pTAs can be designed with 
outcomes in mind – especially when learning is understood as an outcome.78
   
 
 
Loeber, Griessler and Versteeg note that impact studies of pTA tend to focus on its 
effect on policy and media, without necessarily looking at the valuable contribution it 
makes to the arenas of  ‘public contestation.’ In their view 
the very staging of a participatory technology assessment implies the creation of a new 
space for contention in which relationships between actor-networks may shape up, 
evolve and change, or alternatively, reconfirm identities and boundaries. 79 
 
                                                
75 Alfons Bora, Heiko Hausendorf, ’Governing Technology through Public Participation’, in  
Democratic Transgressions of Law: Governing Technology through Public Participation, ibid,  1-
20 (p. 2). 
76  Miltos Ladikas, ‘Introduction’, in  Embedding society in science and technology policy, ibid,  
pp. 13-14. 
77 Terre Satterfield, Milind Kandlikar, Christian E.H. Beaudrie, Joseph Conti, Barbara Herr 
Harthorn, ‘Anticipating the perceived risk on nanotechnologies’, Nature Nanotechnology 4 
(November 2009) 752-58 (p. 754). 
78 David Guston, ‘Participating Despite Questions: Toward a More Confident Participatory 
Technology Assessment. Science & Engineering Ethics 17.4 (December 2011), 691-697 
(p.696). 
79 A.  Loeber, E. Griessler, W. Versteeg, ‘Stop looking up the ladder: analyzing the impact of 
participatory technology assessment from a process perspective’, Science & Public Policy  38.8 
(2011), 599-608 (p.601, p.602). 
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In other words, pTA not only decentralises legitimation from the ‘top’ to the public, but 
encourages a process of agency in which identity might shift its boundaries. This point 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. 
  
 
The NEG report mentioned earlier notes that public engagement has a valuable impact 
in terms of contextualizing science policy, research and governance, creating better 
informed, scientifically aware citizens, while overcoming preconceptions.80  In addition 
to education, this report proposes that one might look at effectiveness differently, in 
terms of influencing researchers and decision-makers to consider the social context of 
their work more carefully: 
Direct links between public engagement activities and decision-making rarely 
happens . . . instead we believe that public engagement activities are more likely 
to influence policy and decision-making through more subtle and indirect 
avenues . . . a public engagement activity may challenge the views and attitudes 
of those who take part, thus leading to a gradual change in the priorities of 
decision-makers or researchers. 81 
 
 
4.2.5 Self-reflection and bridge-building 
Are pTA methods transferable across countries?  Are there any current examples of 
East-West dialogue that provide a basic model? In 1996 the first Asia Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) with European leaders and 10 heads of state in Asia was held. While there is 
potential for a more political agenda within the ASEM framework, including human 
rights and security questions, it is unclear how those interests will be balanced with the 
economic priorities of both regions. The China-UK Economic and Financial Dialogue, 
founded in 2008, is the only vice-premier level economic and financial dialogue 
between China and Europe, and was set up to  develop long-term strategic relations 
between the two regions. Fang argues that ‘the dialogue is still rudimentary and faces a 
lot of difficulties, but if these are overcome, it might produce a historic and world-class 
contribution to the global economy.’82   
An overview of the dialogues between China and the EU suggests a 
‘complementarity of interests’ in the two regions, so that: 
                                                
80 Karin Gavelin,  Richard Wilson, with Robert Doubleday, The final report of the 
Nanotechnology Engagement Group (NEG) (London: Involve, 2007), 
<http://www.involve.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Democratic-Technologies.pdf>,  p.10. 
81  NEG Report, ibid, p. 82. 
82 Yang Fang, ‘Dialogue a sign of increasingly sincere ties’, China Daily 16 September 2011,  at 
<http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-09/16/content_13723556.htm>. 
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China and Europe have considerably more in common than might appear at first 
sight. This creates a strong mutual interest to promote the exchange of 
experience and know-how. China today is experiencing challenges which Europe 
started to tackle a number of years ago in areas such as the environment, the 
internal market, and competition. The EU is demonstrating its willingness to share 
this experience with China. And China has shown an interest in using the best 
practices of the ‘EU model’ in these policy areas. In other areas too, both Europe 
and China are simultaneously confronted with new challenges, such as rapid 
advances in science and technology and problems with health protection. This is 
a two-way street. In some areas Europe could usefully benefit from Chinese 
know-how and experience. Peaceful nuclear research is an example of such an 
area, where Europe will soon have to close down its ageing experimental nuclear 
reactors, whereas China is currently building state-of-the-art facilities.83 
 
 
 
There are many such platforms for strategic discussion. What about S&T dialogue 
though?  
EU-China S&T cooperation started in the early 1980s, through the European 
Commission's Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development, 
with a S&T Cooperation Agreement being signed in 1998. The 6th Framework 
Programme (2002-2006) supported 214 research projects involving Chinese teams. 
(FP7 (2007-2013) is furthering this successful cooperation).84 The 2006 China-Europe 
Science and Technology Year was an example of a joint initiative of the Chinese 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Directorate-General of the 
European Commission. Horvat and Lundin’s report on this cooperation also notes 
activities such as the exchange of equipment in addition to information, interviews, and 
project pooling, with initiatives such as Co-REACH and BILAT SILK.85  These initiatives 
allow for Chinese partners ‘to be more actively involved’, and foster greater ‘reciprocity 
and increased convergence of European and Chinese priorities.’86  However, we may 
observe that such initiatives usually operate at the level of government or scientific 
community. There is less community involvement, although this should be essential, as 
argued by the Global Dialogue Foundation (GDF, established in July 2011 to promote 
                                                
83 ‘An overview of the sectoral dialogues between China and the EU’,  at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/china/sectoraldialogue_en.htm>. 
84 See 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/eu_china/science_tech_environmement/science_tech
nology/index_en.htm>. 
85 CO-REACH  is dedicated to developing cooperation between the EY and China. See 
Coordination Action CO-REACH, ‘Made for China’ (ERA-NET 2005), at 
<ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/coordination/docs/co-reach_individual_project_sheets_en.pdf>. 
BILAT-SILK is an EU Framework 7 program that raises the EU’s S&T profile in China; see 
<http://www.uclan.ac.uk/schools/school_of_health/research_projects/bilat_silk.php>. 
86 Manfred Horvat, Nannan Lundin,  Review of the Science & Technology Cooperation between 
the European community and the government of the People’s Republic of China  (2008), p.12, 
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intercultural understanding). The GDF predicates a two-level approach, one 
international, the other public, in pursuit of its aim to increase understanding and 
cooperation among people of different cultures, faiths and beliefs at the community- 
 
grassroots level, but also at the international, UN level. The project involves 
establishing networks of Civil Society organisations in each country.87  
 
Examples of cross-national participatory TA projects are:  
• Meeting of Minds (2004-6)  
• World Wide Views on Global Warming (2009)  
• World Wide Views on Biodiversity (2012).  
 
 
The Europe-wide pTA on advances in brain research, Meeting of Minds, a two-year 
pilot project (2004-6) led by a European panel of 126 citizens, was a concerted attempt 
by leading organisations in the field to move pTA and foresight to the European cross-
national level. It gave European citizens  
a unique opportunity to learn more about the impact of brain research on their 
daily lives and society as a whole, to discuss their questions and ideas with 
leading European researchers, experts and policy-makers, put them in touch with 
fellow citizens from other European countries and make a personal contribution 
to a report detailing what the people of Europe believe to be possible and 
desirable in the area of brain science and what they recommend policy-makers 
and researchers to be aware of for future developments in this field.88 
 
 
The report on the project concluded that it demonstrated the feasibility, the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of public participation at a multinational European level.  
 In 2009, the Danish Board of Technology organised World Wide Views on 
Global Warming. Over 4000 people in 38 countries met on a single day to discuss 
recommendations to an upcoming conference on climate change. Participants were 
selected for representativeness of age, education and other regional demographics. 
This event serves as an example ‘of how to include everyday citizens in future global 
policymaking, giving them a bigger sense of political ownership and policymakers a 
better insight in the views of the citizens they represent.’89 
                                                
87 See <http://www.globaldialoguefoundation.org/what_we_do.html>. 
88 See <http://www.meetingmindseurope.org/europe_default_site.aspx?ID=13&SGREF=13#8>. 
89 Howard Silverman, ‘Participatory Technology Assessment’, People and Place 1.3 (2010), at 
<http://www.peopleandplace.net/perspectives/2010/9/13/participatory_technology_assessment>
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And on Saturday, 15 September, 2012, thousands of people around the world 
took part in World Wide Views on Biodiversity, a project that engaged ordinary 
citizens from 25 countries in policymaking to address the decline of biodiversity.  
 
Given that a pTA approach seems useful for a new technology such as nano, based on 
the  four reasons outlined above, how does one achieve public involvement in practical 
terms? The following takes a brief look at current pTA achievements in both the EU 
and China. 
 
4.3  pTA in Europe  
 
The European Commission has taken the initiative for fostering the dialogue between 
Science and Society and the involvement of citizens in S&T policy making.  The 
following EU projects have all tackled the idea of public dialogue on socio-ethical 
concerns about nanotechnology: 
• Nanologue (2005-6) 
• NanoBio-RAISE (2006-7) 
• Nanoplat (2009) 
• The framingNano Project (2008-2010) 
• SNAP (2009-2010) (discussed briefly in Chapter 3) 
• and ObservatoryNANO (2008-2012) 
 
The following brief discussions of each project suggest that there have been practical 
outcomes, ranging from tools for engagement, to methodologies for influencing 
nanotechnology stakeholders.   
 
Nanologue, funded by Framework 6 of the EU, has as overarching objectives the 
establishment of a common understanding concerning social, ethical and legal aspects 
of nanotechnology applications, and the facilitation of a Europe-wide dialogue among 
science, business and civil society about its benefits and potential impacts. Over 21 
months of stakeholder consultation and scenario discussion, a ‘NanoMeter’, or online 
tool for assessing the risks of nanomaterials at the R&D stage, was developed.90 
 
 
                                                
90  ‘Nanologue. About the project’, at <http://www.nanologue.net/index.php?seite=4>. 
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Nanobio-RAISE (Responsible Action on Issues in Society and Ethics) was intended to 
bring together nanobiotechnologists, ethicists and communication specialists to 
anticipate and discuss the societal and ethical issues likely to arise as 
nanobiotechnologies develop.  In addition to various conferences and seminars, the 
project created a Democs (deliberative meeting of citizens) part card game, part policy-
making tool that enables small groups of people to engage with complex public policy 
issues. 91 
 
Nanoplat: The initial intention of the Nanoplat research project was to facilitate a form 
of deliberative process between the various players involved in defining, producing and 
commercializing that particular class of goods based on nanotechnology. It would thus 
have concrete power with which to influence the sector.92 It aimed at the ‘points of 
intersection between the sphere of production on the one hand and consumers on the 
other.’93 
 
framingNano, launched in May 2008 with the aim of creating proposals for a workable 
governance platform, focused on analysing existing and ongoing regulatory processes, 
science-policy interfaces, researching risk assessment and governance in 
nanotechnologies as well as stakeholder consultation and information dissemination on 
governance. Recommending nano-specific regulation, the report noted ‘uncertainties 
about public acceptance, resulting from a lack of transparency about EHS and ELSA 
issues.’94 
 
The ObservatoryNANO project supports European policy makers through the 
provision of wide-ranging scientific and economic nanoanalysis and the assessment of 
ethical and societal aspects. It publishes an annual report, and is working on an ethical 
toolkit for nanoapplication.95 
 
                                                
91  Donald Bruce, Engaging Citizens on Nanobiotechnology Using the Democs game.  
Interim Report (2007), at <www.edinethics.co.uk/.../nanobio-raise%20democs%20report-
02.doc>. 
92 Eivind Stø, Gerd Scholl, François Jègou, Pål Strandbakken, ‘The Future of Deliberative 
Processes on Nanotechnology’,  in  Rene von Schomberg, Sarah Davies (eds) Understanding 
Public Debate, ibid, 53-80 (p. 67). 
93 ‘The Nanoplat project’, at  <http://www.nanoplat.org/?q=node/4>. 
94  Framing Nano. Governance in Nanoscience and Nanotechnology  (2010), at 
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In addition to the above-mentioned EU projects, the Netherlands, the UK, and 
Germany offer other examples of public engagement. The Dutch 2009 ‘Nanopodium’ 
project (which reported to Parliament), concluded that: 
• Citizens who had participated in the dialogues in 2009 and 2010 were in favour 
of responsibly implemented nanotechnology. 
• Healthcare applications attract most attention both for the potential benefits and 
for potential risks. Other applications of interest were food, personal care, 
security and privacy. 
• The better the process of information, the more confident the citizens. 
Developing educational packages would be useful as young people are eager 
to learn about nanotechnology.96 
 
 
The last point is of interest to policymakers and corporations concerned with consumer 
confidence in market terms. Thus when the German NanoKommission (founded in 
2006 by the German Federal Minister for the Environment), 97 was set the task of 
discussing the opportunities and risks of nanotechnologies and formulating 
recommendations to the Federal Government, it cast its public net fairly wide in the 
NanoDialogue project, inviting representatives from the scientific world, the business 
community, environmental, consumer and women’s associations, trade unions, 
churches, ministries and authorities. The final report (2011) noted that regarding 
corporations’ risk management, guidelines needed to be more ‘specific to business 
practice.’98  
 A 2009 UK reflection on the 2004 Royal Society Report argued that much of the 
clarity in the original report on the responsible development of nanotechnology had 
been lost and that more needed to be done in the field of public engagement. The 
report added that nanoparticles allegedly are being released into the environment and 
that, in the view of one collaborator on the updated report, there has been no 
                                                
96 ‘Dutch nanodialogue concluded’, Nanoforum 7 February 2011, at 
<http://www.nanoforum.org/nf06~modul~showmore~folder~99999~scc~news~scid~4190~.html
?action=longview>. 
97  In Germany, one institution may be regarded as be the most prominent in the German TA 
landscape with regard to policymaking: the Institute of Technology Assessment and Systems 
Analysis (ITAS) at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT).  
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research.  See Final Report of NanoKommission Issue Group 1 (2010), at  
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‘meaningful change in regulatory practice or social engagement in the UK.’99 The latter 
does not seem entirely justified, however, given the following UK nanodialogue  
initiatives that took place between 2004 and 2006 (plus the UK’s involvement in the 
Dutch Democs project mentioned above):  
• NanoJury UK, a citizen’s jury (2005); 
• the Small Talk programme (2004-06), which sought to coordinate science 
communication-based dialogue activities;  
• the Nanodialogues project (2005-6), a series of practical experiments to explore 
whether the public can meaningfully inform decision-making processes related 
to emerging technologies in four different institutional contexts; and 
• The ‘Moving Public Engagement Upstream’ project (2004-06), set up to 
examine the contribution of nanotechnology to sustainable development by 
developing socially and environmentally sensitive governance processes.100  
 
One aspect of EU public engagement on nanotechnology issues not yet mentioned is 
that of school education.  The EU ‘NanoBioNet eV’ provides vocational courses and 
training for teachers, but has developed a multilingual (German, English and French) 
experimental kit ('the NanoSchoolBox') to teach school students about nanotechnology. 
Nanoethics however, is not widely taught, in contrast to some Eastern counties, where 
we might find programs like the S&T ‘impact on society’ approach in the Korean school 
curriculum, or Japan's distribution of bioethics guidelines to schoolchildren. Taiwan has 
a nanoeducation program, ‘K-12 Nanotechnology', started in 2002, that includes 
animations and  graphic novels, as well as a highschool lesson developed from 
Michael Crichton’s nanonovel Prey.101  
 
 
 
 
                                                
99  A beacon or a landmark? Reflections on the Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering 
Report: Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: Opportunities and uncertainties (The Responsible 
Nano Forum, 2009), 4-5 (p. 5, p. 46), at 
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_rnf.pdf>. 
100 Matthew Kearns, ‘A UK-China workshop: Governance and Regulation of Nanotechnology: 
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<http://www.docstoc.com/docs/17707152/UK-China-workshop-Governance-and-Regulation-of-
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101 National Science and Technology Development Plan 2009-2012 (National Science Council, 
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4.4 pTA in China 
 
How does pTA in China differ from this energetic European pTA scene? Recent food 
scandals have catalysed S&T debates in China by highlighting the limitations of the 
policymaking system, leading to an erosion of public trust in science.  This has been  
 
accompanied by increased calls for appropriate debates on policymaking processes  
that incorporate socio-ethical aspects along with economic ones.  However, the 
problems of communication in such a society influenced by Confucianism means that 
‘confronting others – especially elders – with truth or disagreement cannot be regarded 
as merely an exchange of information or of viewpoints but as an impolite and rude 
gesture’.102 In Japan, for example, traditional forms of communication emphasize 
harmony, meaning peace and good relations with people in one’s immediate 
surroundings.103  In a communitarian society, strong debate is a difficult issue.  
Whilst expert TA has a good history in China, it tends to be dominated by natural 
scientists with little background in social issues.  Information delivery, rather than 
debate, is more likely to be the aim of any survey.  
Thus the Chinese Institute of Physics disseminates research to the public 
through ‘open houses.’ ‘Science popularisation’ activities were carried out nationally in 
2006 and 2010, with an upbeat message about new technology, particularly 
nanotechnology. Kearnes, reporting on a 2009 UK-China workshop on the governance 
and regulation of nanotechnology, notes that in contrast to the UK’s official commitment 
to upstream public debate, Chinese policy focuses more explicitly on the governance 
and coordination of research activities. 
 However there is a movement towards greater public engagement with 
nanotechnology.104  When the Food Safety Law was revised in 2009, for example, in 
the legislative process to redraft the law, public opinion was solicited through 
government websites and newspapers, with over 11,000 comments being collected. 
With respect to nanotechnology, the annual Science Week held across China is also 
used to disseminate information about the sector while engaging public opinion.105  
In terms of nanotechnology, Chinese commentators and scholars acknowledge a lack 
of connection between research and universities in that nanodecisions are limited to 
                                                
102 Georgette Wang, ‘Communication Ethics in a Changing Chinese Society: The Case of 
Taiwan’, in Clifford Christians, Michael Traber (eds.) Communication Ethics and Universal 
Values (Thousand Oaks, Sage, 1997), 225-258 (p. 228). 
103 Hideo Takeichi,  ‘Japanese-Style Communication in a New Global Age’, in Communication 
Ethics, ibid,  244-8 (p.  245). 
104  Kearns, ’UK-China Workshop’, ibid. 
105  Darryl  Jarvis, Noah Richmond,  'Mapping’, ibid,  p. 20. 
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specialists. Recently the risk discourse has developed, focusing on the benefits of, and 
risks to health, state security and ecology; the challenge to basic concepts such as 
‘health’ and ‘human’; the ‘nano gap’; and the impact on privacy and human/consumer 
rights.106  
  
While TA is familiar, pTA is a relatively new development. GM food, nanotechnology, 
stem cell technology and IT, are still seen as major areas of attention for the scientific 
community, rather than the public. Yet there is a growing realisation amongst the 
scientific community that a wider approach, involving greater awareness of societal 
concerns is required, potentially utilising pTA.  A November 2011 workshop on 
scientific ethics worked to facilitate integration between the natural and the social 
sciences, suggesting that the Chinese scientific community realises that the social 
sciences have an integral role to play in technology evaluation and implementation.  
The argument in China currently appears to be that nanoresearchers bear the 
responsibility of proving the safety of nanotechnology, (while developing such 
technology under the constraints of social-ethical norms), as well as of introducing 
nanotechnology to the public.   
 In China, the focus is on the responsibility of the scientist; in the EU, it is about 
government accountability to the public.  The formulation of a Code of Conduct for 
scientists in both regions (predicted for 2012 in China, although not yet in evidence in 
2013)107 reveals similarities and differences in their respective approaches to 
nanotechnology development. This may change, since individual responsibility alone 
cannot guide S&T development, and public participation is increasingly being seen 
globally as integral to governmental decision-making. One might risk the prediction that 
this will ultimately become a governmental issue in China, since individual 
responsibility alone cannot guide S&T development.108  
 
pTA in China has so far been limited to a consensus conference on GM food in 2008, 
one with 25 participants. This conference was organised by the Chinese Academy of 
Science (CAS), and the S&T commission for Xicheng District, Beijing. Called ‘Science 
and Community 2008 – GM foods’, the aim was to recruit volunteers from varied socio-
economic backgrounds; 38 applications were received, from which 20 public 
                                                
106  Ma Ying, Miao   Liao, ’Nano-technology Development’, ibid. 
107 According to GEST project information, due for updating in September 2013 at a project 
meeting in Beijing. 
108 See M. Decker,  Z. Li, ‘Dealing with nanoparticles’, ibid,  p.123; also, M. Decker, A. 
Grunwald, ‘Ethical Aspects of Nanotechnology’, in Wenchao Li, Hans Poser (eds.) The Ethics of 
Today’s Science and Technology. A German-Chinese Approach. (Münster: LIT, 2008). 
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participants were chosen (plus 5 experts on GM foods and health, ethics and society, 
consumer choice and legislation).  The final document report showed more uncertainty 
following the conference compared with responses beforehand about the relationship 
between the public and experts. Some participants began to ‘modify their submissive 
position towards the experts’ while remaining supportive towards the government. The 
primary result of the conference, it was concluded, was the clarification of the need for 
more public education. Du argues, however, that the ‘2008 consensus conference in 
Beijing indicated that public opinion has its own reference value, and the public also 
have some big picture thinking.’109 Zhou argues that there is an immature deliberative 
democracy in China, giving ‘an optimistic prediction’ for the future.110   
 
 
A 2012 report on public/government decision-making argued for a ‘gradual movement 
towards policies and laws that . . . represent a more inclusive approach to policymaking 
at local and regional levels than has been traditionally employed.’111 Interestingly, the 
same report, while noting that there is emerging public participation in the formulation 
of environmental regulation, quotes one interview on the ‘weak’ nature of community in 
China – communitarianism is more of a political than a civil society concept, meaning 
that public communities are seen as governmentally run rather than as demonstrations, 
or encouragement, of public responsibility.112 
Public participation is seen globally as increasingly integral to governmental decision 
making, particularly given the economic effects of product boycotting, and China might 
soon (and perhaps already is in terms of GM food) face this issue. The two regions 
may therefore be converging. 
 
In conclusion, pTA does lead to certain outcomes, the most interesting of which is that 
of educating citizens, researchers and policymakers in a two-way or ‘open’ process that 
is consultative as well as informative. In terms of empowering the layperson by 
increasing his or her agency, it is seen as the foundation for a global ethics, as will be 
discussed below.  
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4.5 How pTA works (and why Habermas?) 
 
There are two ways in which the efficiency of a pTA model can be analysed; one is 
logistical, asking what a pTA event involves, while the other focuses on the role of the 
agent in pTA. In both contexts, the views of Jürgen Habermas on discourse ethics offer 
some useful and practical guidelines that extend to the pTA model.   
 Rather than debating culturally complex and fraught questions of ‘what is best’, 
discourse ethics looks at the means by which such concepts might be debated, and 
how such processes can be made more effective: 
Discourse ethics . . . requires actual discussion and debate among those who 
may be affected by a norm or proposal and accepts the outcome as that which is 
morally correct, assuming of course that the debate was sound. Discourse ethics 
is, therefore, entirely procedural; it does not specify moral behaviors (sic) but only 
methods for agreeing upon them. In this, it would seem to have the potential for 
bringing about ongoing, practical resolutions of moral and ethical concerns.113 
 
 
Habermas’s discourse ethics rests on two main ideas: universalisation and rational 
dialogue. Both are combined in the idea that practical consensus is achievable: 
Firstly, that contentions or utterances rest on particular validity claims that may be 
challenged and defended. For a normative ethical claim to be regarded as legitimate, it 
must be able to be justified in discourse. Arguers aim to construct cogent arguments 
that are convincing. The logical strength of such discourse depends on how well one 
has taken into account all the relevant information and possible objections, as 
argument implies counterargument. Discourse is practical in that hypotheses are tested 
through argument.114  
 
Habermas has been used in a variety of fields, in discussions on justice and 
democracy as well as deliberative discourse, such as in Warren’s argument that  
Participatory democrats hold that when individuals participate in democratic processes 
they are likely to become more tolerant of differences, more attuned to reciprocity, 
                                                
113 John Mingers, Geoff Walsham, ‘’Toward Ethical Information Systems: The Contribution of 
Discourse Ethics’, MIS Quarterly 34.4 (2012), 833-854 (p. 844). 
114  Practical discourse, Habermas writes, is ‘a procedure for testing the validity of norms that 
are being proposed and hypothetically considered for adoption’.  Jürgen Habermas, Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action (trans. Christian Lenhardt, Shierry Weber Nicholson)  
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), p. 103.  
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better able to engage in moral discourse and judgment, and more prone to examine 
their own preferences.115 
 
Habermas has been widely used in discussions of technology assessment, one 
example of which is Decker's analysis of ‘rational technology assessment.’116  He is 
less well-known in the context of pTA. However, Hennen’s recent work is an instance 
of usefully synthesising Habermasian theories,117 while Genus and Coles use both 
Habermas and Foucault in discussing CTA.118  
Reference is also made to Habermas’s ideas in the work of Chambers on rural 
participation,119 and in business ethics related to organisational communication and 
change.120 Habermas appears in the work of Godin et al on forensic health care,121 in 
Jacobson’s study of the public communication of social change in Nepal,122 and in 
Santos et al on how Army Restoration Advisory Boards facilitate Habermas's idealised 
conditions of speech as related to fairness.’123   
Habermas has been popular in China since the 1980s, with the first book-length 
translation of his work appearing in 1989. His notion of the public sphere (gonggon 
lingyu, in Chinese) has proven particularly popular with Chinese intellectuals writing on 
deliberative democracy.124 
 
How does Habermas's work add value to the idea of pTA? 
                                                
115 M. Warren, ‘Can participatory democracy produce better selves? Psychological dimensions 
of Habermas' discursive model of democracy’, Political Psychology 14.2 (June 1993), 209-234 
(p. 209). 
116 Michael Decker, Interdisciplinarity in Technology Assessment: Implementation and its 
Chances and Limits (Springer, 2002). 
117  Leo Hennen, ‘Why do we still need participatory technology assessment?’, Poesis Prax 9 
(2012), 27-41. I did not know about this article when commencing the thesis – although I did 
meet Leo Hennen and heard him speak on TA at a GEST workshop in Beijing in November 
2011. 
118 Audley Genus, Anne-marie Coles, ‘On Constructive technology Assessment and Limitations 
on Public Participation in Technology Assessment’, Technology Assessment and Strategic 
Management 17.4 (2005), 433-443. 
119  Robert Chambers, ‘Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Analysis of Experience’, World 
Development 22.9 (1994), 1253-1268. 
120 Jason Stansbury, ‘Reasoned Moral Agreement: Applying Discourse Ethics within 
Organizations’, Business Ethics Quarterly 19.1 (January 2009), 33-56.  
121  P. Godin, J. Davies, B.  Heyman, L.  Reynolds, A.  Simpson, M. Floyd, ‘Opening 
communicative space: A Habermasian understanding of a user-led participatory research 
project’, Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 18.4 (December 2007), 452-469. 
122 T. Jacobson, J.  Storey, ‘Development communication and participation: Applying Habermas 
to a case study of population programs in Nepal’, Communication Theory 14.2 (May 2004), 99-
121. 
123  S. Santos, C.  Chess, ‘Evaluating Citizen Advisory Boards: The Importance of Theory and 
Participant-Based Criteria and Practical Implications’, Risk Analysis: An International Journal 
23.2 (2003), 269-279. 
124 Gloria Davies, ‘Habermas in China: Theory as catalyst’, The China Journal 57 (January, 
2007), 61-85 (p.63. 
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4.5.1 The logistics of a pTA event 
We may begin to answer this question by isolating the components and issues that a 
pTA/discourse event involves. This section, while chiefly describing and providing 
information about pTA, will also contain more discussion of the idea of education as a 
significant outcome of the pTA process.  
 
The UK government has stated that ‘properly targeted and sufficiently resourced public 
dialogue will be crucial in securing a future for nanotechnologies.’125  Yet achieving this 
is not necessarily easy. Thus the Nanotech Engagement Group (NEG) in the UK, 
(working with the Nanoscience centre at Cambridge University and the Policy Studies 
Institute at East Anglia University), published a 2007 report on public engagement or, 
as the title of the report had it,  ‘democratic technologies’, commenting on several of 
the above-listed initiatives. The seminal NEG report studied six UK upstream projects, 
identifying challenges such as: 
• Creation of meaningful connections between public engagement and 
institutional decision-making; 
• Lack of understanding and appreciation in decision-making institutions and 
science communities of the different impacts and benefits that public 
engagement can deliver; 
• Lack of capacity and interest in public engagement within decision-making 
institutions and science communities; and 
• A need to better distribute the benefits and impacts of public engagement.126 
 
Diagram 1: pTA issues and components 
The pTA/discourse event has the following issues and questions: 
 
 
                                                
125 Response to the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering Report: ‘Nanoscience 
and Nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties’ (London: HM Government, 2005), para. 
80. 
126 Gavelin, Wilson, Doubleday, NEG Report, ibid,  p. x. 
Topics for the debate: 
 
Issue 1: Agenda setting and 
question framing 
Who has the power to set the 
agenda and frame the debate?? 
Methodology: 
 
Issue 2: Rational debate 
Who is included? What level of 
education is required?  
Outcomes: 
 
Issue 3: How is the 
information/how are decisions 
disseminated? 
What is the effect on policy? 
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4.5.2 Power and pluralism 
The diagram above, as can be seen from the right-hand column, suggests that the 
issue of power underlies the discourse/pTA event. ‘Power’ is here understood in the 
sense that the event is powerful if it has a democratic effect on policy. We are led to 
ask: (a) does the inclusion of the layperson really have an effect on governmental 
action, and (b) is the exercise directed by government, scientists or institutions who 
have a predetermined agenda? In other words, who has the power to achieve positive 
action?  
 Point (a) has already been discussed. However, we can now refer to Habermas 
to see if he might add anything to this point. Habermas’s notion of power includes both 
the negative idea of coercion from above and the positive idea of communicative power 
from below. His solution to the charge of ineffectiveness levelled against discourse 
ethics is that it needs to be complimented by a theory of socialization that accounts for 
its institutionalization: 
With discourse ethics as a guiding thread, we can indeed develop the formal idea 
of a society in which all potentially important decision-making processes are 
linked to institutionalized forms of discursive will-formation.127 
 
 
Habermas reinforces the pTA model by reminding us that deliberative democracy has a 
legitimizing function.   
Responding to point (b), there is the issue of institutional location as well as that 
of audience, that is, we need to be cautious about such initiatives being firmly located 
in civil service departments, although government agencies and corporations might 
also be defined as ‘locationally biased.’128  In other words, ownership – particularly 
funding – of the initiative or dialogue group requires scrutiny.  This relates, in particular, 
to those conducting the meeting, for whom it is crucial that no claims of bias, 
disrespect, or confrontational approach can be made. For the pTA/discourse process to 
be an exercise in deliberative democracy, the ownership of the information, even the 
questions, needs to be plural, arising both from the debate as well as being suggested 
to the debaters by the institutional or owning body. The criticism has been made that 
both pTA and discourse ethics reinforce the influence of the powerful, who are able to 
marshal more information and better-formed arguments than their less-informed, less- 
                                                
127 Jürgen Habermas, ‘A Reply to my Critics’, in J. B. Thompson, D. Held (eds.) Habermas: 
Critical Debates (MIT Press, 1982) p.262, p. 3. 
128 See  Herbert Gottweis on the distribution of governance across both State and non-State 
actors and the creation of new spaces of  participatory governance, ‘Participation and the New 
Governance of Life’, BioSocieties 3 (2000), 265-286 (p.282).  
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articulate, and less-credible opposition. According to Habermas, the model requires 
openness and neutrality in the strictly defined sense of a free discourse without 
coercion. Only then can voices be heard fully and pluralistically. 
Habermas suggests that the process of debate should aspire towards an ‘ideal speech 
situation’, in which everyone has equal rights and may question any assertion.  
Participants must come as close as possible to an ideal in which: 
• all voices in any way relevant get a hearing;  
• the best arguments available to us, given our present state of knowledge, are 
brought to bear; and  
• only the unforced force of the better argument determines the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
responses of the participants.129  
 
 
Ideally, no one capable of making a relevant contribution during the discourse process 
will have been excluded; participants will have an equal voice, and be free to speak 
honestly in a free forum (i.e. one where no coercion is at work). Participants will 
recognise each other as having equal rights, will not lie, will not avoid critical 
understanding.  As equal agents, inclusivity means equal and sincere inclusivity for 
them.  
Discourse must take place in a forum containing many and varied 
representative viewpoints, so that discourse may be both pluralistic and dialogic.  Thus 
participants are encouraged to see the world from another’s perspective and ‘come to 
an understanding rather than merely a bargain.’130  Habermas’s model gives us 
reasons for why diversity is important, if a properly pluralistic and non-exclusionary 
debate is to take place rather than one in which the outcomes are already determined 
due to the homogenous nature of the invitees.131   
Such pluralism also needs to have an impact on the decision-making outcomes. 
Irwin notes, in reference to the Public Consultation on Developments in the  
 
                                                
129 Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics (trans. Ciaran 
Cronin) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), p. 163. 
130  Mingers & Walsham, ‘Toward Ethical Information Systems’, ibid, p. 845. 
131 Habermas has been criticized for not fully appreciating issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and 
sexuality, or for understanding the pressures of historical contingency or other outside 
pressures that might introduce elements of coercion. N. Fraser, ‘What’s Critical About Critical 
Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender’, in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds.), 
Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 31-56; M.P. 
Ryan, ‘Gender and Public Access: Women’s Politics in Nineteenth-Century America’,  in Craig 
Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1992),  259-
288. 
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Biosciences held in the U in the1990s, that it was really a government exercise, not a  
real consultation (it was instigated by the UK Department of trade and Industry, and 
conducted by Market and Opinion Research International Plc).  He asks 'What 
happens when public opinion is opposed to government policy?'132   
A possible lack of clarity on hidden agendas like corporate influence also needs 
to be considered.  
As the Dutch report on nanodialogues suggested, the framing of questions can 
be useful, particularly so as to differentiate between the risk issue and its social 
impact.133 Clear questions suggest clear objectives that ensure public engagement 
stays focused and expectations are managed. Flexibility will also be required though, 
as the process may lead to a redefinition of desired outputs. However, such flexibility 
can be subsumed within a single goal. In effect, the overall agenda will need to be set 
prior to directing the event, but can be modified consensually through discourse.  
 
 
4.5.3 Education? 
With TA, the consensus of citizens relies on comprehending the issues, meaning there 
might be a need to look beyond any prevailing ideological framing of the debate. This 
translates the issue of power/agenda into one of representation/education. Or, in other 
words, the number of viewpoints and voices needs to be sufficiently broad and well 
informed to allow for deliberative democracy. 
 The issue therefore might be whether pTA requires too much knowledge from 
its laypersons. Gethmann, looking at the issue of possibly overtaxing citizen 
competence, argues that this competence is not as highly regarded as scientists’ 
expertise;134 however, one does not necessarily have to understand the science of 
nanomedicine to discuss issues of access and equity. pTA is societal rather than 
scientific.  
pTA often implies a process of education, in that citizens, having familiarised 
themselves with a new science or technology, may contribute to an ongoing process of 
further participation. The dialogue between experts and laypersons in pTA leads to a 
mutual exchange of perceptions, as well as knowledge. The scientist’s view that a 
shiny new technology is wonderful may encounter a layperson’s view that such a shiny  
 
                                                
132  Irwin, ‘Constructing the scientific citizen’, ibid, p. 3. 
133  Hanssen, Walhout, van Est, Ten lessons, ibid, p. 72. 
134 Carl Friedrich Gethmann, ‘Participatory technology assessment: some critical questions’, 
Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science  1.2 
(2002), 151-159.  
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toy does not add value to life, and in fact s/he would rather do without it. After all, it is 
not only the public whose voice needs to be heard, but also the scientist or TA 
practitioner, who needs to assume the role of the public intellectual – they ‘go public’ 
and consider wider issues than just those of the effects of technology, looking at 
ownership, control, and social ends. Experts need to be prepared to listen to the public 
instead of regarding their role as that of making decisions on behalf of the public.135   
This idea falls within the field of ‘translational ethics.’  As much as ‘translational 
research attempts to connect the laboratory scientist’s work to its implications for 
patient care, translational ethics focuses on bringing ethical scholarship into the sphere 
of personal and public action.’136  Schroeder, in a draft paper at the Beijing GEST forum 
in November 2012, suggests summarising this concept as requiring: 
Ethical research that is compatible with knowledge generated in other disciplines;  
broad dissemination of results beyond one's own discipline; and  
joining or leading attempts to implement results in the real world. 
 
Schroeder’s model implies translation across disciplines as well as translation from the 
abstract to the practical. Yet ‘translational’ can also imply the translation not only of 
idea into reality, but of translation across cultures. Farroni implies that there is 
movement beyond a compliance-based practice of ethics, intended  to ‘deepen the 
awareness and commitment to others' perspectives and values, respectful interactions, 
reflective problem-solving, and trust-building within, and between groups that engage 
in, as well as stand to benefit from translational research’:  
Emerging from this model is the notion of translational ethics which requires a 
shifting of perspective and a realignment with the values and expectations of 
those who participate in research endeavors . . . the mere application of formal 
rules, codes, regulatory procedures, and ethical principles undermines and even 
ignores the moral content of the practice of translational science . . .  a 
multidisciplinary, team-based approach in which ethical values and norms are 
generated, experienced and shared through relationships, dialogue, reflection, 
and support . . . seeks to broaden the ethical competence of translational 
scientists, deepen understanding of the subjective experiences of research 
participants, and enlarge the capacity and sustainability of trust within research 
institutions and the communities they serve.137 
 
 
                                                
135  Royal Society Report: Science Communication: Excellence in Science (London: Royal 
Society, 2006), p. 9, at 
<http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/Influencing_Policy/Themes_and_
Projects/Themes/Governance/Final_Report_-_on_website_-
_and_amended_by_SK_no_navigation.pdf>. 
136 Alan Cribb, ‘Translational ethics? The theory-practice gap in medical ethics’,  Journal of 
Medical Ethics  36 (2010),  207-210.  
137  Jeffrey S. Farroni, Michele A. Carter, ‘Translational Ethics: An Engaged Humanities 
Approach’, presentation paper at the Association for Clinical Research Training Conference 
(Washington,  April 18-20, 2012).	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Participants need to be open about their reasons for engagement, and their 
expectations. Clarity of roles is significant as this makes it more likely that the process 
will achieve its objectives.138 In addition, the question, ‘what is in this for participants?’ 
needs to be answered.  As scientists often receive little incentive to engage with public 
dialogues, they may need support to discuss this with their affiliated institutions.  
 The task of the discourse/dialogue is to see what views can be ‘universalised’ 
and then ‘consensualised.’  In short, the education issue is not vital, as long as power 
relationships within the discourse/pTA event are neutralized – it should not be assumed 
that experts are in charge, ‘that public knowledges are given the same status as 
scientific understandings’ and that ‘informative (or information giving) and consultative 
(or information gathering) dimensions of participation’ are balanced.139 
Decision-makers should ideally be involved in (invested in) the process early 
on. They should also commit, at the very least, to responding formally to its findings 
and recommendations. The involvement of policymakers would assist other 
participants to understand what is in fact feasible, just as policymakers could learn from 
lay opinion, and from scientists about the complexities of governing science related to 
emerging technologies.  
However, their presence can arguably distort the equality of the process and so 
their role needs to be limited in terms of its input. 
A final issue concerns how the findings are to be disseminated, so as to 
increase both public awareness and the level of public engagement itself, while 
ensuring that any procedural mistakes are not replicated in future processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
138 NEG report, ibid,  p. 143. 
139 Irwin, ‘Constructing the scientific citizen’, ibid,  p. 4. 
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Diagram 2: Further issues to be considered when setting up a pTA/discourse 
forum 
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4.5. 4 Other logistical issues – size, timeline, and methodology 
A further issue in setting up pTA discussions is that of the size of the group. The NEG 
report refers to experiments in public engagement ranging from small focus groups of, 
for example, 13 people, to much wider online participation. Whereas it is claimed that 
the interactive small group process allows for a depth of discussion often lost in large-
scale public engagement, it nevertheless fulfils one objective in breaking down barriers, 
allowing people to interact on a more familiar basis. However, it carries the overriding 
problem of lacking a broad reach.  
One country that has considerable nanotechnology stakeholder involvement 
has been Australia, yet the extent of the inclusion measured by group size has been 
small.140 On 13 May 2009 the Australian Government announced a four-year National 
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  Craig Cormick, ‘The Challenges of Community Engagement’, NanoEthics 4 (2010), 229-31. 
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Enabling Technologies Strategy (NETS) to provide a framework for the responsible 
development of enabling technologies such as nanotechnology. One key part of the 
strategy was the Enabling Technologies Public Awareness and Community 
Engagement (PACE) program that ‘seeks to increase the public's awareness, 
knowledge and understanding of enabling technologies, including the risks and the 
benefits, to enable a more informed public debate.’141   
From 2007-10 a number of events ranging from community presentations and 
educational events, to more substantive fora were organised.142 Of the seven ‘major’ 
events, four were aimed at a better understanding and inclusion of public views and 
concerns.  The forum on water involved only eight participants, however, and the one 
on bionics, nine. (The reports of the fora did not include any meta-analysis of the 
process itself, focusing more on the positive engagement of participants).143 
In terms of timelines, public fora have ranged from one-off occasions to two-
year processes, including review meetings – the Nanoplat program is an example that 
introduced semi-directed online debates in order to review progress and evolve the 
debate.  
A further issue is that of methodology. The question of how one organizes the 
pTA process does not necessarily have a simple answer:144 
. . . public participation and deliberative processes actually do not follow a given 
format. Rather, different forms of deliberative processes are used, from two hour 
card games on nanotechnologies to single evening events, focus group 
discussions of three hours’ length, and processes running over half a year with 
three weekends for face to face contact and additional interaction in between  
 
 
these meetings. Accordingly, there are  a variety of tools employed to stimulate 
interaction between participants, such as working groups, public hearings, 
plenary discussions, presentation plus question and answer sessions, scenario 
techniques, and card games.145 
 
 
                                                
141 See <http://www.innovation.gov.au/industry/nanotechnology/Pages/default.aspx>. 
142  See 
<http://www.innovation.gov.au/Industry/Nanotechnology/PublicAwarenessandEngagement/Pag
es/CommunityEvents/aspx>. 
143 Kyle, Dodds, ‘Avoiding empty rhetoric’, ibid, p. 92;  K Lyons, J. Whelan, ‘Community 
engagement to facilitate, legitimize and accelerate the advancement of nanotechnologies in 
Australia’, NanoEthics 4.1 (2010) 53-66; A. Delgado, K.L. Kjolberg, F. Wickson, ‘Public 
engagement coming of age: From theory to practice in STs encounters with nanotechnology’, 
Public Understanding of Science  20.6 (2011), 826-845. M. Kearnes, B. Wynnes, ‘On 
nanotechnology and ambivalence: The politics of enthusiasm’,  NanoEthics 1.2 (2007), 131-42. 
144 Thomas Kilkauer suggests 10 rules for setting up what he terms an ‘ethics council’ for 
corporations (Critical Management Ethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 200f. 
These include inclusivity, communicative rationality, rules, the significance of time, place, and 
layouts, moderators,  and forms of agreement.  
145 Stø, Scholl, Jègou,  Strandbakken, The Future of Deliberative Processes, ibid, p. 66. 
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Methodology varies in trialled pTA fora, ranging from traditional meetings in which 
participants sit around a table, to online methods. Considering the latter, the idea of 
groups that work on various topics and interact in person may be hard to ignore in 
terms of the benefits of direct personal contact for breaking down knowledge and 
cultural barriers. However, online tools can have a wider engagement utility; one 
instance was that of online gaming used in Citizen Science, a Bristol program aimed at 
engaging young people in discussions about the role of science and technology in 
society. The Democs conversation game is a similar idea, allowing participants to work 
through pre-developed policy decisions, or to formulate one of their own.  
  
In conclusion, the above issues suggest that the task of setting up an ideal 
pTA/discourse event is complex, involving issues of representation, logistics, requiring 
interlocutors to be capable of rational compromise, and a democratic and inclusive 
process that will ideally affect or effect policy. The following questions can be 
extrapolated from reading Habermas’s views on discourse along with those of 
commentators on pTA, and may hopefully serve as a useful checklist when setting up a 
pTA/discourse event: 
 
1. What NELSI questions, apart from risk, have been framed for the discussion? 
2. What are the desired outcomes of the process? 
3. Who should be recruited for the process to ensure sufficiently diverse and 
minority-based viewpoints? 
4. Who is excluded, and why? 
5. How can certain social sectors be encouraged to participate, so as to avoid self-
selection as the only criterion? 
6. What logistical support is needed for the process? (Including budget 
requirements) 
7. Are there any hidden agendas? 
8. How might participants best be prepared?  
9. What is the optimal group size?   
10. What methods, other than face-to-face discussion, are effective? 
11. What is the most effective timescale? How many project phases are there? 
12. Who conducts the process? 
13. Who evaluates the process?  
14. Who will be influenced by translating debate into policy? 
15. What dissemination of information will result?  What channels will be used for 
broad dissemination? 
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So much for general logistical issues. While the above offers a practical do-it-yourself 
guide to setting up your own nanoforum or nanodialogue, it has not, as yet, taken into 
account how or why this would be a useful method for global engagement. This 
requires us to look at the role of the agent in discourse. 
 
It can be argued that the difficulty of achieving effective pTA lies in how dialogic the 
actual pTA/discourse forum is, in the sense of how external pressures (those of 
ownership, agenda setting, issues of power, etc.) and internal pressures (wishing one’s 
voice to be heard), interrelate. If the process were truly Habermasian and dialogic, then 
it would be an equal one. Thus the ‘trick’ of pTA is to ensure that the forum mode 
becomes dialogic, with participants able to affect changes to the conditions set up for 
them. How they accomplish this brings us to a discussion of the 
interlocutors/participants in the pTA process in the following Chapter.  
But there is a further aspect of duality. This other Habermasian facet of pTA is 
the duality of the agent, specifically, of his/her dual identity.  
To introduce this concept, we might look broadly and briefly at the idea of global 
dialogue. 
The award committee for the Global Dialogue Prize in 2009 nominated both 
Daryush Shayegan and Mohammad Khatami as joint winners for their work in 
developing and promoting the concept of a ‘dialogue among cultures and civilizations’ 
as a new paradigm for international relations that includes cultural subjectivity, i.e. that 
operates as a pluralist model that does not ignore cultural relativism.146  
Khatami transposed the ideas of Daryush Shayegan (Director of the Iranian 
Centre for the Study of Civilizations, 1976-1979), particularly his notion of intercultural 
contact as bound to modify the ideas and values in any of the participating cultural  
systems. Shayegan’s  dialogue paradigm promotes active listening, and adopts some 
features of the virtue ethics framework. Arguing that politics should be tied closely to 
ethics, he advocates moral virtues and psychological dispositions such as modesty, 
commitment, and involvement, as well as sympathy and affection, in a ‘genuine effort 
to understand others without the desire to vanquish them’. Khatami adopts what seems 
rather a Habermasian idea of dialogue, involving a rational reconsideration of faith, and 
                                                
146 See <http://www.globaldialogueprize.org/page.php?idMenu=5&idSub=1&idMain=64>. 
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arguing that the latter should be open to change, referring to ‘the rational maturity of 
human beings’.147 
Khatami was instrumental in promoting the UN 2001 ‘Year of the Dialogue 
Amongst Civilisations’, the report of which was published as Crossing the Divide: 
Dialogue among Civilizations, and the Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations. 
Speaking at a Symposium on the Dialogue of Civilisations in 2000, Khatami offered the 
following definition of dialogue: 
Dialogue entails a clear and precise understanding of the world’s cultural 
geography. It means taking a critical look at the “self” and the “other”. It means 
paying attention to heritage as well as being serious about learning new 
experiences. Dialogue concerns humanity’s needs today and tomorrow. 
Therefore, opening a new door towards understanding global realities, and 
finding new viewpoints in the East and West, are prerequisites of real dialogue 
between civilisations and cultures. The basic question is, How can one find a 
common landscape to view, a common message to hear and a common 
language to speak? It is not possible to engage in dialogue with deaf ears and an 
unfamiliar language. One must enter dialogue on the basis of Eastern and 
Western values . . . Westerner and Easterner can remain different and 
complementary in the parallel realms of cultures and maintain their emotional 
affiliation to their origins.148 
  
 
The above suggests that international dialogue rests on notions of self and other, i.e. 
on a duality of culturally learned values as well as receptivity to the values, thoughts 
and feelings of the other. Shayegan suggested this in his acceptance speech for the 
Global Dialogue Prize: 
we live in a fragmented world of broken ontologies, a world in which the concept 
of interconnectiveness has been substituted for the old metaphysical foundations. 
And this interconnectiveness manifests itself at all levels of culture, knowledge 
and science: multiculturalism, plural identities, World Wide Web, holistic science. 
We live in a world of hybrid cultures where all levels of consciousness overlap  
each other. If assumed with lucidity and without resentment this new mosaic 
configuration can enrich us, extending the registers of knowledge, enlarging the 
range of feelings.149 
  
 
                                                
147 Mahommed Khatami,  ‘Dialogue and the New  Millennium’, address  to the annual session of 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), on 29 October 
1999, at <http://en.rafed.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9557:dialogue-
and-the-new-millennium&catid=81:miscellaneous&Itemid=846>. 
148 Mohammad Khatami, Josef Van Ess, Hans Kung, ‘Symposium: Islam, Iran and the Dialogue 
of Civilisations’, Global Dialogue  3.1 (Winter 2001), at 
<http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=125>. 
149 Daryush Sheyagan, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations’, acceptance speech, at 
<http://www.globaldialogueprize.org/page.php?idMenu=1&idSub=1&idMain=74>. 
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Educating themselves in the ways of the other, in strange ontologies, agents have to 
adopt a ’dual self’, a key concept for the remainder of this thesis. The argument is that 
the global agent is a virtuous citizen who can adopt a dual identity that will allow 
consensus. Habermas’s interlocutor or agent must be capable of reason, and be 
capable of achieving some form of cultural compromise that might allow for 
universalisable or reconciled ideas. Participants accept good arguments self-
critically.150   
Does such a paragon exist?  One might add, briefly, that Habermas’s views are 
not as utopian as is often claimed.  Discourse consensus will be based on an evolving 
compromise (e.g. a majority vote). Decisions remain open to further improvements that 
make the discursive process dynamic, for ‘provisionally justified views might have to be 
revised in the light of new information and arguments.’151  
These topics will be discussed in the following two Chapters.  
 
In conclusion, one can summarise that Habermas’s model requires rational and 
polyphonic agency within dialogue.  In terms of dialogue, the interlocutor attempts 
mediation between his/her own motives, needs and virtues, and the procedural 
requirements of the discourse, adapting his or her views according to the procedural 
imperative. This requires self-awareness or ‘emancipatory knowledge’, as well as an 
intersubjective approach to ethics.  
The latter is the basis for the theory of ‘dual identity’ on which this thesis 
predicates the feasibility of global ethics.  This requires a discussion of identity in terms 
of the agent, as will be seen in the next Chapter. 
 
                                                
150  Dietrich Bohler, ‘Transcendental Pragmatics and Critical Morality’, in   S. Benhabib & R. M. 
Dallmyr (eds.), The Communicative Ethics Controversy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 
111-150 (p. 136). 
151 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, ibid, p. 178. 
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Chapter Five: The virtuous discourse agent 
 
All virtue is summed up in dealing justly.1 
 
On the whole, human beings want to be good, but not too good, and not quite 
all the time.2 
 
Each must be able to recognise him- or herself in all that wears a human 
face.3 
 
 
Consequentialism and deontology are less useful approaches to take to pTA than 
virtue ethics.4  Significant activity or agency is the key to this model of discourse 
ethics/pTA.  
Williams and MacIntyre have suggested that the theories of consequentialism 
and deontology impose a universalist framework, ignoring the role of personal 
commitment, as well as that of localized community values, or reciprocity; thus 
Whetstone‘s argument that virtue ethics is required.5  Kirchengast suggests that 
virtue ethics is particularly useful for global ethics: 
Virtue ethics has much to offer . . . because with its naturalistic idea of 
humans as rational beings whose natural way of life is communal, it might be 
of more appeal to proponents of other cultures than, for example, a moral 
theory grounded on an overly individualistic notion of humanity.  Saying that 
‘virtue ethics might have more appeal’ to members of non-Western cultures… 
(suggests) that its method . . . is one that is open to proposals differing from  
 
 
                                                
1  Aristotle, quoted in J. Thomson (ed./trans.) The Ethics of Aristotle (London: George Allen, 
1953), p. 122.  
2 George Orwell, in George Orwell, Keith Gessen, All Art is Propaganda. Critical Essays 
(London: Houghton Miflin Harcourt, 2008). 
3  Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays (trans W.M. 
Hohengarten) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), p. 15.  
4 The arguments usually leveled against virtue ethics as an approach are, broadly speaking, 
that it is (a) too subjectively self-absorbed and too narrow, concepts such as global justice 
not being well developed within the theory; (b) lacking normative principles, and (c) impotent.  
See Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1999); Gilbert C. Meilaender, The 
Theory and Practice of Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Working 
Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, ed. Rebecca L. Walker, P.J. 
Ivanhoe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). The ‘justification problem’ in virtue ethics 
(of how we justify or agree on which traits are virtues), may need to be supplemented by 
other ideas such as coherentism or ethical naturalism; the ‘yardstick’ of ‘flourishing’ used in 
virtue ethics is seen as inadequate – see Sarah Conley, ‘Flourishing and the Failure of the 
Ethics of Virtue’, Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 13.1 (1988), 83-96. 
5 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), pp. 28-9; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A study in moral theory 
(Duckworth, 1981). Also, J. Thomas Whetstone, ‘How Virtue Fits within Business Ethics’, 
Journal of Business Ethics 33.2 (2001), 101-114. 
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traditions other than Western philosophical positions... Virtue ethics’ . . . 
strength lies, among other things, in its conviction that all human beings share 
the same basic nature and accordingly have the same basic needs, so that a 
common set of values is in principle possible.6 
 
 
While agents of discourse are required to discuss the consequences of new 
technology, and to examine the morality of the technological activity, the main aim 
for such agents is to achieve rational dialogue.  To do this, they need to possess 
those virtues that impel them to fully enter into intersubjective dialogue.  
Virtue ethics is associated most closely in the West with Aristotle, whose 
theory of potentiality implies that all matter in the universe, people included, is 
driven towards perfectibility or, rather, towards the fulfilment of that potential.  This is 
both the path and the goal of the person living the truly virtuous, happy life. How 
does Habermas ‘update’ the theory of the virtuous human, so that the participant in 
discourse ethics might enter dialogue with the ‘right attitudes’?  And how universal 
might these virtues be?  
Habermas has never explicated his concept of virtue, and indeed often 
criticises the concept, believing that it plays down the importance of individual 
qualities, and presupposes a shared conception of the good life.7  Since 
Habermasian discourse eschews hegemonic bias, any shared preconception should 
be avoided in favour of neutral, practical procedures.  Habermas is far less 
concerned with – in fact, abhors –  telling his readers how to achieve the good life, 
than with establishing conditions for practical dialogue and debate.  Aristotle’s telos 
of virtue – the ‘good’ towards which humanity strives – is based around the notion of 
eudaemonia, the prosperous, noble and virtuous happiness of the Athenian 
gentleman. The Habermasian telos is that consensual aim of communication: 
For Habermas, this telos is the end of coercion and the attainment of 
autonomy through reason, the end of alienation through a consensual 
harmony of interests, and the end of injustice and poverty through the rational 
administration of justice.8   
 
 
 
                                                
6 Ulrike Kirchengast, ’Solomon on the Role of Virtue Ethics in Business’, in C. Dierksmeier, 
W. Amann, E.von Kimakowitz, H.Spitzek, M.Pirson (eds.) Humanistic Ethics in the Age of 
Globality  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2011), 187-209 (p. 205). 
7  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, ibid, p. 277. 
8 Jane Braaten, Habermas's Critical Theory of Society (New York: SUNY Press, 1991), p. 
116.  
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Communicative action is an inherently consensual form of social coordination, in 
which actors mobilize the potential for rationality given by ordinary language and its 
telos of rationally motivated agreement.  Although it attempts to externalize virtue 
into procedures as much as possible, discourse ethics presupposes that the 
participants possess a virtuous attitude – why else would they wish to engage in 
discourse?  Habermas’s system is a procedural ethics not linked to any substantive 
values, but one that nonetheless implies certain virtues, demonstrated through 
discourse skills, on the part of the discourse agent. 
Perhaps agents enter discourse for the purely egoistic reason of 
demonstrating their rational skills at interlocution, though that would be a fairly 
empty exercise. Like Aristotle’s Athenian gentleman, Habermas’s discourse agent 
must be civic-minded and committed to the ‘greater good’ of a rational discourse 
process.  In identifying moral behaviour with discourse, Habermas implies a 
universal or perhaps primary virtue – that of willingness to communicate rationally 
with the intent to reach agreement. However, Habermas does not call this a virtue 
so much as a ‘species ethic.’  
 
5.1	  The	  species	  ethic	  as	  universal?	  
 
Speech is the mirror of the soul; as a man speaks, so he is.9 
 
To be human entails having the great (universalist) desire to communicate one’s 
views to another human being (whether opposing or not).  Habermas’s view of what 
it is to be human suggests that an essential part of the definition requires us to be 
members of a moral, language-based community.10  
In his The Future of Human Nature (2003), Habermas suggests that reason, 
which leads to moral consensus, is sustained by a 'species-ethic’ (‘Gattungsethik’), 
or prior ethical self-understanding of the species shared by all moral persons.   
We can disentangle this thought as follows: whenever agents use language to 
coordinate their actions, they enter into certain commitments to justify their words on 
the basis of good reasons, and so agree to apply reasoning to their words.  These 
commitments are not merely procedural; they also have a moral status, being 
                                                
9  Publius Syrus, maxim 1073, from The Moral Sayings of Publius Syrus, a Roman Slave, at 
<http://www.archive.org/stream/moralsayingspub00lymagoog/moralsayingspub00lymagoog_
djvu.txt>. 
10 The reader will realize that this topic introduces a larger one, favoured by evolutionary 
psychologists, but outside of the limits of this thesis. 
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universally applicable to agents.11  Thus to be human is to be capable of morality 
and to actualize that capability within society, through the intersubjectivity provided 
by being a language-user. The species ethic presupposes that we approach others 
as equals, and that we want to be moral, that is, that we want to live with those 
others in a society that is so constituted as to protect and nourish ours, as well as 
their ethical decisions about our own lives and how we live them.  In other words, 
our social arrangements lead us to prioritize the autonomy or dignity of the 
individual, and therefore to draw limits on the impositions that can be made on 
others.  
Habermas’s idea leads him to approve of Rawls’s view of the 'just society’ as 
one in which individuals choose how it is that they want to 'spend the time they have 
for living’, guaranteeing equal freedom to develop an ‘ethical self-understanding, so 
as to realize a personal conception of the good life according to one’s own abilities 
and choices.’ 12  These ideas, of course, hint at the Western-centric nature of 
Habermasian thought – namely when looking at issues of justice and autonomy, 
beloved by Western commentators, though rather less so by Eastern ones, in that 
they often imply the rights of the individual as paramount.  In a just society, the 
individual may have the autonomy that implies his/her right to justice; but is the right 
of the society as a whole to justice more important than that of the individual?13 
 
With his concept of the species ethic, Habermas makes various assumptions that 
may be neither feasible nor likely to be universal: 
1. The human being is a social animal....   
2. . . . aware of his/her civic duty to participate in public debate, to work 
towards consensus;  and14 
3. willing to work rationally towards consensus, and so to obey the rules of 
discourse;  and 
                                                
11 James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2005), p. 
26.  
12 Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (trans. Hella Beister and William Rehg) 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 2. 
13 Given the nanotechnology focus of this thesis, it is worth noting that in his writings on the 
species ethic, Habermas has a somewhat conservative view of change. Genetic 
enhancements, for example, are described as a form of (albeit positive) eugenics, and so  
should be forbidden, in his view.  
14  Adela Cortina, ‘The Public Task of Applied Ethics: Transnational Civic Ethics’, in A. 
Cortina, D. Garcia-Marquez, J. Connill (eds.)  Public Reason and Applied Ethics. The Ways 
of Practical Reason in a Pluralist Society (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 9-32 (p. 11, p. 27). See 
also in this volume, K-O. Apel, ‘Globalisation and the Need for Universal Ethics’, 135-154. 
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4. sharing a sense of autonomy and justice with others so that s/he enters 
debate ‘equally’ with others – public ‘morality,’ by which Habermas really 
seems to means justice, is based on one’s commitment to such equality.  
 
 
These are all weighty issues. Taking the perhaps idealistic view that the human 
being strives to be moral instead of following his/her own strategic aims, we must 
ask from where comes our belief that others are worth helping or treating with 
care?15  Whence comes our desire to be social animals aware of our civic duty?  
Habermas’s argues that we cannot refuse to participate in society, as this would 
mean that the ‘refuser’ effectively chooses not to recognise her- or himself as a 
member of a community, and is therefore not counted as a member of that 
community. Therefore, we are all inevitably civic-minded, with discourse the default 
method for settling social disputes, unless we choose to live in splendid social 
isolation, communicating with nobody.  Loners might state that they are beyond the 
bounds of the species-ethic; yet misanthropy implies a dislike of humanity which is 
not the same as being utterly ‘other.’  The misanthropic voice is arguably part of the 
human debate, despite its wish to reject it.  
If that sounds slightly dubious in logical terms, then Habermas has another 
answer in terms of a grounded context for one’s subjectivity.  Even if one refuses 
the ur-context or macro-context of the species ethic, one has a background micro-
context relating to one’s family, education and so forth that still renders one ‘human’ 
and thus a social animal. It would be a rare person who was raised by wolves, 
without social or cultural contexts grounded in and explicated through language. 
In addition, Habermas would claim that the moral dimensions of language lie in the 
very act of speaking with another.  Entering discourse not only recognises our civic-
mindedness, it develops it. Our fundamental human interest, as Habermas terms it, 
is in communication; and through developing this interest we recognize and develop 
ourselves. In short, he makes a vital connection between speaking and being a 
social person. The species-ethic should be seen as something that equips us for 
dialogue; if we refuse to be heard by engaging in such dialogue we are failing 
another of Habermas’s tests for being a rational discourse agent, that of self-
awareness, or being human.  
Whether this recognises those who cannot speak – those human beings in 
states of non-communication – or those who choose to communicate purely through 
                                                
15 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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actions, whether of compassion or violence (the silent monk or the silent bomber) is 
moot, and perhaps indicates a flaw in the theory; Habermas sees being human as 
something to be worked at together. Those who kill – and Habermas defines 
terrorism, for example, as an inexcusable act, (i.e. one without legitimate reasons 
that might ‘excuse’ it) – are, by refusing to enter into discourse, in fact refusing to 
admit their humanity.16  Habermas, although he does not state this as such, seems 
to regard political (and presumably religious-political) acts of murder, or terrorism, 
as being without that human motivation that while unable to excuse the act, makes  
it capable of seeming ‘human’, in that it arises out of motives that can be 
understood.  This is perhaps too broad a point, for surely even fanatical reasons can 
be understood. It may point to an idealistic aspect of the species-ethic, specifically 
that we should choose to enter into moral discourse over simply deciding that the 
enemy is only capable of comprehending force, or should be killed rather than 
discoursed with.  
What Habermas might be saying is that to argue for religious, or socio-
political reasons as justifications for murder may fail the validity test, in other words, 
may be illogical (the obvious illogicality being that killing will be equal to salvation) or 
irrational. Habermas might have looked to Dostoevsky for an interesting illustration 
of this point. Can one murder for rational reasons?  An entire Russian historical set 
of assassins predicated this very point; and Dostoevsky’s Raskol’nikov in Crime and 
Punishment, (1866), incarnated the issue of whether one might murder for 
pragmatic and rational reasons based on the redistribution of wealth.  To 
Raskol’nikov as a ‘modern man’ free from emotions and superstitions, capable of 
acting with calm pragmatism to redress what he perceives as social injustice, it is 
something of a shock to discover that his conscience will not allow such a 
‘validation’ of his act, and the sheer horror of the assault overwhelms him. His 
failure to behave rationally is the point of Dostoevsky’s moral debate.  
Habermas is perhaps a little idealistic in arguing that the most human quality 
is that of wishing to enter dialogue, given that different political and religious beliefs 
may lead one to refuse this condition. And if you do not wish to do so, implying that 
you are not fully ‘human’, this contravenes Habermas’s rule that discourse should 
be inclusive. 
 
                                                
16 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida at <http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/066649.html>. 
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The basic impulse in the human being must be to submit his/her thoughts 
and beliefs to reasoned validation; yet what of those who will not even admit the 
usefulness of rationally examining their own as well as others' beliefs?  
 We now move from the comforting universal context where ‘we are all human and 
thus capable of discourse’, to the more problematic area in which relative types of 
awareness and knowledge may or may not prioritise reason. Some cultures place  
greater stress on intuitive or belief-based forms of knowledge (the primacy of 
religion in such countries perhaps offering a sharp indication of their cultural norms).   
The desire to communicate may be the truly universal human trait; however it 
implies that virtues may be more relative.  
	  
5.	  2	  Reason	  as	  a	  universal	  virtue?	  	  
 
What does reason know? Reason only knows what it has succeeded in 
learning (some things, perhaps, it will never learn) ... you tell me again that an 
enlightened and developed man, such, in short, as the future man will be, 
cannot consciously desire anything disadvantageous to himself ..... But I 
repeat for the hundredth time, there is one case, one only, when man may 
consciously, purposely, desire what is injurious to himself, what is stupid, very 
stupid – simply in order to have the right to desire for himself even what is 
very stupid and not to be bound by an obligation to desire only what is 
sensible . . . choice can, of course, if it chooses, be in agreement with 
reason.... But very often, and even most often, choice is utterly and stubbornly 
opposed to reason . . . 17 
 
 
Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse. What is a ‘competent speaker’? Such a person must be  
1. Voiced (able to speak); 
2. be free to say yes or no;  
3. able to open all statements to questioning, modification and confirmation as 
well as to agree which interests make legitimate claims on all and which do 
not (able to overcome egoism); 
4. capable of mutual understanding;  
5. and, most importantly, committed to rationality in discourse.18 
 
                                                
17  Fedor Dostovesky, Notes from Underground (1862) (chapter 8), e-text, at 
<http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccernew2?id=DosNote.sgm&images=images/modeng&dat
a=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=8&division=div2>. 
18  William Rehg, Insight and Solidarity. A Study in the Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 
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Rationality is a tricky notion, given that it implies emotional neutrality – not always a 
prevalent human trait.  Rawls’s famous idea of an objective position ‘from behind 
the veil’, one without bias, for making decisions based on the social and economic 
good, arguably fails for two reasons.  Leaving aside the question of whether the 
original position could be replicated, the assumption that one might automatically 
choose a society that optimizes aggregation, that people would behave in a risk-
averse way, (i.e. ‘concerned to make the worst-off position as good as possible’), to 
maximize the average position, is not proven.19  We are not necessarily going to 
adopt as our good the rational view of what is good for the whole of society. 
 At the core of Habermas’s model is the idea that the agent will be able to act 
in a rational way during dialogue, capable of tempering his/her own prejudices and 
achieving consensus.  Most readers will remember instances when they and others’ 
discussions have been proven irrational, a contest for sheer bloody-minded 
domination, compromise no longer on the agenda.  Habermas’s view of human 
nature, and of the moral development of the human being, may expose a flaw in his 
notion of the probability of virtuous discourse.  However, when Habermas states 
that motives for consensus are complex in derivation, he points to this potential gray 
area in his reasoning, intimating that a norm, or consensus on behaviour is based 
on reasoning but also on ‘force’: 
Normative claims to validity, then, mediate a mutual dependence of language 
and the social world ... gaining acceptance on the part of a norm is encoded in 
a twofold fashion because our motives for recognising normative claims to 
validity are rooted both in convictions and in sanctions, that is, they derive 
from a complex mixture of rational insight and force.20 
 
 
Is a discourse’s agent’s rational ‘virtue’ different from individual motives that may be 
driven by need or desire?  This would seem a rather idealistic view of human 
nature. 
 When he discusses the power of rational language to establish a morally 
significant connection, Habermas not only discusses the reasons that might be 
given for a statement to make others believe it, but also suggests that we must  
                                                
19 In Adam Swift, Political Philosophy, Part 1: Social Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 
pp. 21-49 (pp. 24-5). 
20 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, ibid, p. 62. 
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grasp the motives behind the statement, and the soundness of those motives.21  
The distinction between reason and motive suggests that there is a foundation for 
reason, as indeed we see from the species-ethic that motivates discourse agents 
both to understand the other in as rational a way as they can, while explaining 
themselves rationally.  The ethic is in fact an innate (species) virtue that motivates 
the desire and the need to engage in dialogue.22  Thus Habermas’s species-ethic 
may be expressed in various ways as virtues or motivations behind the action, the 
desire or the need to act in a certain way; for example, as altruism, the wish to 
promote autonomy, or even as love. It may be expressed differently, such as when 
‘love’ may be a broad notion, one influenced by social, cultural and historical 
contexts.  A Habermasian virtue is therefore a broad idea, as we can readily 
appreciate from his dislike of the term.  Although everything must be subject to 
reason, the sources of that ‘everything’ are not necessarily rational. Certainly one’s 
knowledge is often highly influenced by emotion or intuition.  Thus according to 
Habermas, ‘reason’ or ‘rationality’ can be understood in three different ways: 
a) as a procedural notion (i.e. ‘reasoning’) applying to the practice of dialogue 
or discourse, and requiring interlocutors to provide what evidence they can 
to argue their views and beliefs; 
b) as a trait or virtue, implying the interlocutor’s desire to achieve compromise 
by submitting his/her own values and ideas to scrutiny within reasoned 
discourse; 
c) and as a culturally charged context for the interlocuter’s upbringing and 
personality, meaning that reason implies an attitude towards the value of 
rationality – and that this may become a factor that impedes dialogue. 
 
 
Point (a) is not up for debate in Habermas’s view, since discourse requires scrutiny 
through reasoned debate.  However, (a) and (b) relate to how knowledge enters into 
discourse  and to how one might cultivate reason as a potentially universal value. 
 
Dostoevsky, that great student of human nature, had a very ‘Russian’ view of 
human nature as irrational, both positively and negatively so.  Whereas the  
                                                
21 Jürgen Habermas, ‘A Reply’, in Axel Honneth, Hans Joas (eds.) Communicative Action. 
Essays on Jürgen Habermas’ The Theory of Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1991), p. 239. 
22 Leland L. Glenna, ‘Redeeming Labor: Making Explicit the Virtue Theory in Habermas's 
Discourse Ethics’, Critical Sociology 34.6 (2008), 767-786.  
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interpolation of the Russians may seem strange at this point, it is not particularly so 
given the eternal debate amongst Russian scholars as to whether their country 
belongs to the West or the East – that is, whether it is a product of Catherine the 
Great’s enlightenment (given her admiration for all things Diderot) or if it remains 
stubbornly ‘Eastern’, (characterised as chaotic, emotional, and prone to self-
abnegation).  To Dostoevsky, perversity is the salient trait of the human being.  The 
notion of a utopia being ultimately boring to man, so that he will start to ‘stick pins 
into himself’ (as he suggests in his 1862 manifesto to the perverse, the novella 
Notes from the Underground),  does not bode well for rational attempts to construct 
such a utopia. Dostoevsky tests the limits of human nature; he liked his extremes, 
and chose themes through which his protagonists might be forced into extreme 
behaviour. His point was that human beings often tend to act in surprising, not 
rational ways.  
Against such an argument, Habermas’s views seem rather dull and even 
improbable. However, the first point to note when discussing Habermas’s views of 
rationality is that communicative action is tied to reason, which he sees as a 
capacity inherent within language, especially in the form of argumentation.  The 
structures of argumentative speech – which Habermas identifies as the absence of 
coercive force, the mutual search for understanding, and the compelling power of 
the better argument – are what intersubjective rationality uses to make 
communication possible.  Actions undertaken by participants in a process of such 
argumentative communication can be assessed as to their rationality by the extent 
to which they fulfil those criteria.  In short, one does not have to be entirely rational 
to speak rationally.  The need to persuade forces one’s emotions into logical 
structures.  We speak not to rant to ourselves, but to be heard; speech that does not 
imply an interlocutor is the speech of the mad.23  
Speech, as Habermas states, is indeed the social and rational means by 
which we live together.   
 
We may also end up with a form of passionate argument, as per Mackie’s view that 
impartiality is not as effective as a more invested approach to discourse.24  As long 
as what we say is subject to reasoned scrutiny, any emotion behind it may make us 
try harder to make what we say more rational, rather than less.  Annas posits that 
virtue involves a deeply personal commitment to that point of meaning at which 
                                                
23 ‘Talking to oneself’ arguably still implies an interlocutor…. 
24  J.L. Mackie, Problems from Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). 
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one’s life is aimed, that ethical beliefs have to become rooted in one’s emotional life 
before they can be effective.25  
Yet belief is not the same as rational argument, and while Ayer’s claim that 
knowledge is belief that is true and justified sounds attractively simple, the alleged 
lack of recognized methods for settling moral disputes suggests that belief cannot 
be easily ‘justified’.26  And as Nussbaum has noted, evaluation of facts can even be 
a matter of power, self-assertion or utility.27  
 Solomon argues that we need to care to achieve justice;  ‘justice is not an 
ideal state or theory but a matter of personal sensibility, a set of emotions that 
engage us with the world and make us care – as reason alone . . . cannot’.28  
Solomon’s ‘rational Romanticism’, his view that emotions are judgments rather than 
blind or irrational forces, offers a way forward on this issue.29  He argues that 
rationality is the product not only of thought, but ‘also of caring’, that an emotion ‘is a 
system of judgments, through which we constitute ourselves and our world’, for 
. . . emotions constitute the framework (or frameworks) of rationality itself . . . 
together our emotions dictate the context, the character, the culture in which 
some values take priority, serve as ultimate ends, provide the criteria for 
rationality and reasonable behaviour. Our sense of justice . . . [is] a systemic 
totality of emotions, appropriate to our culture and our character, that 
determines not only particular emotions . . . but also the standards and 
expectations according to which those emotions are provoked.30 
 
 
Thus compassion, pity and sympathy are not just ‘feelings’, ‘they are also 
engagements in the world, instances of involving if not identifying oneself with the 
circumstances and sufferings of other beings’, for ‘compassion and its kindred 
emotions focus our attention on the world, on the person or creature who is 
suffering.'31  
 
 
                                                
25 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: OUP, 1993), p. 27f. 
26 Robin Attfield, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), p. 197. 
27 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian 
Essentialism’, Political Theory 20.2 (1992), at 
<http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/20/2/202.short>.  
28 Robert C. Solomon, A Passion for Justice. Emotions and the Origins of the Social 
Contract (London: Rowman & Littlefield 1995), p. 197. 
29 Robert C .Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Indianapolis: 
Hackett,1993), p. 15; and  Robert C. Solomon, The Joy of Philosophy. Thinking Thin versus 
the Passionate Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 19. 
30 Robert C. Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave. Emotions and Choice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), pp. 55, 85, 97. 
31 Solomon, Justice, ibid, p. 231. 
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Habermas tackles the issue of the invested participant by reminding us of human 
fallibility:  
i. he suggests that emotion does have a part to play in the participant’s 
involvement;  
ii. and he puts forward a different way of looking at the participant’s 
self-view, or identity.  
 
 
On (i) above, Slote argued in the 1980s for ‘dependent’ virtues, those attaining full 
status as desirable traits when ‘accompanied by’ (i.e. dependent on) other ‘desirable 
traits.’32  What we are looking for, it seems, is a harmonious collection of 
interdependent virtues, one that moreover acknowledges limitation or imperfection. 
To this end, Christine Swanton offers a view that a virtue is a ‘disposition to respond 
to or acknowledge...in an excellent or good enough way.’33  ‘Good enough’ is a 
usefully practical amendment of the idealised notion of the altruist.  (And conforms 
to Aristotle’s claim that the subject matter of ethics does not allow for a high degree 
of exactness, that we ‘must be content to draw conclusions that are true only for the 
most part.'34) 
Habermas’s critics have pointed out that his theories are too abstract, and so 
do not altogether explain how one might produce valid moral judgments; to which 
Habermas has replied by noting the element of fallibility in judgments, so that they 
can only ever be provisional.35  
Another way of looking at the notion of fallibility involves noting the shift 
away from the theory of the Ideal Observer (an impartial, omniscient, ideal judge of 
morality), one who unfortunately presents us with ‘unattainable, unknowable 
standards.’36  The virtuous discourse agent may even be a form of Ideal Observer, a 
‘knowledgeable, impartial, and consistent person.’37   
                                                
32 Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 62. 
33 Christine Swanton, ‘Role Ethics and Business Ethics’, in Working Virtue, ibid,  p. 209. 
34 Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘What does the Aristotelian phronimos know?’, in Lawrence Jost, 
Julian Wuerth (eds.) Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 38-57 (p. 50). 
35 Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application, ibid, p. 39. 
36 Jason Kawall, ‘On the Moral Epistemology of Ideal Observer theories’, Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 9.3 (2006), 359–374 (p. 361). 
37  Richard Brandt, ’The Definition of an “Ideal Observer” Theory in Ethics’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 15 (1955), 407–413. 
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Korsgaard argues that emotions are important to the Ideal Observer.  She 
interprets Aristotle as suggesting that emotions contribute to rational activity, that 
emotions are ’a kind of perception of the good’.38 
The Ideal Observer is less neutral and rational than usually thought. 
Swanton argues for a replacement of ‘virtue agent as oracle’ (the Ideal Observer 
approach) with a ‘virtue-ethical species of dialogic ethics’, for ‘the aim of an agent in 
attempting to solve a problem is to integrate the various constraints on its solution’ 
with the aim of maintaining an overall ‘rightness’ to the (modified) solution.39  The 
Ideal Observer is a theoretical device, not a practical reality, however,40 it is often 
replaced by the wise ‘expert’, both knowledgeable and skilled at gaining information 
in situations ’where human interests and perceptions are paramount.’41  This expert 
is endowed with ‘appropriate emotional sensibilities and context-sensitive practical 
wisdom’.42  The shift from impartiality to ‘emotional sensibility,’ indicates a 
movement toward a relational process (instead of a detached and hierarchical one), 
through which mutual understanding is achieved. Rather than a discourse process 
with one ‘ideal’ expert, the discourse process invites all equally to work towards an 
ideal solution, which is likely however to be tempered by consensus. Rather than 
‘thinking for others’, what is advocated is a process of ‘thinking with others’.43  We 
do not need a wise agent, but wise agents, whose view of self within the discourse 
process is both dualistic and more fluid – a concept discussed further on.  
 
 
In his Republic, Plato lists the four cardinal virtues as wisdom, justice, courage or 
fortitude, and moderation or temperance.44  For Aristotle, temperance was the ability 
to find the mean between a state of excess and one of deficiency, analogous to the 
more modern idea of rational neutrality.  Temperance, or neutral impartiality, 
indicates a continuation of virtue across the centuries, though it is perhaps 
interpreted differently. Does Habermas, like Aristotle, believe that the virtuous man 
should possess a certain ‘courage and persistence’ in working towards that good,  
                                                
38 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency. Essays on Practical Reason and 
Moral Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 17-18. 
39 Swanton, ibid, pp. 248, 254. 
40 Kawall, ibid, pp. 359-74.  
41 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Contexts (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 111. 
42 Swanton, ibid, p. 276. 
43 Walker, ibid, p. 132. 
44 Plato, The Republic, trans. B.Jowett (Project Gutenberg ebook:  2008), book IV. 
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'to overcome the numerous obstacles to an adequate and shared understanding’?45  
In other words, does he argue his point presumably with consistence as well as 
persistence?  
Discourse agents must demonstrate open-mindedness, the ability to 
comprehend other points of view as well as complex information, in line with 
Habermas’s/argument that interlocutors should be open to the validity claims of all 
who are engaged in the dialogue, and may change their beliefs on the strength of 
evidence and publicly acknowledged mistakes – thus they must have the capacity to 
learn.   
Swanton allows for virtues that are dynamic, (i.e. ‘can be improved’), and 
suggests ‘a dialogical method for constructing solutions . . . so problems can be 
identified and addressed’ in a way which allows for a variety of voices or 
perspectives.46  She argues that Habermas puts forward ‘an ideal which enables us 
to evaluate critically the institutional and interpersonal conditions under which what 
is right is currently determined, not a specification of how such judgments should be 
reached in concrete circumstances.’47  Siep sees the process of virtue development 
as fluid, a process of continual renewal and discovery of admirable behaviour.48  
This is not necessarily conflated with Aristotle’s belief in consistency, a stable state, 
or ‘appropriate rigidity’ of character, although it should be noted that Aristotle’s 
sense of virtue does imply a developing state, for the virtuous person learns from 
past choices.49 However, Aristotle’s flexibility is linear; Habermas’s is part of the 
ongoing flux of pluralistic dialogue.  For Habermas, a courageous flexibility is a 
defining characteristic of the discourse agent, along with his/her capacity for 
practical wisdom. 
A similar pragmatism informs the notion of consensus itself.  If the ‘truth 
condition of propositions is the potential assent of all others’, this implies a universal 
audience – but what is the knowledge level of this universal audience meant to 
be?50  No universal audience can for example have universal in-depth scientific 
knowledge. 
                                                
45 Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2003), p. 60, 262, 267, 269. 
46  Swanton, Virtue Ethics, ibid, p. 253. 
47  Swanton, ibid, p. 263.  
48  Ludwig Siep, ‘Virtues, Values, and Moral Objectivity’, in Issues in Ancient and Modern 
Ethics, ed. C. Gill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 83-98 (p. 89). 
49  Nancy Sherman, Aristotle’s Ethics (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 18.  
50 Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction, trans. B. Fultner (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2001), 1–103 (p. 89). 
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It would seem that we must return to a non-ideal situation, in terms of which 
a non-universal, but sufficiently inclusive group, works together following a set of 
validity rules that test their statements for rationality and acceptability.  Situational 
knowledge becomes important to the making of a valid judgment.51 
The shift from Ideal Observer to wise expert with his/her ‘appropriate 
emotional sensibilities’ also raises the issue of emotion as a necessary complement 
to reason. 
One can see why philosophers distrust emotions, due to issues of bias, temper, and 
unwillingness to engage in debate.  Stansbury quotes the example of a local 
campaign against a hazardous-waste incinerator, in which local activists refused to 
engage with the scientific or economic reasoning behind the project, and instead 
embarked on emotional letter-writing, vilification, and even violence – all counter-
productive activities.52  
Yet a lack of emotion may be just as bad as too much.  
Aristotle’s golden mean, or temperance principle, surely implies not ‘no 
emotion’, but the ‘right amount of emotion’.  Broadie, discussing Aristotle’s division 
of virtues into the groups of character and intellect, suggests that Aristotle viewed 
virtue as not merely the result of knowledge, but also of appropriate emotional 
responses.53 Solomon makes much the same point, arguing that rationality is about 
having the ‘right emotions’, ‘caring about the right things’; appropriateness is 
important because ‘to say that emotions are rational is to say they serve 
purposes.’54 
Emotion is modified by reason, becoming a useful mean between extreme 
involvement and dispassion. To Aristotle, one’s feelings should be in a correct 
harmonious ratio to one’s virtuous judgments.  Of course, we must always avoid 
merely chaotic emotional states, however, the fact remains that for Aristotle a 
virtuous person does not act from an absence of feeling.55  There is some modern 
agreement, such as in Slote’s argument that emotional goals are to be considered 
alongside the rational.56 Burnor and Raley suggest that virtue ethics allows for a 
reconciliation of impartiality and personal feeling,57 while Lovat and Gray have 
                                                
51 Ricardo Blaug, ‘Citizenship and Political Judgement: Between Discourse ethics and 
phronesis’, Res Publica 6 (200), 179-198 (p. 184). 
52 Stansbury, ‘Reasoned Moral Agreement’, ibid, p. 43. 
53 Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 71. 
54 Solomon, The Passions, ibid, p.79, 83.  
55  Annas, ibid, pp. 58-60. 
56 Slote, Goods and Virtues, ibid, p. 131. 
57 Richard Burnor, Yvonne Raley, Ethical Choices. An Introduction to Moral Philosophy with 
Cases (Oxford: OUP, 2011), p. 226. 
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argued that virtue ethics offers a middle way between deliberative approaches and 
those based on intuition.58  
 
Precisely what emotions – or types of knowledge or cognition – are we talking about 
then if ‘intuition’ is favoured by some philosophers?  And what does Habermas have 
to say on the subject? This will be dealt with in section 4.3, but the issue of emotion 
is still pertinent.  
 In this context it is more useful to look at a modern Habermasian 
commentator such as Seyla Benhabib, who, as Hutchings neatly summarises it, 
sees discourse ethics as requiring more ‘sensitivity’: 
Benhabib argues that discourse ethics is not a way of ‘cutting like a knife’ 
between claims that can be accorded universal validity and those that cannot, 
but is rather a form of moral judgment that combines respect for a principle of 
universalizability with the capacity to recognize and be sensitive to 
difference.59 
 
 
Benhabib suggests that rational scrutiny should be balanced or complemented by 
sensitivity to difference.  Her version of discourse ethics implies an attitude to 
discourse that links with the species ethic and reason to form a neat trio: the 
willingness to speak, to discuss rationally, and to accept with good will the range of 
differences that are likely to be subject to reasoned debate.  
Iser argues that discourse requires ‘sensitive perception’.  By ‘sensitivity’ he 
appears to mean a willingness to assist, and thus an openness to dialogic 
viewpoints, or what he calls ‘good will’, 60 while Hursthouse’s appeal for a virtue 
ethics of hope arguably posits the need for emotional optimism.  She also argues for 
empathy, stating that  ‘our understanding of what will hurt, offend, damage, 
undermine, distress or reassure, help, succour, support or please our fellow human 
beings is at least as much emotional as it is theoretical.’61  
 The feminist ethics of care developed by Gilligan and others contends 
amongst other things that notions of impartiality and universalisability, or abstracts 
such as justice, can denigrate the more particularistic attachments between  
                                                
58 T. Lovat, M. Gray, ‘Towards a Proportionist Social Work Ethics: A Habermasian 
Perspective’, British Journal of Social Work 38.6 (2008), 1100-111.  See also T. Lovat, ‘The 
Contribution of Proportionism to Bioethical Deliberation in a Moderately Post-scientific Age’ 
(2003), at <http://www.mcauley.acu.edu.au/theology/Issue3/index.html>. 
59 Hutchings, ibid, p. 212. 
60 M. Iser, ‘Habermas on Virtue’ (2003), at 
<http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cont/ContIser.htm>.  
61 Hursthouse, On Virtue, ibid, p. 118. 
 180 
 
individuals.  The ethics of care recognizes situational complexity over more general 
ethical rules applied to general, not specific, situations.  According to the ethics of 
care, it is morally counterintuitive to ignore individual differences in favour of an 
impersonal right.  The justice perspective and the care perspective are two different 
ways of organising one’s moral thinking.  Challenging the Kantian view that moral 
action is motivated by respect for universal laws, the ethics of care makes room for 
actions motivated by compassion and sympathy – the altruistic emotions as one 
might call them.  
Benhabib’s expansion of Habermasian discourse ethics borrows from care 
ethics.  Arguing against Habermas’s restriction of moral concerns to universalizable 
questions of what is right for all, she argues that he conflates the ‘standpoint of a 
universalist morality with a narrow definition of the moral domain as being centered 
round “issues of justice”’.  The context of deliberations may, in fact, require 
consideration of the particular needs of the other, established on the basis of care.  
Her view is that Habermasian impartiality and universalisability claims deny 
difference.  To be morally valid is to be equally good for all.  For Benhabib, to be 
ethical is to adjust one’s understanding of whether a morally valid norm is in fact 
equally good in that specific instance where there may be  negative consequences 
for a concrete other. In other words principles should not be applied to all people 
indiscriminately.  
Habermas recognizes that care for the other is a necessary condition of 
discourse, yet the claims of care appear to be subsidiary to universal justice in his 
system.  Since universal justice is a problematic term when looking at global virtues 
that might apply to global or universal discourse, another way of framing it might be 
to say that Habermas notes how in discourse, a norm can only be justified with 
reference to a reason external to the individual – thus subjectivity is balanced by 
external reasons.62  The other in discourse accepts the validity of a statement 
because they accept the good reasons for that statement (a validity claim has a 
‘warranty’ as it were, assumed behind it).  However, a persuasive argument for a 
norm must tie the norm to a language of wants and needs.63  Interlocutors in 
discourse might be swayed by emotional persuasion more than rational argument –  
 
                                                
62 M.  Keller, W. Edelstein, T. Krettenauer, F. Faug, F. Ge., ‘Reasoning about Moral 
Obligations and Interpersonal Responsibilities in Different Cultural Contexts’, in W. 
Edelstein, G. Nunner-Winkler (eds.) Morality in context (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), 317-
37.  
63 William Rehg, Insight and Solidarity, ibid, p. 43. 
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but Habermas’s riposte would be that, ultimately, there would have to be a logical 
discussion of the norm and its consequences.  
In discussing the issues of subjectivism and relativism in applied ethics, Tim 
Dare argues for ‘expertise in ethical reasoning’, achieved through proficient 
reasoning skills, knowledge, and a commitment to understanding and finding 
reasoned solutions – one should be skilled in constructing and assessing reasoned 
support for any ethical position.64  What makes an ethical judgment correct, 
according to Korsgaard, is that endorsing that judgment is constitutive of rational, 
reflective agency.65   
Habermas argues that the appropriate application of moral norms to specific 
situations requires a sense of empathy (agape).66  He later defines this as a form of 
‘considerateness’, meaning awareness of intersubjective feelings.  This ‘empathy’, 
as Habermas might define it, is a distinctly moral form of perception; it is essential to 
the process of dialogue. 
 Thus Habermas’s view of reasoning is balanced by the understanding that 
humans have feelings, ‘wants and needs’ that inform the process of reasoning. It 
can be argued, as Brentano has done, that an emphasis on feeling, without lapsing 
into subjectivism, can be conflated with the idea that there is a ‘higher class of 
feelings’ or ‘emotional activities’ common to all, identified with a form of love that 
places value outside of the self onto an object or activity.67  This has some similarity 
with the Habermasian view of transcendence, as will be discussed later. 
 
The conclusion so far is that emotion is a pre-context to the process of reasoned 
debate, and one that may in fact encourage the species-ethic in us – the desire to 
enter into communication, and the need to develop ‘considerateness.’  Emotion 
adds harmony, care, the passion behind reasoning, or Solomon’s ’judgement’ 
capability. 
 
                                                
64 Tim Dare, ‘Applied Ethics, Challenges To’, in Ruth Chadwick, Doris Schroeder (eds.) 
Applied Ethics. Critical Concepts in Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2002) vol. 1, 23-35 (pp. 
27-8). 
65 Christine Korsgaard, ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1) 
(1986), 5-25; also see her The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
66  Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, ibid, p. 182.  
67 Franz Brentano, The Foundation and Construction of Ethics (trans. E. Schneewind) (New 
York; Humanities Press, 1973); see also Janet Donohoe, Husserl on Ethics and 
Intersubjectivity. From Static to Genetic Phenomenology  (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 
2004), p. 120f. 
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What of Eastern views on reason?68  Eastern rationalism seems always to be a 
subset of harmonious unity, mind balanced by heart.  Confucianism, central to the 
development of Chinese thought, supports belief in the notion of order, or harmony 
(li): 
There is a prevalent generalization that takes the Western culture as rational 
and the Chinese culture as emotional.  In fact, what the Confucian school 
emphasizes is the general ‘li’ as reason that deviates from the concrete ‘qing’ 
as emotions . . . The ideal realm the Confucian school pursues is a state of 
‘rationality’, ‘harmony between reason and emotion’, and ‘harmony’ between 
heavenly principles and human feelings.69 
 
 
Perhaps this is close to the idea of sincerity, in which mind and heart might be in 
balance.  Habermas’s view of discourse admits this term, appearing to use it in the 
sense of a tool for gauging falsehood in discourse, but nonetheless, sincerity 
suggests an emotional parity between the discourse subject and how one feels 
towards it. Admitting, for example, that validity claims are often made on the basis of 
subjectivity (feelings, moods, desires, beliefs, and the like), he argues that such 
claims are:  
. . . open to rational assessment, not in discourse but by comparison with the 
actor's behavior: for example, if a son claims to care deeply about his parents 
but never pays them any attention, we would have grounds for doubting the 
sincerity of his claim. Note that such insincerity might involve self-deception 
rather than deliberative lying.70 
 
Habermas’s view of emotion therefore relates to procedural issues such as coming 
to a dialogue with a sincere and committed mindset that allows for empathy or 
‘considerateness’. 
 
Asian countries do not all follow one particular set of virtues, though with the 
possible exception of Japan,71 most fall broadly into the Confucian area. 
                                                
68 Lawrence C. Chin, ‘The Budding of the Structural Perspective in China (i.e. in the Eastern 
Ecumene): Wang Ch'ung and Fan Zhen’, at 
<http://www.oocities.org/theophoretos/fanzhen.html>. 
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interpreters are examining Confucianism as a living philosophy of ongoing significance, but 
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It can be argued that Confucianism has little in common with Western virtue 
ethics. Rosemont and Ames distinguish a Confucian role ethics from Western virtue 
ethics for, like Nuyen, they see the community as prioritized over the individual.72  
Yet the idea of individual and community virtues being compatible is surely not too 
far-fetched an assertion, if we examine the interaction between what can be called 
the more individual Confucian virtues and the more ‘socially’ oriented ones.  
Van Norden argues that Confucius may not have had a list of cardinal virtues, but 
his follower Mengzi did, such as benevolence (ren), righteousness (yi), wisdom 
(zhi), and propriety (li).73  Other critics suggest two forms of Confucian ethical 
clusters, one based around notions such as respect for parents, loyalty to 
government, and keeping to one's place in society; the other being the ‘central 
Confucian doctrine’ of ren, ‘humanness’ or ‘care’.  This might seem somewhat 
analogous to Habermas's view of humans as being sufficiently caring to engage in 
discourse. 
As Van Norden relates, ren implies both dutifulness (zhong), but also 
reciprocity (shu).74  Ren is a specifically ‘relational’ term, meaning an implied 
attitude to others:75  
Ren, sometimes translated as love or kindness, is not any one virtue, but the 
source of all virtues.  The Chinese character literally represents the relationship 
between ‘two persons,’ or ‘co-humanity’ –  the potential to live together humanely 
rather than scrapping like birds or beasts.   
Ren keeps ritual forms from becoming hollow; a ritual performed with ren 
has not only form, but ethical content; it nurtures the inner character of the person, 
furthers his/her ethical maturation.  Thus if the ‘outer’ side of Confucianism is 
conformity and acceptance of social roles, the ‘inner’ side is the  cultivation of 
conscience and character.76 
 
                                                
72 The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1998); also see A. T. Nuyen, ‘The self and its virtues: Is there a Chinese–Western 
contrast?’, in Kim Chon, Yuli Liu (eds.), Conceptions of Virtue: East and West  (Singapore: 
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(Cambridge: CUP, 2007), p. 40. 
74 Van Norden, ibid, p. 77. 
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76 Peimin Li, ‘Confucian Values and personal health’, in Confucian Bioethics, Ruiping Fan, 
ed. (Hingham, MA:  Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 24-48 (p. 31). 
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Other commentators have added chung (loyalty to one’s true nature, 77 but also 
meaning exerting one’s best efforts to serve others, and as such, forming a subset 
of reciprocity, or shu).78  
 Ren-ethics seems fairly similar to the Habermasian species-ethic on the 
following points: 
1. It reveals itself in a relational form; 
2. It requires sincerity or ‘inner form’; 
3. And it is linked to ethical maturation – a concept Habermas picks up 
in his view of human development and how the human being progresses 
through various stages of knowledge. 
 
The ethics of care, ren ethics, or the Western notion of charity, all imply a human 
mutuality capable of universal acknowledgement.  To illustrate this, we might use a 
term from African ethics, that of ‘ubuntu’, a major tenet of African ethics. 
 
Ubuntu79 
Ubuntu has been suggested as uniquely universal, for 
it emphasizes respect  for the non-material order that exists in us and among 
us; it fosters man’s respect for himself, for others, and for the environment; it 
has spirituality;  it has remained non-racial; it accommodates other cultures 
and it is the invisible force uniting Africans worldwide.80  
 
 
Eze notes that the idea is less of an imposition of a culturally homogenous norm 
than an allowance for contradictions and differing contexts, as to ‘understand 
ubuntu . . . is therefore to locate the context in which it was invoked and recognized 
as a normative rule governing social practices’; for there can be no homogeneity, as 
social norms differ in differing contexts or communities . . . Thus ubuntu is 
                                                
77 Fred Wenstop, ‘Mindsets, Rationality and Motion in Multi-criteria Decision Analysis’, 
Journal of Multi-criteria decision Analysis 13 (2005), 161-172 (p. 163). 
78 Chan See Yee, ‘Disputes on the One Thread of Chung-Shu’, Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 26.2 (June, 1999), 165-86. 
79 See Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African perspective 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), and J. Broodryk, Understanding South Africa: 
The uBuntu way of living (Waterkloof: UBuntu School of Philosophy, 2007). For a negative 
view of ubuntu, see Kai Kresse, ‘”African Humanism” and Case Study from Swahili Coast’ in 
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interculturality, and a new humanism that moves beyond colonial power 
relationships to the simple humanity of mutual creation – ‘we create each other.’81 
 One is human because one belongs, participates, shares.  In ubuntu, a 
central concern is the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the 
restoration of broken relationships, all while seeking to rehabilitate both the victim 
and the perpetrator.  
Gichure suggests that ubuntu combines personal responsibility and common 
good, for as the African proverb has it, ‘a person becomes virtuous through the 
virtue of others’.82 This comment opens up the central tenet underpinning much of 
Asian (bio)ethics: that of the mutual recognition of each other’s ‘humanness’.  
It has been argued  that African ethics is an amalgam of Western and traditional 
values, that  ‘ubuntu’, ‘the foundation and the edifice of African philosophy’,83 ’the 
basis of African communal cultural life,’84 ‘functions as a unifying factor, bringing 
people together regardless of their background or status.85  It teaches unity – ‘above 
all, that we are a collective with the success of one person depending very much on 
the success of all, in terms of combining personal responsibility and common 
good.’86   Ubuntu implies a recognition of one’s own humanity in the other,87 for ‘a 
person is a person through other persons’  (umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu).88 Bishop 
Tutu explains it thus:  
When we want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘Yu, u nobuntu’; ‘Hey, 
he or she has ubuntu.’  This means they are generous, hospitable, friendly, 
caring, and compassionate. They share what they have. It also means my 
humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a 
bundle of life.89 
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89 Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (Rider: London, 1999), pp. 34-35. See also 
David W. Lutz, ‘African Ubuntu Philosophy and Global Management’, Journal of Business 
Ethics (2009) 84:313-328.   
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The above suggests the nexus for Eastern ren and Western individualism: ‘I‘ 
requires ‘you’. Or as Habermas might put it, to be human means having someone 
with whom to discourse because our species-ethic requires that communication.  
What else does discourse require in terms of virtue? 
	  
5.3	  Emancipatory	  knowledge	  
 
Human beings, as a species, are capable of harmony, both within themselves, 
and with each other.90   
 
 
Let us take a step back and begin with one aspect of virtue that engenders little 
debate: practicality. 
Broadly speaking, there is one obvious similarity between the theories of 
discourse and virtue ethics; both Aristotle and Habermas place the burden of truth 
on individuals making rational judgments.  Habermas’s praxis is arguably a version 
of Aristotelian phronesis, or practical reasoning needed for ethical action.  To 
Aristotle, a virtuous person is above all distinguished by practical wisdom – this 
implies both character and action.  Virtue ethics today is less distant from 
deontological and consequentialist theories than might be thought, in that although 
the focus remains on the virtue of the agent, the actions of the agents can be 
evaluated in terms of their contribution to the preponderance of the good or to 
consensus.91  Likewise, Hursthouse has reminded her readers that virtue ethics is 
also act-centred, not merely agent-centred,92 and one might also note Ludwig Siep’s 
argument that virtue can lead to intersubjective convergence, in that the agent and 
the receiver confirm the virtue of the act.93  Opinions differ not only on what 
constitutes a virtue, but on what constitutes a virtuous act: Rosalind Hursthouse 
considers a virtuous act to be what a virtuous agent would do; Michael Slote has 
narrowed that further, suggesting that a virtuous act is what a virtuously motivated 
person would do; while Christine Swanton argues that a virtuous act is one that 
realizes the end of virtue.  But, in short, the virtuous person is required to 
demonstrate, not merely possess virtue. 
                                                
90  Hursthouse, On Virtue, ibid, p. 265. 
91   Ronald L. Sandler, Character and Environment (NY: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
92   Hursthouse, ibid, pp. 222-23. 
93   Siep, ibid, p. 86. 
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Aristotelian virtue is ‘a state of character concerned with choice.’94  To Aristotle, a 
virtuous person takes pleasure in choosing to do the right thing, as well as in doing 
it temperately and habitually, so that 'we become just by doing just acts, temperate 
by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.'95  Wisdom must therefore be 
demonstrable through practical acts. 
 To a degree, this mitigates the complaint made about wisdom being 
somehow related to elitism (i.e. through education).  Aristotle’s elitist view of those 
with education and wise virtue making decisions for others is clearly non-inclusive – 
a major difference compared to Habermas, for whom inclusivity is essential in 
dialogue. However, a modern interpretation of ‘wisdom’ might view it as being 
culturally determined; an example would be a dialogue in which a Harvard or 
Oxbridge-educated interlocutor is grouped with an African tribesman.  One might 
argue from the standpoint of Western wisdom, the other from generations of tribal 
folklore and proverbial knowledge. There is not necessarily a hierarchy of wisdom, 
merely a different context to each.  
 
According to Habermas, communication works because there is an internal relation 
between meaning and validity.96  He suggests that in making any utterances the 
speaker raises four validity claims, on which s/he can be challenged:  
1. the speaker can be challenged on the meaningfulness of what s/he 
says; 
2. on the truth of the facts about the world s/he assumes;  
3. on his/her authority to make an assertion;  
4. and on his/her sincerity. 
 
 
Point (4) has already been accepted in terms of Habermas’s tendency towards 
accepting the interlocutor’s investment in the discourse.  A sincere interlocutor is a 
basic element in his notion of admitting one’s species-ethic driven desire to enter 
into dialogue. 
In terms of (1), it may be argued that questions about the nature of 
meaningfulness add to the challenge.  However, one might stick to a practical 
definition of meaningfulness as that which can be reached through reasoned  
                                                
94   Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, trans W.D. Ross (Oxford: OUP, 1998), Book 2 (p. 
6), at <http://www.constitution.org/ari/ethic_00.htm>. 
95 Nicomachean Ethics, ibid, p. 12. 
96 Jürgen Habermas, ‘What is Universal Pragmatics?’ in Communication and the Evolution of 
Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 1-69. 
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debate, that is to say, it is factual and thus agreed upon by interlocutors, making it a 
communal decision. 
Regarding point (2), we must ask what happens when the facts are open to 
differing interpretations, as can happen with new and untested sciences such as 
nanotechnology?   
Even point (3) about authority is problematic if it is assumed that the speaker 
is self-deceptive about his/her right to make a validity claim.  The notion of a 
speaker who is always sufficiently self-reflexive to admit his/her deceptive authority 
is rather an idealistic one.  (Or, in short, if we knew when we were being stupidly 
pig-headed, we’d stop and agree that others might have a point – something that 
anyone who has ever got into a trivial shouting match knows to be extremely hard.) 
Yet Habermas suggests that dialogue will expose the speaker’s right to say 
s/he is right, and as such embeds the notion of non-hierarchical, pluralistic and fluid 
debate into discourse.  Any assertion, he believes, can be checked within such a 
structure. The degree of self-deception is perhaps the greatest issue in terms of 
compromise, or the ability to accept one’s ‘checked’ assumptions. 
 
Self-deception is a key notion for Habermas. He differentiates three cognitive areas 
in which knowledge is generated:  
• work knowledge, or the way one controls and manipulates one's 
environment;  
• practical or social knowledge, governed by binding consensual norms, the 
validity of which is grounded in intersubjectivity, i.e. the mutual 
understanding of intentions;  
• and emancipatory knowledge, 'self-knowledge' or self-reflection. One 
becomes the critically reflective knower who knows the self as the person 
doing the knowing.97  Insights gained through critical self-awareness are 
emancipatory in the sense that at least one can recognize the correct 
reasons for his/her problems.  Knowledge is gained by self-emancipation 
through reflection, which leads to a transformation of one’s perspectives.  
 
 
                                                
97  Mel Gray, Terence Lovat, ‘Horse and Carriage: Why Habermas's discourse ethics gives 
virtue a praxis in social work’, Ethics and Social Welfare, 1.3  (November 2007), 310-328. 
See also Eduardo Mendieta, The Adventures of Transcendental Philosophy. Karl-Otto Apel’s 
Semiotics and Discourse Ethics (Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, 2002), for the argument 
that Apel’s philosophy has a focus on self-reflexivity.  
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Thus one might note that there is now another way of looking at sincerity – namely, 
to see it as the antithesis to self-deception, and as a major aspect of emancipatory 
knowledge.  Accepted as such, one's sincere and humbling acceptance, (e.g. of 
one’s own mortality), might be a universal one, as Veatch suggests: 
A recognition of human finitude leaves one simultaneously affirming a single 
universal moral authority and a deep sense of human inability to know the 
content of that moral authority in a definite way. The impact on cross-cultural 
ethics is critical. We can simultaneously affirm a common morality and show 
respect of the differences in those cultures that do not share our own moral 
perception. Finitude requires respect for the moral views of others without 
surrendering one's conviction that there is a single, universal foundation for 
morality.98 
 
 
The emancipated, self-aware self is humble, open to reason and willing to 
compromise.  S/he is also capable of dialectical agency. 
 
 
5. 4 Dialectical agency 
The dialectical process of  (in simple terms) arriving at the truth by stating a thesis, 
developing a contradictory antithesis, before combining and resolving them into a 
coherent synthesis, suggests that the dialectical process and dialogue have much in 
common. The term ‘dialectical process’ is often used widely any two oppositions 
that must be synthesised for progress; a dialectical process can mean a creative 
tension between opposites.  
 The real East-West difference may be in terms of the dialectical process 
implied by the Habermasian model, one in which self and other exist in a dialectical 
state.  The Confucian model implies that such a state must evolve towards the goal 
of social harmony; the Habermasian, towards the goal of consensus.  There 
appears to be a difference in terms of how much dialecticism is allowed, in that 
Western individualism encourages greater opposition to the whole. In short, through 
dialectical process, agreement would be partial, a compromise between agreement 
and disagreement.  This implies that the discourse agent, to achieve emancipatory 
knowledge, must exist within the dialectical tension between relative and universal 
values, between the goal of the common good, and that of individual and contextual 
desires.   
                                                
98 R.M. Veatch, ’Common Morality and Human Finitude: A Foundation for Bioethics’, in E. 
Baumann, A. Brink, A. May et al  (eds.) Weltanschauliche Offenheit in der Bioethik (Duncker 
& Humboldt, Berlin, 2004), 37–50 (p. 39, 45).  
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There are several forms of dialecticism within discourse. For example, there 
is an essential distinction between the motives of the interlocutors (participants in 
dialogue/discourse) and the procedural aims of the discourse or dialogue.  This 
implies that the interlocutor performs a dialectical role, between his/her own 
motives, needs and virtues, and the procedural requirements of the discourse, 
adapting his/her views as the procedural imperative requires.  There is a dialectic 
between relative/subjective views and the normative aim that such views might 
impede, with a common criticism of virtue ethics being that it typically appeals to 
emotive and culturally influenced notions such as justice and courage, and so does 
not ’provide a standard that successfully distinguishes virtue from vice.’99  In other 
words, it provides only a form of relative ethics that is insufficiently useful in terms of 
binding a group.   
 
In Habermas’s model, relative and universal ethics exist in a necessary dialectic.  
Dialecticism is in fact the crucial factor, rather than ‘wisdom’ or knowledge, or 
indeed any issue concerning educated elitism. 
The notion of relational dialectics in communication theory, developed by 
Baxter and Rawlins in the 1980s, suggests relational communication as a clash of 
desires.100  For dialogue to be useful, it must in fact be dialectical, i.e. opposed, 
multivoiced, and thus capable of evolution.  
  
 
Inclusive dialecticism, and dialogue 
Truth is not born, nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, 
it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their 
dialectic interaction.101 
 
There is a definition of dialogue derived from the work of Russian critic Mikhail 
Bakhtin that offers further nuance to the idea.  In Bakhtin's view, any utterance is 
formed through a speaker's relation to otherness (other people, others' words and  
 
                                                
99 Sarah Conley, ’Flourishing and the Failure of the Ethics of Virtue, ibid, p. 88.  
100 L. A. Baxter, ‘A dialectical perspective of communication strategies in relationship 
development’, in S. Duck. (ed.) Handbook of personal relationships (New York: Wiley, 1988), 
257-273. Also, William K. Rawlins, ‘A Dialectical Analysis of the Tensions, Functions and 
Strategic Challenges of Communication in Young Adult Friendships’, in James A. Anderson 
(ed.) Communication Yearbook 12 (Newbury, CA: Sage, 1988).157-89. 
101 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999), p. 110.  
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expressions, and their lived cultural world in time and place). When he stated that 
the word ‘lives, as it were, on the boundary between its own context and another, 
alien, context’,102  Bakhtin implied an inherently dialogic quality in any speech act, 
that segues into a dialectic spiral of understanding/compromise and then higher 
understanding.  
Otherness means that any word uttered requires an answer:  Any 
understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently responsive . . . 
Any utterance is a link in the chain of communication.103   
 
 
Every statement contains in fact the echo of its own opposition, since speech is 
inherently oppositional.  Thus, in discourse, one says what is true to oneself, but 
also predicates the echo of an opposing view, the voice of the other.  As Bakhtin 
stated, ‘the word . . . exists in other people’s mouths, in other peoples’ concrete 
contexts, serving other peoples’ intentions; it is from there that we must take the 
word and make it our own.’104 
In order to achieve a state of agency in which one can act as a global 
citizen, one needs to achieve an intersubjective state through dialogue that implies 
the validation of one’s words only through the speech of the other.  Identity is reliant 
on otherness, for ‘a living person is able to do furious battle with definitions of their 
personality in the mouths of other people.’105 
The hardest part of the dialogue process is the recognition of the validity of 
others’ viewpoints; namely, the undermining of the belief in the rightness of one’s 
own views.  A successful dialogue requires a dialectical shaking of the ‘certainties’ 
of one’s identity; this is even more difficult when undertaken globally. Such a 
process is reliant on the goodwill of the agent, and, most significantly, his or her 
ability to accept the pluralism of truth and of the self, his ‘dialectical agency.’   
 Refining a dialectical process in the Bakhtinian sense may prove to be a way 
forward for improving global dialogue on new technologies such as nano.  The 
fundamental principle of a Habermasian pTA forum intended at global consensus 
operates on a simple (yet complex) procedure, that of requiring all agents to argue 
the opposing position(s). From such a dialectical process, it is hoped that 
consensus may be reached.  
                                                
102 Mikhail Bakthin,The Dialogic Imagination.  Four Essays (Austin: University of Texas 
Press,1981), p. 284. 
103 Mikhail Bakthin, Speech Genres, and Other Late Essays (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1986), pp. 68, 84. 
104 Bakhtin,The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays, ibid, p.294.  
105 Mikhail Bakhtin, ibid, p. 59. 
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 The virtuous agent will search for good through dialogue, balancing reason 
and empathy, as well as private and public selves.  Aristotle’s concern with 
balancing the demand for absolutes, with the need to trust our sense perceptions, 
suggests an innate dialecticism in any virtuous dialogue leading to decision-making. 
Thus Habermas brings discourse ethics down to the individual virtuous 
discourse agent, whose chief virtue, it seems, is that she or he is self-aware.  But 
this suggests the familiar virtue debate between Western individualism and Eastern 
community-mindedness.  It appears we have come full circle to the original problem 
without making any particular headway.  Or have we?  Perhaps the conclusion so 
far is not a question of emotive reasoning, or of what one knows, but of how one 
knows it – whether one is able to admit of a dialectical model of self-awareness or 
not.  
Or to express it rather simplistically, in the West, the individual’s knowledge 
enters into full dialogue with society.  By contrast, in the East, since dialogue is 
entered into with the full knowledge that society must ultimately be seen as right, 
harmony must be restored, and subjects are less free to admit of dissent, dialectical 
agency is only partially achieved. 
We may be back at the question of autonomy. 
 
5.5	  	  Autonomy	  as	  a	  (non)-­‐universal	  virtue?	  
  
The end of man is…the highest and most harmonious development of his 
powers to a complete and consistent whole.107 
 
 
Habermas’s theory, as in much Western writing on ethics and justice, promotes the 
principle of autonomy.  However, this term, with its stress on individual rights, has 
several meanings in the West.   
For Aristotle, given that civic action was already the province of the elite, it 
could be argued that autonomy for his citizens of the polis (as opposed to slaves, for 
example) was an attribute that did not require any attention.  
Feinberg has claimed that there are at least four different meanings of ‘autonomy’ in 
moral and political philosophy: the capacity to govern oneself, the actual condition of 
self-government, a personal ideal, and a set of rights expressive of one's  
 
                                                
107 Wilhelm von Humboldt, The Limits of State Action (1792), at 
<http://classicliberal.tripod.com/humboldt/>. 
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sovereignty over oneself.108  The last one is a useful notion of autonomy that in 
more general terms might suggest self-rule, presumably achieved through self-
awareness, the emancipatory state necessary for Habermasian flexibility in 
discourse, as well as through rationality.  
There is also the Kantian moral value of autonomy, from which Habermas 
takes some of his ideas, and two points can be made here. 
First, the Kantian notion of autonomy is often thought to be highly 
individualistic in its ethics of responsible action.  Neumann argues though, that Kant 
was not such a champion of individualism as is commonly thought. Kant, as a 
champion of rationality in Neumann’s account, valuing a universal trait in the human 
being, admiring  ‘rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity 
to the universal principles of pure practical reason.’109  If we take Kant’s law of 
universalisation – that we should act as though one’s actions could be universal 
laws – and apply it to this issue, what is universalisable is derived from our respect 
of the person as rational, and as an end in him/herself.110 
Second, Kant offers a theory of ‘attraction and repulsion’ as two forces 
necessary for the human, moral world.  Repulsion, being ‘the body filling its own 
space’, implies individual freedom, but is counterbalanced by a strong relationship 
to the other – attraction is that which ‘binds into unity.’111  Kant implies a dialogical 
autonomy where care for self is complemented by care for others.  
In considering these two ideas, the statement that Habermas derives some 
of his views on autonomy from Kant becomes more complicated than might initially 
be thought.  As Korsgaard states, autonomy concerns the independence and 
authenticity of the desires (values, emotions, etc.) that move one to act, and also 
the capacity to impose upon ourselves, by virtue of our practical identities, 
obligations to act.112   
Autonomy suggests both reason (self-governance) and the actualization, to 
return to the discussion of Habermas, of the species-ethic.  
 
 
                                                
108 Joel Feinberg, ‘Autonomy’, in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 27–53. 
109 Michael Neumann ‘Did Kant Respect Persons?’, Res Publica 6 (2000), 285-99 (p. 285). 
110 The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor, ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), Part II, ii, p. 186. 
111 Immanuel Kant, quoted in Jerome B Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History 
of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 491. 
112 Christine M. Korsgaard, Normativity, ibid, p.11 
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 In his notion of the species ethic, Habermas emphasises autonomy – a 
Western rather than an Eastern concept (as well as rationality, arguably also more 
of a Western virtue than an Eastern one).  Yet he qualifies autonomy by suggesting 
that although public 'morality’ is tied very closely to an individual commitment to 
one’s own values, the actualization of morality depends upon being in a community 
of fellow-agents, through the intersubjectivity provided by being language-users: ‘the 
logos of language embodies the power of the intersubjective, which precedes and 
grounds the subjectivity of speakers.’113  Thus there seems to be a (positive or 
negative) tension between private and public, individual subjective virtues and 
intersubjective virtues (a tension that rather recalls that of the so-called Eastern 
values tension between the one and the whole).  
 It seems we may be in the right place with Habermas in terms of advising 
interlocutors on how to be global dialogue agents, and thus how to deal with the 
tension between the group and one's self – assuming that his ‘power of the 
intersubjective’ actually works.  
 
Virtues mentioned by Asian leaders, including ‘hard work, family, education, 
savings, and disciplined living’, are certainly not alien in the Western tradition.114  
The Western emphasis on individual human rights is not addressed in that 
statement.  However, economist and political theorist Amartya Sen, in his 1997 
lecture, ‘Human Rights and Asian Values’,  questioned the notion that there is a 
distinct set of Asian values that is in tension with Western human rights thinking. By 
contrast, he argued that historically, respect for human rights is not an exclusively 
Western concept.115  In this vein, Wong argues that Confucianism and Western 
rights-centred morality can be brought closer ‘through the interdependence of rights 
and community’,116 through defining rights as recognised on the basis of their 
necessity for promoting the common good, rather than as necessary for personal 
autonomy.  This is not wildly different to Aristotle’s idea that the best person is not 
only one who exercises virtues that benefit him/herself, but also one who acts 
virtuously to benefit others.  
                                                
113 Ibid, p. 13. 
114 P. Marshall, ‘Bad Company: Western Values Criticized in Asia’, Areopagus 7.4 (1994), p. 
11. 
115  Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values (Sixteenth Morgenthau Memorial Lecture 
on Ethics & Foreign Policy, 1997) at 
<http://www.cceia.org/resources/publications/morgenthau/254.html/_res/id=sa_File1/254_se
n.pdf>. 
116 David B. Wong, ‘Rights and Community in Confucianism’, in Kwong-lo Shun, David B. 
Wong (eds.)  Confucian Ethics. A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and Community 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 31- 48 (p. 32).  
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Kupperman, writing on Confucius and Aristotle, suggests that the Confucian 
rejection of a Western rationalist individualism still assumes ethics is based on an 
individual's good character and education.  However, for Confucius, decision-
making will rely heavily on tradition and community, whereas for Aristotle, the agent 
has freedom to act independently of how others might have acted before.  
The relationship between ren and the so-called Asian ideal of harmonious 
collectivism is explained in the Confucian Analects, through the idea of the virtuous 
or exemplary ruler.  Sim traces the logic as follows: 
Confucius thinks that rule by an exemplary ruler is more effective for making 
one virtuous than rules, for if you govern effectively, ‘what need is there for 
killing? The excellence of the exemplary person is the wind, while that of the 
petty person is the grass. As the wind blows, the grass is sure to bend. 
 
 
This is an image of a quiescent populace happy to be ruled (hopefully) wisely.  
Elsewhere, Confucius talks of how the people will regulate themselves according to 
their ‘shame’ if they do not follow the exemplary leader’s model expressed through 
wise leadership. Such an attitude, or ‘ability to be moved by the exemplary person’ 
Sim explains, 
. . . begins at home with filial piety (xiao) toward one’s parents and love for 
other family members mediated by ritual propriety (li). Li dictates the proper 
behavior for all roles . . .  in the larger community . . . li enables the extension 
of love for family members, in a graduated manner, to everyone else in the 
community. When accomplished, one will have the highest Confucian virtue of 
humaneness (ren) which includes all particular virtues like courage (yong), 
wisdom (zhi), appropriateness in actions (yi) and truthfulness (xin), just to 
name a few . . . filial and fraternal responsibility . . . is the root of humaneness 
(ren).117 
 
 
This statement suggests that the virtue of ‘proper’ behaviour is governance of the 
self. Yet  Rosemont suggests that  Confucianism can imply ‘not only a sense of self-
governance, but a sense of the importance of nurturing self-governance in 
others.’118 This may sound patronising, though when seen in the context of mutual 
agency, of mutual species-endeavour, it is rather less so. Arguably, dialogue is one 
such situation of mutual agency.  
                                                
117 May Sim, ‘Rethinking Virtue Ethics and Social Justice with Aristotle and Confucius’, Asian 
Philosophy 20.2 (July 2010), 195–213 (pp.198-9). 
118 Henry Rosemont, Jr., ‘Whose Democracy? Which Rights? A Confucian Critique of 
Modern Western Liberalism’, in Confucian Ethics, ibid, 49-71 (p. 61). 
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Confucian humaneness (ren) leads one to benefit others; as Confucius puts it, 
‘Persons with humaneness (ren) establish others in establishing themselves and 
promote others in promoting themselves.’119  There are some echoes in this notion 
of developing others through oneself in Chan’s work on the idea of ‘jen’:  
Confucius has an answer to harmonise the conflict between international 
guidelines deriving from one culture (Western) and other cultures with strong 
and well established moral and legal traditions (such as in Asia). His answer is 
. . . that bioethics should and must be 'in harmony but not identical'; 'in 
harmony as well as diversified' . . . The basic values underlying international 
ethical guidelines, such as non-malfeasance/beneficence, respect for persons 
and justice are not so far different from Asian values . . . ’ren’ encapsulates 
non-maleficence or ‘do no harm’, respect for others, and the Confucian  ‘Do 
not do to others what you do not want to be done to you’… or  jen . . . 
translated as human heartedness, benevolence, love, compassion, kindness 
or humanity . . . The person of jen is the one who in 'desiring to sustain 
oneself, sustains others and desiring to develop oneself develop others'.120 
 
 
In a general sense, both Aristotle and Confucius promote the notion of community 
duty to others – thus Sim claims that these thinkers’ ethics can 'include perfect 
duties to others, formulated in universal laws that are enforceable.’121  In addition, 
not only is one concerned with others, but for the universe as a whole:  
. . . the harmony and welfare of the entire community takes precedence over 
the  interests of individuals. Such harmony and welfare is to be achieved by 
the leading elite engaging in a rigorous regimen of learning and self-
examination, namely, by incessant self-cultivation through sincere 
commitments to their respective roles in family, state, and world . . . Humans 
have to show concern and empathy not only for humans but also other beings 
in the universe. Thus the Confucian virtue ethic is rooted in an 
anthropocosmic world view, in which the individual is defined in terms of 
his/her roles and responsibilities within a given contextual relationship to other 
beings in the universe.122 
 
 
Note the reference to education (shades of Aristotle!) and to self-reflection. 
Confucius’s follower Mencius believed that everyone has the potential to become 
virtuous, but that these incipient tendencies towards virtue often fail to manifest in 
situations where they probably should; thus we must ‘extend’ the manifestations of 
                                                
119  Sim, ibid, p. 201. 
120  W.T Chan, A Source Book, ibid, p. 105. Jen has been variously translated as 
benevolence, perfect virtue, goodness, human heartedness, love, altruism, etc. According to 
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121  Sim, ibid, p. 205. 
122  Young-bae Song,  ‘Crisis of Cultural Identity in East Asia: On the meaning of Confucian 
ethics in the age of globalisation’, Asian Philosophy, 12. 2 (2002), 109-125 (p. 119). 
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our virtue.123  Community plays a primary role in self-extension, or self-development, 
as the person imitates his/her parents, but another force is that of self-reflection, for 
‘upon reflection, the self acquires an identity as well as a power for self-
transformation; the self is a duality, both a reflective subject and a reflected-upon 
object.124  (This notion of a dual identity is important for global ethics, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Six).  
 
Song offers an interesting, if not altogether convincing argument that the 
‘anthropocosmic’ nature of Confucianism is essentially a version of care ethics 
linked to eco-ethics, yet also suggests a dialectical self: 
Whereas modern liberalism takes as its task the systemic guarantee of 
individual autonomy and rights and their protection from outside coercion, 
Confucian anthropocosmic ethics concerns itself with the mental, spiritual 
effort of intellectuals, which, first and foremost starts with resolving the conflict 
within oneself between the ‘dao-mind’ (daoxin, the will to observe the public 
good) and the ‘human-mind’ (renxin, the will to pursue private interests and/or 
selfish desires), and which further culminates in preserving the harmony of 
humans with nature in the universe.125 
 
 
Self-governance, in terms of managing the dual self, is all very clear within the 
Confucian emphasis on achieving harmony.  What of disharmony, however, when 
individuals wish to disagree?  What if the rights to speech and dissent are 
somewhat insecure within political systems known to be dismissive of individualism?  
Wong appears to suggest that the channels through which individual dissent can 
emerge are significant, in that they allow individual dissent while maintaining 
community consensus.126  In other words, the issue may not be one of incompatible 
virtues or values, but of incompatible process.  Thus Habermas’s view is that we 
can see universal validity in procedural terms, as based on certain rules of 
argument presupposed upon ‘conditions of rational speech, symmetry, and 
reciprocal recognition.’127  However, one is reminded of Engelhardt’s belief in a 
‘collapse of consensus’ on bioethical issues demonstrated by passionate and 
                                                
123 Bryan W. Van Norden, ‘The Virtue of Righteousness in Mencius’, in Kwong-loi Shun, 
David B. Wong (eds.) Confucian Ethics. A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and 
Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 149-182 (pp. 149-50). 
124 Chung-ying Chen, ‘Theory of Confucian Selfhood’, in Confucian Ethics, ibid, 124-48 (pp. 
126-7). 
125 Song, ibid, p. 124.  
126 David B. Wong, ‘Rights and Community’, ibid, p. 32.  
127 Michael Kelly, ‘The Gadamer-Habermas debate revisited: the question of ethics’, in David 
Rasmussen (ed.) universalism vs. communitarianism. Contemporary debates in ethics 
(Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1990), 139-162 (p. 147). 
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persistent disagreement that cannot be resolved through reasoning.128  Consensus 
is never easy.  
 
To return to the problem as originally stated, Eastern and Western virtues differ 
vastly on this issue of individualism. Sandel has stated that the over-emphasis on 
choosing our own aims in the Western liberal tradition may result in our denial that 
‘we can ever be claimed by ends we have not chosen – ends given by nature or 
God, for example, or by our identities as members of families, peoples, cultures, or 
traditions.’129  In other words, we may over-stress individualistic virtues at the 
expense of our very real ties to our communities. In this vein, Widdows notes that: 
The 'western' moral agent is an autonomous, isolated, free, choosing 
individual and the Asian moral agent is a connected, community-defined, 
relational being . . . This division is false, of course. Western individuals are 
not isolated beings making choices in a vacuum. To present human beings as 
making judgments outside their culture and background is to ignore the 
historically and socially constructed nature of human beings. The eastern 
picture is no better — that of an amalgamated creature, conjoined to relations 
and the family with no distinguishable personhood or identity. Such a person 
would be entirely passive and lack any sense of self, preference, decision-
making and the ability to form relationships — again, not a realistic picture of a 
human being.130 
 
 
Perhaps Amartya Sen has the last word on this belief that Eastern values are utterly 
communitarian: 
There is much variety in Asian intellectual traditions, and many writers did 
emphasize the importance of freedom and tolerance, and some even saw this 
as the entitlement of every human being. The language of freedom is very 
important, for example, in Buddhism, which originated and first flourished in 
South Asia and then spread to Southeast Asia and East Asia, including China, 
Japan, Korea, and Thailand. In this context it is important to recognize that 
Buddhist philosophy not only emphasized freedom as a form of life but also 
gave it a political content. To give just one example, the Indian emperor 
Ashoka in the third century BCE presented many political inscriptions in favor 
of tolerance and individual freedom, both as a part of state policy and in the 
relation of different people to each other. The domain of toleration, Ashoka 
argued, must include everybody without exception.131 
 
In conclusion, the Asian (Confucian) virtuous agent is similar to the Aristotelian and 
Habermasian one in that: 
                                                
128 Engelhardt, Global Bioethics: The Collapse of Consensus, ibid, pp. 2-3. 
129 Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1996), p. 70. 
130 Heather Widdows, ‘Western and Eastern Principles”, ibid, p. 21. 
131  See <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/asian%20values/sen.htm>. 
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• Both ‘saw moral virtues as...derived not from a universal moral calculus but 
from a careful process of personal discovery’;132  
• and both have an intersubjective view of ethics based on a dialectical 
relationship between self and others.  
 
 
Table 7:  Aristotelian, Habermasian and Confucian ‘virtues’ 
 Aristotelian virtues 
 
Habermasian virtues 
 
Confucian virtues 
What is a 
virtue? 
A quality which enables a 
person to achieve, through 
right choice, a good and 
noble life of happiness and 
prosperity 
Willingness to communicate 
to achieve consensus – part 
of the ‘species ethic’ and the 
practical skills required to 
realize that ethic 
That which promotes 
social harmony 
How virtue 
is achieved 
Through habituation and 
moderation or temperance, 
good temper, patience 
Through rational discourse 
and self-realisation, self-
reflection 
Through imitation and 
self-reflection 
Chief virtue Practical reason (phronesis)  Reason, which allows the 
validity of statements to be 
tested and thus agreed upon 
Ren, or benevolence, 
which allows a 
meaningful pursuit of 
li, or propriety/order 
Expressed 
through...? 
Deliberative wisdom  The ability to deal with 
complex information in an 
insightful and wise way; 
flexibility; self-reflective 
knowledge, or sincerity 
Correct and caring 
social behaviour 
Communi-
cates 
With truthfulness and 
impartiality 
Intelligibly and sincerely  With a view to 
harmony 
Is aimed at:  Greater good (thus, altruism) 
– including generosity, a 
high-minded sense of justice, 
and proper ambition 
Consensus Harmony (tao) 
Is similar in: terms of emphasis on the self On the intersubjective self On the self within the 
collective 
 
 
                                                
132 Nicholas F. Gier, ‘Whitehead, Confucius, and the Aesthetics of Virtue’, Asian Philosophy 
14.2 (July 2004, pp. 171–190 (p. 181). 
 200 
 
The notion of setting up a discourse process that allows individual self-discovery, 
and an emancipatory dialogue, may seem somewhat unfeasible, yet when the 
Habermasian notion of intersubjectivity is explored further, it becomes less so. It is 
the core mechanism through which emancipatory knowledge, and thus useful 
discourse outcomes, might be achieved. This may go some way toward resolving 
the problems with which we began this chapter – namely that of achieving 
compromise for the good of the whole, rather than merely the self; and, conversely, 
of ensuring the self has enough autonomy to speak sincerely within the dialogue 
process. 
 
5.6	  Intersubjectivity	  
 
The farther individuation progresses, the more the individual subject is caught 
up in a... network of reciprocal dependencies.133   
 
 
The question: “Can Complex Societies Form a Rational Identity?” already 
indicates how I wish to use the term ‘identity.’ A society does not just have an 
identity ascribed to it in the trivial sense an object does, which can be 
identified by various observers as being the same ‘thing,’ although they may 
apprehend and describe it in different ways. In a certain sense a society 
achieves or, let me say, produces its identity; and it is by virtue of its own 
efforts that it does not lose it. To speak, moreover, of the ‘rational’ identity of 
society reveals that the concept has a normative content.134 
 
 
As Gray and Lovat argue, implicit in Habermas’s emancipatory knowing is the idea 
of the ‘self-reflective knower’ going beyond self-knowledge to take a ‘stand for 
justice . . . that spills over into practical action.’135  This implies a quality or virtue of 
transcending one’s own limited viewpoint and interest, to become aware of a greater 
issue, or another person.136  It may seem idealistic; no wonder that Habermas once 
phrased the idea of transcending one’s own viewpoint through a religious image, 
suggesting ‘God’ as the name for a ‘communication structure that forces men, on 
pain of a loss of their humanity, to go beyond their accidental, empirical nature to 
encounter one another indirectly, that is, across an objective something that they 
                                                
133  Jürgen Habermas, ‘Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning “Stage 6”’, The 
Philosophical Forum 31 (Fall-Winter, 1989-90), p. 46. 
134 Jürgen Habermas, ‘On Social Identity’, telos 19 (1974), 91-103 (p. 91). 
135  Gray, Lovat, ‘Horse and Carriage’, ibid, p. 312.  
136 Steven Hendley, From Communicative Action to the Face of the Other. Levinas and 
Habermas on Language, Obligation, and Community (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 
2000), p. 68. 
 201 
 
themselves are not.’137 How does one achieve this transcendence?  Or perhaps one 
might call it a virtuous identity, in that it implies both self-realisation and an 
acceptance of others’ beliefs in a sincere and rational moment of insight.  The 
important thing in such a moment is that it demonstrates not only the exercise of 
individual reason and judgment but of mutual (i.e. consensual) reason and 
judgment. 
 
A virtuous identity arises out of a network of relationships.  This does not mean 
forgetting or downplaying the needs of the self. Habermas argues that one’s ‘centre’ 
or self is created partly through externalisation in ‘communicatively produced 
interpersonal relationships.  The self should be strong and self-aware in a ‘web of 
intersubjective relations of mutual recognition by which individuals survive as 
members of a community.’138  Habermas argues that discourse requires strong 
individual contributions to discussion so that the participants become collectively 
convinced of the validity of a norm. Thus the notion of intersubjectivity relies on a 
strong and individual self.  
 Habermas’s virtue of ‘considerateness’ is key, for it ‘has the twofold objective 
of defending the integrity of the individual and of preserving the vital fabric of ties of 
mutual recognition through which individuals reciprocally stabilize their fragile 
identities.’139  In fact, Habermas sees the strength of the self and the strength of the 
community/other as indispensably symbiotic: 
The person develops an inner life and achieves a stable identity only to the 
extent that he also externalizes himself in communicatively generated 
interpersonal relations and implicates himself in an ever denser and more 
differentiated network of reciprocal vulnerabilities, thereby rendering himself in 
need of protection. From this anthropological point of view, morality can be 
conceived as the protective institution that compensates for a constitutional 
precariousness implicit in the social or cultural form of life itself. Moral 
institutions tell us how we should behave towards one another to counteract 
the extreme vulnerability of the individual through protection and 
considerateness. Nobody can preserve his integrity by himself alone . . . 
Morality is aimed at the chronic susceptibility of personal integrity implicit in 
the structure of linguistically mediated interactions, which is more deep-seated 
than the tangible vulnerability of bodily integrity, though connected with it.140 
 
 
                                                
137 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, ibid, p. 152. 
138 Habermas, ‘Justice and Solidarity’, ibid, p. 46. 
139 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, ibid, p. 200. 
140 Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 109. 
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The above statement suggests a nexus between identity and the network of mutual 
(considerate) recognition. There is more to it than this, however; assuming that 
individuals deserve equal consideration, we still have to know what it means to 
regard the interests of others as being as important as our own.  Hare thinks we 
should imagine ourselves in the place of others, with the interests that they have, 
before weighing these interests in relation to each other to determine which course 
of action would maximise their satisfaction.141  In a sense, we are adopting the 
stance of the other; as this is difficult though, we might consider the adoption of a 
‘public’ role, which means considering the good of the whole as opposed to merely 
the good of the self. Thus Habermas’s view of solidarity as ‘rooted in the realization 
that each person must take responsibility for the other, because as coassociates all 
must have an interest in the integrity of their shared life context in the same way.’142 
 Solidarity to Habermas means the coordination and pursuit of individual (or 
joint) goals on the basis of a shared understanding that the goals are inherently 
reasonable or merit-worthy.  This gets around the so-called flaw in the Rawlsian 
suggestion that parties might act as if ‘rational and mutually disinterested’ when 
settling an issue – it is by no means guaranteed that those debating an issue will 
argue towards a position of mutual benefit, or are motivated only by a concern for 
the better argument.143  Rawls himself, noting the potential gap between acting 
justly and the (Kantian) desire to express the self as a free moral person, implies 
that the desire for reciprocity may be the necessary missing ingredient.144  Rawls 
arguably reworks Smith’s theory of sympathy, according to which, ‘howsoever 
selfish man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to 
him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it’.145  
Communicative reason is the practice of solidarity.146  
 
                                                
141 Richard Hare, Freedom and Reason  (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 123. 
142 Habermas,  ‘Justice and Solidarity’, ibid, p. 244. 
143  Habermas's discourse ethics has been criticized for being utopian and idealistic by 
Foucault and Flyvberg: see .M. Foucault, ‘The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of 
Freedom’, in James Bernauer and David Rasmussen (eds.) The Final Foucault (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 1-20, and B.  Flyvbjerg, ‘Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil 
Society?” British Journal of Sociology, 49.2 (June, 1998), 208-233. 
144 Thomas Baldwin, ‘Rawls and Moral Psychology’, in Oxford Studies in Metaethics  vol. 3 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 247-70 (pp. 262-3). John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971). 
145 See <http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS.html>. 
146 Max Pensky, The Ends of Solidarity. Discourse Theory in Ethics and Politics (New York, 
State University of New York Press, 2008), p. x. 
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It seems that of all the virtues, the only ones that particularly matter after all, are the 
ones of solidarity and self-knowledge, existing within a dual structure.  In other 
words, we have a global value (solidarity), and a private/personal one (self-
knowledge).  
 
Table 8: The skill set of the (global) virtuous discourse agent 
The speaker must be:        How this works   Is this 
universal?  
Motivated by the species 
ethic, i.e. have a desire to 
communicate for the greater 
good of consensus 
Emotion and the species ethic 
provide universal impulses 
towards communication 
Yes. 
Must be able to compromise, 
be flexible (be swayed by 
reason)  
 
Reason is part of the process; a 
sincere considerateness is 
brought to that process of 
reasoning 
Ren-ethics and 
care ethics have 
much in common; 
however reason 
is seen as less 
important in the 
East 
Must possess a practical 
desire and ability to act 
 
A function of practical discourse 
ethics, particularly in the form of 
pTA 
A function of 
practical 
discourse ethics, 
particularly in the 
form of pTA 
Must act wisely, i.e. rationally 
(neutrally, temperately, 
consistently) in terms of 
understanding one’s own 
motivations and arguments, 
and those of others – in 
short, must be self-aware 
 
Self-awareness is developed 
through dialogue and dialectic – 
just as awareness of the other is 
developed. Consensus is the 
desired   result 
Awareness of the 
other is 
developed 
through dialogue 
-  harmony is 
seen as more 
important in the 
East 
Must be able to act 
autonomously and justly 
 
Intersubjectivity implies that the 
autonomous self requires 
relationality 
The community-
minded person 
seeks harmony of 
self and whole 
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5.7	  Global	  or	  universal	  virtues?	  
 
Cultivate the self, and virtue will be true; cultivate the family, and virtue will be 
complete; Cultivate the village, and virtue will grow; Cultivate the country, and 
virtue will be rich; Cultivate the world, and virtue will be wide.147 
 
The cultural diversities of the world are there to stay but human beings, 
regardless of their cultural traditions, do share some universal values, such as 
love and compassion, doing no harm... These values are the foundation of a 
global bioethics which should be independent of the norms of any particular 
culture because foundational moral values transcend particular cultural 
values.148 
 
 
Before looking at identity formation as a way towards global agency in ethics, it is 
worth asking whether there is any particular agreement as yet on global values, and 
whether East and West have any similarities in their general concept of identity. 
 
As Widdows and Sandel suggest, the individual and the collective are not quite as 
distanced from each other as we might initially expect.  Kupperman leaves the door 
open for a compromise position when he looks at the issue of the unity of the self, 
and argues that Confucius may have believed in a ‘self-as-collage’ approach.149  
What does this mean?  De Castro refers to collage in a more useful fashion when 
discussing universalisation that ‘can be understood as a process of putting together 
a collage of varying perspectives without having to assert a neutral standard of 
measure.’ 'Intersections of experience’, as he terms them, may lead to that 
universalising moment.  Arguing that the main issue is ‘one of identity’, he suggests 
that authenticity (being true to one’s self and to the values that constitute our unique 
cultural perspective) is the key to ethics.150   
There is a simpler way of viewing this balance between individual and 
collective.  Empathy – or to use Habermas’s term, considerateness, may indeed be 
a universal virtue, Western care ethics is close to Confucian ren (or jen) ethics, in  
which the central principle, ren, means ‘love and care for others.’  The focus is put  
                                                
147 Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, at 
<http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Chinese/TaoTeChing.htm>. 
148 T.W. De Bary, The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1996), 14-5. Also M.C.T. Tai, ‘A Confucian Perspective on Bioethical Principles in 
Ethics Consultation, Clinical Ethics, 2.4 (2007), 201-7. 
149Joel J. Kupperman, ‘Tradition and Community in the formation of Character and Self’, in 
Confucian Ethics. ibid, 103-123 (p. 117). 
150 De Castro, ’Is there an Asian Bioethics?’, ibid, p. 5.  
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on interdependent human relationships; relational ties suggest the basis for 
interdependence, whether within or across communities.151  Kishore suggests 
virtues such as ‘love, trust, righteousness, compassion, tolerance, fairness, 
forgiveness, beneficence, sacrifice, and concern for the weak’,152 while Tai presents 
virtues and principles based on Chinese traditions of ‘compassion, respect, 
righteousness, responsibility, ahimsa’ (the latter meaning the sacredness of all living 
things).153 
 Sass argues that we need a radical paradigm shift towards a new and 
healthier way of caring.  Referring to health care ethics, he argues that compassion 
and communication are vital; ‘also the competence and cooperation of stakeholders 
involved will be essential for a new culture in the cultivation of human-human 
interactions.’  The five golden C-principles are, therefore: ‘competence, compassion, 
communication, cooperation, culture.’154 
Gould asserts the relationality and connectedness of human beings, which 
militates against a conception of human beings as isolated, separate individuals, 
seeing us as  ‘individuals-in-relations’, i.e. individualism being tempered as all 
activity includes the recognition of others, their needs and the individual's 
relationship with them.155 
 The individualistic concept of autonomy might be replaced by the notion of 
‘holistic harmony.' The word ‘holistic’, though somewhat over-used, is a useful 
reminder, in that it implies balancing various needs within the community.  Thus 
Hongladarom, looking at how technology might be adapted to Thai Buddhist 
concepts of emptiness and compassion, suggests that nanotechnology would need 
to be geared more towards public good than personal gain.  It should be 
accompanied by a concern for its impact on others:  
 
 
                                                
151 E. Hui, ‘Jen and Perichoresis: The Confucian and Christian Bases of the Relational 
Person’, in   G.K. Becker (ed.), The Moral Status of Persons: Perspectives on Bioethics 
(Rodopi, 2000), 95-118. 
152 R.R. Kishore, ‘End of Life Issues and Moral Certainty. A Discovery through Hinduism, 
Eubios Journal of Asian International Bioethics, 13 (2003), 210–3. 
153 M.C. Tai, in The Way of Asian Bioethics (Taipei: Princeton International Publications, 
2007), 122–6  
154 H.-M. Sass, ’Asian and European Roots of Bioethics: Fritz Jahr's 1927 Definition and 
Vision of Bioethics, Asian Review of Bioethics, 1.3 (2009), 185–97. Also, H.-M. Sass, 
‘Cultivating and Harmonising Virtues and Principles’, Asian Review of Bioethics 3.1 (2011), 
36-47. 
155 C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, 
and State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) also C. Gould, Globalising 
Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004). 
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. . . the Buddhist attitude would be to say that the primary motivation behind 
such introduction of the products should not be exclusively for the personal 
gain of the owners or the shareholders of the firms themselves, but primarily 
for the benefits of all who will find a use for the products.156 
 
 
In 2005, Knoppers and Chadwick noted a new trend in ethics.  They found that 
there has been a movement away from prioritising the dominant Western set of 
biomedical principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice, 
toward those of ‘reciprocity, mutuality, solidarity, citizenry and universality.’157  
These are not only less teleological and more process-oriented,158 but also suggest 
an Aristotelian balance between the common good and autonomy, a common good 
being ‘proper to and attainable only by the community, yet individually shared by its 
members.’159  Such a balance would seem, in terms of the differing global bioethics 
values that have been identified, to suggest a meeting between Western 
individualism and Eastern or African communalism.  If the term ‘good’ seems 
perhaps too culturally loaded, then one might use Sen’s term ‘flourishing’ – a nice, 
practical term, and one more easily quantifiable. As Radha Krisha argues in the 
context of Malaysian bioethics: 
The ethical landscape of modern multicultural, multiracial, multi-faith Malaysia 
. . . may indeed have been what Ladikas [and Schroeder]  envisaged when 
describing global ethics as ‘the attempt to agree on fundamental conditions for 
human flourishing and to secure them for all.160   
 
 
In conclusion, if we return to Habermas, it is less important that the participant in 
pTA or discourse possesses particular virtues, compared with virtuous skills that 
enable dialogue.  The most crucial aspect of dialogue may be that it is in fact 
dialogue; the perception that cultural, national and racial identity is being subverted 
by a colonizing Western form of ethics may be the greatest bar to such a debate.   
                                                
156 Soraj Hongladarom, ‘Nanotechnology, Development and Buddhist Values’, NanoEthics 3 
(2009), 97–107 (p. 105). 
157 B .M. Knappers, R. Chadwick, ‘The Human Genome Project: Under an International 
Ethical Microscope’, Science Sept 30, 1994, pp. 2035-6. A European group of bioethicists, 
financed by the EU, has suggested ‘autonomy, dignity, integrity, vulnerability’ as a specific 
European list. 
158 Brian Salter, Charlotte Salter, ‘Bioethics and the Global Moral Economy: The Cultural 
Politics of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Science’, Science Technology Human Values 32 
(2007), 554-81 (p. 562). 
159 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, at <http://www.constitution.org/ari/ethic_00.htm>. 
160 Lalit K. Radha Krishna, ‘Global Ethics - A Malaysia -Singaporean Perspective’, Eubios 
Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 20 (September 2010), 140-46, (p. 141). 
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Thus Sen’s concern that ‘the lives of Asians – their beliefs and traditions, their rules 
and regulations, their achievements and failures, and ultimately their lives and 
freedoms’  can appear to be already decided.161  
 
Western dialogue may be broadly defined as teleological; Asian dialogue appears, 
again speaking broadly, to be relational.162   
What we still need to understand is the procedural principle of 
universalisation that Habermas brings to the discourse model, and that allows for 
the intersubjective recognition of common goals.  This will be discussed in the next 
Chapter, together with the issue of identity formation. 
 Thus, when asking the question, are virtuous discourse agents the same in 
the East and the West, the argument is that Habermasian thought (particularly as 
developed by people like Benhabib), incorporates an element of care ethics. Thus 
there is a point of crossover with Confucian ren (benevolence or kindness) ethics. 
Habermas’s view of emotion relates to procedural issues such as coming to 
dialogue with a sincere and committed mindset, one that allows for empathy or 
‘considerateness.’ Ren-ethics seems fairly similar to the Habermasian species-ethic 
on the following points: 
1. It reveals itself in a relational form 
2. It requires sincerity or ‘inner form’ 
3. It is linked to ethical maturation – a concept Habermas has discussed 
in his view of human development and how the human being 
progresses through various stages of knowledge. 
 
 
However, even if there is a similarity in the agent's approach to discourse, this is not 
to say that his or her ‘knowledge form’, i.e. mode of argumentation, is alike.  The 
main issue appears to be that despite having comparable virtues in the East and the 
West, there is still a problem in determining how global virtuous agents might 
approach dialogue.  This requires us to look further at the idea of agent identity 
formation. 
                                                
161 Amartya Sen, ‘Thinking About Human Rights and Asian Values’, at 
<http://www.cceia.org/resources/publications/dialogue/1_04/articles/519.html>.  
162Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, ibid, p. 388.  See also M. Karmasin, 
‘Towards a Meta Ethics of Culture - Halfway to a Theory of Metanorms’, Journal of Business 
Ethics 39 (2002), 337–346 (p. 340). 
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Chapter Six: Universalism versus relativism 
 
One who knows himself and others 
will find out here 
that East and West 
are no longer separable.1 
 
. . . universalisation . . . can be understood as a process of putting 
together a collage of varying perspectives . . . ‘Intersections of 
experience’ . . . may lead to that universalising moment.2   
 
 
With the formation of the IMF and the World Bank in 1944, the UN in 1945 and its 
subsidiary the World Health Organisation in 1948, along with the UN’s adoption of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the same year, one could begin to 
argue for an emerging sense of transnational moral responsibility. The ideals 
promoted by the new global organisations – global democracy, global economic 
growth and stability, global peace, and global health – suggested shared or global 
concerns. 
 However, the word global does not always evoke positive associations of 
international moral responsibility. To non-Western countries it can mean a form of 
cultural imperialism, while the globalised world of international trade links and global 
businesses derived from the reduction of barriers to the flow of goods, services, 
people and capital is leading to a global ‘McWorld’ culture of increased financial 
volatility.3 Naomi Klein has argued that instead of a global village of international 
harmony, we find one where ‘the economic divide is widening and cultural choice 
narrowing.’4 In a homogenised global world of international corporations, 
globalisation might be no more than consumerism without borders. So what about a 
global society, ‘a single human community’,5 social globalisation leading to the 
                                                
1 Johann Wolfganag von Goethe, West- stlicher Divan (1814-19), (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1972), p. 279: ‘Wre sich selbst und andere kennt wird auch hier erkennen; Orient und 
Okzident sind nich mehr zu trennen, Sinnig zwischen beiden Welten sich zu wiegen lass ich 
gelten: Also zwischen Ost-und Westen sich bewegen sei zum Besten’.  
2 De Castro, ibid, p. 5. 
3 J. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003). B. Barber, 
Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World (New York: 
Ballantine, 1996). Noam Chomsky, ‘A World Without War’, delivered at the World Social 
Forum, January 31, 2002, <http://www.chomsky.info/talks/200202--.htm>. 
4 Naomi Klein, No Logo (Flamingo, 2000), p. 15. 
5 Clive S. Kessler, ‘Globalization: another false universalism?’, Third World Quarterly 21.6 
(2000), 931-42 (p. 932). 
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creation through social media of global (virtual) villages,6 a new, paradoxically 
homogenising yet multicultural global lifestyle?7   
 What unifying values might a global society espouse?  What would global 
ethics, international ethics, or world ethics, look like?8  We assume in what follows, 
that values are the topic for discussion, rather than political structures.9  I will not 
talk about ‘a set of ranked or weighted moral standards binding on rational 
agents’,10 as this leads to slippery issues such as who might create universal ethical 
standards, and questions about who they will be imposed on.  Here Kymlicka’s 
point, that by global ethics we mean not only standards, but a second layer of 
‘values’, is useful:  
(global ethics is)…a two-level phenomenon. At one level, we have a self-
standing international discourse, such as human rights, that seeks to define a 
minimum set of standards agreeable to all. At the second level, we have a 
multiplicity of different ethical traditions, each of which has its own account of 
what more, or what else, is needed above and beyond human rights.11  
 
 
This chapter focuses on the problem of how to combine or to achieve consensus, 
given this multiplicity of different ethical traditions. It will therefore start with 
universalism, or the attempt to assert universal values.  
 
Problems with universalism and relativism 
Common accusations levelled against universalism are that it is paternalistic and 
colonial.  The cross-cultural application of a ‘transnational set’ of values12 is seen as 
a form of neo-colonialism,13 and, more generally, as undermining cultural pluralism 
                                                
6 M. Tehranian, Global Communication and World Politics (Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1999); M. Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Interest (Boulder, Co, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1994), 6-11. 
7 Yet, as Appiah suggests, globalisation can also threaten homogeneity, Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, Cosmpolitanism. Ethics in a World of Strangers (London: Allen Lane, 2006), p. 101. 
8 Dower prefers the term ‘world ethics’. His reasoning is given in World Ethics. The New 
Agenda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
9 Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (New York: OUP, 2005), 
p. 27. 
10 Michael Philips, Between Universalism and Skepticism. Ethics as Social Artifact (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 20. 
11 W. Kymlicka, ‘The Globlization of Ethics’, in W.M. Sullivan, W Kymlicka (eds.) The 
Globalization of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-16 (p. 5).  
12 J. Mann, S. Gruskin, M. Grodin, G. Annas, Health and Human Rights (New York: 
Routledge, 1999).  
13 Widdows, ‘Is Global Ethics Moral Neo-Colonialism?’, ibid, 305-15. 
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and human dignity.14  However, the concept of ‘universalism’ might also be seen in 
a Kantian context, as about maxims of common understanding approached in a 
less dictatorial manner. 
Philpott notes Pope John Paul II and President Khatemi of Iran’s suggested 
‘dialogue between civilisations’, which might enunciate values and rights ‘in ways 
that are more consonant with the claims of multiple traditions’, as a better way 
forward than Western-centric universalism.15  We might then agree with Sakamoto, 
who argues that global ethics must be based on ‘the traditional ethos of each 
region.’16   
A modern ethics must acknowledge postmodern ‘globality’, which ‘entails a 
turn away both from provincial gaze and from the exotic gaze of the colonizer (and 
the colonized),’ and works according to ‘networks of global inter-communication.’17  
It is true, as Ferraro states, that ‘the new universalism will have to come to terms 
with one important aspect of the transformation undergone by philosophy during the 
last hundred years, namely, the discovery of the contextuality of knowledge and 
normativity.’18   In other words, universalism has been in retreat before relativism, or 
contextuality, for some decades. 
 
However, relativism is not entirely wonderful either.  Like universalism, which can 
be broadly seen as an agreement on certain ethical principles, but which is often 
seemingly interpreted as a form of Western cultural fascism, relativism can be 
broadly defined as a sensitivity to cultural variation, as well as a pragmatic 
understanding that such variation needs to be taken into account when working 
towards common agreement.  
Taken to its furthest extreme, relativism implies Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’, a 
fluid situation in which, lacking solid frames of reference, we must create our own  
 
                                                
14 Andorno, ‘Human Dignity and Global Rights’, ibid, 223-240. 
15  Daniel Philpott, ‘Global ethics and the International Law Tradition’, in The Globalization of 
Ethics, ibid, 17-37 (p. 25).  
16  Sakamoto, ‘Towards a new global bioethics’, ibid, p. 197. 
17 Goran Therborn, ‘At the Birth of Second Century sociology: Times of Reflexivity, Spaces, 
and Nodes of Knowledge’, The British Journal of Sociology 51.1 (2000), 37-57 (p. 51). 
18 Alessandro Ferrara, ‘universalism: procedural, contextualist and prudential;’ in 
universalism vs. communitarianism. Contemporary debates in ethics, ibid, 11-38 (p. 11). 
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structures, establishing individual meaning under conditions of uncertainty,19 
operating without semantic agreement as we ‘run against the boundaries of 
language’,20 constructing in fact our own ‘languages’ or worldviews, which are not 
always subject to external validation.21  Thus there can be no agreement on ethics, 
given that there can be no causal explanations,22 no disagreements about facts, but 
rather disagreements about ‘differences in values about which nothing can be 
said.’23  There are varying types of relativism (which can be discussed in the context 
of subjectivity or metaethics, for example), 24 but most describe a ‘relativist’ as 
someone who can always find a cultural reason that requires an accommodation or 
exception from a general moral or behavioural rule.  At its most extreme, relativism 
predicates a world of utter subjectivity or contextuality, leading to the conclusion 
that the relativist can also be accused of undermining the human dignity of others, 
just as the universalist does.25  After all, one can use it to justify doing what one 
wishes to do anyway, with little care for others’ values. As Mackie notes,  
Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people’s adherence to and 
participation in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be 
mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they 
participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a 
monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy’.26 
 
 
Given that both universalism and relativism are problematic, what is a global 
ethicist, or policymaker, to do?  One might first take comfort in the fact that the two 
theories are not as opposed as they might initially seem, which perhaps hints at 
some form of possible synthesis. In support of this claim, we might propose two  
 
                                                
19 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).  
20 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 75. 
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, Philosophical Review 74 (1965), 3-12, (11-12). 
22 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); 
Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977); Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985); and Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992). 
23 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, ibid, p. 241. 
24 Richard Brandt, ‘Ethical Relativism’ in Paul K. Moser, Thomas L. Carson (eds.) Moral 
Relativism: A Reader (New York: OUP, 2001), 25-31. 
25 John W. Cook, Morality and Cultural Differences (New York: OUP, 1999), p. 41. 
26 J. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Rights and Wrongs (Penguin, 1990), p. 36. 
 212 
notions.  The first comes from Stephan Lukes, who has argued for a point of 
intersection between relativism and universalism.  To Lukes, acknowledging the 
facts of moral diversity and value pluralism does ‘not entail abstention from judging 
others (and their judging us).’27  Thus Lukes looks at the 'two questionable 
assumptions' underlying contemporary multicultural thinking: first, that the world 
divides neatly into distinct cultures – (must cultural identities be seen as ‘distinct 
and incompatible’?)  –  and second that everyone needs just one such culture to 
live a meaningful life.  He argues that to see culture as an integrated concept rather 
than as a cluster (possibly even a loose one) of practices, or a set of processes, is a 
detrimental myth for our times, and adds that: 
The loss of a widely shared worldview with secure metaphysical and religious 
foundations (was it really so consensual and secure?) does not render us 
unable to make universally applicable judgments.28 
 
 
In other words, one does not need an agreed universal set of values or even laws in 
order to decide whether something is wrong.  Such a decision can be based on an 
individual worldview, but is also, in the Kantian sense, seen as something that 
should have a more general application than ‘I think this is right.’  Lukes’ suggestion 
is appealing, as it implies some form of intersection between relative judgments (‘I 
judge’), and universal judgments (‘we should all judge this way’).  
On the other side of the argument, one might also argue that universalism is 
never fully universal, but is rather the imposition of an idea held by the majority. 
Scott comments on this universalisation of a limited ethos: 
The frequent and recent criticisms of universalisation are right in their claims 
that this movement itself . . . incites something like tribal wars, now conducted 
as struggles for cultural domination and refusal of amalgamation (i.e. of 
transformation of identity) . . . The question arises from a limited ethos 
combined with its universalization, which transgresses its own limits, and its 
claim to authority.29   
 
 
                                                
27 Steven Lukes, Moral Relativism (London: Profile, 2008), pp. 96-7. 
28 Lukes, ibid, p. 140.  
29 Charles E. Scott, ‘The Sense of Transcendence and the Question of Ethics’, in The Ethics 
of Postmodernity. Current Trends in Continental Thought, ed. by. Gary B. Madison and 
Marty Fairbairn (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1999), 214-230 (pp. 215, 228-9). 
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Scott suggests that (a) a universal view is not feasible, rather we can only achieve a 
limited one; and (b) that ignoring such limitation while asserting the universal 
application of a limited viewpoint is actually highly destructive.  Universalisation 
claims are therefore quite hypocritical, or, reflect self-deception caused by the 
mistaken belief that one’s views are sufficiently good to be universally applied.  
Nussbaum has a pointed example of this kind of limited universalism, discussing 
attitudes to women who wear the burqa in a Western country.  Arguments for 
banning the burqa, (effectively arguments against religious/cultural toleration), 
according to Nussbaum, revolve around the notion that it affects communication 
and social reciprocity, as well as indicating the patriarchal domination of women, 
and is thus an affront to universal female dignity.30  Feminists around the world can 
therefore happily promote a universal ban, and any counterargument is rubbished 
as an injustice that can be perpetrated under the guise of cultural tradition.31 
Yet Nussbaum’s view is that the real reason for a ban is fear of the Muslim 
‘other’.  Bringing forward very Western democratic arguments around 
communication and feminism suggests a certain cultural attempt to impose 
restriction – i.e. to control that fear – under the guise of promoting a universal value, 
that of the dignity of women. The burqa is a useful example of this kind of clash 
between what Westerners see as a universal rule – the right of women to wear what 
they want – and a relative rule, such as that a modest Muslim woman may choose 
to wear the burqa.  The important word here is, of course, choice. Ignoring this, the 
universalist implies that no woman would want to wear the burqa (a patronizing 
attitude for feminists and others to take).  
The majority French ban on the burqa is a highly relativist position, not a 
universalist one about dignity.  The issue is not one of cultural relativism, but 
questions how far individual choice can be extended.  If individual choice differs 
markedly from a universal rule, must it then submit to that universal rule?32  The 
                                                
30 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Veiled threats’, Opinionator, The New York Times, July 11, 2010, at 
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/veiled-threats/>. 
31 Thus Susan Moller Okin in a chapter of Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’, (eds. J. 
Cohen, M. Howard, M. Nussbaum) (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999), points out that  cultural 
defences can violate women’s and children’s rights (p. 19-20), and that there is a deep 
tension between feminism and multiculturalism.  
32 Keith Lehrer, ‘Individualism, Communitarianism and Consensus’, The Journal of Ethics 
5.2 (2001), 105-120 (p. 109). 
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question can be phrased more simply – how can the universalist ensure she or he 
isn’t simply applying a conformist notion which may imply an alleged majority bias?  
This leaves the global ethicist looking for some form of synthetic or mid-point 
theory that develops the negative tension between universalism and relativism into 
a more positive philosophy.   
Communitarianism and cosmopolitanism are often promoted as likely 
solutions. 
 
Communitarianism and cosmopolitanism 
At the risk of drowning in a sea of ‘isms’, one might start by noting a confusion of 
terms – relativism, pluralism, communitarianism and particularism are often and 
erroneously regarded as the same (see Table 9 below for the general usage of the 
terms). The term cosmopolitanism is the more useful one for the purposes of this 
discussion. 
 
 
Table 9: A ‘sea of isms’: Definitions 
 
Universalism  The theory that there are universal values such as  ‘it is 
always wrong to kill another human’ that can (and should) be 
applied across cultures 
Relativism The theory that there are cultural influences that may be taken 
into account; for example, some countries apply the death 
penalty 
Pluralism That both of the above ideas can be equally respected within 
society 
Particularism Primary allegiance is to the values of a group such as one’s 
family, friends, or neighbours 
Communitarianism The socially embedded self requires individual views such as 
a belief in euthanasia to be balanced with potentially opposed 
views of the majority:  ‘Communitarians begin by positing a 
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need to experience our lives as bound up with the good of the 
communities out of which our identity has been constituted’.33 
Sources of selfhood are taken from a range of social 
constructions and experiences 
Cosmopolitanism A dialogic theory that looks to mediate between universalism 
and relativism, between being a ‘global citizen’ and being a 
culturally defined individual.  There are several types – this 
thesis uses contemporary definitions of moderate moral and 
cultural cosmopolitanism, and particularly that of Appiah, who 
sees cosmopolitanism as both a notion of shared citizenship, 
but also as respect for individual beliefs.34 
 
 
Communitarianism is useful for the purposes of this thesis, in that it includes an 
idea of multi-or dual identity, as developed to a large degree by Charles Taylor, but 
also informed by the works of Habermas, Benhabib, Korsgaard, and Beck among 
others. 
The notion of multi- or dual indentity also appears in the theory of 
cosmopolitanism, which is often promoted as a form of ‘soft universalism’.  Seen as 
a less hegemonic and monologic form of universalism, it is based on a balance of 
the universal and the relative, of community and alterity, for the following reasons: 
1. We are world citizens today as well as national individuals with specific 
cultures- (i.e. we have a dual identity) 
2. Globalisation is a dual process, or dialogic, as will be explained. 
 
Diogenes, when he referred to himself as a cosmopolitan, did not know that he 
might be spawning a global movement of ‘world citizens’, and indeed Diogenes 
himself left no blueprint for such citizenship.  However, Kant’s notion of 
cosmopolitan law suggests that in addition to one’s national citizenship, we also 
                                                
33 Definition taken from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/>. 
34 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, ibid, p.xv. 
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have citizenship of the world state, which operates on the basis of international 
law.35  
However, cosmopolitanism today has a more general meaning, one that has 
been called utopian in the negative sense of being ineffectively broad. It can mean 
global free trade and/or a single global market, as well as a rejection of exclusive 
attachments to particularist cultures, and/or a facet of modernity or postmodernity. 
Cosmopolitan ethics can also refer to either a sociological ethics (e.g. Beck or 
Miller) centred on the notions of citizenship and global solidarity, a cultural trend 
(e.g. Appiah), or a political concern with global justice (e.g. Habermas, Rawls, Sen 
and Pogge).  
Beck differentiates between cosmopolitanism as a form of ‘mundane 
interaction’ that is a ‘by-product of global institutions and agencies plugging into one 
another’, and cosmopolitan realpolitik.36  He does this by looking at dialecticism, 
mentioned in the previous chapter, as a central methodological issue in terms of 
how the East and the West might cooperate.  This is an issue that interests Beck 
and Sznaider, who promote  a ‘real cosmopolitanism’ that ‘seek(s) to overcome 
dualisms by proceeding on a logic of “both-and” instead of “either-or”.’37 
In other words, such practical cosmopolitanism rejects both so-called 
Chinese uniformity and Western either-or dissensus for a both-and form that implies 
relativism and universalism.   
Cosmopolitanism, also called ‘globalization from within’, based on ‘the 
transnationality that is arising inside nation-states’, is seen by Beck and Sznaider as 
an answer to the problematic nature of universalism. In their view the latter is faulty 
in that it obliges us ‘to respect others as equals as a matter of principle’, yet without 
involving  ‘any requirement that would arouse curiosity or respect for what makes 
others different. On the contrary, the particularity of others is sacrificed to an 
                                                
35 L. P. Pojman,  ‘Kant’s Perpetual Peace and Cosmopolitanism’, Journal of Social 
Philosophy 36.1 (2005), at  
 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2005.00258.x/pdf>. 
36 Sarat Maharaj, ‘Small change of the universal: beyond modernity?’, The British Journal of 
Sociology 61.3 (2010), 565-578. David Miller, ‘The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice’ in David 
R. Mapel, Terry Nardin (eds.) International Society. Diverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998). 
37 Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider, ‘Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a 
research agenda’, The British Journal of Sociology 57.1. (2006), 381-403 (p. 381), at 
<http://www2.mta.ac.il/~natan/unpacking%20cosmoplitanism%20for%20the%20social%20s
ciences.pdf>. 
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assumption of universal equality.’ Thus Beck and Sznaider suggest a form of 
cosmopolitanism  
. . . conceived, elaborated and practiced not in an exclusive manner but in an 
inclusive relation to universalism, contextualism, nationalism, 
transnationalism, etc. It is this particular combination of semantic elements 
which the cosmopolitan outlook shares with the universalistic, relativistic and 
national outlooks and which at the same time distinguishes it from these other 
approaches.38 
 
 
This complex statement with all its 'isms', can be boiled down to the suggestion that 
universalism attempts to find some form of synthesis with relativism. It is akin to the 
argument of Appiah, who also noted that cosmopolitanism, as such a both-and 
form, has unsurprisingly been criticised for being  
. . . all things to all people. Is this the secret of its resurgence: an infinitely 
flexible mission statement for politics in the global age: a badge of identity 
politics, deference to difference and high value placed on plurality? Should it 
be understood as a political philosophy, an individual orientation to the world, 
a societal condition, a political project, or a pejorative designation?39   
 
Yet, Appiah has also said that ‘we cosmopolitans believe in universal truth, too, 
although we are less certain that we have it all already. It is not scepticism about 
the very idea of truth that guides us; it is realism about how hard the truth is to 
find’.40  (Admittedly, this doesn’t really solve the problem, but only suggests the 
willingness to try and do so.) 
 
All-inclusiveness is not the only criticism of cosmopolitanism.  Zolo, for example, 
argues that cosmopolitanism does not ‘go much beyond the optimistic expectation 
of affluent Westerners to be able to feel and be universally recognised as citizens of 
the world’ and also underestimates ‘the way in which Westernization is cultural 
homogenization without integration’.41  
                                                
38 Beck, Sznaider, ‘Unpacking’, ibid, p. 397. 
39 Appiah, ibid, p.145f.  See also Cosmopolitanism and Europe (Chris Rumford, ed.) 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), pp. 1-2. 
40 Appiah, ibid, p. 144. 
41 D. Zolo, Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 
p.  137. 
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 As a more pluralistic version of universalism, cosmopolitanism can still be 
understood as less judgmental.42  This is in line with the eighteenth-century 
associations the term held, when ‘cosmopolitan’ indicated 
. . . An attitude of open-mindedness and impartiality. A cosmopolitan was 
someone who was not subservient to a particular religious or political 
authority, someone who was not biased by particular loyalties or cultural 
prejudice. Furthermore, the term was sometimes used to indicate a person 
who led an urbane life-style, or who was fond of traveling, cherished a 
network of international contacts, or felt at home everywhere.43 
 
 
Another criticism has been that cosmopolitanism is difficult to assess in action – that 
it is better in theory, than in practice. Benhabib has attempted to answer this issue 
by suggesting that a process of iteration is required:  
when citizens become convinced of the independent validity of cosmopolitan 
norms, they can ‘reiterate these principles and incorporate them into 
democratic will-formation processes through argument, contestation, revision 
and rejection . . . My answer to the question as to how to reconcile 
cosmopolitanism with the unique legal, historical and cultural traditions and 
memories of a people is that we must respect, encourage and initiate multiple 
processes of democratic iteration.44 
 
‘ 
As Benhabib suggests, for example, the tension between ‘democratic self-
determination and the norms of cosmopolitan justice’ can be resolved through an 
internal process within nation-states, in terms of which cosmopolitan claims are 
iterated by the people until they become cultural norms and gain the standing of law 
by common consent. The nation or people show itself to be the authors of such 
laws rather than merely the subjects.45  This suggests, of course, a stress on 
agency, and particularly on Habermas’s theory of the legitimisation of laws through 
public discourse, as discussed previously.  
 
 
                                                
42 Morin, ibid, 58-72. 
43 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/#2>. 
44 Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism The Berkeley Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 42, 70. 
45 Benhabib, ibid, p. 17.  
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Cosmopolitanism, therefore, has its detractors, but it involves the following positive 
notions: 
• It is process-oriented; 
• it aims to be practical; 
• it aims at a methodology that works on a both-and dialectic of inclusivity, 
one that ignores neither relativism nor universalism but attempts to make 
them work together; 
• and (in Benhabib’s version, at least), it stresses agency. 
 
Combining these positive aspects, we might argue that what is really needed for 
cosmopolitanism to work practically and globally, is a process model of both-and, or 
dual, identity. Cosmopolitanism is a process of detachment from one's self (or from 
the relative position), not so that identity is swallowed up by universalism, but in 
order to achieve ‘reattachment with multiple affiliations.’46  Seen in the contexts of 
Habermas's universalisation principle and moral identity formation, the idea of dual 
identity offers a way forward for global ethics. 
	  
6.1	  Identity	  
One who knows himself and others 
will find out here 
that East and West 
are no longer separable.47 
 
. . . universalisation . . . can be understood as a process of putting together a 
collage of varying perspectives . . . ‘Intersections of experience’ . . . may 
lead to that universalising moment.48   
 
Alasdair MacIntyre proposed three questions that get at the heart of moral thinking: 
Who am I? Who ought I to become? And how ought I to get there?49  These might  
                                                
46 Conceiving Cosmopolitanism. Theory, Context, and Practice, eds. Robin Cohen, Steven 
Vertovec  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 180.  
47 Johann Wolfganag von Goethe, West-ostlicher Divan (1814-19), (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1972), p. 279: ‘Wer sich selbst und andere kennt wird auch hier erkennen; Orient und 
Okzident sind nich mehr zu trennen, Sinnig zwischen beiden Welten sich zu wiegen lass ich 
gelten: Also zwischen Ost-und Westen sich bewegen sei zum Besten’.  
48 De Castro, ibid, p. 5. 
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also form the core of discourse ethics; namely, how can one achieve a rational self-
aware selfhood? Can one achieve a global and more ‘ideal’ selfhood? And how 
does one get there? 
 
The problems of universalism and relativism can be seen as built into the self, 
which (as communitarians and particularists both argue) is a self conditioned by its 
culture and context, thus it is irrevocably relative and renders universalism 
impossible.  Yet, at the same time that emotional identity and attachments to 
families and countries are formed, there is the possibility of a universal and 
transcendent approach to global citizenship, a transcendental identity. But how?  
 
Here one might look at pTA and at Habermas, particularly his ‘universalising’ 
principle of discourse between individuals.  
 
The first point to recall is that, as the species-ethic implies, humankind in 
Habermas’s view enters into dialogue with a tendency towards consensus.  
Habermas sees the ability to coordinate actions through communication (language) 
oriented toward reaching agreement as the most fundamental characteristic of 
human beings as a species. The focus of discourse ethics is what is ‘equally good 
for all’: 
. . . this ‘moral point of view’ constitutes a sharp but narrow spotlight, which 
selects from the mass of evaluative questions those action-related conflicts 
that can be resolved with reference to a generalizable interest.50 
 
Recognising the equal rights of participants in the moral discourse is a principle of 
universal moral respect, and one of egalitarian reciprocity.51 Thus, every person 
who accepts the process of practical discourse also implicitly presupposes as valid 
the principle of universalisation itself – in other words, by accepting the notion of 
argument, one also accepts every rational being’s participation in the process. 
This identifies an agency quality, or virtue of orientation towards agreement 
as universal.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
49 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory (University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1984). 
50 Habermas, ‘Discourse Ethics, Law and Sittlichkeit,’ ibid, p. 24. 
51 Benhabib, ‘Afterword’ in The Communicative Ethics Controversy, ibid, p. 337. 
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Habermas’s universalisation principle 
‘Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech'.52 
 
What exactly does the universalisation principle imply? Habermas’s dialogue model 
has two components, which he labelled ‘D’ and ‘U’.  
‘D’ is defined by Habermas as the principle of reaching agreement through 
practical discourse.  Universalisation (‘U’), occurs when  
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects that [the 
norm's] general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of 
everyone's interests, and the consequences are preferred to those of known 
alternative possibilities for regulation.53  
 
Stated yet another way, Habermas claims that something can be valid when the 
foreseeable ‘consequences and side-effects of its general observance for the 
interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all 
concerned without coercion.’54  
Thus ‘only those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected 
persons could agree as participants in rational discourse’.55 
Through the ‘D’ and ‘U’ principles, discourse ethics aims to be a consensual 
ethics. Habermas develops the (Kantian) idea that the universal ‘ought’ – of norms 
as ensuring equality of treatment, of being publicly defensible, that valid norms 
deserve recognition – by arguing for a principle that constrains all concerned to 
adopt the perspectives of everyone else in the balancing of interest.   
Asking whether we can find truth or reach agreement, Habermas suggests 
that ‘D’ settles the first question, while ‘U’ (universalisation) aims to settle the 
second. 
 Does this mean that the universalisation principle is a function of language, 
in that it is part of that ‘telos of human speech’ that Habermas mentions? It has 
been argued that Habermas follows Pinker’s development of Chomsky’s concept of 
universal language.  This is the argument that human thought takes place in a 
prelinguistic form of cognition that is the same for all human beings – thus we all 
think in fundamentally the same ways, as the signified to which we attach the 
                                                
52 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, ibid, pp. 287-88. 
53 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, ibid, p. 6. 
54 Habermas, ibid, p. 42. 
55 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms,  ibid, p. 107 
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signifiers of language are universal.57  This seems a little simplistic, given the 
culturally loaded associations some signifiers can have, and Pinker does suggest 
that complex grammar is universal ’within a society’ rather than universally.  The 
comments that can be made on this idea are:  
(a) that Habermas’s views on universal language are by no means clear;  
(b) that this brings us to the ideas of neurolinguistics, a subject which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis;58 and  
(c), that Habermas examines the mechanisms of speech in terms of how 
validity claims can be substantiated and rendered acceptable to interlocutors 
rather than simply claiming universal referentiality. 
 
Such a claim as raised in point (c) is arguably missing Habermas’s point somehwat.  
‘U’ regulates argumentation amongst many participants; Habermas argues along 
the lines suggested by Apel, that every argumentation rests on pragmatic 
suppositions from whose propositional content the principle of universalisation (‘U’) 
can be derived.  
What this all means is that Habermas wants his discourse agents to 
undergo the process of understanding the other through debate, not through any 
universal referent. Words that have value associations – such as the good life – are 
a focus for the testing of rational ideas in the attempt to show interlocutors that they 
need to challenge their views (and their cultural referents, instead of agreeing on 
the universality of these referents). 
 
 
 
                                                
57 Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct (California: W. Morrow & Co, 1994), pp. 26-7. 
58 A recent Hong Kong study allegedly managed to ‘reprogram’ subjects’ cultural mindsets 
through linguistic and visual programming.  Does this suggest that neural ‘representations of 
the self, and more generally the brain’s ability to internalize diverse cultural perspectives – 
the basis of what we call cross-cultural empathy – are flexible and dynamic works in 
progress’? See Cyrus Rolbin, Bruno della Chiesa, ‘We Share the Same Biology. Cultivating 
Cross-Cultural Empathy and Global Ethics Through Multilingualism’, Mind, Brain and 
Education, 4.4 (2010), 196-207 (p. 199). Also, S. Begley, ‘East Brain, West Brain? What a 
difference culture makes’, Newsweek, 18 February 2010. S.H. Ng, S. Han, L .Mao, J.C.L. 
Lai, ‘Dynamic bicultural brains: fMRI study of their flexible neural presentation of self and 
significant others in response to culture prime’, Asian Journal of Social Psychology 12 
(2010), 83-91. 
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Rather than relying on a universal grammar, interlocutors look towards what 
is termed 'ideal communication’.  This form of justification, rooted in pragmatic 
agreement, but formulated to transcend individuals, has been called 
transcendental-pragmatic and/or universal-pragmatic discourse.59   
Ideal communication relies on ideal conditions for argument – in other 
words, no restrictions on rational and honest debate (as discussed in Chapter Four, 
on non-coercive fora).  As well as such rules, it also relies on the idea of the 
lifeworld (‘Lebenswelt’), which Habermas suggests as the realm of social life. As 
Finlayson explains succinctly, this is a sphere that is subject to change, and has 
shifting boundaries: 
The shared meanings and understandings of the lifeworld form a unity, but 
not a totality . . . The contents of lifeworld are open to revision and change . . . 
In principle there is no reason why eventually every part of the lifeworld 
should not be revised or replaced.60 
 
 
Communication is rooted in a shared lifeworld.61 The lifeworld supports 
communicative action in that, as a shared context, it creates a platform for 
consensus. The lifeworld thus offers a place for change, and for shifting boundaries 
that means consensus can be negotiated.  
   
In conclusion, the universalisation principle is the expression through rational 
discourse of the innate human capability to achieve consensus.  It implies not only 
logistics for discourse (rules for ‘ideal’ speech), but also the possibility of mutual 
change in the lifeworlds of interlocutors, who in effect shift the boundaries of their 
social spheres or lifeworlds towards a world of agreement. 
How does this shifting of boundaries towards a new intersection of horizons 
actually work?  The following discussion (with some additions to Habermas from 
other commentators such as Taylor, Korsgaard, and Beck), suggests a five-stage 
process of universalisation formulated around the following activities: 
                                                
59 A. J. Watt, ‘Transcendental Arguments and Moral Principles’, Philosophical Quarterly 25 
(1975), 40-57 (p. 41). 
60 Finlayson, ibid, p. 52.  
61  Apel, ibid, p. 136. Also see Andreas Georg Scherer, Moritz Patzer, ‘Beyond universalism 
and relativism: Habermas' contribution to discourse ethics and its implications for 
intercultural ethics and organization theory’, Research in the Sociology of Organizations 32 
(2011), 155–180 (p. 162). 
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1. Decentralisation 
2. Recognition 
3. Accepting the responsibility of reciprocity 
4. Negotiation for consensus, and  
5. Identity creation. 
 
As this list suggests, the process aims to create the condition of ‘dual identity’, in 
terms of which the lifeworld of the interlocutor shifts towards a new situation that 
includes a part of the lifeworld of the other.  Thus the interlocutor, while remaining 
authentic in terms of his or her original lifeworld and identity expressed therein, has 
the option of a new, shared identity. 
 
6.2 	  	  Deriving	  the	  universal	  
6.2.1  Decentralisation 
We need to create space for people to speak to, and listen to, one another.62 
 
Decentralisation has three applications in this discussion in that it relates to: 
• Deliberative democracy 
• Decentralisation of place 
• Decentralisation of self. 
 
The first issue has already been mentioned in Chapter Four, in terms of the current 
argument that the social and ethical issues raised by science and technology are no 
longer the responsibility of a ‘relatively closed bureaucratic-professional-legal world 
of regulation’, but have been relocated within the public arena.63  So-called 
‘upstream engagement’ occurs when the public is involved prior to significant 
research taking place, and before attitudes towards any new technology are 
established.  
 
                                                
62 Desmond Tutu, ’We are all of one family’, The Guardian 22 October 2012, p. 24 
63 Jotterand, ‘The Politicization of Science and Technology’, ibid, p. 661. 
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Other meanings of decentralisation are probably less clear.  One meaning derives 
from the idea that universalists vainly attempt to create a neutral space, one that is 
culturally unbounded, or as Solomon puts it, ‘the result of us trying too hard to be 
“above” any particular society and culture’ has the result that ‘in the name of 
universalism, (we) find ourselves nowhere at all.’64  Yet as Westwood notes, we 
need a ‘decentred social space’, ‘a space of neutrality for practice of the politics of 
recognition.’65  
As Chinese critics have observed, ‘universalism’ can often mean an 
imposition of Western values, hence the space within which universalism is 
discussed should be neutral.66  Thus Tong refers to the decentralist context of 
intersubjective interaction to emphasise ‘that only those elements of mutual interest 
to all participants should be considered as sufficiently neutral and relevant for 
discussion – so that no 'subject  – whether an individual or a group’ can ‘declare 
itself the embodiment of reason.’67 
Postmodern conceptions of space suggest a ‘recovery of space as a social 
space’, but a space located in ‘deterritorialized’ flows of communication.  The public 
sphere is a network of discursive spaces in society.68   
The third context to the word decentralisation derives from identity. 
Cosmopolitanism, as already mentioned, implies ‘a conception of the self as a 
situated being, a person whose values and scope of moral concern have been 
shaped by history, social context, and political boundaries’.69  MacIntyre notes the 
way in which virtues that contribute to human flourishing are worked out in a 
particular community or tradition.70  
 
 
                                                
64 Robert C. Solomon, On Ethics and Living Well (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth 
Philosophical Topics, 2006), p. 145. 
65 Sallie Westwood, ‘Complex Choreography: Politics and regimes of Recognition’, in Scott 
Lash, Mike Featherstone (eds.)  Recognition and Difference  (London: Sage, 2002), 247-64 
(p. 259). 
66 Yang Hengda, ’Universal Values and Chinese Traditional Ethics’, Journal of International 
Business Ethics 3.1 (2012), 81-90 (p. 82) 
67   Gloria Davies, ibid, p. 68; Tong, Shijin, quoted, ibid. 
68 Delanty, ibid, p. 129. 
69 Eduard Jordaan, ‘Dialogic Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice’, International Studies 
Review 11 (2009), 736-48, p. 741. 
70 MacIntyre, ibid. 
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Decentralisation operates on the basis of recognising that ‘sited-ness’ within 
a community or tradition, yet also of attempting to place discourse with a wider, 
decentred or decentralised ‘social space’.  One might digress slightly to Jameson’s 
interesting concept of ‘mapping’, which combines a sense of where one is with a 
sense of unbounded, utopian space.  Arguing for the postmodern subject’s inability 
to map him/herself spatially or politically, Jameson suggests that our awareness of 
situation may reveal those ideologically derived imaginary relations that conceal 
reality from the subject, thus the ‘mental map of city space . . . can be extrapolated 
to that mental map of the social and global totality we all carry around in our heads 
in variously garbled forms.’71  The notion itself is usefully dialectic and dialogic.  
Cosmopolitan identity implies a process firstly of  detachment and then, secondly, a 
‘reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance.’ 72 
 A decentralised space is one with a neutral viewpoint, a development of the 
idea promulgated through cosmopolitanism, which has been identified with the 
adoption of an impartial viewpoint; ‘its crux is the idea that each person is equally a 
subject of moral concern, or alternatively, that in the justification of choices one 
must take the prospects of everyone affected equally into account.’73  
 Here one needs to be clear about the difference between ‘viewpoint’ and 
‘identity’. Wolfe, for example, sticks to the issue of recognising viewpoints when she 
describes a member of the pacifist Amish sect who can appreciate the position of 
someone who thinks that violence is sometimes justified, while the other can 
appreciate the Amish position; each can acknowledge that the other’s position is 
rational in its own terms, and yet each can regard him/herself as justified in 
believing and following his or her own code.  Wolfe suggests that persons can 
(sometimes) accept an outside perspective on their judgments without undermining 
their ethical convictions or succumbing to subjectivism. This defence depends on 
the assumption that conflicts are not total, i.e. that individuals will be able to agree 
                                                
71 Fredric Jameson, ‘Cognitive Mapping’, in Cary Nelson, Lawrence Grossberg (eds.)  
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Chicago: University  of Illinois Press, 1988),  347-
360 (p. 353).  
72 Bruce Robbins,  ‘Introduction part one: Actually existing cosmopolitanism’, in P. Cheng, B. 
Robbins (eds.) Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 1-19 (p. 3).  
73 Charles R.  Beitz, ‘Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the State System’ in Political 
Restructuring in Europe, ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 124. See also T.M. 
Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in Amartya Sen, Bernard Williams Utilitarianism 
and Beyond (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 103-28 (p. 116). 
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despite differing opinions.74  
 However, this thesis takes the line that viewpoint and identity are closely 
linked in discourse. This is not a particularly Habermasian view, as he falls back on 
logical argument to transcend personally held beliefs; yet it is a fact that such 
beliefs are strongly held, often due to being a part of who we are, and that they 
make rational argument and compromise difficult.  I see the two as combined; thus 
multiple identities can provide multiple viewpoints. 
 
The postmodern self is a plurality, a protean ‘multi-self’, decentred’,75 or even 
‘extracentred, so that the relation of “I’ and the other can be imagined as one of 
compossibility.’76  While we are on this postmodern level, one might also mention 
Dower, who notes the emergent transnational space of global civil society,77 which 
in its dialecticism moves seamlessly to holistic dialogism, from the productive 
tensions of either/or, to the fluid decentralisation of both/and. 
 Yet in very simplistic terms, the ‘decentralisation of self’ means rising above 
one’s culturally bound identity.  The interlocutors in discourse/pTA need a critical 
distance from the normative assumptions of their particular culture. Hendley 
describes this as a process of ‘abstraction’, i.e. of abstracting the self from one’s 
context: 
Properly moral principles are formed therefore, only by a process that 
abstracts from the particularity of one’s culture and its specific ethical ideals. 
Our concern for the concrete other, with a caring appreciation of his/her 
unique concerns and aspirations, necessarily disappears at this level of 
abstraction.78  
 
 
This may be more difficult than it sounds.  Lukes, looking at the alleged contrast 
between Western individualism and Eastern holistic modes of thought, examines  
                                                
74 S. Wolf, ‘Two levels of pluralism’, Ethics, 102. 4 (1992), 785-98 (p. 797).  
75 Walter Anderson, The Future of the Self. Inventing the Postmodern Person (New York:  
Putnam, 1997), p. 34. Kenneth Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in 
Contemporary Life (New York: Basic, 1990), p. 69. 
76 Couze Venn, ibid, p. 76. 
77 Dower however depends rather on rationality and on liberalism in his arguments) Nigel 
Dower, ‘Situating global citizenship’, in The Idea of Global Civil Society. Politics and ethics in 
a globalizing era (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 100-118. 
78 Hendley, ibid, p. 35. 
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the crucial issue of whether contrasting values and modes of thinking are ‘culturally 
ingrained or can be switched off and on.’79 In other words, can the culturally 
bound(ed) self be transcended?  Lukes argues that culturally ingrained values may 
not necessarily be deep or stable, making the point that there exists moral diversity 
in an individual’s life, as well as the possibility of moral change or evolution – 
possibly towards universalism. 
 
The dialogue structure, as Habermas predicates it, recognises reason, otherness, 
and self-awareness, but also suggests a mechanism through which universalisation 
might occur.  As Habermas stated: 
Relativising one’s own form of existence to the legitimate claims of other 
forms for life, according equal rights to aliens and others with all their 
idiosyncrasies and unintelligibility, not sticking doggedly to the universalisation 
of one’s own identity, not marginalizing that which deviates from one’s own 
identity, allowing the sphere of tolerance to become ceaselessly larger than it 
is today – all this is what moral universalism means today.80 
 
 
Expanding ‘one’s sphere of tolerance’ (which is not of course the same as respect, 
although Habermas implies that)81 does sound useful for attempts at consensus.  
But one still has a nagging feeling that in addressing a pTA group, more detail might 
be required on how exactly to do this.  The better way to see this process of 
‘tolerance’ is as suggested, one of ‘decentralisation’, of creating a neutral space in 
which no-one ’tolerates’ another, but in which interlocutors – as Habermas is at 
pains to stress elsewhere – meet as equals.  Perhaps the ‘tolerant person’ should 
rather be understood in the sense that Benn uses the concept, as someone who is  
usually not abrasive in the delivery of his judgments, is prepared to give 
others the benefit of the doubt, and is inclined to regard them as sincere and 
rational until shown otherwise. He pursues his disagreements by means of 
argument rather than force or abuse, and is open to the possibility that he 
may be wrong himself.  But he does not thereby come to believe that his own  
                                                
79 Lukes, ibid, p. 84. 
80 S.K. White, ‘Ethics, Politics and History: An Interview with Jorgen Habermas, conducted 
by J-F. Ferry’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 14 (1988), 433-439 (p. 436). 
81 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Wann müssen wir tolerant sein? Über die Konkurrenz von Weltbildern, 
Werten und Theorien,’ Lecture at the Leibniz Conference at the Berlin-Brandenburg 
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views are no more true than the views of those who seem to disagree with 
him. It is possible to be tolerant while believing that others, to put it brutally, 
are simply in the wrong.82 
 
 
McCarthy’s ‘reflective equilibrium’ modifies one’s individual narrative, as MacIntye 
suggests, to express a wider coherence values embedded in the communities 
within which the individual lives.83  Simply put, through reflective dialogue, we 
discover common ground. Taylor suggests that we must 
learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formally taken 
for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility 
alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture. The 
‘fusion of horizons' operates through our developing new vocabularies of 
comparison.84 
 
Zeiler, attempting a ‘theoretical underpinning for a bioethics that recognises the 
diversity of traditions and experiences without leading to relativism’, suggests 
searching ‘principally for sameness.’85  
This brings us to the issue of recognition.  
	  
6.2.2	  Recognition	  	  
What we should chiefly desire is to find ways to empower ourselves, 
individually and collectively, that also connect us, and ways to connect us 
that also empower us.86 
 
 
The name associated with the ‘politics of recognition’ is often that of Charles Taylor, 
with his notion of ‘other-understanding’ leading to a ‘fusion of horizons’ – a phrase 
borrowed from Gadamer’s ‘Horizontverschmelzung’.  Taylor uses it somewhat 
broadly, given that Gadamer’s initial usage of the term is contextualised in a 
                                                
82 Piers Benn, Ethics, (London: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2001), p. 20. 
83 J. McCarthy, ‘Principlism or narrative ethics: Must we choose between them>?’, Medical 
Humanities 29.2 (2003), 65-71.  
84 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism, and “The Politics of Recognition” (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1992), p. 67. 
85 Kristin Zeiler, ‘Self and other in global bioethics: critical hermeneutics and the example of 
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86 Sen, Development as Freedom, ibid,  p. 153. 
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discussion of the intersection of history with the present, but the concept offers a 
succinct view of one rising above the self.  Gadamer states that: 
Transposing ourselves consists neither in the empathy of one individual for 
another nor in subordinating another person to our own standards; rather, it 
always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our 
own particularity but also that of the other. The concept of ‘horizon’ suggests 
itself because it expresses the superior breadth of vision that the person who 
is trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one 
learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not in order to look away from it 
but to see it better.  
 
Understanding happens when our present understanding or horizon is moved to a 
new understanding or horizon by an encounter; ‘understanding is always the fusion 
of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves.’ 87 
 
Before the phrase ‘politics of recognition’ derails the discussion, it can be noted that 
Taylor’s work on recognition and multiculturalism is often used in political matters 
such as indigenous land rights; yet the idea of ‘recognition’ often means a 
sociological or ethical concept as opposed to a political one, and so this discussion 
uses it in those terms. 
Gadamer’s approach, of an I-Thou relationship characterised by openness 
and respectful questioning, hopefully allows one to recognise and respect the other 
as both the same and different, using a language based on a ‘moral economy of 
interdependence.’88  Let us examine the notion of recognition. 
As Beck’s theory of cosmopolitanism suggests, the willingness to work 
through dialogue rather than imposition needs to be matched by a willingness to 
move beyond narrow nationalism with its exclusion of ‘otherness.’ His definition of 
cosmopolitanism therefore implies the ‘dialogic imagination, the capacity to explore 
creatively the contradictions within and between cultures.’89  
                                                
87 H-G. Gadamer, Truth and method (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 
2004, Kindle edition, location 4668).   
88   Ann Robertson, ‘Beyond Apocalyptic Demography: Towards a Moral Economy of 
Interdependence’, Ageing and Society 17 (1997), 425-446. 
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(2002), 1-16, p. 4.  
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Recognition, in terms of Gadamer’s I-Thou, or Beck’s ‘creative exploration of 
contradictions’, obviously suggests a recognition of difference. This means 
overcoming that well-known instinctive distrust of the ‘strange’ (that in its extreme 
form manifests as xenophobia).  This involves a genuine struggle to recognise the 
validity and reality of others’ views, moving beyond the instinctive reaction of ‘that’s 
stupid’ when faced with a different view of how something might be done or 
intellectualised.90  Charles Taylor’s ethos of ‘other-understanding’ suggests that to 
‘really’ encounter the other – as opposed to encountering one’s own view of the 
other – we must ‘give due acknowledgment only to what is universally present – 
everybody has an identity – through recognising what is peculiar to each’; he 
suggests an active effort to recognise difference.91 
 As Todorov argued when discussing Rousseau’s ‘good universalism’, it is 
based on dialogue and on becoming 'thoroughly familiar with the particular’ so that 
the universal, the ‘horizon of understanding between two particulars’ may therefore 
be achieved.92 
Recognition is only the first step; a particular kind of recognition is meant, one 
that encourages the cultivation of:  
... an unconditional desire to view and harness other people’s uniqueness and 
difference, not as a threat but as a complement to one’s own humanity... The 
relation with the ‘other’ is one of subjective equality.93 
 
 
Taylor saw the process of understanding the differences between worldviews as 
one of  ‘letting people be’ or of not asserting power over difference. Recognition of 
people for what they are allows us ‘to reach a common language, common human 
understanding, which would allow both us and them undistortively to be.’94 But here 
one might argue with Taylor. Recognition is not meant to be an appreciation of 
everything about the other, as Taylor implies, but the recognition of ‘humanity.’  In  
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91 Taylor, Multiculturalism, ibid, pp. 25, 39. 
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other words, it is a search for recognition of the principle of humanity.  This implies, 
to borrow a phrase from Rumeili, that we need to distinguish between ‘good’ and 
‘bad ‘forms of othering’.’95  
One might conceptualise the idea of ‘bad othering’ as an utterly bland, 
passive acceptance of the other compared to ‘good othering’, which is an evaluative 
recognition, an active attempt to understand and to relate. 
Rumeili discusses identity formation through differentiation (recognising the 
other), and here we come to the positive side of the process – once one has gone 
to all the effort of appreciating another’s humanity, the payoff comes in the form of a 
greater sense of self.  As Taylor rather more obliquely puts it, ’in the case of the 
politics of difference, we might say that a universal potential is at its basis, namely, 
the potential for forming and defining one’s own identity.’96 Mead’s theory of identity 
formation (from which Habermas was later to borrow) sees this as taking on the role 
of community identity. In his work on the genesis of the self, Mead argues that 
taking the role of the other is the mechanism that allows the development of self-
consciousness, in that taking on the attitudes of the community means constituting 
the self from these same attitudes.97  Finally, Merleau-Ponty also has a definition of 
this process. In Madison’s view, Merleau-Ponty’s ethics are founded on the notion 
of the self and other as coexisting symbiotically, ‘reciprocally confirming each other 
in their own being’ through an ethics of ‘reversibility or reciprocity’, in terms of which 
the self cannot be known until recognised by the other:98  
In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person 
and myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a 
single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the 
state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which 
neither is the creator…We are collaborators in a consummate reciprocity. Our  
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perspectives merge into another [cf. Gadamer’s notion of a “fusion of 
horizons’].99 
 
 
Taylor thinks identity is created dialogically, through our interactions with others: ‘If 
human identity is dialogically created and constructed, then there is room for us to 
deliberate about those aspects of identity that we potentially share’.100  Recognition 
thus implies not only an active process of understanding, tolerating and 
appreciating the other, but recognising that reciprocal humanity. Recognition of 
difference is accompanied by recognition of sameness.  
 
Before looking at reciprocity, however, one should note that the recognition process 
has been criticised as unfeasible.  It has been argued that Habermas’s interest in 
cultural specificity, the lifeworld of the interlocutor, meaning that s/he is embedded 
in the argumentative praxis of a specific social world with a specific cultural and 
historical legacy,101 renders the possibility of later universalisation unlikely.  Equally, 
critics condemn Benhabib, as her development of Habermas’s ideas still does not 
demonstrate how recognition of specificity develops into universalism:  
Habermas . . . situates rather than universalizes the conditions for truth . . . 
Benhabib’s attempt at overcoming the same dualism by demanding a focus 
on the other has similar strengths and weaknesses . . . (as) the process of 
recognising the other is not natural and automatic, but depends on socially 
variable conditions. Thus Benhabib merely displaces the problem of 
universalism on to these new procedures for judgment which are not 
sufficiently universal to be adequate to the task demanded of them. The ‘act 
of recognition’ requires a social process of assessment as to what constitutes 
the same or different from oneself.102 
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Linking moral action to its cultural basis implies a reduced scope as the focus shifts 
towards local problem solving.103  In short, we can never transcend our own 
historical and cultural situations.  
Yet Habermas defended what he calls a ‘correctly understood universalism’ 
by noting that universalism need not assimilate heterogeneity by levelling cultural 
differences, since a ‘correctly understood community’ constitutes itself through the 
‘negative idea of abolishing discrimination’; ‘inclusion of the other’ implies 
community openness as well as free and equal recognition.104  
Perhaps a simple way of characterising recognition is through the idea of 
hospitality, which has been suggested by some theorists as the way forward for 
cosmopolitan ethics.105  Derrida’s cosmopolitanism (although perhaps unhappily 
Eurocentric) foregrounds the notion of hospitality in the ethical welcoming of the 
stranger,106 and is a neat, practical way (within certain parameters of the word 
‘practical’) to ground our recognition of otherness.  
As Habermas might put it, the universalisation principle requires participants 
to attend to the values and interests of each person as a unique individual:  
conversely, each individual conditions her judgment about the moral import of 
her values and interests on what all participants can freely accept. 
Consequently, moral discourse is structured in a way that links moral validity 
with solidaristic concern for both the concrete individual and the morally 
formative communities on which her identity depends.107 
 
 
Webb might refer to the ‘longstanding European tradition of humanism with its 
various considerations of shared moral understanding, the cultivation of the self, 
mutual reciprocity, social virtues, and the common good’ in his discussion of 
virtuous practice, but in fact, the notion is not humanism as much as recognition of 
humanity.108  It is an active process, in the sense that it implies, as Eze has said, a 
desire to utilise the human potential recognised in the other, presumably aimed 
towards mutual flourishing.  
                                                
103 H.J. Schneider, ‘Ethisches Argumentieren’, in H. Hastedt, E. Martens (eds.) Ethik. Ein 
Grundkurs (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1994), pp. 13–47. 
104 Jürgen Habermas, ’Preface’, in The inclusion of the other, ibid, xxxv–xxxvii (p. xxxiv-vf). 
105 Turner, ‘Cosmopolitan Virtue’, ibid.  
106 Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London: Routledge, 2001). 
107 See <plato.stanford.edu/entries/Habermas>. 
108  S.A. Webb, Social Work in a Risk Society  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 
233. 
 235 
	  
6.2.3	  	  The	  responsibility	  of	  reciprocity?	  
Habermas situates rational collective will outside formal organisations, for 
discourses do not govern. They generate a communicative power that cannot 
take the place of administration but can only influence it.109 
 
 
Mutual flourishing requires a sense of responsibility, or obligation, towards the other 
as s/he flourishes alongside me.  This is a tenet of much Western philosophy, in 
terms of Christian responsibility for others, but is also found in Confucian ethics.  
Confucius was alleged to have responded to the question of whether there was ‘any 
single word that could guide one’s entire life’ with the word ‘reciprocity’ – ‘what you 
do not wish for yourself, do not do to others.’110  As Madison notes, this view is a 
‘prototype of the ethics of mutual recognition called for today by the logic of 
globalization.’111 
 
However, reciprocity suggests a rather idealistic view of humankind, given multiple 
examples from daily life can demonstrate how individuals have exploitative desires 
focused purely on their own good, often at the expense of other people's flourishing.  
It implies that all human beings posses some form of basic virtue, their humanity 
equating with a concern for others.  Jonas might have a better way of looking at 
this. In his ‘Verantwortungsethik’ he suggests that to feel responsibility, one must 
become aware of the fragility of the other, i.e. that we hear the call of the other’s 
‘perishability, indigence, and insecurity.’112  This requires a moment of care and 
apprehension for humankind, prompted by fear.  Similarly, Rorty’s view of human 
solidarity promotes the idea of ‘increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of 
the pain and humiliations of other, unfamiliar sorts of people.’113   
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Jonas’s ‘heuristics of fear’ suggest that we share the fear of our mutual 
human vulnerability – which is thus the source of responsibility.  It can be argued 
though, that it is precisely that sort of fear that one would rather not acknowledge 
and that denial is very much a twenty-first century mode. 
   
Habermas suggests the basic virtue is a willingness to communicate, with the intent 
to reach agreement – a virtue that implies openness and receptivity.  This does not 
necessarily imply responsibility and obligation, except in a limited sense, such as 
that of participating in dialogue.  Cortina similarly states that an awareness of one’s 
responsibility to participate in public debate becomes the crucial point for a 
‘phenomenisation’ of civic morality that brings citizens together.114  
 If we look back to cosmopolitanism for some help on this matter, as Beck 
and Grande have noted, it is insufficient merely to want ‘good’; there must also be a 
cosmopolitan ethics of responsibility.115  The theories of Weisband, who develops 
discourse ethics with an implied notion of responsibility, provide a more overt idea 
of discourse accountability.116  
Weisband, having stated that he believes in a decentralised approach to 
ethics, or as he describes it, a networked approach that encourages participation, is 
less hierarchical, and recognizes ‘nebulous or uncertain boundaries of governance.’  
He then suggests something termed ‘reciprocal inter-subjectivity’, discussing how 
the self and other are ‘reciprocally exchanged’ through virtue and ‘reversibility’ (or 
‘becoming’ the other’), for 
it is through the language of reciprocated accountabilities that we construct 
our social or collective identities in ways connected to the progression of a 
postmodern public ethics. And this becomes a key to our display of virtue . . .  
through accountability practices and relationships.117  
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Weisband’s ideas, despite their merits, are limited in application.  Offering 
accountability practices as ‘a kind of postmodern text written about appearances’, 
Weisband mentions the technique of naming and shaming as one useful 
accountability-promoting technique, given the effectiveness of credibility loss as a 
sanctioning mechanism in global postmodern societies.118  This may be partially 
effective against corporations, depending on how much public outcry affects their 
market share, but less so on the many other global issues that require agreement.   
Gutmann and Thompson distinguish between reciprocity and accountability, 
seeing the first as expressive of a sense of mutuality that citizens bring to a public 
forum, and the second as a part of democratic deliberation (individual 
responsibility).119 
Korsgaard has a different approach, linking agency to identity via morality.  To 
explain, obligations arise out of the practical identities we maintain in our everyday 
life – in other words,  
When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all your 
desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desires to work 
on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your action is 
one that you regard as being expressive of yourself.120   
  
 
Thus to be oneself is to be a moral self. In fact, any ‘practical conceptions of your 
identity which are fundamentally inconsistent with the value of humanity must be 
given up’; she gives the example of an assassin, whose identity does not derive 
from the value of humanity he demonstrates.  Korsgaard adds a further dimension 
by arguing that one’s moral identity is practically arrived at through social 
interaction. One perceives obligation as necessary due to threats to one’s identity – 
in other words, ignoring social obligation means accepting such a threat to your self: 
The conception of one’s identity here is not a theoretical one . . . It is better 
understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description 
under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth 
undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity.121 
 
                                                
118 Weisband, ibid, pp. 315, 335. 
119 Gutmann, Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, ibid, p. 67. 
120 C. Korsgaard, Normativity, ibid, p.100.  
121 Korsgaard, ibid, pp. 101-102.  
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This is all, however, a little too vague, just as Habermas’s species-ethic was in 
describing how we innately desire consensus.  Dostoevsky, would have reminded 
such philosophers that the human being can be innately perverse, desiring neither 
consensus nor a practical moral identity.  Korsgaard argues though, that the 
‘process of self-constitution’ requires us to act morally.  A commitment to the moral 
law is built right into the activity that, by virtue of being human, we are necessarily 
engaged in: the activity of making something of ourselves.  The moral law is the law 
of self-constitution.122 
 
Given that responsible reciprocity is not clearly defined, let us look then at self-
creation as another, and perhaps more useful stage, in this process of ‘deriving the 
universal’.  
Before doing so, the notion of compromise (as the outcome of) requires brief 
discussion to see whether/if that contributes to identity creation. 
 
 
6.2.4	  	  Negotiation	  and	  consensus	  
Incomprehension and misunderstanding, intentional and involuntary 
untruthfulness, concealed and open discord can distort dialogue and prevent 
consensus.123 
 
 
The process of examining cultural differences, achieving dialogue, and then 
attaining compromise sounds fairly easy.  Or is it?  To understand oneself is a 
process of unmasking negotiation temptations to ‘to deny our mutuality’, of learning 
that although  ‘you and I are irreducibly different from each other’, as human beings 
we are of the same basic constitution:  
Our common constitution demands mutual recognition. Nonetheless, because 
our vulnerabilities are never eliminated, we must constantly struggle to 
achieve it. This is a struggle against the misrecognition of others at the same 
time that it is a struggle for recognition of oneself by others.124  
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Presumably, in Habermasian terms, such vulnerabilities are counteracted by 
rational discussion.  Let us examine what Habermas has to say about reasoned 
debate aimed at consensus.  
Habermas suggests that, relevant reasons should be acceptable to any 
reasonable agent.  This takes the notion of one’s subjective reasons a little further 
than the sphere of testing through assessment of sincerity, onto a more universal 
level instead. Habermas presupposes that a universal (ideal) consensus results if 
participants argue reasonably (and presumably for long enough so that all 
arguments are tested).   
He does, however, appear to admit that ethical claims may be difficult for 
consensus, for example, because many are bound to introduce questions of the 
good life for individuals or groups and are therefore values-based, and so 
situationally determined (in that an individual’s view of the good may be largely 
determined by his/her education and upbringing, class structure, nationality and so 
forth).  
It can be noted though, that one class of ethical questions for which 
Habermas requires universal consensus are species-wide ethical issues relating to 
the nature of the human being raised by new technologies such as genetic 
engineering.125  
 
However, where different discourses lead to competing conclusions, or when issues 
arise in which discourse becomes unclear and/or deeply contested, Habermas 
appears to rely on the basic notion of his discourse theory – that we communicate 
in order to understand and reach consensus, rather than to fight for deeply held 
beliefs.126  Where disagreement arises, this is a ‘distortion’ of discourse, meaning 
that there has been a derailment of the process, perhaps a lack of understanding, a 
lack of sincerity or validity. Habermas insists on the universality of the grammatical 
                                                
125 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, ibid. 
126 See McCarthy for commentary on Habermas and the issue of contested arguments: 
Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1978), and Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). 
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role of concepts such as truth, rationality or justification, regardless of their differing 
interpretations.127  
This may seem rather idealistic, for dialogue leading to consensus is a 
process of disagreement. Consensus might never be reached.  Yet, as Gutmann 
argues, though there may be irresolvable cultural differences about some moral 
matters, the more significant issues (at least as far as political ethics, which is her 
topic, is concerned) are the fundamental matters on which individuals agree:  
No culture or political community with which we are familiar gives its members 
good reasons for rejecting principles or practices that protect innocent people 
from being enslaved, tortured, murdered and malnourished, imprisoned, 
rendered homeless or subject to abnormal physical pain and sickness.128 
 
 
As Hutchings argues, any approach to global ethics must start with the problem of 
‘identifying and achieving justice in a context in which right-minded people 
disagree’,129 though ‘the question of what is right in some cases lacks a unique and 
determinate answer.’130  
 The principles already discussed, those of decentralisation, negotiation 
(forcing opponents into decentring their perspectives by recognising the validity of 
other perspectives), and of reciprocity, suggest that there are forces that counteract 
‘unresolvable’ argument. There is also, arguably, room for answers rather than one 
answer; we are reminded of Lyotard’s postmodern conception of justice as 
distinguished by divergence, multiplicity, contestation, novelty, and opinion, of an 
ethical theory the task of which is ‘to recover principles from tradition and to clarify 
the meaning of local norms and institutions.’131  As Habermas notes, compromise 
may be a dynamic and constantly evolving process rather than a final achievement.  
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Gutmann and Thompson also suggest a partial consensus, arguing that 
participants in democratic discourse are not being asked to change their first-order 
beliefs, but  
To discover what aspects of those beliefs could be accepted as principles and 
policies by other citizens with whom they fundamentally disagree. Since it is 
this second-order agreement that citizens should seek, they do not have to 
trade off their personal moral views against public values.132 
 
 
Bargaining, or working out disagreements with a view to individual interests, is 
common in deliberation. Gutmann and Thompson argue for its value, as long as it is 
constrained by the overall value of reciprocity. 
Dialogue results in openness to the other, ‘recognizing that I myself must 
accept something against me’ in attempting to fuse horizons.133  This learning 
process can be characterized by the example of the three-stage model of 
communicative cultural integration proposed by Wohlrapp.  In the first step actors 
have to submit themselves to the ‘experience’ of the other as something beyond the 
familiar. In the second step the actors strive to achieve an ‘understanding’ of the 
experienced unfamiliarities, and a third step aims to ‘produce peaceability.’134  
 
Dialogue ethics innately suggests compromise. Habermas defines consensus in a 
way that suggests that it may not be ideal, but merely ‘preferred’, a state wherein 
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's 
interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known 
alternative possibilities for regulation).135 
 
Another way of looking at this issue of ‘open’ consensus is dialectically. This term is 
used in a broad sense in this thesis to mean a creative tension between opposites 
(including between the notions of agreement and disagreement). Dialecticism is 
based on the idea of dialogue and the dialogic/dialectical self: 
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. . . the self is not merely a recipient of cultural forms, passively absorbing a 
range of values . . . Agents participate in a cultural world, engaging in 
transactions of meaning and furthering the social reproduction of various 
ways of understanding the world . . . The core claim in the dialogical 
conception of the self is that the self is a product of social interaction.136 
 
 
Out of such dialogue and dialogic activity, a dialectic can be developed.  Thus 
Siep’s fluid dialogue between universal and local, Gill’s Stoical/Aristotelian model of 
a ‘complex, forward-and-back negotiation between localized and universal norms’ in 
his pluralist approach to the problem,137  Etzioni’s productive tension between 
individual and community, Beck’s ‘glocalism’, all suggest a harmonious relationship 
between consensus/dissensus.  (Multiculturalism, in Beck’s view, asserts plurality, 
fostering a ‘collective image of humanity in which the individual remains dependent 
on his cultural sphere’; being local yet cosmopolitan, he is ‘glocal.139) 
 Consensus derives from the decentralised space that is created from such 
fluid dialecticism.  
 Another way of looking at fluid dialecticism is to examine the concept of 
negotiation, which as Gutmann and Thompson have already argued, can operate 
as a second-order process that may be in a dialectic relationship with first-order 
beliefs.  
 
There are two ways in which negotiation might be used as a term in this discussion: 
as negotiated identity, and as a negotiation strategy. The point, however, is that in 
terms of discourse identity, the two are closely linked.   
Dhanda, arguing that identity is negotiated, sees it as a combination of 
Rorty’s flexible bargaining method of developing identity, combined with Taylor’s 
view that there are underlying ‘moral ontologies’ that reveal our sense of the truth of 
who we are. Dhanda uses the useful analogy of a stranger in a town – the ‘map’ he 
might use to find his way correlates to Taylor’s belief that there is a background 
situation which is fixed, whereas when trying to find a specific building, you might 
supplement the map by asking directions, taking advice and seeking other’s 
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guidance while attempting to find the new address. This is another version of 
Gutmann and Thompson’s double-order process of deliberation. 
 Thus Dhanda comes up with the ‘givens’ for a negotiation strategy, of which 
the most relevant is that there must be an acceptance of ‘fixed’ identity as well as 
‘open, for ‘our practical identities locate us in a particular time and place. All our 
negotiations for identity must proceed from this location’.140   
There is also a pragmatic element, explained best perhaps by Williams 
when he notes that we share a social space, and that such sharing gives us 
. . . some shared understanding of the psychological bases of moral 
agreement and disagreement themselves; a sense of the virtues, of expected 
conduct, or of public principle, and with these we work, in seeking to articulate 
and perhaps resolve disagreements.141  
 
The idea of sharing suggests that we may look at the idea of shared versus 
individual identity.  
	  
6.2.5	  	  Creating	  identity	  
The self . . . is a process of socialization that itself already presupposes the 
structure of relations of reciprocal recognition.142 
 
 
Sen’s attempt to create a new approach to the issue of global justice, one that 
seeks a way between the established approaches of ‘grand universalism’ and 
‘national particularism’, in terms of so-called ‘plural affiliation’, predicates identity as 
a nexus of global and national aspects of affiliation.143  Appiah’s cosmopolitan 
approach requires people ‘to be capable of living double lives, of stepping outside  
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themselves, of taking a position both in a culture and external to it.’144  More 
specifically, Beck argues that cosmopolitanism requires an epistemological shift, for 
we need to learn how to operate in two frames of reference, the local and the 
global.145 To do this, we need to cultivate a different self, what one might call a 
‘global’ or decentralised self, less firmly tethered to time and place.  The self is 
defined in (post)modernity as radically un-dogmatic, aware of limitations, dual, i.e. 
both a universal self as well as a situated self.   
  This can be seen as adopting, in addition to one’s culturally bounded self, 
the identity of a ‘global citizen.’ It also raises the issue of global moral duty, as 
discussed by Walzer, O’Neill, Singer, and Nussbaum, for example, in terms of 
whether global moral obligations are as important as one’s national or local 
duties.146  In other words, has this idea returned us most unhelpfully to the 
universalism/relativism debate?  Miller, in suggesting that ‘international law must 
overcome its apparent bias in favor of states and open its institutions, procedures, 
and principles to individuals who might then act as “world citizens” by accepting 
moral responsibilities towards humankind as such’, argues that: 
talk about the ‘world community’ can best be understood as an attempt to 
apply “communitarian”, i.e., particularist principles of responsibility and 
obligations, to the universe of humankind.  According to our conventional 
philosophical wisdom, this is an evident paradox.  International solidarity 
would mean that states should assume the same kind and degree of 
responsibility for the wellbeing of any part of humankind as they reserve for 
their own nationals.147  
 
 
This does sound a little too idealistic, though. 
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Habermas’s notion of a cosmopolitan public sphere suggests a post-national 
citizenship that is not anchored in territory or the cultural heritage of institutions, but 
involves an identification with the normative principles of the constitution.  However, 
this gives it a political aspect, in that a democratic constitution is essential.  On 
global citizenship, he argues a little vaguely that ‘only a democratic citizenship that 
does not close itself off in a particularistic fashion can pave the way for a world 
citizenship, which is already taking shape today in worldwide political 
communication.’148 In other words, the global citizen is simply a citizen of global 
discourse. 
 
Rather, we are looking for a global identity that can be adopted in addition to one’s 
first-order or culturally bound self. This is a version of Delanty’s argument that: 
The decoupling of citizenship and nationality is strikingly evident in the 
question of identity . . . with identity increasingly becoming the basis of 
participatory politics . . . the politics of identity is more than just the assertion 
of identity . . . identity is not an inherent personality of cultural condition but 
something that can be freely chosen and is not exclusive.  This emphasis on 
multiple identities is one of the main changes in identity formation today.149   
 
 
Not even multiple identities, but a dialogic or dialectic self, as not only does society 
create self, but the self in turn creates society.  As Appiah notes:   
The self is . . . dialogically constituted because it is in dialogue with other 
peoples’ understanding of who I am that I develop a conception of my identity 
. . . also because my identity is crucially constructed through concepts (and 
practices) made available to me by religion, society, school, and state, and 
mediated to varying degrees by the family.150 
 
 
Thus the ideal discourse agent is someone with a dual identity that is dialectically 
fluid. How does one become this person?  The principle of universalisation is 
intended to compel the universal exchange of roles that Mead called ‘ideal role-
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taking’ or ‘universal discourse’.151  Habermas, it is known, took some of his ideas 
from Mead.  In ‘Individuation through Socialization:  On George Herbert Mead’s  
‘Theory of Subjectivity’,  1992), Habermas extends Mead’s idea of the socialized 
self whose identity is formed through relationships: 
. . . universalistic form of life, in which everyone can take up the perspective of 
everyone else and can count on reciprocal recognition by everybody, makes it 
possible for individuated beings to exist within a community – individualism as 
the flipside of universalism.  Taking up a relationship to a projected form of 
society is what first makes it possible for me to take my own life history 
seriously as a principle of individuation – to regard it as it were the product of 
decisions for which I am responsible.152 
 
 
In other words, the individual must see him/herself as responsible for his/her own 
morality, while socialisation, or recognition of the other, develops that process of 
(moral) self-recognition.  S/he becomes someone with a dual identity that can be 
called ‘intersubjective.’  In other words, her/his dual identity is a reciprocal 
recognition of mutual, shared, or intersubjective humanity. 
 
Therefore, the suggestion is that the universalism/relativism debate can be 
reframed in contemporary terms as part of a pluralist globality based on a decentred 
and dual identity, a ‘reciprocating intersubjectivity.'  
 
This can be expressed simply, in terms of values, as Yang does:  
The Confucian ethics code ‘do not do to others what you do not want done to 
yourself’ coincides with the . . . ‘Golden Rule’ of the West . . . According to 
Confucius, the relationship between oneself and others is an interactive one, 
which is a form of inter-subjectivity, as expressed by him in ‘wishing to be 
established oneself, one seeks also to establish others, wishing to enlarge 
oneself, one seeks also to enlarge others’, and win-win is achieved through 
inter-subjective interaction.153 
 
Or it can be expressed as a methodological issue.  Gan makes this point, arguing  
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for the combination of universal principle and practical (i.e. method-based) 
adaptation to a situation as an ‘effective combination’ for ‘people to handle and 
settle moral differences’.154 
 
In terms of methodology, what does ‘dualism’ mean?  We have already discussed 
the idea of dialectic. 
There is always a dialectic between self and society.  Communitarianism for 
example, while it emphasizes the importance of community is also very focused on 
the notion of otherness, or difference: ‘communitarians invoke Heidegger's 
Differenz, Derrida's differance, Lyotard's differend, Levinas's heteronomy, and 
Mikhail Bakhtin's heteroglossia’, and advocate Foucault’s  ‘opposition to any kind of 
universal rational ethics.’155  In short, community implies pluralism, a group of selves 
and others. We find our group identity through our own identity, through identifying 
with, and noting our difference to, otherness; as Etzioni states, ‘the dichotomous 
opposition between partiality and impartiality, or between particularistic and 
universal obligations, holds only if we assume that one’s position on this matter 
must be all-encompassing’, for ‘in social reality people often combine the two 
orientations.’156   
Etzioni suggests that the particularistic is part of the communitarian, for 
particularistic obligations are part of the socially embedded self.  And, although as 
Sandel argues, we understand ourselves as the ‘particular persons we are – as 
members of this family or community or nation or people’, 157 communities are 
essential for one’s particular identity.  A particularist obligation includes the 
nurturing of a moral ecology within which communities function, and within which 
moral ideas can be universalized.  The relationship between individual and 
community, unless defective, will not necessarily manifest itself in dichotomy,158 but  
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rather, as Etzioni suggests, through a ‘productive tension.’  Thus we find our way to  
the development of an ‘intercultural personhood.’159 Kim explains thus:  
The term, intercultural identity, is employed as a counterpoint to, and as an 
extension of, cultural identity, and as a concept that represents the 
phenomenon of identity adaptation and transformation beyond the perimeters 
of the conventional, categorical conception of cultural identity . . . through 
prolonged and cumulative intercultural communication experiences, 
individuals around the world can, and do, undergo a gradual process of 
intercultural evolution.160 
 
 
For Habermas, moral development meant maturing beyond adherence to social 
contracts,  to a new stage of guidance by universal ethics principles.  This does not 
mean forgetting one’s context or community-driven social contract, but rather that 
the developed human being is able to transcend the latter when it is considered 
unjust. Thus  
rational autonomy supersedes societal concerns . . . at Stage 5, with its social 
contract . . . right consists of an awareness that people hold a variety of 
values and opinions . . . But for Kohlberg and Habermas, some non-relative 
values and rights . . . must be valued regardless of societal opinion. Stage 6 
provides another example: The right choice is viewed as self-chosen, based 
on universal ethical principles.161 
 
 
Is this theory of stage 6 based too much on Western principles of ego-development 
and autonomy?162  Eastern critics have disagreed, stating that Kohlberg’s 6 stages 
include 3 stages that are culturally universal, and 3 that are culture-bound.  In short, 
the model itself is dialectical, involving both universalism and relativism, in a fluid 
structure that implies movement across the boundary between culture and universe, 
and that can ‘integrate’ the two different perspectives of collectivism and 
individualism, while acknowledging their differences.163  
                                                
159 Taylor, Multiculturalism, ibid, 66-67; Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Society’, ibid, p. 25. 
160 Young Yun Kim, ’Intercultural personhood: Globalization and a way of being’, 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations 32.4 (2008), 359-368 (p. 359). 
161 Anthony J. Cortsese, The Restructuring of Moral Theory (New York: SUNY Press, 1990), 
p.  143. 
162 Kohlberg has of course been heavily criticized by feminist critics such as Carol Gilligan. 
See her In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).  
163 Hing Keung, ‘The Chinese perspectives on Moral Judgment Development’, International 
Journal of Psychology 23 (1988), 201-227 (p. 202). See also D.S. Dien, ‘A Chinese 
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Table 10: China/EU points of similarity/dissimilarity in nanotechnology 
discussions 
 
East  West 
Risk and economics – are primary 
foci 
Risk and economics – are primary 
foci 
 Precautionary principle applied 
Economic issues in terms of 
consumer attitude 
Economic issues but also wider 
societal issues, i.e. enhancement 
pTA an emerging context for 
nanpolicy 
pTA established for nanopolicy 
Ren-ethics – benevolence  Principlism –  i.e. do no harm 
 
Approach to nano based on 
harmony or tao 
Approach to nano based on 
reasoning and argumentation 
	  
6.3	  Identity	  formation	  and	  nanoethics	  
(It is necessary to) . . . shake off the yoke of national prejudices, to get to 
know men by their conformities and their differences, and to acquire that 
universal knowledge that is not exclusively of one century or of one country 
but of all times and of all places, and thus is, so to speak, the common 
science of the wise.164 
 
 
How do all the above ideas fit within nanotechnology pTA?  
Am looks at the German NanoKommission in terms of the creation of new 
trust relationships in the governance of nanotechnology, i.e. with a view to how a  
 
                                                                                                                                    
perspective on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development’, Developmental Review 2 (1983), 
331-341. 
164 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses (trans V. Gurevich) (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 219.   
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new ‘we’ in governing can arise amongst previously disparate positions transformed 
by ‘new relations of trust and mutual responsibilities’.165  Am refers to a new ethos 
governing participatory governance, or democratic deliberative governance, 
suggesting that stakeholder fora like the NanoKommission can both offer a 
decentralised forum for responsible nanodebate, and  
Contribute to the forming of new identities and the creation of a new style of 
governance that is marked by new relations of trust among actors who might 
previously have entered into controversies about an emerging technology . . . 
can contribute to the development of trust and mutual responsibility of the 
involved actors . . . bring about effects on the formation of boundaries of what 
is sayable and thinkable in nanotechnology governance.166 
 
 
Am draws from literature on identity building in deliberative policy, and from 
Szerszynski on how trust transforms social identities and relationships.167  However, 
rather than suggesting how such identity transformations might work, Am moves to 
a focus on how the deliberative process becomes less transparent due to the 
concealment of political agendas within the forum.  Thus her article, while promising 
a way forward, also cautions against the way in which acting together in 
governance networks can produce restraints. 
  
On decentralised or distributed responsibility, one aspect of the individual identity 
element of global ethics brings us to the individual responsibility of the scientist. 
Kjolberg and Strand look at EU-CoC, The EU Code of Conduct for scientists 
(discussed in Chapter Three), as bringing ‘the concept of responsible nanoresearch 
a long way’ but as having one ‘crucial element’ lacking, namely ‘responsible 
nanoresearch as increased awareness of moral choices.’168  By this they mean that  
 
 
 
                                                
165 Heidrun Åm, ‘Trust as Glue in Nanotechnology Governance Networks’, NanoEthics 5.1 
(April 2011), 115-128 (p. 116). 
166 Am, ibid, p. 117.  
167 B. Szerszynski, ‘Risk and trust: The Performative Dimensions’,  Environmental Values 8 
(1999), 239-252. See also M. Hajer, H. Wagenaar (eds.) Deliberative Policy Analysis. 
Understanding Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 139-171. 
168 Kamilla Lein Kjølberg,  Roger Strand, ‘Conversations About Responsible Nanoresearch’, 
NanoEthics 5.1 (April, 2011), 99-113 (p. 99). 
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researchers’ responsibilities might be assessed according to criteria that seem 
poorly defined.   
 And, as Subra notes, the issue is not simply one of research ethics, but also 
of disparate standards in reviewing such ethics: ‘disparate standards for scientific 
merit review and differences in the infrastructure that ensure professional ethics and 
scientific integrity...are further exacerbated by cultural differences that arise from 
the large range of social perspectives and stages of national development.’169  
What is needed, the article suggests, is a different kind of thinking about 
responsibility, following Schomberg’s 2007 call for ‘new and badly-needed 
intermediate deliberative science policy structures’,170 namely,  forms of distributed 
responsibility, that place more emphasis on the individual. The authors introduce 
Pellizzioni’s notion of responsibility as a ‘willingness to understand and confront the 
other’s commitment and concern with our own, to look for a possible terrain of 
sharing’, that ‘entails readiness to rethink our own problem definition, goals, 
strategies, and identity.’171  Thus while intuitional structures provide governance and 
direction, there is a need for nanoresearchers to question themselves and to act 
actively rather than reactively; moral education is therefore key for professionals.  
 It seems that educating the public and scientists on how to develop a dual 
identity might help with global nanoethics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
169 Subra Suresh, ‘Moving Towards Global Science’, Science 333 (2011), p. 802  
170 Rene von Schomberg, ’From the ethics of technology towards an ethics of knowledge 
policy and knowledge assessment (Working document, Brussels, EC Directorate-General, 
2007), at <ec.europa.eu/research/science.../ethicsofknowledgepolicy_en.pdf>. 
171 L.  Pellizzioni, ‘Responsibility and Environmental Governance’, Environmental Politics 13 
(2004), 541-65 (p. 557).  
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Table 11: The five-stage process 
 
Decentralisation and 
Recognition  
 
Action(s): Global advisory body sets agenda. Local 
policymaking bodies agree to consider outcomes of forum.  
Agenda circulated to citizen’s forum for commentary; inclusion 
of expert viewpoints; public survey to uncover most emotive 
issues as well as more mainstream concerns. 
Methodology: Dialogue conducted via internet and other 
methods (for those without access to IT). Selection of agents 
(panel) to represent all groups, face-to-face if possible. 
Intention: to uncover polarized viewpoints for debate/dialectic.   
Reciprocity, 
Negotiation, and 
Identity formation.  
All agents recognise the opposing viewpoint. 
All agents asked to respond dialectically to the model, in 
terms of personal belief and general (‘global’) view, i.e. as ‘I-
self’ and as ‘we-self’. 
 Dissemination of consensus by panel members to groups 
(constituencies), as well as dissemination of education 
strategy based on forum knowledge outcomes. 
 
 
The final word on this might usefully go to Eastern scholars. Habermas’s views on 
moral education (which of course derive heavily from Kohlberg), have some 
similarities with Confucian teachings on moral self-development, from which Tran 
and Shen extrapolate the following Habermasian-Confucian stages: 
• The learning process is one of mutual-cognition and recognition. 
• The learning process and cognitive reception are developed through 
individual as well as social praxis. 
• Moral cognition or consciousness is acquired through learning fundamental 
human interests. 
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• Moral laws are constructed on moral judgement and the consensus of basic 
interests. 
• The act of consensus is free from coercion.172      
 
 
As the Chinese philosopher Mencius noted, human nature is understood in terms of 
growth; Tang and Liang have argued that Mencius’s philosophy involves dignity and 
criticism of one’s society as aspects of the maturing process of the human being.  
This sounds rather similar to Western ideas of a morally developed society as 
dependent on ideas of self-worth and freedom in the realisation of one’s own 
virtuous life and virtuous agency.173  And as Fung notes, such agency is dual, given 
the ‘dualism between the sanctity of personal liberty and the public morality of 
service to society and state.’  He bases his argument (partly) on the work of the 
philosopher Hu Shi, who argued that  individualism consists not only of a free and 
independent personality, but also of self-development and responsibility – including 
social responsibility: 
Driven by civic virtue or public morality, rather than coerced by the state 
apparatus, the autonomous agent may see a higher value in collective 
interests than in private gains, in certain times and circumstances, taking 
serious actions to further those interests as part of a moral repertoire and as 
an expression of moral autonomy.174  
 
 
Unbridled individualism is not useful; individualism that exists in a creative tension 
with greater concerns – what Hu called the immortal, greater self – is good. From 
the tension between the two comes an intercultural personhood that can, through 
dialogue, make global decisions and effect global change.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
172 Van Doan Tran, Vincent Shen, Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character 
Development, vol. III.2 (CRVP Press, 1991), p. 142. 
173 Tao Liang, ‘Mencius and the tradition of articulating human nature in terms of growth’, 
Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4.2 (2009),180-197, p. 197. 
174 Edmund S.K. Fung, ‘The Idea of Freedom in Modern China Revisited: Plural 
Conceptions and Dual Responsibilities’, Modern China 32 (2006), 453-482 (p. 476). 
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The combination of pTA and identity theory (intersubjectivity) suggests a model for 
nanotechnology dialogue aimed at consensus.  This can work (within the 
established parameters for such a dialogue), across both East and West, for the 
Confucian virtuous agent is similar to the Aristotelian and the Habermasian, in that 
both see moral virtues as derived not from personal discovery, but rather have an 
intersubjective view of ethics based on a dialectical relationship between self and 
others.  
For the Western discourse agent, this implies more community focus; for the 
Eastern, more individualism.  Thus the pTA/Habermasian model of intersubjective 
ethics requires a dialectic between self as individual and self-as-other, or self as 
collective.  
Through the dialogical process of the pTA forum, a second self, or 
’intercultural personhood’, can be created, in terms of which the horizon of the 
nanoagent stretches beyond their life-world to encompass the horizon of the other.   
It turns the usual negative of East-Western ethics from a negative (the 
individual and the collective are two very foreign notions) into a positive (the 
dialectic between individual and collective is what makes ethics work).  
 
 
If we now return to nanotechnology, as summarised at the end of the nanoissues 
discussion in Part I of this thesis (Table 6), how might such a model apply? In short, 
why do I believe an enhanced pTA model might be useful for a global approach to 
nanotechnology policy? 
 Given that the emphasis on procedure, rather than values, is intended to 
make it easier for those with divergent views on nanotechnology’s impact on, or 
contribution to, any ‘good life’, to achieve consensual progress, the question is first 
one of setting a practical agenda for a nanodialogue between East and West. As 
suggested on page 252, global nanodialogues agendas should be set by global 
advisory bodies. COMEST, as described on page 114, seems the most likely body 
(given that China is one of its members, as well as several EU countries).  Given 
the neutrality of the prodecuralist model, which focuses on how debate is to be 
conducted rather than proscribing outcomes, the notion of ‘agenda’ would optimally 
become less a charged space of ideological confrontation, and more a 
‘decentralised’ arena for discussion. 
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Given the discussion in Chapter One of the difficulty of assessing the 
societal implications of nano, the main item on the agenda might be that of greater 
public education (rather than merely inclusion).  In other words, the nano-question 
that might be proposed by global dialogue is, how are better-informed citizens 
created and brought into nanodialogue? 
Here one must add that as well as being a practical question that can be 
procedurally debated using the 5-stage pTA model this thesis predicates, this 
question clearly exposes a  ‘clash of civilisations’, or of Habermasian lifeworlds  - 
thus such a dialogue is likely to be difficult before it even begins. Taking a broad 
view of East-West nanodebates thus far (as discussed for example in terms of the 
lack of pTA to date in China), we could predict that ‘better informed citizens’ is a 
very Western notion unlikely to be fully embraced by all the Chinese participants in 
this dialogue (though it should be added that it might not be embraced by all the 
Western participants either, particularly given that scientists and policymakers 
included in this multivoiced debate can be notoriously cautious of potential 
intellectual property theft.) 
To make the 5-stage model work, the intersubjective identity-formation 
aspect of the 5-stage model comes into play. 
Habermasian lifeworlds do not imply replacement of one by another, but of 
an intersection of horizons achieved through dialogue. The Habermasian species-
ethic of communication presupposes the intent  f all parties in the debate to enter 
into a rational debate that leads to emancipatory knowledge through the adoption of 
a ‘public’ role that may differ from one’s privately or culturally held beliefs. 
The issue of understanding a new and complex science not only exposes 
the heart of the nanodebate, namely, the issue of education, but also suggests that 
the educative process of ethical dialogue provides the answer to the question. The 
proceduralist model is both method and telos. 
 The education process through which the topic of informed citizenry is 
debated would also potentially lead to some interesting insights into how global 
agents’ skills might be better developed from a nano pTA process. 
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Conclusion:	  Discourse	  ethics	  and	  the	  dialectics	  of	  East-­‐West	  
intersubjectivity	  
 
 
I call it a draw. No decisive choice should be made between universalism and 
particularism.1 
 
‘Only connect!’2 
 
This thesis started with an interest in three seemingly divergent topics: global ethics (a 
topic of interest to me given my work in a multicultural setting), nanotechnology (about 
which I knew a bit from avid reading of science fiction novels), and virtue ethics.  While 
at first it seemed that these three things had little in common, I came to believe quite 
the opposite.  
 
Global ethics – or rather the lack thereof – seems to be a problem to be dealt with at a 
time when the globe is rapidly forging ahead with a new technology, one that may be 
riskier than we currently know.  There seems little point in developing a country-specific 
approach to a technology that transcends boundaries, and thus I began with the choice 
of two divergent regions, China and the EU, which I assumed (following a commonly 
held view) to be very different in their cultural contexts as well as their approaches to 
S&T regulation.  As there had been very little written on Chinese nanoethics, it seemed 
an interesting challenge and a useful contribution to the field.  
 
Nanotechnology has been presented as a key site for experimenting with novel forms 
of so-called upstream engagement, or efforts to engage members of the public in 
dialogue about emerging technologies.3 It provides a context for the emergence of a 
new risk governance paradigm, in terms of which political culture and risk perception in 
local societies are becoming crucial factors in risk assessment and governance.4  In 
asking whether Eastern and Western approaches to nanotechnology governance can 
be aligned, one can observe that Europe is increasingly co-operating and competing 
with both China and India, which are also keen to develop their S&T sectors.  Such 
new interdependencies between global actors require new global approaches to S&T  
 
 
                                                
1 Daniel Callahan, ‘Universalism and Particularism. Fighting to a Draw’, Hastings Centre Report 
30.1 (2000), 37-44, p. 41. 
2 E.M. Forster, Howard’s End (1910) (Project Gutenberg e-version, Chapter 22, page 11). 
3 See <http://www.ensaa.eu/index.php/innovation/106-nanotechnology-moving-upstream.html>. 
4 Kuei-Tien Chou, ‘Biomedtech Island Project and Risk Governance. Paradigm conflicts with a 
hidden and delayed high-tech society’, Soziale Welt 58 (2007),123-143 (p. 126). 
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policy, or at least the recognition of differing local approaches to global science.  
 
The first task was to see if China and the EU were so very different in their views on 
nanotechnology – the answer being yes and no.  Chapters One and Two concluded 
that the bioethics context (unsurprisingly) differs in the East and the West.  A brief look 
at various guidelines, for example, in the context of cloning, suggests that as 
personhood can only be acquired through social practice, according to Confucian 
teachings, human value evolves out from an individual’s social relations.  Western 
individualism would take a different approach, one based more on the right to individual 
autonomy.  This outlines the basic conflict as it is often perceived in broad terms 
between West and East.  However, Chapter Two argued the point that ‘dignity’, seen 
as a primary value in Western discourse on the individual and his or her rights, is a 
more universal concept than is usually thought. The so-called clash of civilisations is 
often seen as a clash of individualism, meaning that the Western stress on human 
rights is irreconcilable with Eastern communitarianism, which places the good of 
society over individual rights.  A more useful way to approach this issue is to look at 
dignity as more fundamental to Western individualism than political notions of human 
rights.  Dignity should be seen as a form, not even of autonomy, as that too has 
connotations of human rights, but rather of virtuous agency. It is a process, not a 
values-based system. 
 
Related conclusions were: 
(a) in terms of nanosafety as expressed through policy and regulation, China and 
the EU have similar approaches towards, and concerns about nanotoxicity – the 
official debate on benefits and risks is not markedly different in the two regions;  
(b) that there is a similar economic drive behind both regions’ approaches to 
nanodevelopment, the difference being the degree of public concern admitted;  
(c) and that – most significantly – participation in decision-making is 
fundamentally different in the two regions.  
 
Reading about nanotechnology issues reveals that risk is paramount, but also that risk 
is not dealt with in the same way by each region, as indicated by their nanopolicies (the 
focus of Chapter Three).  The precautionary principle in the EU and economic drivers 
in China make for a difference in emphasis that translates, obviously enough, into the 
way the public has been involved in S&T analysis.  Here the interesting fact is that  
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issues of public perception have been emerging in China; might the region approach 
participatory Technology Assessment differently from the West? Here I discovered that 
there has not been much pTA in China worth speaking of. Thus, in China, the focus is 
on the responsibility of the scientist; in the EU, it is about government accountability to 
the public.  This may change in China, since individual responsibility alone cannot 
guide S&T development, and as public participation is increasingly seen as integral to 
governmental decision-making more globally.  
 
Given increasing public concern, post-GM food, about far-reaching technologies, pTA 
would seem to be the logical method for further discussion of potentially global 
approaches to nanotechnology.  Whereas the official debate on benefits and risks is 
not markedly different in both areas, the public debate in China lags behind the EU. 
This is partly due to the fact that the public in China currently appears more concerned 
about GM food, as well as the lack of channels for public participation in China.  Yet 
public participation is globally seen as increasingly integral to governmental decision-
making, particularly given the economic effects of product boycotting, and so China 
might soon (and perhaps already is in terms of GM food) face this inevitable issue.  
The two regions are converging. 
 
This occasioned two questions – is pTA so important, and if it is, how might it be done 
most effectively worldwide?  Reading about pTA was to take me into a variety of 
eclectic environments, as the business world has become engaged with the idea of 
community or stakeholder involvement, while sociologists, political philosophers, and 
communication ethics writers have all come to realise the importance of community 
engagement for successful product implementation (to put it rather cynically).   This 
also led me to Habermas, whose work seems to provide a much richer theoretical 
background to pTA than commentators (Leo Hennen’s recent work being one 
exception) had considered, and which seemed to me to expose a deficit in discussions 
of nanofora.  
 
Habermas, although he has his detractors, has a few sensible ideas for anyone looking 
at global ethics and public engagement (or as he would put it, deliberative democracy, 
which he sees as a legitimising force for initiatives such as new technology 
development).  In particular, Habermas is very keen on the idea of polyphonic 
discourse, one in which consensus is achieved through the recognition of differing 
viewpoints.  This seemed to me to be the key question of global ethics – how might 
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citizens come together and surmount cultural differences so as to agree on what the 
world might like to do with potentially revolutionary technology? 
 
This is an idealistic question, though it is one which I felt could be answered 
pragmatically.  In fact, a pragmatic approach seemed to be the solution, particularly 
after some reading on the ongoing debate between proponents of universal values, 
and those of relative or culturally determined values, which revealed how discussions 
like this would always be tricky.  The discussion, however, was the important part of the 
statement, as from dialogue one might develop a methodology that would work towards 
consensus through procedure rather than content.  In short, it should be a rational 
discourse, as Habermas suggests, aimed towards a global ethics methodology. 
 
There has been some work done on this topic, ranging from discussions about the role 
of the public in offering new and creative approaches to the field, to whether the 
nanoethics field requires a radical new paradigm, to work on narrative and the role of 
the humanities in offering a multidisciplinary and thus creative methodology, to the idea 
of a clash between references to the technological past and suppositions about its 
future.  Such work, while it clarifies the issues that are being discussed, and on what 
basis this takes place – i.e. whether they derive from arguments based on a 
consequentialist position, or arguments on human dignity and autonomy – seemed to 
circle a particular issue concerning what the best practice might look like if we were to 
achieve consensus. 
 
This is the moment when I realized that Aristotle did have a point to make.  If global 
ethics in the nanotechnology field requires public input (upstream engagement, as it is 
called), then it seemed odd to ignore the nature of the global agent, whose task it 
would be to participate in public debate, and perhaps to develop creative approaches 
to nanoethics.   
 
Nanoethics agency is not often analysed by critics, though there has been an emerging 
realisation that the more familiar consequentialist and deontological positions might be 
usefully engaged with that of virtue ethics.  Comparisons have been made between 
Habermas and Aristotle, for example, in McIntyre's work on their political views.  
However, there has been little on the idea of an Aristotelian-Habermasian global agent 
who would use the ideas of Chinese commentators. Interweaving such strands into the 
new work on Chinese pTA, Habermas’s views of intercultural dialogue, and the skills 
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required by a practical discourse agent, seemed to me to offer a potential basis for a 
new approach to the nanoethics debate. 
 
Global ethics is to be achieved by global agents, who are not only policymakers and 
scientists, but laypersons as well.  Looking at pTA as a useful focus for points of 
similarity or difference between the Eastern and Western approaches to ethics, it 
seemed logical to turn to the work of Jürgen Habermas, whose comments on discourse 
ethics bear obvious similarities to the pTA process, particularly in his emphasis on 
discourse as necessarily inclusive and multi-voiced (see Chapter Four).  Habermas has 
also been relevant to the emphasis placed in this thesis on procedure and agency. The 
latter, with its connection to Amartya Sen’s focus on what people are ‘capable’ of, 
provides a practical basis for discourse and international dialogue.  
 
Habermas asks a basic question of global ethics, namely, how different views 
(particularly of social order) can be universally recognized and reconciled, perhaps 
within an 'ideal community' of communication that may be global.  Discourse ethics 
focuses on what is 'equally good for all', action-related conflicts being resolved with 
reference to a generalizable interest.5  This is similar to the practical statement by 
Ladikas and Schroeder that global ethics ‘is not a field of academic study, it is an 
activity; the attempt to agree on fundamental conditions for human flourishing and to 
actively secure them for all.’  It is reliant on such practical fora as platforms for 
intercultural dialogue and trust-building, as well as international ethics committees and 
ethics reviews for ongoing global negotiations.6   
 
As Chapter Five argues, while agents of discourse are required to discuss the 
consequences of new technology, and to examine the morality of the technological 
activity, the main aim for such agents is that of achieving rational dialogue.  To do this, 
they need to possess those virtues that impel them to enter fully into such 
intersubjective dialogue. The significant activity or agency is the key to this model of 
discourse ethics/pTA. 
 
Habermas’s orientation towards reasoning, rather than rationality, is examined with a 
view to arguing that as Habermasian thought (particularly as developed by Benhabib, 
for example), incorporates an element of care ethics, there is a point of crossover with 
Confucian ren (benevolence or kindness) ethics.  
                                                
5 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Discourse Ethics’, ibid, p. 248. 
6 Schroeder, Ladikas, ‘Too early for global ethics?’, ibid, p. 412. 
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Habermas’s view of emotion relates to procedural issues, such as coming to 
dialogue with a sincere and committed mindset, one that allows for empathy or 
‘considerateness.’  Ren-ethics seems fairly similar to the Habermasian species-ethic on 
the following points: 
a) It reveals itself in a relational form; 
b) It requires sincerity or ‘inner form’; 
c) And it is linked to ethical maturation – a concept Habermas has discussed in his 
view of human development and how the human being progresses through 
various stages of knowledge. 
 
However, even if there is a similarity to how agents  approach discourse, this is not to 
say that their ‘knowledge form’, (mode of argumentation), is alike.  Against so-called 
Western rational individualism one might predicate the reputed Asian ideal of 
harmonious collectivism, raising the issue of whether the Habermasian model can 
adapt to a less rationally teleological and less autonomous decision-making 
environment.  
 
 
Having reached this point, it struck me that the work of this thesis was only three-
quarters complete, and despite my interest in the fields of nanotechnology, science 
fiction novels, bioethics, the GM debate, the differences between Eastern and Western 
views of dignity, Aristotle, Habermas, deliberate democracy, pTA, communication 
ethics, and so forth, I needed to look further to define what exactly the global agent 
should do.  Embracing further eclecticism in my reading, I considered the issue of the 
global agent’s process of debate – what stages might he go through in the attempt to 
achieve consensus and overcome any culturally determined viewpoints that might 
prevent consensus?  Of course, this is as broad a question as asking, ‘why can’t we 
get along’? 
An answer to this problem is potentially supplied by my development of a five-stage 
model of identity formation for the global agent, one that emerges from considering the 
works of various critics such as Taylor. The model utilises the following five steps: 
• Decentralisation – A process intended to ensure a neutral debate 
• Recognition – A process intended to ensure that all interests and viewpoints are 
recognised 
• Reciprocity – A process intended to recognise the value of viewpoints with 
which we do not agree 
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• Negotiation – Subjecting those viewpoints to (Habermasian) rational debate; 
and  
• Identity formation – Achieving consensus by adopting a dual identity through 
intersubjectivity and dialectic. 
 
This model offers a synthesis of ideas on cultural identity, while contextualising them 
within a pTA/Habermasian process that hopefully could be of use in dialogue 
processes. 
 
 
The Asian (Confucian virtuous agent) is similar to the Aristotelian and the Habermasian 
in that: 
(a) both ‘saw moral virtues as . . . derived not from a universal moral calculus but 
from a careful process of personal discovery’;7 and 
(b) both have an intersubjective view of ethics based on a dialectic relationship 
between self and others.  
 
Intersubjectivity is a key concept for any theory of global ethics. The basis for 
supporting such an applied model derives from the concept of moral identity, the 
formation of which requires one to go beyond one’s 'context', for ‘universalistic action 
orientations . . . make it possible to gain some distance from the social roles that shape 
one’s background and character.’8  Habermas suggests ego identity as a dual concept, 
reflecting an interdependence of society and one’s inner self; one can both understand 
the cultural biases inherent in any act of communication, while acting autonomously, 
free from such bias.9   In terms of dialecticism, it implies one’s socially circumscribed 
self is also in a productive tension with a public or broader self.  For the Western 
discourse agent, this means more community focus; for the Eastern, more 
individualism.  Thus the pTA/Habermasian model of intersubjective ethics requires a 
dialectic between self as individual and self-as-other, or self as collective.  
 
It turns the usual negative of East-Western ethics (the individual and the collective are 
two very foreign notions) into a positive (the dialectic between individual and collective 
is what makes ethics work).  
                                                
7 Nicholas F. Gier. ‘Whitehead, Confucius, and the Aesthetics of Virtue’, Asian Philosophy 14.2 
(July 2004, pp. 171-190 (p. 181). 
8 Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, ibid, p. 97. 
9 Jürgen Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity, ibid, p. 240. 
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There is a further meaning of the word ‘dialectic.’  A distinction, between dialogue and 
dialectic, suggests that in order to achieve a state of agency in which one can act as a 
global citizen, one needs to achieve an intersubjective state.  Such intersubjectivity can 
be achieved through dialectic.  Dialectical agency implies the validation of one’s words 
only through the speech of the other.  This suggestion, based on a Bakhtinian 
approach, is a new suggestion in work on how nanoethics might develop on the basis 
of procedural agency (pTA).  
 
There is a key methodological issue – whether the East-West real difference may be 
stated in terms of the dialectic process implied by the Habermasian model, in which 
self and other exist in a dialogic state.  The Confucian one implies that such a dialogic 
or dialectic state must operate towards the goal of social harmony; the Habermasian 
towards the goal of consensus.  There appears to be a difference in terms of how much 
dialecticism is allowed, in that Western individualism encourages greater opposition to 
the whole.  
The argument runs thus: every statement contains in fact the echo of its own 
opposition, since speech is inherently oppositional. Thus in discourse, one both says 
what is true to oneself, but also predicates the echo of an opposing view, the voice of 
the other.  This implies that the discourse agent, to achieve emancipatory knowledge, 
must exist within a dialectic, or the tension between relative and universal values, 
between the goal of the common good, and that of individual and contextual desires. 
Whether she or he can maintain that tension or not might be the real issue of global 
ethics.  
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1. Acronyms	  
 
BASF Code of Conduct 
Nanotechnology 
BASF - chemical corporation, Germany  
 Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development 
 
Cenarios Certifiable Nanospecific Risk Management and Monitoring System 
 
DBT Danish Board of Technology (TeknologirÂdet) 
 
EGE European Commission’s Group on Ethics in Science and Technology 
 
ETAG European Technology Assessment Group 
 
EGAIS Ethical Governance of Emerging Technologies) project, funded by 
the EU 7th Framework Programme (Science in Society) 
 
ELSI  
 
Ethical, legal and social implications analysis  
EU-CoC European Commission’s  Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research 
 
GEST  EU 7th framework Global Ethics in Science and Technology project  
 
GHS Globally Harmonised Scheme (for classification and labeling of 
substances) 
 
GM  Genetically Modified  
HLEG European Commision’s High Level Expert Group on Key Enabling 
Technologies 
 
ICON  International Council on Nanotechnology 
IG-DHS Interest Group – retail trade (Switzerland), a group of the 6 largest 
Swiss retailers: Migros, Coop, Denner, Manner, Vogele and Valora  
 
IPM Institute of Policy and Management, part of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences 
IRGC     
 
International Council on Risk Governance 
ISO  International Standards Organization  
MOST Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology  
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
NELSI Nanotechnology ethical, legal and social implications analysis 
pTA  Participatory Technology Assessment 
PTA Parliamentary Technology Assessment 
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REACH Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical 
Substances regulatory framework 
 
S&T   Science and Technology 
SCER European Commission’s Scientific Committee on Health and 
Environmental Risks  
 
SCENHIR European Commission’s Scientific Committee on Emerging and 
Newly Identified Health Risks 
 
Oviedo Charter  EU Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
 
COMEST UNESCO Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and 
Technology 
 
WPMN OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials 
WPN OECD Working Party on Nanotechnology 
 
2. Technical	  terms	  	  
 
 
• Buckyballs:  Clusters of carbon atoms. Their hollow spherical structure, reminiscent 
of the geodesic domes of eccentric architect Buckminster Fuller, earned them the 
names buckyballs and fullerenes. 
• Carbon nanotubes:  large molecules of pure carbon that are long and thin and 
shaped like tubes, about 100 times stronger-than-steel and one-sixth its weight. 
Some carbon nanotubes can be extremely efficient conductors of electricity and heat; 
depending on their configuration, some act as semiconductors 
• Fullerenes: see buckballs above 
• Plasmonics: Used for the optical transmission of data 
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African nanoethics 
 
Peoples of African descent...are linked by shared values that are fundamental 
features of African identify and culture. These, for example, include hospitality, 
friendliness, the consensus and common framework-seeking principle, ubuntu, 
and the emphasis on community rather than on the individual. These features 
typically underpin the variations of African culture and identity everywhere. The 
existence of African identity is not in doubt.1 
 
 
Nanotechnology is certainly important to Africa.  In 2005, the UN Millennium Project's 
Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation had already identified the 
technology as an important tool for addressing poverty in Africa.  The Millennium Goals 
are accompanied by initiatives such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD), the Blair Commission Report, and the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD), all of which foreground science and technological innovation 
as major driving forces for African development.  The 9 member countries of the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), at a summit in 2010 on 
harnessing science and technology for development, urged the promotion and 
utilization of nanotechnology and science, particularly given its application in various 
key areas such as medical treatment.2  The impact of nano on developing countries 
could in fact be radical, in that it could lead to:3 
1. improved crop yields 
2. clean water 
3. access to more energy (improved energy storage) 
4. better packaging to improve the shelf-life of food 
5. better construction materials 
6. and more widely available health screening, and better treatments.4  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J. M.Nyasani,The African psyche.(Nairobi: University of Nairobi and Theological Printing Press 
Ltd.,1997), 197-8. 
2  See <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20100911201707964>. Focus 
nanotechnology Africa Inc.(FONAI) was formed in 2006 as a South Africa-Nigerian joint not-for-
profit educational and scientific organization especially  in the US, Africa and the Caribbean ‘to 
combat brain drain and all forms of poverty including science and technological poverty’. It 
repeatedly pleads for donations and there is little information on achievements. 
3  Joachim Schummer, ‘Impact of nanotechnologies on developing countries’, in F. Allhoff, P. Lin, 
J. Moor, J. Weckert (eds,) Nanoethics—the ethical and social implications of nanotechnology, 
291–307;  N. Invernizzi, ‘Nanotechnology for developing countries. Asking the wrong question’, 
in G. Banse,  A. Grunwald, I. Hronszky, G. Nelson (eds.) Assessing societal implications of 
converging technological development. (Berlin, 2008), 229–239. 
4 T. Acharya, A.S. Darr, E. Dowdeswell, P.A. Singer and H. Thorsteinsdottir, Genomic and 
Global Health: A Report of the Genomics Working Group of the Science and Technology Task 
Force of the UN Millennium Project (Toronto: University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics, 
2004), pp. 190-191. F. Salamanca-Buentello F, D.L. Persad, E.B .Court, D.K. Martin, A.S. Daar, 
	   303	  
 
 
So much for the positive, but in negative terms there are concerns about 
nanotechnology, with some African nations arguing for the right to ‘say no to nano’, i.e. 
to accept or reject the import and use of manufactured nanomaterials to minimize risk, 
and calling for more work to be done on nanotechnology's ethical and social risks to 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition'.5 
 The issues, apart from the global concern with risk in terms of a relatively new 
technology, are principally those of the nanodivide, and also of what might be termed  
risk colonisation.  The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its Human 
Development report in 2001 endorsed biotech as a means of improving food supply in 
developing countries, with the caveat that it should be introduced into such countries 
with a view to sustainability.  The alternative is to ‘utilise’ Africa as a testing ground; 
one might note the US’s attempt to impose GM crops on southern African countries.   
As unmilled maize was included in the offering – meaning cross-fertilisation with local 
crops – the approach would have been disallowed in the EU, and the OECD took the 
view that it was unethical.6 
There are other issues, such as economic upheaval, as well as the problem that 
manufacturing in countries with weaker controls (and subsequently exported worldwide 
may increase risk; and benefits may be unevenly distributed.  
If nano is a ‘GP’ or general purpose technology that impacts on the productivity 
of many technologies, there may be global job losses, and an increasing move towards 
a workforce with nanoskills, in terms of which the developing world with its unskilled 
labour market may be disadvantaged.7  New nano-products may also lead to major 
changes in trade balances between countries. Wetter, writing on nanotechnology as 
not such a good idea for Africa, notes potential  ‘major disruptions to traditional 
commodity markets’, for  ‘if a new nano-engineered material outperforms a 
conventional material and can be produced at a comparable cost, it is likely to replace 
the conventional commodity’ and so critical export earners in developing countries, 
namely, raw materials, may be replaced by nanomaterials. And worker-displacement 
brought on by commodity-obsolescence ‘will hurt the poorest and most vulnerable, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
et al, ‘Nanotechnology and the Developing World’, PLoS Medicine 2.5 (2005),  
<doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0020097>. 
5 Kathy Jo Wetter, ‘Big Continent and Tiny Technology: Nanotechnology and Africa’,  Foreign 
Policy in Focus, 15241939, 15 October, 2010. 
6 Unsurprisingly, the US has refused to sign up to the Cartagena Protocol (2003) that  governs 
trade in Living Modified organisms. 
7 Walter D. Valdivia, ‘Innovation, growth and Inequality: Plausible Scenarios of Wage Disparities 
in a World with Nanotechnologies’, in Nanotechnology. Risk, Ethics and Law, ibid.  p. 161. 
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particularly those workers who don’t have the economic flexibility to respond to sudden 
demands for new skills or different raw materials’.8  
However, the nanodivide is Africa’s chief ethical concern. The combination of 
visionary research with possible (even if to some, unfeasibly so)  enormous societal, 
medical and environmental impact, as well as lucrative short and long-term benefits 
encouraging a rush to market, does indeed sound like an uneasy mix for African states 
concerned (perhaps idealistically) about whether profits or world problems might be 
more important.9  As Hunt states,  ‘Can we at last know ourselves know ourselves well 
enough to make an international cooperative effort to put nanotechnological 
developments at the service of human and ecological welfare, or will it be primarily 
nanotechnology for more over-consumption?’10 In an ideal world, all nano R&D would 
be subject to the Millennium Goals, particularly those of eradicating poverty, hunger, 
and health issues, all governments and corporations would support a global fund 
(somewhat like Thomas Pogge’s Health Impact Fund), their aims being neither those of 
political piggybacking on popular national initiatives, nor of short-term profiteering.  In 
the harsh realities of today’s global commerce, nanoengineered tennis balls will still be 
more profitable than developing improved and ultra-cheap water filtration units for 
Africa. There is also the issue of corporations wishing to recoup research outlay by 
maintaining monopolies on products:  ‘Without targeted action, it is likely that many of 
the benefits nanotechnology can provide to the developing world will be delayed by at 
least a generation or more – the 20-year term of a patent.’11  Wetter argues that 
researchers in the south are likely to find that participation in the proprietary nanotech 
revolution is ‘highly restricted by patent tollbooths, obliging them to pay royalties and 
licensing fees to gain access… nanotech will profoundly affect Africa’s economy.’12 
In pharmaceutics this is particularly clear, as ongoing debates over generic 
drugs versus their more expensive parented versions and of the ‘values gap’ between 
populations that can pay for drugs and those who cannot, have shown.13  The 
developing world may find itself unable to fund sufficient research to develop its own 
products, and reduced to the status of a global market for developed world 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Kathy Jo Wette, ibid. 
9 Göran Hermerén, ‘Challenges in the Evaluation of Nanoscale Research: Ethical Aspects’, 
NanoEthics 1 (2007), 223-237. 
10 G. Hunt, ‘The Global Ethics of Nanotechnology’, in G. Hunt & M. Mehta (eds.)  
Nanotechnology. Risk, Ethics and Law, eds. (London: Earthscan 2008),  183-195 (p. 193).  
11 Jacob Heller, Christine Peterson, ‘Nanotechnology: Maximizing Benefits, Minimizing 
Downsides’ in Nanoscale, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron and M. Ellen Mitchell (New Jersey: Wiley, 
2007), 83-96 (p. 94). 
12 Kathy Jo Wette, ibid. 
13 ‘The question of the social good and to whom it applies filters through every phase of 
pharmaceutical production’, Global Pharmaceuticals. Ethics, Markets, Practices, eds. Adriana 
Petryna, Andrew Lakoff and Arthur Kleinman (Durham: Duke University Press,  2006), p. 7. 
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corporations.14 Due to research funding and the rush to patent, one may find a  
concentration of the power of nanotechnology in the hands of few transnational 
corporations headquartered in developed countries, something that that ‘goes hand in 
hand with inequity’ in the view of Foladori (et al). Such corporations, they claim, are 
intent on: 
...the control of risks as long as they do not imply less profit; the adoption of 
voluntary codes of conduct rather than mandatory regulations implemented by 
governments; the guarantee of health and environmental security only after 
obtaining technological developments to deal with these issues; and all these 
only after allocating nanotechnologies in the market.15 
 
 
Nanotechnology arguably (as with any high-tech industry) enters a situation of existing 
and widening divides.  The ‘nanodvide’ between developed and developing countries 
(often called the north-south divide) can mean the gap between the  ‘information rich’ 
and the ‘information poor’, but also can refer to inequity based on the (more profitable) 
areas towards which nanotechnology research is targeted, as compared to the areas in 
which it would address basic human needs.  Maclurcan notes that there is ‘little 
consideration’ of ‘what Southern populations might lose through trade liberalisation’, 
with Southern countries having little recourse for protecting their markets, or entering 
the race for ‘land grab’ for nanotechnology patenting, one that ‘far surpasses what was 
seen in the equivalent historical period for biotechnology patenting’.16    
The south’s role as a market for nanoproducts is also potentially enormous, as 
is its role in offering a lower-cost manufacturing environment, so there is little incentive 
to support north-south start-ups.  Given the embryonic status and long-term potential 
payback of many of nano’s stages of development, the assumption is that much of the 
research would be too costly in terms of human capital and infrastructure to do in a 
developing country.  Thus there is ‘the assumption that nanotechnology R&D, and 
therefore a potentially active role in global nanotechnology innovation, is limited to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 R. Macklin, Double Standards in Medical Research in Developing Countries, (NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). Joachim Schummer, ‘The Impact of Nanotechnologies on Developing 
Countries, in Fritz Allhoff, Patrick Lin, James Moor & John Weckert (eds.), Nanoethics: The 
Ethical and Social Implications of Nanotechnology (Hoboken, Wiley, 200),  291-307. Andrew 
Jamison, ‘Can Nanotechnology Be Just? On Nanotechnology and the Emerging Movement for 
Global Justice’, Nanoethics 3.2 (2009), 129-136. 
15 Guillermo Folador, Noela Invernizz, Edgar Záyago, ‘Two Dimensions of the Ethical Problems 
Related to Nanotechnology’, NanoEthics 3 (2009), 121–127 (p. 124, p. 125). 
16 Donald Maclurcan, ‘A more equitable approach to nano-innovation is needed’, 24 November 
2010, at <http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/a-more-equitable-approach-to-nano-innovation-is-
needed.html>. 
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developed countries and beyond the realm of developing countries.’17  Yet one might 
point to South Africa’s active role in global partnerships such as ESASTAP and 
ESASTAP Plus, dedicated platforms for the advancement of global  scientific and 
technological cooperation,18 or  IBSA, an India,  Brazil, South Africa nanotech project  
working on solar, drug delivery and nanosponges.  Researchers in South Africa are 
working on a way to incorporate  tuberculosis drugs into nanoparticles so they are 
released slowly into a patient's bloodstream, raising the possibility that daily pills could 
be replaced with a single weekly dose.  Despite the expenses of development, ‘the 
potential advantages of the technology make its pursuit worthwhile.  If TB treatment is 
reduced to a once-a-week dose, the overall costs, both of the drugs and of employing 
healthcare staff, could be significantly reduced’.19 
Developing countries may still decide to prioritise nanotechnology in terms of 
budget spend, and global partnerships may go some way to addressing the issue of 
funding. The question is rather that of whether one should according to the principle 
perhaps of distributive justice, argue that a potentially transformative technology such 
as nano should be more freely available to developing countries.  
 
 
There is a further issue; that of benefit sharing. In essence, patenting at the nanoscale 
could mean monopolising the basic building blocks of life. Whereas biotechnology 
patents make claims on biological products and processes, nanotechnology patents 
may literally stake claim to chemical elements, as well as the compounds and the 
devices that incorporate them.  With nanoscale technologies, the issue is not just 
patents on life – but on all of nature – opening up new avenues for biopiracy.20  Thus 
Brownsword has suggested that more attention needs to be paid to how we regulate 
for benefit-sharing.21  The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
(EGE) identifies  the following ethical questions relating to the development of 
nanomedicine:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Donald C. Maclurcan, ‘Southern Roles in Global Nanotechnology Innovation: Perspectives 
from Thailand and Australia’, NanoEthics 3 (2009), 137–156 (p. 144), and  ‘Nanotechnology and 
developing countries: part 2 - what realities’, AzoNano online journal of nanotechnology (2005), 
at <http://www.azonano.com/Details.asp?ArticleID=1429>. 
18 The acronym stands for ‘European and South African Science and Technology Advancement 
Program’ See <http://www.esastap.org.za/southafrica/bilateral_int.php>. 
19 Munyaradzi Makoni, ‘Case study: South Africa uses nanotech against TB’, 24 November 
2010, <http://www.scidev.net/en/health/nanotechnology-for-health/features/case-study-south-
africa-uses-nanotech-against-tb-1.html>. 
20 Kathy Jo Wette, ‘Big continent and tiny technology’, ibid.  
21 Roger Brownsword, ‘Regulating Nanomedicine - The Smallest of Our Concerns?’,  
NanoEthics 2 (2008), 73–86. 
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How should the dignity of people participating in nanomedicine research trials be 
respected? How can we protect the fundamental rights of citizens that may be 
exposed to free particles in the environment? How can we promote responsible 
use of nanomedicine which protects both human health and the environment? 
And what are the specific ethics issues, such as justice, solidarity and autonomy 
that have to be considered in this scientific domain?22 
 
 
The question in broadest terms therefore is one of how developing countries can best 
benefit from nano, given an economic situation in which they may be globally 
disadvantaged.  The questions for NELSI commentators seem clear, but whether there 
are such nanoethical processes current in Africa is rather less certain.  
If we look to the wider context of bioethics – which has often been seen as a 
model for nanoethics - we might start by asking whether or not African bioethics 
actually exists.  Murove, arguing that the current discourse on bioethics in Africa is 
trapped in Western categories of thought and relies heavily on Western analytical 
philosophy, maintains that an authentic discourse on bioethics in Africa must take 
cognizance of the fact that most Africans rely on traditional medicine, which often 
remains the most accessible and affordable system of health for the majority of 
Africans in rural areas.23  A UNESCO report gives the figure for sub-Saharan Africa of 
85% of the population as using traditional healers, and notes that ‘in Ghana, Mali, 
Nigeria and Zambia, herbal medicines are administered at home as first-aid treatment 
for 60% to children with high fever caused by malaria’.24 
However, various bodies within and outside Africa have pioneered the 
movement towards ensuring that medical research in Africa conforms to international 
ethical guidelines; the Pan African Bioethics Initiative (PABIN), for example is a pan-
African organization established in 2001 to foster the development of bioethics in Africa 
with a particular focus on research ethics.25  Various ethics workshops and 
conferences have been held in Africa.26  Yet apart from some countries in the southern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 ‘Opinion on the ethical aspects of nanomedicine’ (Opinion no. 21, paragraph 4.1), The 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 
(2007), at <http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-
ethics/docs/publications/opinion_21_nano_en.pdf>. 
23 F.M. Murove, ’On African Bioethics: An Exploratory Discourse’, Journal for the Study of 
Religion 18.1 (2005), 16-36. 
24 ‘Draft preliminary report on traditional medicine and its ethical implications’ (UNESCO, 2010),  
at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001895/189592e.pdf>, p. 5 of 16. 
25 Pan African Bioethics Initiative (PABIN), see <http://www.pabin.net/en/index.asp.> 
26 Workshop on Ethics Review Committees in Africa, Lusaka, Zambia 29–31 January 2001;An 
International Symposium on Good Ethical Practices in Health Research in Africa, Pan-African 
Bioethics Initiative Cape Town, South Africa 23–24 February 2001;An International Conference 
on Good Health Research Practices in Africa. In collaboration with UNDP/World Bank/WHO; 
Special Programme for Research & Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR/WHO); African Malaria 
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and eastern parts of Africa and a handful of universities in other parts of Africa, there is 
no formal ethics education in most of Africa's medical schools.27  Chadwick and 
Schuklenk have question the altruism behind training developing world bioethicists in 
the West and warn against bioethics colonialism.28  Opportunities to explore and 
develop local and traditional knowledge to find solutions for the country’s health needs 
can be lost under such paternalism – thus in South Africa there is a move towards 
taking indigenous knowledge into account, adding value by complementing it with 
scientific knowledge (and regulating its exploitation).29 
Africa’s Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action, 2006–2010, is 
largely a product of NEPAD, which with the African Union (AU) established a high-level 
African Panel on Biotechnology (APB) to facilitate open and informed regional multi-
stakeholder dialogues on, for example scientific, technical, economic, health, social, 
ethical, environmental, trade and intellectual property protection issues associated with 
or raised by rapid developments in modern biotechnology.30 In addition, the Nelson 
Mandela African Institute for Science and Technology (NM-AIST) is a network of  S&T 
institutes across African intended  to train the next generation of African scientists and 
engineers. with a view to impacting profoundly on the continent’s development through 
the application of science, engineering and technology (SET).31 This Institute aims to 
stimulate the establishment of science, technology and innovation courses at post-
graduate level in African universities, to build a critical mass of science policy advisors 
to African governments and the policy sector and to build and disseminate information 
and experiences on science, technology and innovation policy analysis, advice and 
development. UNESCO is also helping to set up regional parliamentary fora on science 
and technology – for example, the Nigerian Parliamentarian Forum on Science and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Network Trust (AMANET); Department of Health and Human Services, USA; European Forum 
for Good Clinical Practice (EFGCP); Institut National de la Santé et de la RechercheMédicale 
(INSERM), France; and Glaxo Smith Kline (GSK- Belgium) FondationMerieux. 28–30 April 2003 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; AMANET training workshop on health research ethics in Africa 
Biotechnology Centre, University of Yaoundé I, Yaounde, Cameroon; Workshop on Ethical 
Issues in Health Research in Abuja, Nigeria 03–17 December 2001; National Workshop on 
Ethical Issues in Health Research. Organized by the University of Ibadan, in collaboration with 
Aids Prevention Initiative Nigeria (Harvard School of Public Health) and Boston University, 
Harvard: Held at International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), Ibadan, Nigeria 27 August 
– 01 September 2003. 
27 Temidayo O. Ogundiran ‘Enhancing the African bioethics initiative’, BMC Medical Education 4 
(2004), p. 21, at <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/4/21/>. 
28 R. Chadwick, U.Shuklenk, ‘Bioethical Colonialism?’, Developing World Bioethics 18.5 (2004), 
11-iv. 
29 Marion Motari, Uyen Quach, Halla Thorsteinsdóttir, Douglas K.Martin Abdallah S. Daar & 
Peter A. Singer, ‘South Africa - blazing a trail for African biotechnology’, Nature 
Biotechnology22 (December, 2004), p. DC41. 
30 See <http://www.nepadst.org/doclibrary/pdfs/doc27_082005.pdf>. 
31 See <http://www.nm-aist.ac.tz/background.html>. 
	   309	  
Technology in Abuja in 2006; however there is as yet no regional parliamentary forum 
on S&T for sub-Saharan Africa.32  
Moemeka, noting the ‘fundamental African principles of supremacy of the 
community, value of the individual, sanctity of authority, respect for age and religion as 
a way of life’, argues that one might add the issue of ‘democratisation or all-inclusive 
participation.’33  Yet at present, South Africa is the only government in southern Africa 
that has a Science Communication unit and a Public Understanding of Biotechnology 
programme.34 There are however other initiatives such as the science cafes in Kenya 
(started in 2008),35 or various conferences in Africa on aspects of risk, technology and 
environment. There are various biotechnology associations such as the Agricultural 
Biotechnology Network in Africa (ABNETA) made up of people from across Africa who 
want to discuss, support, develop or use biotechnology in support of agriculture on the 
continent, AfricaBio, engaged in transferring information about biotechnology and 
biosafety to all levels of society through information days, workshops, seminars, 
conferences, exhibitions, websites, newsletters and technology demonstration (and has 
an agricultural biotechnology emphasis); and  ACTS, a  think-tank on the application of 
science and technology to development that runs fora that discussed emerging new 
technologies and issues to do with Biotechnology, Biosafety, Climate Change and the 
Environment.36 South Africa has a EU partnership on S&T.37 
 Little is specific to nanotechnology, however. In South Africa in April 2006, the 
Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, Derek Hanekom, launched the South 
African National Nanotechnology Strategy, to support the optimal use of 
nanotechnology to enhance South Africa’s global competitiveness, and to achieve 
social development and economic growth targets.  Since 2006, South Africa has set up 
several centres in the fields of water treatment, health sciences and energy 
production.  There is also the Nanotechnology Speak2aScientist programme that aims 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Susan Schneegans, Anne Candau, Science  in Africa: UNESCO's Contribution to Africa's 
Plan for Science and Technology to 2010 (UNESCO, 2007). 
33 Andrew Azukaego Moemeka, ‘Communalistic Societies: Community and Self-Respect as 
African Values’, in Communication Ethics and Universal Values, ed. Clifford Christians, Michael 
Traber (Thousand Oaks, Sage, 1997), 170-193 (p. 173, 183).  
34 Pascal Newbourne Mwale, ‘Democratization of Science and Biotechnological Development: 
Public Debate on GM Maize in South Africa’, Africa Development, 33.2 (2008), pp. 1–22. 
35  See <http://dougal.union.ic.ac.uk/media/iscience/features/brewing-knowledge/>. 
36 SciDev.Net – the Science and Development Network – is a not-for-profit organisation 
dedicated to providing information about science and technology for the developing world, and 
lists initiatives in nano in sub-Saharan Africa and North Adfrica (as well as in Asia).  
37 See 
<http://cordis.europa.eu/fetch?CALLER=EN_NEWS&ACTION=D&SESSION=&RCN=24157>. 
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to educate and enhance a public understanding of nanotechnology and stimulate 
meaningful public debate (Sci-Bono Discovery Centre, Johannesburg).38 
 Kenya and South Africa have adopted national guidelines on bioethics, 
although, as Langlois has noted, there are some differences in the ‘translation’ of the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Bioethics into national 
principles.39 The UNESCO article on Cultural Diversity and Pluralism, Article 9, for 
example, in terms of the Kenyan Guidelines refers to gaining informed consent from 
married women in rural communities, reminds researchers that each of Kenya’s 42 
tribes will have unique sociocultural backgrounds.  The South African guidelines, in a 
section on indigenous medical systems, call on researchers to respect the cultures and 
traditional values of all communities, and also state that: 
The challenge to international research ethics is the development of universal 
rules for research at a time when health care is being delivered within very 
different health care systems and in a multicultural world in which people live 
under radically different economic conditions.40 
 
 
The guidelines suggest state-level focus on how researchers should engage with 
communities and which particular members of society should receive special attention 
as vulnerable persons. States may need to adopt particular interpretations of the 
declaration’s principles in order to realise them in national and local contexts. 
 A more ‘wholistic’ approach to policymaking, with advice taken on local issues, 
is needed in Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See <http://www.sci-
bono.co.za/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=94&Itemid=94>. 
39 Adèle Langlois, ‘The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: 
Perspectives from Kenya and South Africa’, Health Care Analysis 16.1 (2008): 39–51. 
40 S.R. Benatar, ‘Justice and Medical research: A Global Perspective’, Bioethics 15.4 (2001), 
333-340  (p. 337).	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Abstract The following article offers a brief over-
view of current nanotechnology policy, regulation
and ethics in Europe and The People’s Republic of
China with the intent of noting (dis)similarities in
approach, before focusing on the involvement of
the public in science and technology policy (i.e.
participatory Technology Assessment). The conclu-
sions of this article are, that (a) in terms of nano-
safety as expressed through policy and regulation,
China PR and the EU have similar approaches
towards, and concerns about, nanotoxicity—the of-
ficial debate on benefits and risks is not markedly
different in the two regions; (b) that there is a
similar economic drive behind both regions’ ap-
proach to nanodevelopment, the difference being
the degree of public concern admitted; and (c)
participation in decision-making is fundamentally
different in the two regions. Thus in China PR,
the focus is on the responsibility of the scientist;
in the EU, it is about government accountability to
the public. The formulation of a Code of Conduct
for scientists in both regions (China PR’s predicted
for 2012) reveals both similarity and difference in
approach to nanotechnology development. This
may change, since individual responsibility alone
cannot guide S&T development, and as public
participation is increasingly seen globally as inte-
gral to governmental decision-making.
Keywords Nanotechnology . China . EU . Regula-
tion . Policy . Nanoethics . Global ethics . Participatory
technology assessment
Ought bioethics in East Asia to use the same
approaches (assumptions, principles, theories,
styles, methods, concepts) as bioethics devel-
oped in the West, or ought it to reflect a specif-
ically East Asian approach to the subject? ([18]:
310)
Ethics and socio-ethical analysis have increasingly
become an integral part of the assessment of any new
technology and its applications [7]. Certain European
countries have instigated national programs dedicated
to ethics in science and technology (S&T) (e.g. The
Netherlands) or have established institutes to conduct
research into the ethical implications of new technol-
ogies (e.g. national genomics centres in the UK and
The Netherlands). In China PR, ethical, legal and
social implications (ELSI) analysis is becoming a
more prominent issue when evaluating new S&T
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developments., but is not yet as well established as in
Europe.
A growing trend since the 1980s in terms of S&T
evaluation in the EU has been that of pTA, or participa-
tory Technology Assessment, a drive towards incorpo-
rating social concerns into technology assessment
through public dialogue. Such a trend has developed
under pressure of increasing public scepticism about
scientific research and development ([22]: 386). The
outcome of such scepticism has been a demand for more
informed public debate, and greater public involvement
both in how new technologies should be regulated and
funded ([14]: 211), and how they should be applied to
everyday life. Policymakers anxious not to repeat the
mistakes associated with the introduction of biotechnol-
ogy initiatives such as genetically modified (GM) foods,
namely, that ‘legislation came too late and with too little
public engagement and ethical reflection’, began to call
for the inclusion of ethical and societal impacts of po-
tentially transformative new technologies at an early
stage in policymaking [21, 26].
Public dissatisfaction in The People’s Republic of
China (China PR) after various food safety scandals
relating to milk and to gutter oil suggests scepticism
about regulation is not only an EU issue.1 A China
Daily 2010 survey concluded that more than 85 % of
respondents were worried about the potential health
hazards of GM food.2 Hu & Chen’s earlier survey of
Beijing consumers found that consumers’ purchase
intentions of GM vegetable oil were low, indicating a
considerable skepticism toward GM products’ [24].
After the granting of biosafety licenses to two rice
strains, 120 Chinese academics signed a public peti-
tion in March 2010 asking the Ministry of Agriculture
to withdraw the certificates [27].
China PR has an established survey process on
S&T public perceptions, but such a process has
tended to be quite general, with a lack of surveys
on specific issues and more importantly, a dearth
of implementation processes for using such sur-
veys in policy debates.
Can China PR catch up to Europe in this area?
Europe is increasingly co-operating and competing
with both China and India, which are also keen to
develop their S&T sectors. Such new interdependen-
ces between global actors require, arguably, new glob-
al approaches to S& T policy, or at least, recognition
of differing local approaches to what is perhaps a
global science, The complex question of whether there
can ever be a global approach that does not run the risk
of neo-colonialism [3, 49], or an imposition of ‘colo-
nial’ values on the East aside [19], one can note
general similarities in Eastern and Western approaches
to the dangers of nanotechnology. The major differ-
ences are in the processes by which public concerns
are mediated in Europe and China PR.
China PR: Nanohistory, Nanoregulation,
Nanopolicy and Nanoethics
Of the Asian countries, Japan and China are leading
the way in nanotechnology. The national program in
China PR dates from the establishment of the National
Steering Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotech-
nology (NSCNN) in 2000 to coordinate nationwide
efforts on nanotechnology R&D. The committee is
composed of 21 scientists from universities, institutes
and industry and 7 administrators from government
agencies.
Research goes back 13 years before that, however,
to the 1987 National High Technology Plan (or ‘863
Plan’), that supported ultrafine particles research. In
1990, the State Science and Technology Commission
[the predecessor of the current Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST)] approved the ‘Climbing Up’
project, in which nanomaterials research was empha-
sized. In the early 1990s, several Chinese academic
research organizations collaborated to accelerate re-
search efforts in China on nanomaterials science,
while MOST’s 973 Program (1999) was aimed at
supporting basic research on nanostructures such as
nanotubes. The 973 Program’s significance lies in its
emphasis on the standardization of procedures and
assessment and test protocols, which tend to form the
basic framework structure for regulatory considera-
tions of nanomaterials [25].
1 The 2008 scandal, when milk from the Sanlu corporation was
found to be contaminated by melamine, was China’s second
major baby-milk scandal. The death toll from the Sanlu contam-
ination varies, according to whom one reads, from 3 to 11, but
up to 300 000 children were allegedly reported as affected. The
gutter oil scandal erupted in September 2011 after reports of
companies recycling oil from drains behind restaurants.
2 China Daily 3 April, 2010. Retrieved January 7, 2012, from
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/04/content_
9534076.htm
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Since 2002, when the China PR National Sci-
ence Foundation produced a nanotechnology plan,
nanotechnology has been recognized as a high-
priority area by the Chinese government (Lee et
al. 2011). In China PR’s National Medium- and
Long-term Science and Technology Development
Plan (2006–2020), nanotechnology is one of four
large projects explicitly mentioned in the plan as a
priority mission area, and as a key frontier tech-
nology, over the next 15 years [45]. The 2009
national research plan set aside 0.15 billion RMB
(yuan) for nanotechnology; Appelbaum and Parker
conclude that, with respect to nanotechnology,
China is closing the gap that once existed between
itself and the United States, Europe, and Japan [4].
Presently, there are more than 30 research organ-
izations in China PR that have initiated research ac-
tivities studying the toxicological and environmental
effects of nanomaterials and nanoparticles [52], and
120 research organisations undertaking general re-
search into nanoscience and nanotechnology ([13]:
101). The three major national centres for nanotech
are the National Centre for Nanoscience and Nano-
technology (NCNST) in Beijing, the Nanocommerci-
alisation centre in Tianjin, and the China Safety Lab,
which comes under the auspices of the Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences (CAS).3 The three areas of research,
commercialisation, and safety to which these three
centres are dedicated aptly indicate PR China’s current
foci.
In the view of Tang, Carley and Porter, the initial
focus for China PR was regulatory support for signif-
icant research for technology commercialization and
economic growth. However, a 2004 conference on
biological and environmental nanoeffects and the
launch of a program on the toxicological effects of
nano suggested the start of a China PR nanosafety
debate. As Qi argued, nanosafety research became
‘an integral part of nanotechnology research’ [39].
China has run two major 5-year projects: ‘The Toxi-
cological Effects of Carbon Nanomaterials’ (2004–
2008), and ‘The Environmental Activity and Health
Impact of Ambient Superfine Particle’ (2006–2010).
The China Nanosafety Lab, which examines environ-
mental health and toxicology matters, is linked into a
larger network of research centres for nanosafety.
From its inception in 2008 with the establishment of
the Laboratory for Biomedical Effects of Nanomateri-
als and Nanosafety, it has worked with the Research
Centre for Cancer Nanotechnology (at the Tianjin
Cancer Hospital), the Lab for the Bio-environmental
Effects of Nanomaterials and Nanosafety (established
by the Institute of High-Energy Physics, or IHEP, and
the NCNST), and the nano-biological research group
at IHEP.
The debate has intensified after a nanoparticle ex-
posure accident in a poorly ventilated Chinese paint
factory in August 2007, in which seven workers con-
tracted lung disease—two died [43]. After this inci-
dent, ‘Chinese policymakers shifted focus to the risk
management aspects of nanotechnology’ [46]; a large-
scale program began in 2011 for example on factory
monitoring for worker exposure. The f 2007 incident
realised several questions about whether the casual
link between exposure and pulmonary illness can in
fact be proven.
While the effects of nanoparticles on humans and
on the environment have been the priority, there has
also been acknowledgement of other societal con-
cerns. The Director’s Note in the 2007–8 Annual Re-
port of the China Nanosafety Lab for example states
that the lab ‘must take an extensive and deep research
of nanotechnological influence on human health, en-
vironment, and social problems’ [20].
In terms of oversight, the Ministry of Science and
Technology is generally responsible for S&T policies
and the planning and execution of national S&T plans
and programs. It is also responsible for drafting rules,
regulations and laws, and has responsibility for policy
implementation. MOST plays an important role in
distributing research funds including projects imple-
mented by other agencies. MOST is supported by the
Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for
Development (CASTED), an institution that under-
takes foresight and strategic research to provide
macro-level advice and assistance for designing S&T
plans. CASTED contains ISTS, the Institute of Sci-
ence, Technology and Society, which conducts several
large-scale surveys on matters such as food safety risk,
the public image of scientists etc. One of its three main
areas of interest is the social environment of innova-
tion. Thus while initially emphasis was solely on
applied research in the nanotechnology field, new
research teams such as the Institute of Policy and
3 Professor Chunying Chen, Bilat-Silk (Bilateral Support for the
International Linkage with China, FP7, 222800) roundtable on 9
November, 2011 at CASTED, Beijing, China PR.
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Management (IPM), part of the Chinese Academy of
Sciences, have now been formed.4
Nanoethics (China PR)
China PR is beginning to face a range of nanotechnol-
ogy governance challenges, such as addressing low
public awareness, developing a robust risk research
strategy, and implementing an effective oversight sys-
tem, very similar to those confronting the EU. One
general concern that has emerged is whether the public
outside of China, especially the United States public,
will trust Chinese-made nanoproducts in the wake of
scandals involving tainted pet food, toothpaste, child-
ren’s toys, and drugs. Michelson asks:
…can China find an effective way to move up
the value chain and transition from manufactur-
ing cheaper, low-end products to more expen-
sive, high-end, nano-engineered goods? …. In
the wake of more immediate environmental and
public health concerns currently affecting China,
from managing pollution, to depleted fisheries,
to lack of access to healthcare, how will disrup-
tive challenges posed by nanotechnology exac-
erbate or enhance these existing problems? Will
China have the resources and the luxury of pro-
actively addressing environmental and health
risks posed by nanotechnology in addition to
these ongoing challenges? ([32]:406).
The concern with nanoethics started later in China
PR than in the EU, not only due to the development
delay in technology, but also perhaps because of dif-
ferences in emphasis on societal concern. In other
words, China PR’s belief in social progress through
scientific development means that economic impetus,
rather than societal concern, is the major driver and
overriding impetus behind new technologies.
Choi has argued in 2003 that the following issues
should be considered by Asian nanoethicists:
& Equity between those with access to technology
and those without, both in terms of developed
versus underdeveloped countries, as well as inter-
nally within rural and urban populations
& Privacy issues in Confucian systems (there has
long been debate over the individual’s right to
privacy of medical information, for example)
& Gender issues (as the majority of nanoscientists are
male)
& Brain implants and other issues relating to human
enhancement
& Undue inducement, for human subjects in nano-
medical clinical trials for example
& Military uses of new technologies
& Environmental toxicity, including how effectively
nanowaste can be managed in space-limited
countries with large populations.
These issues, when compared to EU debates on
nanoethics, are quite similar (see Table 1 in the Ap-
pendix). Choi’s recommendations are:
& Better ethics education in schools
& More dialogue between research institutes, grant-
ing bodies, and the public on ethical issues
& Bioethics education for medical practitioners
& More ELSI research funding
& More international cooperation and knowledge
sharing
& Establishing NGOs to work primarily on ethical
concerns related to technology development
& Establishing independent watchdogs for
nanotechnology-related policy and research for
government and business [10].
In China PR, CASTED has called for S&T ethics
courses in universities on the basis that education is
the main channel for building a culture of S&T values.
Tsinghua University for example has an engineering
ethics course. Several Chinese universities (Dalian
Technology University, Beijing University, as well as
Renmin, Hunan, and South-East), have research
centres based around S&T ethics. CASTED is in-
volved in the GEST (Global Ethics in Science and
Technology) project as part of the EU 7th framework.
GEST aims to explore the role of ethics in science and
technology policy as it is currently developing both in
Europe and in the two main global emerging econo-
mies of China and India.5
What of the Chinese debate? Compared to the
reasonably extensive debate in the EU, it is fairly
low-key (see Table 2). Chinese commentators have,
4 Professor Zhenzhen Li, Bilat-Silk (Bilateral Support for the
International Linkage with China, FP7, 222800) roundtable on 9
November, 2011 at CASTED, Beijing, China PR. 5 See www.uclan.ac.uk/gest.
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albeit in very brief fashion, noted toxicity risks such
as damage to human health and the environment.
However, some have introduced other issues. Ying
likens nanotechnology to GM foods issues, imply-
ing a public acceptance issue, albeit only in passing
[51]. Li, while mentioning environmental problems
(giving the example of a Korean company that
stopped production of a certain washing machine
after pressure from Friends of the Earth) notes
wider issues such as increased lifespan due to nano-
medical development, i.e. the societal impact of
longer-living, healthy citizens [30]. Wang notes po-
tential problems relating to consumer rights (in the
context of food and cosmetics products), as well as
privacy and intellectual property rights issues. [48].
Fan, perhaps the most ‘Western’ in his writing on
nanoethics, notes that ‘compared with safety issues,
research on ethical, legal and social issues should
be strengthened’, as should dialogue between the
scientific community and the public [17]. As Cao
and Li note, the shift in approach from a predominately
science-community-based approach to nanotechnology
policy and regulation, to one that includes social scien-
tists as well, is still ongoing [9].
Public Participation in the East
The Thai government is reviewing the country’s first
strategy plan on nanotechnology safety and ethics,
drafted in 2011. The Thai National Nanotechnology
Center, NANOTEC, held a public hearing session in
Bangkok in 20122 where stakeholders from various
sectors were given an opportunity to voice their opin-
ion on the draft. (Nanosafety labeling can be expected
in 2016, when regulations on nano safety and ethics
are fully enforced.)6 In South Korea NGOs play an
active role in bringing together scientists and the pub-
lic. The ‘STS’ or Science-Technology-Society ap-
proach informs the Korean school curriculum, just as
in Japan schoolchildren are given guidelines to bio-
ethics [11]. In Taiwan, the National Strategic Plan for
Responsible Nanotechnology, reflects the govern-
ment’s ambition to realize the full potential of nano-
technologies while acknowledging the possibly
harmful societal impacts from nanotechnologies.
Table 1 Categories of nanoethics issues in the East and West (China PR/EU)
Issue Pro (West) Contra (West) Contra (East)
Enhancement A new and improved ‘better human’ with
increased longevity, fewer health
issues, possibly even enhanced
intelligence through IT/cognitive/
biological convergence (NBIC)
Creation of new elites (enhancement
only for the rich); loss of ‘humanness’
(‘nanoself’); increased longevity
means more pressure on resources
IT/neurobioengineered
implants; equity of
access
Military use Better wound care; more precise targeting
(less collateral damage)
Leading to ‘unequal wars’; creation
of ‘supersoldiers’
Military uses of
nanotechnology,
i.e. weapons
Health risks Health amelioration, better drugs;
portability—better health care for remote
and rural communities; economic benefit
of reduced health care spending
Threats to human health through dermal
exposure or inhalation or ingestion of
nanoparticles
Threats to human health
through dermal exposure
or inhalation or ingestion
of nanoparticles
Environmental
harm
Amelioration of environmental issues such
as non-potable groundwater
Threat to environmental health Threat to environmental
health; nanowaste and
space limitations
Access/Equity General economic benefit globally in terms
of new products that will affect the
construction, energy, medtech and IT
industries
Increased (nano)divide between devel-
oped and developing countries—issues
of distributive justice, global benefit
Nanodivides within Asian
countries with large rural
and/or poor populations;
undue inducement
Privacy Smaller and less obtrusive surveillance
devices; privacy of medical information;
greater security
Increasingly miniaturised surveillance
devices lead to potential loss of civil
liberties, increased surveillance of
average citizens
6 Thailand pushing forward on Nanosafety regulations’, January
18, 2011. Retrieved 12 December, 2011, from http://www.
biospectrumasia.com/content/180111THA15262.asp.
Nanoethics (2012) 6:137–150 141
Author's personal copy
(The combination of nanotechnology and Chinese
herbal medicine is a newly emerging field sought after
by the Taiwanese industry, and is leading to some
ethical discussion, most notably around intellectual
property issues [23]). In the most recent Taiwanese
Science and Technology Development Plan [34],
Table 2 A comparison of nanoethics environments in the EU and China
Europe Asia (China)
Social values: Autonomy, individual human rights Harmony, community
Attitude towards S&T and
scientists:
• Public differentiation between technologies i.e.
differing risks for nuclear, nano, GM
• Innovation is always good
• Risk v benefit • Tao governs technology;
• Post-Fukushima emphasis on confidence/or lack
thereof in government, according to how it han-
dles S&T crises
• Harmony between tian (nature) and ren (human)
• Trust in government (although this may be starting
to decrease due to food scandals)
• Concern with social responsibility of scientists
GM food as example GM ‘backlash’ in many EU countries GM issue products sold in China—but must be
labelled; public distrust
Which nanoissues are seen
as significant?
Toxicity (human and environmental),
enhancement, military use, privacy, distributive
justice
Safety; science governance; global security an
emerging issue, as is public knowledge deficit
Economic benefit focus Better drugs e.g. for cancer treatment General economic driver
Consumer confidence in
new products
EU 2013 mandatory labelling of cosmetics that
contain nanoparticles
New equals good; and ‘nano’ are pluses for
marketeers
Institutes leading
nanoresearch
EC Action Plan on Nanotechnology 2005–9
(ongoing implementation reports in 2007, 2009)
2000: National Steering Committee for Nanoscience
and Nanotechnology established in China; 2003;
nanosafety lab
Seminal reports that have
triggered nanoethics
concerns:
Greenpeace report, the Royal Society and Royal
Academy (RS/RAE), report and insurance
company Swiss Re’s report (2003–4)
Role of NGOs in S&T
advising:
Strong in terms of TA and policymaker liaison NGOs small in size and relatively weak in
organisational capacity, no policy-effecting
channels
TA infrastructure Varied across Europe Established for about 10 years
Participatory technology
assessment
Many European dialogue initiatives, plus
individual (national) initiatives in Germany, the
Netherlands, UK etc.
• Not yet—planned for 2012
• Consensus conference 2008 on GM food—with 25
participants; from that negative experience
scientific community focussed on Code of Conduct
as way of promoting acceptance
Global view and
cooperation
On standards On standards
Increasing awareness of Western debates
International bodies—IRG,
GHS, ISO, REACH,
Comest, OECD etc.
EU representatives on all China PR active on ISO and REACH
Codes? EU Code for responsible nanoresearch • MOST S&T general guidelines applied to
nanoresearch from beginning
• CAS Special committee on science ethics
examined scientific misconduct in 2010–11 and
has ethics of emerging technologies as next focus
(GM and nano)
• Code predicted in 2012
Much of this information was taken from roundtable discussions in Beijing 9–11 November, 2011
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nanotechnology is given specifically notable attention.
Two passages in the plan stand out and provide par-
ticular insight in to the government’s outlook on tech-
nology policy:
The public’s distrust of science and technology is at
least partially attributable to insufficient relevant in-
formation and awareness. Appropriate ethical and le-
gal responses may be needed to deal with the risks
posed by new technologies to life and the environ-
ment, and the ethical conflicts they cause…Unlike
such areas as medical biotechnology, where ethics
committees have been established, little has been done
thus far to address research ethics in many new tech-
nological fields in Taiwan (such as genetic technology
and nanotechnology).7
The issue of ‘public distrust’ is one that China PR
has been starting to face in terms of GM food. Whilst
expert Technology Assessment (TA) has a history in
China PR, it tends to be dominated by natural scien-
tists with little background in social issues. Informa-
tion delivery, rather than debate, is more likely to be
the aim of any survey, as in the Dalian Technical
University 2008 nanotechnology survey (of 1,000
samples). This survey concluded that the Chinese
public had greater awareness of nano than the US.
CASTED conducted a survey in three cities in 2008
on GM food, concluding that public non-awareness of
the subject was widespread (while noting variations
according to city size and level of tertiary education).
While TA is known, participatory Technology As-
sessment (pTA) is a relatively new development, and
has so far been limited in China PR to a consensus
conference on GM food in 2008, one with 25 partic-
ipants. This conference was organised by CAS, and
the S&T commission for Xicheng District, Beijing.
Called ‘Science and Community 2008—GM foods’,
the aim was to recruit volunteers from varied socio-
economic backgrounds; 38 applications were re-
ceived, from which 20 public participants were chosen
(plus 5 experts on GM foods and health, ethics and
society, consumer choice and legislation). The final
document report showed more uncertainty post-
conference than before about the relationship between
the public and experts, as some participants began to
‘modify their submissive position towards the experts’
while remaining supportive towards the government.
The primary result of the conference, it was conclud-
ed, was clarification of the need for more public
education.8
GM food, nanotechnology, stem cell technology
and IT, are still seen as the major areas of attention
for the science community, rather than the public, but
there is a growing realisation amongst the scientific
community that a wider approach, involving greater
awareness of societal concerns, and potentially also
pTA, is required. A November 2011 workshop on
academic morality and scientific ethics to facilitate
integration between the natural and the social sciences
suggest the China PR scientific community’s realisa-
tion that the social sciences have an integral role to
play in technology evaluation and implementation.
EU Nanohistory, Nanoregulation, Nanopolicy
and Nanoethics
China PR is not alone in its belief that nanotechnology
is an economic driver: In terms of the 2004 Lisbon
Strategy, now replaced by the Europe 2020 strategy,
Europe has clarified stated its aim of being a highly
competitive knowledge-based global economy.9 A fo-
cus on nanotechnologies was seen as a key part of this
strategy. Thus the formation of the 2004 European
Nano-Electronics Initiative Advisory, in terms of
which European technology companies such as Phi-
lips, Nokia, Ericsson, AMD, and IBM decided that if
Europe wanted to lead the world, it would need to
invest at least 6 billion euro per year to switch from
micro to nanoscale electronics. A public-private part-
nership charged to develop and implement a European
nano-electronics research agenda first met in 2004. Its
goals include: supporting research and investment in
nano, speeding up innovation and productivity, the
facilitation and acceleration of market penetration of
new technologies, aligning research/technology with
European policies and regulatory frameworks, and
7 National Science and [34], National Science Council, Execu-
tive Yuan, Taiwan, http://web1.nsc.gov.tw/public/Attachment/
91214167571.PDF, p. 60; See also Mika Purra & Noah
Richmond, ‘Mapping Emerging Nanotechnology Policies and
Regulation: The Case of Taiwan’ [38]. Retrieved 28 December,
2011 from http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/
centresandunits/regulatingnanotechnologiesnanopdfs/
Taiwan2010.pdf.
8 Du Peng, ‘The Practice of TA in China’ (Chinese Academy of
Science), NCSTE presentation on 10 November, 2011, Beijing.
9 Retrieved 15 December 2011 from http://ex.europa.eu/
europe2020/targets/eu-targets/index_en.htm. See also http://
www.eu2020regions.eu/node/6, retrieved February 2, 2012.
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increasing public awareness, understanding, and ac-
ceptance of nanotechnologies ([1]: 238–9). A later
group, The European Network of Excellence
(Nano2Life) 2004–2008 involved nearly 200 scien-
tists, 23 research organizations, and 12 countries, and
has joined with industrial partners to identify regional
centers, disciplines, and expertise available for col-
laboration. Goals included developing joint re-
search projects on four major technical platforms:
functionalisation, handling, detection, and integra-
tion of nanodevices.
The history of EU nanoregulation should be placed
in the context of biotechnology regulation, which
dates back to the establishment in 1991 of a European
Commission Group on Ethics in Science and Technol-
ogy. The Group was constituted to advise the Com-
mission on how to exercise its powers as regards the
ethical aspects of biotechnology. It noted in its general
report examples of embedded ethics into policy such
as the Science and Society Action Plan (2001), the
Action Plan Life Sciences and Technology (2007), as
well as legislative activities such as directives govern-
ing clinical trials, patents, data protection, the use of
animals in experimentation, and the EU Chemical,
Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Action
Plan (2009).10 The EGAIS (Ethical Governance of
Emerging Technologies) project, funded by the 7th
Framework Programme (Science in Society) for ex-
ample, has as its mission ‘to overcome the existent
limitations of the current approaches to ethical gover-
nance in projects with technical development’.11 The
European Commission’s Directorate-General and
Services involved in nanotechnology number over a
dozen, including 7 agencies for risk evaluation.12
EU awareness of nanotechnology issues began in
earnest in 2003, after discussion on potential risks by
the European Parliament’s Green Party, [36] and after
the publication of the 2001 National Nanotechnology
Initiative (NNI) in the USA. In terms of the EU’s
‘framework’ structures for funding research and
technological development, Framework Programme
6 (FP6) (2002–6) indicated that nanotechnology had
become a research priority, possibly stimulated by a
need to compete with the USA. FP6 was introduced
with policy objectives to enhance innovation, and to
‘change the European research landscape through the
introduction of the integrated European Research Area
(ERA), and create sustainable growth, increased em-
ployment and greater social cohesion’ [37].
The 3 EC Scientific Committees set up in 2004
were: SCCS (the Scientific Committee on Consumer
Safety), which oversees nanomaterials in consumer
products; SCER (the Scientific Committee on Health
and Environmental Risks), which looks at nanotech-
nology in food, as well as medical and environmental
issues, and SCENHIR (the European Commission’s
Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identi-
fied Health Risks), which looks at methodologies for
risk assessment of new technologies such as
nanotechnology.13
The EC’s Action Plan on Nanotechnology (2005),
as well as considering possible adverse effects on
health and the environment, also highlighted the eth-
ical issues of nanotechnology’s potential to contribute
towards the Millennium Development Goals. As well
as discussing public participation and education, the
Plan encouraged internationally cooperative work on
nanoregulation. In 2007, the European Commission
accepted the first implementation report (2005–2007)
of the Action Plan. The second implementation report
was adopted in 2009, with the statement that ‘efforts to
address societal and safety concerns must be contin-
ued to ensure the safe and sustainable development of
nanotechnology.’14
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies (EGE) set up in 1991, has a strictly
advisory role, with a global outlook rather than a
specifically EU one (Heemeren). The EGE’s 2006
Opinion 21 paper underlined ‘the vital importance of
addressing concern for safety with respect to … nano-
technology in general’. It advocated, in regards to
nanomedicine, the need to ‘establish measures to ver-
ify the safety of nanomedical products’, and issues of
military usage of nanotechnology, enhancement,
10 Retrieved 15 December 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/
european_group_ethics/docs/GAR%20EGE%202005-2010_
WEB.PDF.
11 Retrieved 15 December 2011 from http://www.egais-
project.eu>. EU ethics advising has seen (according to Cordis,
the EU’s information repository) an increased level of funding
allocated in terms of the EU’s 7th Framework Programmes
(2007–2011).
12 The full list can be seen at the following website: http://
ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/links_en.html.
13 Retrieved 18 December 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/health/
archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_
023.pdf.
14 Retrieved 18 December 2011 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri0COM:2009:0607:FIN:EN:PDF.
144 Nanoethics (2012) 6:137–150
Author's personal copy
economic equity and animal testing.15 The EGE group
has been referred to as ‘largely unknown’, however,
according to a public (admittedly global rather than
EU) survey.16 Another EU advisory group is ETAG,
The European Technology Assessment Group, which
runs projects on the potential environmental, health
and safety risks of engineered nanomaterials (such as
their project on chemical risk in 2006, and on human
enhancement in 2008–9).
The High Level Expert Group (HLEG) was con-
vened by the EC in 2010 to develop possible policy
measures to promote the industrial take-up of new
technologies by EU industries. The HLEG’s nanotech-
nology report suggests two views of convergence, one
implying mutually enabling technologies, and the oth-
er a culture of promotion of enhancement (Foresight-
ing: 2; de S. Cameron, [12]: 29). The interesting parts
of the HLEG document are its advocation of both
moral pluralism, and of the need for ethics to be an
intrinsic part of technological advances. Stating that
technological development must ‘harmonize with the
values of diversity, social justice, international securi-
ty, and environmental responsibility’, it recommends
preparation of an international ‘code of good
conduct’.17
The European Project NanoCode, a 2-year multi-
stakeholder dialogue providing input to the European
Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences &
Nanotechnologies Research commenced in January
2010, with the aims of monitoring stakeholder input
and suggesting revisions to this Code of Conduct (EU-
Coc).18 In 2011, its report on stakeholder attitudes
towards the Code concluded that awareness of the
code ‘was limited to a community of selected key
experts’ and was not ‘embedded in the everyday life’
of the large majority of researchers in Europe. The
report also concluded that few governments seemed
able to communicate the Code’s principles to
stakeholders effectively.19 An issue raised by stake-
holders has been that of the ‘lack of teeth’ of voluntary
codes such as this, which have not been widely adop-
ted—although some research institutions claim that
their own codes are sufficient. This raises the further
issue of whether the Code should be promoted as the
‘one and only’, or allowed to coexist with the institu-
tional guidelines. Suggestions on how to give the
Code some ‘teeth’ ranged from the development of
tailor-made codes i.e. specific for nano-companies, a
‘naming and blaming’ in case of non-compliance,
linking compliance to public funding, and incorpora-
tion of the Code into the EC Research Framework as a
guideline.
In 2008, the European Commission (Regulatory
Aspects of Nanomaterials) concluded that existing
EU regulatory frameworks covered in principle the
potential health, safety and environmental risks related
to nanomaterials, and stressed that the protection of
health, safety and the environment needed to be en-
hanced mainly by improving the implementation of
current legislation. In answer to this communication,
however, the European Parliament declared the EC’s
statement to be misleading and ‘one-dimensional’.20
Nanoethics (EU and the West)
Whereas nanoethics in China PR is an emerging field,
and still remains focused to a degree on toxicity risk,
Western commentators have a wider view of potential
NELSI issues. A 2008 summary of ‘nanorisks’— or
‘nanopportunities’, depending on one’s level of opti-
mism—include ownership of technology and account-
ability; privacy (increasingly undetectable nanoscale
devices); human enhancement, and public involve-
ment in technology development ([50]:17). Bennett-
Woods notes issues of human dignity and also of
fidelity, or competing loyalties—security versus priva-
cy or profit versus equity—as well as social justice,
military and security implications, and informed con-
sent to new technological ideas ([6]:5). Spagnolo and
15 Retrieved 18 December from http:/ /ec.europa.eu/
nanotechnology/pdf/swedish-presidency-event/martinho_de_
silva.pdf.
16 ‘Report on the European Commission’s Public Online Con-
sultation. Towards a Strategic Nanotechnology Action Plan
(SNAP) 2010–2015’, p. 4. Retrieved 18 December from http://
ec.europa.eu/research/consultations/snap/report_en.pdf.
17 Retrieved 18 December from http://www.ntu.no/2020/final_
report-en.pdf, p. 9, p. 54.
18 Retrieved 18 December from http://www.innovationsgesell-
schaft.ch/media/archive2/publikationen/nanocode-newsletter-
2.pdf.
19 Retrieved 18 December from http://www.nanocode.eu/files/
reports/nanocode/nanocode-consultation-synthesis-report.pdf
(p. 6).
20 European Parliament: Report on regulatory aspects of nano-
materials (2008/2208(INI)). Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Food Safety. A6-0255/2009. Retrieved 3
February, 2012 from http://nano.foe.org.au/node/329.
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Daloiso, arguing that nanomedicine is the most useful
application of nanotechnology, summarise ethical
issues as: toxicity, immunogenicity and biocompatibil-
ity, nanoparticle stability, human enhancement, priva-
cy and integrity, and the shift from patient-doctor
interaction to home-care technology used by the pa-
tient ([44]: 396). Schummer selects six areas of con-
cern, including the more speculative areas of the
increasing autonomy of machines, how nano should
be controlled (the ‘grey goo’ scenario), and of biomed-
ical application or enhancement. He also sees military
applications, health and environmental risks, and the
equity issue of developing countries, as well as the
issue of intellectual property rights [41]. New nano-
products may lead to a displacement of jobs and major
changes in trade balances between countries; manu-
facturing in countries with weaker controls and subse-
quently exported worldwide may increase risk, and
benefits may be unevenly distributed (leading to a
so-called ‘nanodivide’—[33]). More broadly, nano-
technology has been condemned for its potential to
advance Western consumerism; little research has
been aimed at products that might benefit the poor
[31].
The West shares with China PR a strong concern
however on toxicity risk. The effect of nanotoxins on
humans, animals and the environment have yet to be
determined, and laboratory studies have suggested
some physical damage through the inhalation of nano-
particles, leading to the fear that nanotech might po-
tentially be ‘the next asbestos’ ([2]:5). Nanoparticles
have been alleged to damage DNA, negatively affect
proteins, and cause cell death [28]. A study at the
University of Rochester found that when rats breathed
in nanoparticles, the particles settled in the brain and
lungs, which led to significant increases in biomarkers
for inflammation and stress response [8]. Mice studies
have also found that nanoscale titanium dioxide,
touted for use in many energy applications, can cause
genetic instability [47]. A 2-year study at UCLA’s
School of Public Health found laboratory mice con-
suming nano-titanium dioxide showed DNA and chro-
mosome damage [15]. Several types of engineered
nanomaterials including titanium dioxide and carbon
nanotubes are believed to produce pulmonary inflam-
mation and fibrosis in animals [42], and even brain
damage [35]. Nanoparticles may increase the risk of
strokes [16]. There is concern that carbon nanotubes
may potentially be ‘the next asbestos’ [2]. A further
issue is that of environmental damage, as there is no
clear view on how long nanoengineered materials may
last in landfill, for example. (The table in Appendix A
attempts to categorise these commonly agreed issues,
and the arguments pro and contra their benefit, indi-
cating the level of similarity between East and West.)
Public Participation in the EU
The UK government has stated that ‘properly targeted
and sufficiently resourced public dialogue will be cru-
cial in securing a future for nanotechnologies’ ([40]:
para. 80). There have been several EU projects
designed to increase public dialogue on the socio-
ethical concerns of nanotechnology, such as Nano-
logue (2005–6), aimed at the facilitation of a Europe-
wide dialogue among science, business and civil soci-
ety about its benefits and potential impacts, or
Nanobio-RAISE (2006–7) intended to bring together
nanobiotechnologists, ethicists and communication
specialists to anticipate and discuss societal and ethical
issues, or Nanoplat (2009), aimed at the ‘points of
intersection between the sphere of production on the
one hand and consumers on the other.21 The SNAP
global public consultation conducted from 18 Decem-
ber 2009 to 19 February 2010, concluded optimisti-
cally that, there was a’good or very good perception of
EU governance related to nanotechnologies in terms
of stakeholder consultation and setting research prior-
ities’ (SNAP: 4, 17), However, another EU project,
framingNano (2008–2010), noted greater uncertainty
about public acceptance of nanotechnology.
Individual EU members also have run dialogue
initiatives; for example, in The Netherlands, ‘Nan-
oNed’ allocates 15 % of its budget to research on
societal impact,22 while ‘Nanopodium’ (launched in
December 2009 in The Netherlands) has as its mission
the stimulation of public dialogue about the threats,
opportunities and applications of nanotechnology. In
Germany’s ‘NanoDialogue’, representatives from the
scientific world, the business community, environ-
mental, consumer and women’s associations, trade
21 Retrieved 18 December 2011 from http://nanobio-raise.org/
groups/editors/menus/main/activities/view; http://www.
nanoplat.org/?q0node/4.
22 Retrieved 18 December 2011 from http://www.nanoforu-
m.org/nf06~modul~showmore~folder~99999~scc~news~
scid~3743~.html?action0longview.
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unions, churches, ministries and authorities provide
input in to the public debate on the opportunities and
risks of using nanotechnologies.
However, despite the positive initiatives—and
many more—listed above, the 2009 reflection on the
seminal 2004 Royal Society report argued that more
needs to be done in the field of public engagement.
The report added that nanoparticles allegedly are be-
ing released into the environment and that in the view
of one collaborator on the updated report, there has
been no ‘meaningful change in regulatory practice or
social engagement in the UK’ ([5]: 5, 46).
Global Collaboration
…it is still necessary to set up a viable system
based on the precautionary principle.....since re-
search in the field of social and ethical evalua-
tion of nanotechnology developments in China
is not as advanced as in the USA and Europe,
cooperation is important to avoid making similar
mistakes and to promote the smooth develop-
ment of nanotechnology ([13]: 106).
The major achievement of the EU nanoadvisory
‘movement’ has been the establishment of standards
for working with nanomaterials. The CEN/TC 352
‘Nanotechnologies’ (established in 2005) to develop
a set of standards, and the 2006 EC establishment of
REACH—Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and
Restriction of Chemical Substances addressing the
following aspects of nanotechnologies: classification,
terminology and nomenclature; metrology and instru-
mentation, including specifications for reference mate-
rials; test methodologies; modelling and simulation;
science-based health, safety and environmental practi-
ces; and nanotechnology products and processes.23
The second major achievement is the 2009 Code of
Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotech-
nologies Research, described as follows:
The recently released Code…developed by the
European Commission is one code that is voluntary,
but which has originated in a political sphere and
which demands a higher level of accountability.…
the code seeks to intervene at an earlier stage in the
development cycle of nanotechnologies, embedding
principles of responsibility at the research stage.24
Given its recent focus on nanosafety, unsurprisingly
China PR has published 15 nanotechnology standards
since the establishment of its Committee of National
Nanotechnology Standards (2005), which dealt mainly
with risk assessment of nanoparticles. This focus
translated into its international work on the global
nanotechnology regulation bodies/projects, of which
there are 9 major ones, including REACH, already
mentioned above. The other 8 are: (1) the International
Council on Nanotechnology (ICON) [29]; (2) the Eu-
ropean Standards Committee (CEN/TC352) Nano-
technologies (set up with the aim of providing an
international standard)25; (3) the Globally Harmonised
Scheme for classification and labeling of substances
(GHS); and (4) the International Standards Organiza-
tion (ISO). The various ISO standards provide ways of
evaluating risk; they are primarily methodological
tools for industry players. However it should be noted
that the ISO has a member list of 162 countries,
including China, which has been involved in 707
standards—more than any other of the countries
listed.26 (China PR hosted ISO/TCC 229 in 2008 in
Shanghai).
The 5th is the International Council on Risk Gov-
ernance (IRGC), established in 2003, at the initiative
of the Swiss government; its Council has members
from 13 different countries, one of which is China.27
The final 3 are: The Commission on the Ethics of
Scientific Knowledge and Technology (UNESCO/
COMEST) and two OECD nanotechnology working
parties, WPN (the Working Party on Nanotechnolo-
gy), with a focus on governance, and WPMN (the
Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials), an
international forum for the further development of test
23 Retrieved 21 December from http://www.cen.eu/cen/Sectors/
Sectors/Nanotechnologies/Pages/default.aspx.
24 Retrieved 21 December from http://www.framingnano.eu/
index.php?option0com_content&task0view&id0147&Itemid01.
25 Retrieved 21 December from http://www.ecostandard.org/
downloads_a/cen-overview-std-nanotech-sept07.pdf; see point
2.1.1. It includes analysis of national standards bodies in the
EU, UK, North America, Japan, China, and Korea as well as
brief mention of international standards bodies such as the E56
Committee on Nanotechnology, which rather vaguely lists as
one of its activities ‘as the maintenance of appropriate global
liaison relationships with activities related to nanotechnology’.
26 http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members.htm
27 Retrieved 21 December from http://www.irgc.org/irgc/about_
irgc
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guidelines and strategies needed for the proper imple-
mentation of regulation.
The OECD and UNITAR jointly held Awareness-
Raising Workshops on Nanotechnology/Manufactured
Nanomaterials for Developing and Transition
Countries, held in Beijing, Abidjan, Lodz, Kingston,
and Alexandria. In addition to the formal structures
discussed briefly above, there have been international
dialogues such as that on the Responsible Research
and Development of Nanotechnology (established by
The European Commission in 2004), and the Meridian
Institute’s Global Dialogue on Nanotechnology and
the poor, which has resulted in a paper, a news service,
and two workshops (India and Brazil, 2006 and
2007).28
A November 2011 project on research methods for
managing the risk of engineered nanoparticles and
engineered nanomaterials, the MARINA project, un-
der FP 7 of the EC, will run for 4 years and involve the
collaboration of 47 different scientific and industrial
partners, including China PR.
There are also individual joint country agreements,
such as the 2002 EU/China co-operation agreement in
the field of material sciences. This agreement facili-
tates the participation of Chinese research organisa-
tions, including companies, in European research
projects with Chinese funding and vice versa. In ad-
dition, the EU and China have a joint agreement to
exchange data relating to safety testing in order to
boost research into consumer safety respective to
nanotechnology products.
China’s regulatory regime for the management of
nanotechnology chemicals will likely manage risks
comparable to those identified under the EU’s
REACH regulation, and in this context, in 2009, the
government revised the chemical substance rules in
order to incorporate risk assessment, risk management
and data submission requirements, similar to REACH
([25]:11–12).
Conclusion: The Nano Environment in China PR
Versus in the EU
Although there are obvious economic drivers behind
the development of nanotechnology in both countries,
the difference is in the degree of account taken of
public concern, and the greater emphasis on develop-
ment over social concerns in China PR. In the latter,
industry employs the label of ‘nano’ as a plus point
when advertising nanoproducts, whereas in Europe
there is concern about nanolabelling, as well as more
vocal consumer movements. However, the current
food debate in China may signify a turning point in
the perception of scientific development, and a need to
accelerate public debate. The focus in China is cur-
rently on the responsibility of the scientist; in the EU it
is on government accountability to the public—yet
one might risk the prediction here that ultimately this
will also become a governmental issue in China, since
individual responsibility alone cannot guide S&T
development.
Whereas the official debate on benefits and risks is
not markedly different in both areas, the public debate
in China PR lags behind the EU. This is partly due to
the fact that the public in China PR appears currently
more concerned about GM food, and also to a lack of
channels for public participation in China PR.
Yet public participation is globally seen as increas-
ingly integral to governmental decision making, par-
ticularly given the economic effects of product
boycotting, and China PR will arguably soon (and
perhaps already is in terms of GM food) face this
inevitable issue. The two regions are converging.
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